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ABSTRACT 
 
The research question central to the thesis is stated as follows: what are the implications of new technological 
phenomena in South African law to the existing legal frameworks in relation to (i) investigatory powers of law 
enforcement and security and intelligence agencies to obtain electronic evidence, and (ii) its subsequent 
admissibility in criminal proceedings? Written with an emphasis on South African law, but also taking into 
account aspects of foreign and international law, the thesis seeks to investigate how our existing legal frameworks 
which regulate the use of and access to electronic evidence in criminal proceedings, including its admissibility, 
integrate and adapt to challenges raised by new and rapidly changing technological developments.  
The thesis provides a critical analysis of the existing legal framework regulating certain key investigative powers 
of law enforcement and security and intelligence agencies in the current modern environment of the information 
age in which they operate. Key among them is the Regulation of Interception of Communications and Provision 
of Communication-Related Information Act 70 of 2002. New technology has not only increased opportunities for 
criminal activity, it has also created opportunities for law enforcement and security and intelligence agencies to 
have access to more sophisticated and new capabilities. The range of intrusive capabilities now available to law 
enforcement and security and intelligence agencies triggers a range of issues and challenges for individual rights, 
including how those capabilities are used in investigation activities, the scale of their use, the extent to which such 
capabilities intrude on privacy rights, legislative authority for their use and safeguards that constrain and regulate 
such new technological capabilities. The challenges of regulating investigative powers in an era of new and fast-
paced technological developments is explored in relation to (i) interception of communications (ii) acquisition 
and retention of communications data, and (iii) access to encrypted information.  
The introduction of electronic evidence in criminal legal proceedings raises unique challenges in the South African 
law on evidence. The most interesting perhaps is the extent to which the nature of the evidence presented, in this 
instance electronic evidence, impacts on admissibility in criminal proceedings. Potential anomalies arise as the 
relevant legislation, the Electronic Communications and Transactions Act 25 of 2002, is based on an electronic 
commerce model law concerned with commercial activities. In this regard, two separate issues are the focus of 
research interest. The thesis offers a rethinking of (a) admissibility of electronic evidence and (b) its weight. The 
meaning and application of certain statutory provisions, insofar as it applies to electronic evidence as hearsay or 
real evidence, or both, are key and controversial issues. Another relates to the business records exceptions, which 
directly translated for electronic records appears to have created a problematic presumption. On matters of 
evidential weight, there is no ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach that will work. While a robust consideration of 
authentication is required in the court’s assessment of evidential weight of electronic evidence, it should not be 
subject to inflexible tests that make it difficult for authentic electronic evidence to be admitted into evidence.  
A central premise of the thesis is that evolving technological phenomena can and do present challenges to existing 
legal concepts on evidence and the investigatory powers of law enforcement and the security and intelligence 
agencies to obtain electronic evidence and for its admissibility in criminal proceedings. This is done in the context 
of understanding whether South African law has developed appropriately in response to advancements in 
technology. In the final analysis, the thesis considers appropriate and meaningful reform towards a modern and 
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I RESEARCH QUESTION  
The research question central to the thesis is stated as follows: what are the implications of 
new technological phenomena in South African law and its challenges to the existing legal 
frameworks in relation to investigatory powers of law enforcement and security and 
intelligence agencies to obtain electronic evidence, and its subsequent admissibility in 
criminal proceedings? The thesis seeks to investigate how our existing legal frameworks 
which regulate the use of and access to electronic evidence in criminal proceedings, including 
its admissibility, integrate and adapt to challenges raised by new and rapidly changing 
technological developments.  
Written with an emphasis on South African law, but also considering certain 
jurisdictional aspects of international law, the thesis follows the temporal development of an 
investigation initiated by a suspicion of criminal activity, followed by an investigation, and 
thereafter by presentation of evidence at trial. Each chapter focuses on a type of investigative 
power: the investigative power is discussed critically to ascertain whether the law has  
developed appropriately to advancements in technology or in ways that are cause for concern. 
The thesis considers the challenges of continued technological advancements and complexity 
of electronic evidence by concentrating on certain key investigative powers of law 
enforcement and the security and intelligence agencies to obtain such evidence, whether 
obtained from third party telecommunication service providers, or from the victim or 
suspect/target of an investigation.  
Following the investigation, and having obtained what appears to be prima facie 
evidence of criminal activity, the next stage is prosecution and the process of presenting 
evidence to a court. Evidential issues have been central to many of the debates about the 
nature and medium of the evidence being presented. The most interesting perhaps is that of 
evidential exclusions, and the extent to which the nature of the evidence presented, in this 
instance electronic evidence, impacts on admissibility in criminal proceedings. Complex 
admissibility rules of evidence have historically existed to govern evidential exclusions, 
which may occur due to statutory provisions, through judicial determination in case law or 
through a combination based on statute and case law. In this regard, two separate issues are 
the focus of research interest: (a) admissibility of electronic evidence and (b) its weight. 
 
 2 
A consideration and analysis of these issues could be taken further in terms of 
understanding what the law could be. Introducing new laws, or amending existing ones, will 
only work to a certain extent. In the end, the law needs to be enforced in a modern fast-paced 
environment of technological advancements where, arguably, almost any criminal activity 
perpetrated today has an electronic element to it. In the final analysis, the thesis considers 
appropriate and meaningful reform towards a modern and transparent legal framework in 
South African law. 
 
II THE CHALLENGES OF REGULATING INVESTIGATORY POWERS AND 
ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE IN AN ERA OF EVOLVING TECHNOLOGICAL 
PHENOMENA 
The last two decades have witnessed rapid developments in technology resulting in 
extraordinary changes to the physical nature of computers, introduction of smart devices and 
mobile technology, including the proliferation of a modern global communications system, a 
range of applications and networked technology. Advancements in technology have 
revolutionised society and its ability to send, receive and now routinely store information in 
mostly electronic form. 1  These technological developments have also created new 
opportunities for crime. Perpetrators are increasingly using sophisticated techniques to evade 
detection and perpetrate serious and organised crime. Many of the features of modern 
technology such as low cost, ease of use and the potential of anonymity and pseudonymous 
activity make new technologies an appealing medium for committing and facilitating crime. 
With the use of technology in criminal activity, obtaining electronic evidence that can reside 
almost anywhere of criminal conduct poses different challenges and investigatory concerns 
when compared to obtaining conventional physical evidence. 
The ability of law enforcement and security and intelligence agencies to make 
progress in investigations in an increasingly internet-based communications environment 
raises concerns about the erosion of their capabilities by technological change.2 ‘We have to 
 
1 See F Cairncross The Death of Distance: How the Communications Revolution will Change our Lives (1997) 
and the author’s revised and updated version, The Death of Distance: How the Communications Revolution is 
Changing our Lives (2001) wherein ‘[t]he death of distance’ we are told ‘will probably be the single most 
important force in shaping society in the first half of the next century’.  
2 Home Office ‘Guidance Investigatory Powers Bill: Overarching documents’ (2015) available at https://www. 




enter the labyrinth to find them’3 has been quoted in reference to categories of websites, in 
particular the ‘dark net’ which offers sophisticated systems of anonymity beyond the reach of 
law enforcement: 
‘[I]t is quite clear that we have a pressing and, indeed, rising challenge to deal with highly 
encrypted communications online that are managed through the space of the darknet, which 
are effectively out of the reach of law enforcement authorities – not in every case, but in an 
increasing proportion of those cases. It is fair to say that the scope that the police have to 
monitor communications in the offline world is greater than it is in the online world. Given 
that a majority of those communications run by these networks are moving online, there is a 
security gap there. To what extent it should be plugged by the right and balanced legislation is 
for others to judge but I do think it is one of the most pressing problems that police face 
across Europe.’4 
In the era of the information age and a modern fast-paced environment of 
technological advancements, the nature of criminal threats evolves. This presents new 
challenges in respect of an appropriate balance between the needs of law enforcement and 
security and intelligence agencies in the disruption, detection and investigation of criminal 
activity and rights of individuals.5 Investigative tools and techniques have to be adapted to 
keep pace with technology in combatting these criminal threats. The exercise of investigative 
powers by law enforcement and the state and security agencies are by their very nature 
intrusive, and interfere with the rights of individuals, whether third parties such as 
telecommunication service providers, or the suspect/target of an investigation. Any 
disproportionate, or unfettered, use of such investigative powers can have consequences for 
individual rights.6  Invoking May’s cypherpunk manifesto of imagery of Internet criminals as 
the ‘four horseman of the apocalypse: drug-dealers, organised crime, terrorists and 
paedophiles’7 this thesis provides a critical analysis of existing legal frameworks regulating 
the investigative powers of law enforcement and security and intelligence agencies in the 
current modern environment of the information age in which they operate: 
 
3 Attributed to Sir Ian Lobban, then Director of the GCHQ quoted in D Anderson QC A question of trust: Report 
of the Investigative Powers Review (2015) Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation at 48 available at 
www.gov.uk/government/publications, accessed 17 May 2016.  
4 Attributed to R Wainwright, then Director of Europol, quoted in Anderson op cit note 3 at 48.  
5 I Walden Computer Crimes and Digital Investigations (2007) at 204.  
6 United Kingdom Interception of communications in the United Kingdom: A consultation paper (Cm 4368, 
1999) 1. 
7 TC May ‘The cyphernomicon’ (1994) 8.3.4 available at https://groups.csail.mit.edu/mac/classes/6.805/article 
s/crypto/cypherpunks/cyphernomicon/CP-FAQ, accessed on 20 May 2016. 
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 ‘Modern communications networks can be used by the unscrupulous for purposes ranging 
from cyber-attack, terrorism and espionage to fraud, kidnap and child sexual exploitation. A 
successful response to these threats depends on entrusting public bodies with the powers they 
need to identify and follow suspects in a borderless online world. But trust requires 
verification. Each intrusive power must be shown to be necessary, clearly spelled out in law, 
limited in accordance with international human rights standards and subject to demanding and 
visible safeguards.’8 
As new technologies and new capabilities become more prevalent in the information 
age, new opportunities exist for these new technologies to be exploited by criminal elements. 
One result of this is that the investigation of many traditional (offline) criminal offences will 
now involve electronic evidence. 9  This thesis is not about cybercrime offences, now 
increasingly recognised as a distinct branch of criminal law. 10  The issues of criminal 
procedure and evidence examined in this thesis are not limited to cybercrimes, but are 
relevant to almost any type of criminal activity. A number of academic texts have explored 
core concepts of cybercrime and the numerous ways in which criminal activity could be 
facilitated by technology.11 While this is not the place for identifying cybercrimes, albeit a 
phenomenon that is not easy to define, or for adopting a classification that appropriately 
determines when a crime is or is not a cybercrime, it is a necessary and useful starting point. 
Key in the analysis of the core concepts of cybercrimes is the recognition that many 
cybercrimes are arguably traditional crimes, whereby technology facilitates or is an incidental 
aspect of the principal traditional crime but in a way that technology may afford evidence of 
it. 12  In the modern environment of technological advancements that have revolutionised 
mobile and communication technologies, arguably almost any criminal activity perpetrated 
has an electronic element to it. 13  Therefore, whilst the principal crime may not be a 
 
8 D Anderson ‘Statement by the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation on publication of the report of the 
Investigatory Powers Review (A question of trust)’ (2015) available at https://terrorismlegislationreviewer.inde 
pendent.gov.uk/wp…/IPR-Press-Release.docx, accessed on 20 May 2016. 
9 AA Gillespie Cybercrime: Key Issue and Debates (2019) at 333. 
10  Ibid at vii. 
11 Ibid at 13. See M Wasik Crime and the Computer (1991); B Sandywell ‘On globalisation of crime: the 
internet and new criminality’ in Y Jewkes & M Yar Handbook in Internet Crime (2010) 38-66; D Wall 
‘Cybercrimes and the Internet’ in D Wall (ed) Crime and the Internet (2001) 3-7; M Yar ‘E-crime 2.0: The 
criminological landscape of social media’ (2012) 21 Information & Communications Technology Law 207-219, 
AM Weber ‘The Council of Europe’s Convention on Cybercrime’ (2003) 18 Berkley Technology Law Journal 
425-466. 





cybercrime per se, it is likely that most investigations in the information age will involve 
having access to electronic evidence in what would appear to be ‘traditional crimes’. 
In the last decade, communications technology have undergone significant 
advancements and continues to evolve at an unprecedented level. Evolving communications 
technology is now central to the way we interact, both socially and commercially. 
Communications technologies, such as the Internet, mobile smartphones and WiFi enabled 
devices, have become part of daily life with major developments including wireless email, 
instant messaging and social networking as central modes of communication. Such 
developments also brings together various and different forms of communication (mobile 
calls, emails, internet, instant messaging, social media access, banking, shopping, and so 
forth) to a single device ‘that is both mobile and Internet enabled.’14 There are now in excess 
of one trillion websites providing instantaneous access to a diverse range of information and 
services, with more than 4.54 billion Internet users as of January 2020.15 With almost 2.5 
billion monthly active users as of the fourth quarter of 2019, Facebook is the biggest social 
network worldwide.16 The video-sharing platform YouTube is just as impressive: ‘over 2 
billion logged-in users visit YouTube each month and daily users watch over a billion hours 
of video and generate billions of views.’17 The extent of content generated is unprecedented 
in terms of the degree of detailed information that can be gathered and stored. With almost 
real-time access to information and communications providing instant and ‘now’ means of 
interaction,18 innovations in communications technology is such that modern life is portrayed 
increasingly online, as the Internet has become both pervasive and increasingly intimate of 
peoples’ lives.19 
This thesis is deliberately titled ‘electronic evidence’. It is necessary to understand the 
context of the term. When criminal activity is perpetrated, the ability of law enforcement and 
the state and security agencies to prosecute those involved is guided, to an extent, by the 
 
14 Media Policy and Democracy Project The surveillance state: Communications surveillance and privacy in 
South Africa (March 2016) available at http://www.mediaanddemocracy.com/uploads/1/6/5/7/16577624/sa_ 
surveillancestate-web.pdf, accessed 05 January 2017. 
15 ‘Global digital population as of January 2020’ available at https://www.statista.com/statistics/617136/digital-
population-worldwide/, accessed 11 March 2020. 
16 ‘Number of monthly active Facebook users worldwide as of 4th quarter 2019 (in millions)’ available at 
https://www.statista.com/statistics/264810/number-of-monthly-active-facebook-users-worldwide/, accessed 11 
March 2020.  
17 Available at https://www.youtube.com/yt/press/statistics.html, accessed 11 March 2020. 
18 T Pistorius ‘Monitoring, interception and big boss in the workplace: is the devil in the details?’ (2009) 12.1 
PER available at http://www.saflii.org/za/journals/PER/2009/1.html, accessed 05 January 2017. 
19 Human Rights Council ‘The right to privacy in the digital age’ A/HRC/27/37 (30 June 2014) available at 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/RegularSessions/Session27/Documents/A.HRC.27.37_en.pdf, 
accessed 04 January 2016. 
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availability and access to information across a range of  contexts, including, the gathering of 
intelligence, access to obtaining evidence, analysis thereof and subsequent presentation in 
criminal proceedings. 20  In the investigation process, particular techniques, or use of 
investigative powers, at different stages in an investigation are generally subdivide into 
covert (interception and surveillance) or coercive techniques (search and seizure).21 New and 
evolving technologies, whether through latest devices or software applications, are capable of 
creating a trail of electronic evidence that can originate from a variety of sources and 
geographies. In the event of a criminal investigation, devices and information will need to be 
accessed and examined. In recent times as ease of Internet connectivity and mobile 
technologies came to prominence, it was realised that the information accompanying a 
communication between individuals could be useful to identify persons of interest to be 
placed under surveillance, or to establish evidential relationships between persons of 
interest.22 For example: 
A robbery was perpetrated at the premises of Company X and items of considerable value 
were stolen. For the purposes of the investigation that is to take place, the disclosure of the 
information sought, in this instance information from cell towers servicing the area in which 
the premises is located, may well provide identifying markers or particulars of persons of 
interest. These include call/messaging information (date, duration and time of all calls or 
messages made and received) or geolocation information of the device when it was used (by 
analysing their logs and using triangulation techniques to determine the general location of 
the device at the time of a call/message) or internet browsing information for a particular 
device. An examination of this information identifies C and D as suspects/target of the 
investigation. C and D deny knowing each other and being involved in the robbery. Analysis 
of information from the cell towers triangulate C and D’s location together to early hours of 
the morning in the vicinity of where the robbery took place, and also reveal that a history of 
calls/messaging between them.23 
It is possible to identify some characteristics of electronic evidence and, in particular, 
the challenges it can pose to the law: (a) scale—potential number of victims and 
suspects/target of an investigation is huge; (b) quantity—a particular issue with electronic 
evidence is volume and likelihood that most individuals use more than one device, with 
personal storage devices in the terabytes now being considered commonplace;  
 
20 See Walden op cite note 5 at 203-295.  
21 Ibid at 203-04.  
22 Gillespie op cite note 9 at 337.  
23 Based on Nampak (Pty) Ltd v Vodacom (Pty) Ltd and Others 2019 (1) SA 257 (GJ). 
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(c) anonymity—referred to as the ‘identity’ problem such that anonymous or undetectable 
communications are becoming more widespread; (d) accessibility—technology is making it 
more difficult to locate the evidence because of the use of encryption/password systems;  
(e) deletion and destruction—electronic information and data is extremely volatile and 
susceptible to claims to fabrication and manipulation.24 
In South Africa, legislation governing the use of investigative powers by law 
enforcement, including security and intelligence agencies, is covered by a number of statutes, 
key among them is the Regulation of Interception of Communications and Provision of 
Communication-Related Information Act 70 of 2002.25 A central premise of the thesis is that 
evolving technological phenomena can and do present challenges to existing legal concepts 
on evidence and the powers of law enforcement and the security and intelligence agencies to 
obtain electronic evidence and its admissibility in criminal proceedings. This is done in the 
context of understanding whether South African law has developed appropriately in response 
to advancements in technology. 
As to matters of evidence, courts are increasingly presented with evidence that 
originates from a variety of sources which raises a number of evidential concerns. A 
particular challenge facing proponents of electronic evidence in court proceedings, as often 
referenced by the South African courts, relate to concerns with electronic evidence by virtue 
of the nature of its medium. This is primarily due to the intangible and often transient nature 
of electronic data, where such data can be created, stored, copied and transmitted with 
relative ease. It can also be easily modified or tampered without obvious signs of changes 
made, thereby rendering the process of investigation and recording of evidence extremely 
vulnerable to claims of errors, accidental alteration, prejudicial interference or fabrication.26  
In S v Ndiki and Others, 27 a case that involved admissibility of computer generated printouts, 
it was stated: ‘Finally, in dealing with computer evidence it must be recognised that 
computers are not infallible and that the dangers inherent in this type of evidence must be 
acknowledged and the necessary safeguards put in place.’ 28  Many of the earlier held 
 
24 Gillespie op cit note 9 at 14 and 333-35. 
25 Hereafter ‘RICA 2002’. 
26 C Tapper ‘Evanescent evidence’ (1993) 1.1 International Journal of Law and Information Technology 35;  
I Walden ‘Computer crime’ in C Reed & J Angel (eds) Computer Law 5ed (2003) at 295. 
27 2008 (2) SACR 252 (Ck). 
28 Supra note 27 at 270. 
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assumptions that a computer is just like a ‘compact filing cabinet’ or that electronic 
documents are just like the paper equivalent no longer hold true.29 
The admissibility of electronic evidence in criminal proceedings is regulated by the 
provisions of various sources of law, including the Electronic Communications and 
Transactions Act 25 of 2002,30 the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 and the common law. 
The desirability of the current legal framework in this regard has raised a number of 
admissibility issues in relation to hearsay and authenticity.31 Indeed, on matters of evidence 
and challenges to the admissibility of electronic evidence, should such evidence be exempt 
from the evidential rules regulating hearsay? Having regard to the nature and characteristics 
of electronic evidence, including legitimate concerns about its reliability and authenticity, 
should stricter standards for admissibility, generally, and in the context of evidential weight, 
apply to electronic evidence as a ‘new species of evidence’ with a whole new body of 
evidence law specific to its use? 
 
III THESIS STRUCTURE 
The thesis is divided into five main chapters, and the content of each is briefly set out below. 
Chapter one will place the rest of the thesis into context. In doing so it considers what is 
meant by the information age and a modern fast-paced environment of technological 
advancements referred to throughout the thesis and as the setting in which the law operates. 
Part II introduces the information age and examples in recent advancements in technology 
that underlie key debates on legislative reform considered in the thesis. Part III presents 
perspectives on the right to privacy in the information age. Part IV briefly introduces key 
legislation which will be considered in this thesis, namely RICA 2002 and the ECT Act 25 of 
2002 and the issues informing the analysis.  
The thesis seeks to understand the implications of new technology and new 
capabilities in the information age in the context of the investigative powers of law 
enforcement and the state and security agencies. Chapters 2, 3 and 4 examine the regulatory 
framework governing the processes for obtaining electronic evidence in criminal 
 
29 P Sommer ‘Computer forensics: An introduction’ available at http://www.virtualcity.co.uk/vcaforens.htm at 
62, accessed on 16 May 2016. 
30 Hereafter ‘ECT Act 2002’. 
31 S v Harper 1981(1) SA 88 (D); S v De Villiers 1993 (1) SACR 574 (Nm); S v Mashiyi and Another 2002 (2) 
SACR 387 (Tk); Ndlovu v Minister of Correctional Service and Another [2006] 4 All SA 165 (W); S v Ndiki 
and Others 2008 (2) SACR 252 (Ck). 
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investigations. They generally divide into three mechanisms: (a) interception of 
communications; (b) obtaining evidence from third party telecommunication service 
providers; and (c) obtaining evidence from a suspect/target of an investigation. Each 
mechanism is governed by legal frameworks that present unique issues to evolving 
technological phenomena. Understandably, the issues discussed in chapters 2,3 and 4 can 
overlap. A key argument in the analysis of these mechanisms for obtaining electronic 
evidence in criminal proceedings is that, despite widespread innovations in policy and 
technology globally, South African domestic legislation remains out-dated, especially its 
safeguards as ‘technological innovations makes even more new and diverse forms of 
communication surveillance possible.’32  
Chapter two is about interception of communications. After the Part 1 introduction, 
the chapter will explore, in Part II, the legal framework for interception in RICA 2000 
including circumstances in which lawful interception can take place, authorisation procedures 
and the protection of privacy interests through prohibiting unlawful interceptions. Part III 
deals with existing challenges in the legal framework of RICA 2002. The key challenges 
identified are twofold: (a) the scope and breadth of investigative powers by law enforcement 
and the security and intelligence agencies; being (b) unconstrained by out-dated legislative 
frameworks that have expanded the scope of their activities and the extent of their 
capabilities in an information age of innovations in technology. The RICA 2002 has been the 
subject of legal challenge and Part IV considers the future of interception of communications 
in South Africa. A conclusion is drawn in Part V. 
Chapter three is about communications data. Part II begins with an analysis of the 
obligations of telecommunication service providers in RICA 2002 with regard to mandatory 
data retention. This is followed by an examination of the investigatory powers of law 
enforcement and security and intelligence agencies to acquire communications data. The key 
issues identified relate to the process of authorising the acquisition of communications data, 
procedures in RICA 2002 for storing, accessing, examining, using and destroying the 
communications data. Completing the analysis is a consideration of s 205 of the Criminal 
Procedure Act 25 of 1977 as a parallel process for law enforcement and security and 
intelligence agencies to obtain communications data from third party telecommunication 
service providers. Part III concludes the chapter. 
 
32 Walden op cite note 5 at 179. 
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Chapter four is about compelled decryption. Part II is an overview of the powers of 
law enforcement and security and intelligence agencies to compel decryption. RICA 2002 
compels (a) disclosure of the decryption key; or (b) provision of decryption assistance to 
obtain access to the encrypted information or to put that encrypted information in an 
intelligible form. Part III considers certain legal issues that may arise in relation to compelled 
decryption. These powers anticipate, at the very least, that the potential disclosure of 
information may incriminate the suspect/target to whom a compelled decryption order is 
directed. Applying the constitutional law framework on the right against self-incrimination, 
two distinct issues arise with regard to compelled disclosure and modern technology: (a) 
compelled disclosure of a user’s passcode (reveal/enter the passcode); and (b) compelled 
entry of a biometric based information (by placing a finger on a device or by facial 
recognition). In the analysis, a nuanced understanding of the interaction between modern 
technology and legal doctrine will be integral in the development of doctrinal principles that 
involve ‘reveal-the-passcode’, ‘use-a-fingerprint-or-facial-recognition’, ‘enter-the-passcode’ 
or ‘produce-the- decrypted-data’ scenarios. Part IV considers the development of a doctrinal 
approach in South African law. Part V is the conclusion. 
Chapter five shifts focus to the evidentiary aspects in relation to the admissibility of 
electronic evidence. The introduction of electronic evidence in criminal legal proceedings 
raises unique challenges in the South African law on evidence. This chapter identifies two 
separate issues in this regard: (i) admissibility of electronic evidence and (ii) its weight. In 
doing so an analysis of relevant provisions the ECT Act 25 2002 are considered. Part II is 
about the ECT Act 2002 and its provisions on admissibility and evidential weight of 
electronic evidence. Part III considers electronic evidence in the context of the exclusionary 
rule on hearsay and real evidence. Part IV considers the evidential weight of electronic 
evidence and new rules on the business records exception, including authenticity and 
integrity. Part V completes the chapter with concluding remarks on rethinking admissibility 
and evidential weight of electronic evidence in the information era. 
In the final analysis, the conclusion chapter of the thesis considers appropriate and 
significant proposals for change towards a modern and transparent legal framework in South 
African law. In doing so, it is hoped that my contribution to the legal landscape and debates 
about far-reaching and long term developments in the law of criminal procedure and evidence 
in the outcomes of the thesis research, is a better understanding of the challenges and 
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complexities of regulating investigatory powers and electronic evidence in an era of evolving 
technological phenomena. 
 
IV RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
In terms of methodology, the thesis is primarily concerned with the law of criminal evidence 
and procedure in South Africa from a theoretical perspective. While it is beyond the scope of 
the thesis to conduct a comprehensive comparative study of electronic evidence in criminal 
proceedings and subsidiary research areas, reference will be made to other jurisdictions 
where relevant to the analysis undertaken, either as a basis for critically assessing the 
approach in South African law or as a starting point for discussion on issues where South 
African law has yet to develop. Various legal sources will be used to critically consider the 
South African position including, case law, books, journal articles, white papers, legislation, 
and the common law. Where applicable, the thesis shall refer to comparative jurisprudence,  
to draw on key lessons, especially where such jurisprudence demonstrates a very different 
approach to the position in South Africa law. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
THE WORLD IN AN INFORMATION AGE 
 
I INTRODUCTION 
This chapter will place the rest of the thesis into context. It is necessary to consider what is 
meant by the information age and a modern fast-paced environment of technological 
advancements referred to throughout the thesis, and as the setting in which the law operates. 
Part II introduces the information age and provides examples of recent advancements in 
technology that underlie key debates on legislative reform considered in the thesis. Part III 
presents perspectives on the right to privacy in the information age. Part IV briefly introduces 
key legislation which will be considered in this thesis, namely the: (a) Regulation of 
Interception of Communications and Provision of Communication-Related Information Act 70 
of 2002, and (b) Electronic Communications and Transactions Act 25 of 2002. 
 
II THE INFORMATION AGE 
(a) New technology, new capabilities: connectivity, devices and data 
We live in the information age.1 This refers to a period in human history beginning in the 20th 
century characterised by the rapid shift from traditional industrial production to one primarily 
based upon information technology, computerisation and an era marked by rapid adoption of 
new technologies.2 A recently expressed view is that when the history of the information age 
is written, 2019 will be heralded as a ‘landmark year where innovation was rife.’3 This is 
undoubtedly true. The world as we live in has experienced in recent years new technologies 
from artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning to blockchain and the Internet of Things 
(IoT). New digital technologies are having a major impact on our lives and transforming the 
way we live and work – and that impact will only grow in 2020 and beyond. After all, new 
technology, albeit in different forms, have preceded almost every generation just ‘as the 
 
1 Also known as the ‘computer age’, ‘digital age’ or ‘new media age’. 
2 See ‘Information age’ available at https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Information_Age, accessed 17 February 2020. 
3 ‘The top five trends for digital transformation in 2020’ available at https://www.information-age.com/top-5-tr 
ends-digital-transformation-2020-123469909/, accessed 17 February 2020. 
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telegraph gave way to the telephone, the stagecoach gave way to the automobile, and the 
typewriter gave way to the wordprocessor.’4  
A significant example of the result of a combination of continued advanced 
technologies in the information age is IoT. In its simplest sense, IoT is a concept that is about 
connectivity, devices and data. IoT refers to a system of interrelated computing devices 
connecting to the Internet, with the ability to gather and share information without human-
computer intervention. The combination of technologies that IoT contains and make it work is 
often referred to as ‘smart’ technologies. These smart technologies include new platforms such 
as advanced analytics, 5G networks, sensor tech devices and edge computing. Examples of IoT 
in the form of sensor tech devices (smart devices) range from the simplest consumer centric to 
industrial based devices that provide (a) real-time insights and the ability to store reams of data 
that is being recorded, and (b) the ability to efficiently and quickly process that stored data in 
order to create actionable insights out of it. Common examples of IoT technology for the 
consumer include smart speakers, the most popular of which is the Amazon Alexa5 capable of 
home automation (lighting/heating controls), voice interaction, ordering take-out food, 
streaming services, delivering messages and making calls, playing audiobooks, and providing 
real-time information such as weather, traffic news and sports. A popular IoT technology in 
the midst of energy challenges resulting in almost daily electricity blackouts in South Africa, 
is the smart sense energy monitor.6 The device provides in-depth insight into how energy is 
being used in a home, automatically tracks electricity usage and lets the user know which 
appliances are hogging up power. 
IoT and connectivity are growing rapidly. Statistics reveal that there are 26.6 billion 
IoT devices in the world as at August 2019, and there are expected to be over 65 billion IoT 
devices worldwide by 2025, with consumers now connected more than ever, such that 127 IoT 
devices connect to the Internet every second.7 A perusal of IoT technology on the market now 
makes the most mundane of home chores exciting and automated. In the year 2020 information 
age, advanced applications IoT technology are being tested in the automotive industry and are 
 
4 F Galves ‘Where the not-so-wild things are: Computers in the courtroom – The Federal Rules of Evidence and 
the need for institutional reform and more judicial acceptance’ (2000) 12 Harvard JL Technology 165 at 300. 
5 Available at https://www.amazon.com/Amazon-Echo-And-Alexa-Devices/b?ie=UTF8&node=9818047011, 
accessed 17 February 2020. 
6 Available at https://www.amazon.com/Sense-Energy-Monitor-Electricity-Usage/dp/B075K6PHJ9, accessed 17 
February 2020. 
7 ‘Internet of Things statistics 2020 [The rise of IoT] available at https://techjury.net/stats-about/internet-of-
things-statistics/#gref, accessed 17 February 2020. 
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likely to soon lead us into the future of automatous driving in the form of fully capable, IoT-
intelligent self-driving autonomous cars.8 
Technology promises an exciting journey in the information age. Are there any serious 
concerns? There are security and privacy challenges and concerns about how potential 
vulnerabilities might allow cybercrime to take place. If no security, such as anti-hacking 
software, was applied in the design stage of IoT devices could these devices be hacked and 
used to facilitate criminal activity? Potentially, yes. Arguably IoT technology could provide 
greater opportunities for technology facilitated criminal activity.9 Dunlap suggests that hackers 
actively exploit weaknesses in IoT security not to attack the devices themselves, but as an entry 
point to a network for all kinds of malicious behaviour, such as distributed denial-of-service 
attacks, malware distribution, spamming and phishing, click fraud, and credit card information 
theft.10 IoT technology can potentially be used to perpetrate more traditional (offline) offences, 
such as robbery or burglary. Examples relate to smart surveillance devices or smart automation 
technology popular in many homes. Smart thermostats (for controlling heat/cooling and 
automatically turn off when occupants are away), smart baby monitors11 and smart wireless 
cameras, which if hacked could potentially reveal occupant movements, allowing perpetrators 
to watch for when a house is empty and the opportunity to burgle the premises. It is clear that 
as the IoT ecosystem expands, new levels of security and privacy provisions will be needed. 
 
(b) Evolving methods of communication  
A particular issue with electronic evidence in the information age is the sheer volume of 
electronic information and data. The information age quite literally is about ‘information’ in 
the form of zeros and ones, which has ‘become a commodity that is quickly and widely 
disseminated and easily available especially through the use of computer technology.’12 In the 
information age, the growth of wireless connectivity, communication and mobile technologies 
have revolutionised the way to connect to the Internet, with an almost instantaneous ability to 
 
8 ‘Internet of Things (IoT) and AI self-driving cars’ available at https://www.aitrends.com/ai-insider/internet-of-
things-iot-and-ai-self-driving-cars/, accessed 17 February 2020. 
9 AA Gillespie Cybercrime: Key issues and debates (2019) at 8. 
10 T Dunlap ‘Unsecured IoT: 8 ways hackers exploit firmware vulnerabilities’ (2019) available at https://www. 
darkreading.com/risk/unsecured-iot-8-ways-hackers-exploit-firmware-vulnerabilities/a/d-id/1335564, accessed 
17 February 2020. 
11 ‘Internet of babies–When baby monitors fail to be smart’ (2018) available at https://sec-consult.com/en/blog 
/2018/02/ internet-of-babies-when-baby-monitors-fail-to-be-smart, accessed 17 February 2020. 
12 Available at https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/Information%20Age, accessed 17 February 2020. 
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send, receive and now routinely store information in mostly electronic form. Mobile 
technology and associated devices have evolved as rapidly as computers in the last two 
decades. In today’s information age, mobile phones, now often referred to as smart phones, no 
longer lead with their traditional feature of being able make/receive telephone calls with short 
message services. With the development of touch screen technology, mobile technologies have 
revolutionised connectivity and communication. Mobile technology now means the ability to 
access the Internet, almost anywhere, and in public places such as malls, airports, and hotels. 
Mobile phone contracts by telecommunication service providers are now dominated, not by 
call minutes and short message service (SMS) bundles, but by data bundles and smart phone 
devices where for many the ability to make/receive telephone calls is perhaps one of the least 
used functions of the device. 13  User interaction is now predominantly through software 
applications and social media platforms. In the year 2020 information age, the landline 
telephone has given way to smartphone devices, postal letters to email communications, instant 
messaging, video calls and social networking sites. Voice calls and traditional methods of SMS 
texts have now been overtaken by instant messaging applications, social network 
communication, all of which allow both voice and video calls.     
In terms of a recent compilation of the latest global social media statistics of consumer 
adoption and usage in 2019, the number of internet users worldwide in 2019 was 4.388 billion, 
the number of social media users worldwide in 2019 was 3.484 billion, the number of mobile 
phone users in 2019 was 5.112 billion.14 Similarly for instant messaging applications, there are 
1.6 billion active users, ‘WhatsApp’ is number one among instant messaging applications, 
followed closely by ‘Facebook Messenger’ with 1.3 billion users and the Chinese instant 
messaging application ‘WeChat’ with 1.1 billion users. This is followed by ‘Instagram’ with 
one billion users and the Chinese ‘QQ’ with over 800 million active users.15 Many of these 
applications are accessed through smartphone devices, which as standalone devices are also 
capable of providing detailed information on user movements and geographic locations:  
‘Mobile application software on a cell phone, or “apps,” offer a range of tools for managing 
detailed information about all aspects of a person’s life. There are apps for Democratic Party 
news and Republican Party news; apps for alcohol, drug, and gambling addictions; apps for 
 
13 Gillespie op cit note 9 at 4-6. 
14 D Chaffey ‘Global social media research summary 2019’ available at https://www.smartinsights.com/social-
media-marketing/social-media-strategy/new-global-social-media-research/, accessed 04 August 2019. 
15  B Bucher ‘WhatsApp, WeChat and Facebook messenger apps – Global messenger usage, penetration and 
statistics’ available at https://www.messengerpeople.com/global-messenger-usage-statistics/, accessed 04 
August 2019. 
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sharing prayer requests; apps for tracking pregnancy symptoms; apps for planning your budget; 
apps for every conceivable hobby or pastime; apps for improving your romantic life. There are 
popular apps for buying or selling just about anything, and the records of such transactions may 
be accessible on the phone indefinitely. There are over a million apps available in each of the 
two major app stores; the phrase “there’s an app for that” is now part of the popular lexicon. 
The average smart phone user has installed 33 apps, which together can form a revealing 
montage of the user’s life.’16  
New technology has not only increased opportunities for criminal activity, it has also 
created opportunities for law enforcement and security and intelligence agencies to have access 
to more sophisticated and new capabilities.17 The range of intrusive capabilities now available 
to law enforcement and security and intelligence agencies triggers a range of issues and 
challenges for individual rights, including how those capabilities are used in investigation 
activities, the scale of their use, the extent to which such capabilities intrude on privacy rights, 
legislative authority for their use and safeguards that constrain and regulate such new 
technological capabilities.18 These include intrusive capabilities known as ‘IMSI catchers’, a 
device that enables interception capabilities in relation to mobile phone devices. There are also 
applications that reveal location history and allow the tracking of mobile phone devices. 
Beyond these intrusive capabilities, a simple search of information and digital contents on a 
smartphone device can in itself be quite revealing. Different technologies, whether through 
devices or software applications, are capable of creating a trail of electronic evidence that can 
originate from a variety of sources and geographies: 
‘[This] means that almost everything anybody does on a device that is connected to a network 
is capable of being distributed and duplicated with ease. As a result, the same item of digital 
data can reside almost anywhere. The ramifications for lawyers and police officers are obvious: 
the relevant document may be available, but it might not be clear where it resides. This affects 
how a criminal investigation is conducted….’19 
Riley v California (US) 20 provides useful insights into evolving methods of 
communication in the information era, and has been described as a ‘helpful reminder’ of 
 
16 Riley v California 573 U.S. ___ (more) 134 S. Ct. 2473; 189 L. Ed. 2d 430 at 20. 
17 D Anderson QC A question of trust report of the Investigative Powers Review (2015) Independent Reviewer 
of Terrorism Legislation available at www.gov.uk/government/publications, accessed 17 May 2016 at 68-70. 
18 Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament Privacy and security: A modern and transparent legal 
framework (12 March 2015) at 11 available at https://www.pdpjournals.com/docs/88433.pdf, accessed 08 
August 2019. 
19 S Mason ‘The characteristics of electronic evidence’ in S Mason (ed) Electronic Evidence: Disclosure, 
Discovery and Admissibility 1ed (2007) 21 at 33. 
20 Supra note 16. 
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technology as it now exists and the need for the law to keep pace ‘both in the interests of 
national security and the protection of the public, and in the interests of the civil liberties of 
individuals.’21 Riley was stopped by police for a traffic violation, which subsequently led to 
his arrest on charges of possession of concealed and loaded firearms. Incident to his arrest on 
weapons charges, police searched Riley’s and seized a smartphone device from his trousers’ 
pocket. The police accessed the device’s information and digital contents. As a result thereof, 
based in part on videos and photographs on the smartphone, Riley was charged in connection 
with a shooting incident that had taken place a few weeks earlier. In the second case 
consolidated for review, another petitioner Wurie, was arrested by police after being involved 
in an apparent drug sale. Following Wurie’s arrest, two mobile phones were seized from his 
person. The police accessed the mobile phone and, from call logs of repeated calls to the mobile 
phone, traced the phone number to an address suspected to be Wurie’s apartment. In the 
execution of a search warrant, police found drugs, a firearm and ammunition. Wurie was 
subsequently charged with drugs and firearm related offences. The United States Supreme 
Court was presented with a Fourth Amendment issue of whether the police may, without a 
warrant, search information and digital contents on a mobile phone that was seized during the 
course of an arrest. 
In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court held that police generally require a warrant 
in order to search mobile phones, even when it occurs during an otherwise lawful arrest. 
Debunking earlier held assumptions and analogies between physical records and digital data 
as being ‘materially indistinguishable’, Roberts CJ explained that analogising the search of 
data on a mobile phone to a search of physical items is akin to ‘saying a ride on horseback is 
materially indistinguishable from a flight to the moon. Both are ways of getting from Point A 
to Point B but little else justified lumping them together.’22 Roberts CJ observed that mobile 
phone devices ‘differ in both a quantitative and a qualitative sense’ from other types of objects 
kept on an arrested person. Such a device, he noted, ‘is itself misleading’ because they 
effectively operate as ‘minicomputers that also happen to have the capacity to be used as a 
telephone’ with ‘one of the most notable distinguishing features’ being ‘their immense storage 
 
21 The Queen (on Application of National Council for Civil Liberties (Liberty) v Secretary of State for the Home 
Department and Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs [2019] EWHC 2057 (Admin) para 
200.  
22 Supra note 16 at 16-17. 
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capacity.’23 He continued that the storage capacity of modern cell phones have a number of 
consequences for privacy: 
‘First, a cell phone collects in one place many distinct types of information – an address, a note, 
a prescription, a bank statement, a video – that reveal much more in combination than any 
isolated record. Second, a cell phone’s capacity allows even just one type of information to 
convey far more than previously possible. The sum of an individual’s private life can be 
reconstructed through a thousand photographs labeled with dates, locations, and descriptions; 
the same cannot be said of a photograph or two of loved ones tucked into a wallet. Third, the 
data on a phone can date back to the purchase of the phone, or even earlier.’24 
Later, Roberts CJ expounded on the qualitative differences between physical records 
and stored digital data on a mobile phone by reference to examples such as an ‘Internet search 
and browsing history’ which ‘could reveal an individual’s private interests or concerns’ and 
‘historic location information’ which ‘can reconstruct someone’s specific movements down to 
the minute, not only around town but also within a particular building.’25  
These challenges raised in Riley demonstrate the complexities of electronic evidence 
and technology. Similarly, in South Africa, the pace of technological change is a challenge for 
those responsible for policy, legislation and regulation.26 The last two decades have witnessed 
rapid developments in technology resulting in extraordinary changes to the physical nature of 
computers, introduction of smart devices and mobile technology, including the proliferation of 
a modern global communications system, range of applications and networked technology. The 
existence of adequate safeguards against misuse of these devices and applications under the 
guise of investigation activity cannot be understated. Limits and safeguards are therefore 
essential in an information age no longer limited by ‘physical realities’ which ‘generally 




23 Supra note 16 at 17. 
24 Supra note 16 at 18. 
25 Supra note 16 at 19-20. The Chief Justice referred to United States v Jones 565 U. S. ___, ___ (2012) 
(Sotomayor, J., concurring) (slip op., at 3): ‘GPS monitoring generates a precise, comprehensive record of a 
person’s public movements that reflects a wealth of detail about her familial, political, professional, religious, 
and sexual associations.’ 
26 See Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies A democratic license to operate: Report 
of the independent surveillance review (July 2015) at 7 available at https://rusi.org/sites/default/files/20150714_ 
whr_2-15_a_democratic_licence_to_operate.pdf, accessed January 2018 (hereafter ‘RUSI’). 
27 Riley’s case supra note 16 at 3. 
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III A PERSPECTIVE ON PRIVACY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 
(a)  ‘Electronic surveillance is the greatest level[l]er of human privacy ever known’28 
It has been rightly stated that ‘antiquated laws will neither keep the public safe nor ensure 
individual privacy.’29 The concept of privacy has been much debated, especially in recent 
times. Following the constructs of a law, that was developed before the unprecedented rise of 
innovations in technology that have enabled a technology-dependent and data-based society, 
the right to privacy, both online and offline, poses new dilemmas for privacy protection and 
what constitutes a justifiable level of intrusion in law.30 There are two imperatives in the 
underlying analysis for a change in law: (a) innovations in communications technology 
enabling greater capabilities of our law enforcement and security and intelligence agencies, 
and (b) the privacy interests they implicate. 
New techniques and technologies of surveillance capabilities emphasise the cautionary 
statements of Justice Brandeis when he said that ‘[s]ubtler and more far-reaching means of 
invading privacy have become available to the Government’, and that ‘[d]iscovery and 
invention have made it possible for the Government, by means far more effective than 
stretching upon the rack, to obtain disclosure in court of what is whispered in the closet.’31 In 
the information era, communications technologies have enhanced the capacity to conduct 
electronic surveillance and data collection. Technological advancements mean declining costs 
of surveillance technology and data storage. This means that the ability and effectiveness of 
the state in conducting surveillance is no longer limited by scale or duration, or any of the 
financial or practical disincentives often associated with conducting surveillance, allowing the 
state to have ‘a greater capability to conduct simultaneous, invasive, targeted and broad-scale 
surveillance than ever before.’32  
 
28 United States v White 401 U.S. 745 (1971) at 756, Douglas J dissenting. 
29 RUSI op cit note 26 at x. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Olmstead v United States 277 U.S. 438, 473 (1928) (Brandeis J, dissenting). See also SD Warren and LD 
Brandeis ‘The right to privacy’ (1890) Harvard LR 193 at 195: ‘Political, social, and economic changes entail 
the recognition of new rights, and the common law, in its eternal youth, grows to meets the demands of society 
… Recent inventions and business methods call attention to the next step which must be taken for protection of 
the person, and for securing to the individual … the right to be let alone.’ 
32 Human Rights Council ‘The right to privacy in the digital age’ A/HRC/27/37 (30 June 2014) at 3 available at 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/RegularSessions/Session27/Documents/A.HRC.27.37_en.pdf, 
accessed 04 January 2016. 
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Any disproportionate, or unfettered, use of interception powers can have consequences 
for individual rights.33 The volume of communications data now being generated has the 
potential to give law enforcement, including security and intelligence agencies, unprecedented 
access to personal information unless privacy protections and safeguards are robust in the 
modern communications environment.34 The regulation of electronic surveillance and the need 
to protect us from a ‘much more insidious danger inherent in allowing the state, in its unfettered 
discretion, to record and transmit our words’ has been articulated by Supreme Court of Canada 
court as ‘the realization that if the state were free, at its sole discretion, to make permanent 
electronic recordings of our private communications, there would be no meaningful residuum 
to our right to live our lives free from surveillance.’35 The court went further: 
‘A society which exposed us, at the whim of the state, to the risk of having a permanent 
electronic recording made of our words every time we opened our mouths might be superbly 
equipped to fight crime, but would be one in which privacy no longer had any meaning. … If 
the state may arbitrarily record and transmit our private communications, it is no longer possible 
to strike an appropriate balance between the right of the individual to be left alone and the right 
of the state to intrude on privacy in the furtherance of its goals, notably the need to investigate 
and combat crime.36 
As the court recognised, the regulation in doing so ‘is not to deny that it is of vital 
importance that law enforcement agencies be able to employ electronic surveillance in their 
investigation of crime.’37 After all, electronic surveillance plays ‘an indispensable role in the 
detection of sophisticated criminal enterprises.’38 The threat that such conduct would pose to 
privacy rights, and deemed ‘wholly unacceptable’ by the court, is if ‘in a free society that the 
agencies of the state be free to use this technology at their sole discretion.’39 It therefore 
becomes important, and necessary to ‘strike a reasonable balance between the right of 
individuals to be left alone and the right of the state to intrude on privacy in furtherance of its 
responsibilities for law enforcement.’40 
 
33 United Kingdom Interception of communications in the United Kingdom: A consultation paper (Cm 4368, 
1999) 1. 
34 J Clough ‘A world of difference: The Budapest convention on cybercrime and the challenges of 
harmonisation’ (2014) 40.3 Monash University LR 698 at 712. See also L Huey and R Rosenberg ‘Watching the 
web: Thoughts on expanding police surveillance opportunities under the Cyber-Crime Convention’ (2004) 46 
Canadian Journal of Criminology and Criminal Justice 597. 
35 R v Duarte [1990] 1 SCR 30 at 44. 
36 Supra note 35 at 44. 
37 Supra note 35 at 44. 
38 Supra note 35 at 44. 
39 Supra note 35 at 45. 
40 Supra note 35 at 45. 
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Section 14 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Act 108 of 199641 guarantees 
everyone the right to privacy, including the right not to have their person or home searched, 
their property searched, their possessions seized, or the privacy of their communications 
infringed. The right to privacy has been discussed in a number of Constitutional Court 
judgments.42 In Bernstein and Others v Bester and Others NNO,43 Ackermann J characterised 
the right to privacy as ‘a continuum of privacy rights which may be regarded as starting with a 
wholly inviolable inner self, moving to a relatively impervious sanctum of the home and 
personal life and ending in a public realm where privacy would only remotely be implicated, 
if at all.’44 He stated: 
‘A very high level of protection is given to the individual’s intimate personal sphere of life and 
the maintenance of its basic preconditions and there is a final untouchable sphere of human 
freedom that is beyond interference from any public authority. So much so that, in regard to 
this most intimate core of privacy, no justifiable limitation thereof can take place. But this most 
intimate core is narrowly construed. This inviolable core is left behind once an individual enters 
into relationships with persons outside this closest intimate sphere; the individual’s activities 
then acquire a social dimension and the right of privacy in this context becomes subject to 
limitation.’45 
 
41 Hereafter ‘the Constitution’.   
42 National Coalition For Gay and Lesbian Equality and Another v Minister of Justice and Others 1999 (1) SA 
6 (CC) paras 29-32; Mistry v Interim Medical and Dental Council of South Africa and Others 1998 (4) SA 
1127 (CC) paras 22-23, 25, 27-30; Case and Another v Minister of Safety and Security and Others, Curtis v 
Minister of Safety and Security and Others 1996 (3) SA 617 (CC) para 91. See also Investigating Directorate: 
Serious Economic Offences and Others v Hyundai Motor Distributors (Pty) Ltd and Others In re: Hyundai 
Motor Distributors (Pty) Ltd and Others v Smit NO and Others 2001 (1) SA 545 (CC) (25 August 2000) para 
18: ‘As we have seen, privacy is a right which becomes more intense the closer it moves to the intimate personal 
sphere of the life of human beings, and less intense as it moves away from that core.’ See also Thint (Pty) Ltd v 
National Director of Public Prosecutions and Others, Zuma and Another v National Director of Public 
Prosecutions and Others 2009 (1) SA 1 (CC) para 77: ‘Although a search and seizure operation will inevitably 
infringe a person’s right to privacy, the Act provides considerable safeguards which ensure that the infringement 
goes no further than reasonably necessary in the circumstances. Furthermore, the requirement of judicial 
authorisation for search warrants is only one aspect of a broader scheme which ensures that the right to privacy 
is protected.’ 
43 1996 (2) SA 751 (27 March 1996). The most pertinent passage in his judgment merits quotation in full, para 
67: ‘The truism that no right is to be considered absolute implies that from the outset of interpretation each right 
is always already limited by every other right accruing to another citizen. In the context of privacy this would 
mean that it is only the inner sanctum of a person, such as his/her family life, sexual preference and home 
environment, which is shielded from erosion by conflicting rights of the community. This implies that 
community rights and the rights of fellow members place a corresponding obligation on a citizen, thereby 
shaping the abstract notion of individualism towards identifying a concrete member of civil society. Privacy is 
acknowledged in the truly personal realm, but as a person moves into communal relations and activities such as 
business and social interaction, the scope of personal space shrinks accordingly.’ 
44 S v Jordan and Others (Sex Workers Education and Advocacy Task Force and Others as Amici Curiae 
(CCT31/01 2002 (6) SA 642 para 76. Bernstein’s case supra note 43 para 75. 
45 Supra note 43 para 75.   
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Notably the right to privacy extends beyond ‘the inner sanctum’, a principle firmly 
established in Bernstein’s case. The Court stated that ‘the scope of a person’s privacy extends a 
fortiori only to those aspects in regard to which a legitimate expectation of privacy can be 
harboured.’46 In Magajane v Chairperson, North West Gambling Board,47 the court sought to 
interpret the right to privacy with reference to Bernstein’s case: ‘Ackermann J described what 
can be seen as a series of concentric circles ranging from the core most protected realms of 
privacy to the outer rings that would yield more readily to the rights of other citizens and the 
public interest.’48 It is possible to identify two forms which an invasion of the right to privacy 
may take: (i) an unlawful intrusion upon the personal privacy of another and (ii) the unlawful 
publication of private facts about a person.49 The right to privacy covers certain private facts 
about which there is a reasonable expectation of privacy. The reasonable expectation of privacy 
test comprises two questions. Firstly, there must at least be a subjective expectation of privacy 
and, secondly, the expectation must be recognised as reasonable by society.50 
Central to the debate and delicate legislative balance is a consideration of whether 
privacy is possible, 51  and still matters in this era of innovations in communications 
technology.52 Is it the case that ‘privacy is no longer the social norm’,53 and should we simply 
accept that in this information age ‘you have zero privacy anyway, get over it?’54 As such is it 
inevitable that privacy can no longer be protected? That any attempt to regulate the powers of 
law enforcement and security and intelligence agencies, should thus be abandoned? 55 
Therefore any intrusion by law enforcement and security and intelligence agencies remains 
 
46 Supra note 43 para 77.   
47 (CCT49/05) 2006 (5) SA 250 (8 June 2006).  
48 Supra note 47 para 77.   
49 Financial Mail (Pty) Ltd and Others v Sage Holdings Ltd and Another (612/90) [1993] 2 All SA 109 (A) (18 
February 1993) para 29. At para 31, the court stated: ‘The telephone-tapping which occurred was manifestly an 
unlawful invasion of the privacy of Sage and its corporate executives and appellants did not seek to justify the 
tapping; nor is there any acceptable evidence on record which would possibly provide such justification.’ 
50 Bernstein’s case supra note 43 paras 75-76. 
51 BN Meeks ‘Is privacy possible in the digital age?’ (2000) available at http://www.nbcnews.com/id/3078854/t 
/privacy-possible-digital-age/#.WHI2fLFh0fN, accessed 08 January 2017.  
52 A Roos ‘Privacy in the Facebook era: A South African legal perspective’ (2012) 129 SALJ  375. 
53 Facebook founder M Zuckerberg (2010) available at https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2010/jan/11/ 
facebook-privacy, accessed 08 January 2017. 
54 Former Sun Microsystems CEO Scott McNealy (1999) available at http://archive.wired.com/politics/law/ 
news/1999/01/17538, accessed 08 January 2017. See also J Morgan ‘Privacy is completely and utterly dead, and 
we killed it’ (2014) available at http://www.forbes.com/sites/jacobmorgan/2014/08/19/privacy-is-completely-
and-utterly-dead-and-we-killed-it/#609dae69dfbd, accessed 11 January 2017. 
55 Anderson op cit note 17.   
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‘justified by a calculated and often persuasive narrative that holds the goals of national security 
above all else?’56 As noted by Preston: 
‘We have come to the end of privacy; our private lives, as our grandparents would have 
recognised them, have been winnowed away to the realm of the shameful and the secret. … 
Insidiously, through small concessions that mounted up over time, we have signed away rights 
and privileges that other generations fought for, undermining the very cornerstones of our 
personalities in the process. While outposts of civilisation fight pyrrhic battles, unplugging 
themselves from the web – “going dark” – the rest of us have come to accept that the majority 
of our social, financial and even sexual interactions take place over the internet and that 
someone, somewhere, whether state, press or corporation, is watching.’57 
Notwithstanding the developments in communications technologies in the information 
age, in my view, it does not mean that individual privacy should no longer be protected, or that 
attempts to regulate the exercise of investigative powers should be abandoned without ado.58 
It is within this context that the exercise of investigative powers by law enforcement and 
security and intelligence agencies in chapters 2, 3 and 4 are explored. Undoubtedly, the 
investigative powers analysed in chapters 2-4 implicate the right to privacy. A number of cases 
in the Constitutional Court dealing with warrants for search and seizures provide guidance in 
this regard. In Mistry v Interim Medical and Dental Council of South Africa and Others, the 
Constitutional Court held that ‘[t]he existence of safeguards to regulate the way in which state 
officials may enter the private domains of ordinary citizens is one of the features that 
distinguish a constitutional democracy from a police state.’59 In Magajane’s case, with regard 
to all regulatory inspections ‘searches’ for the purpose of the threshold question of whether the 
inspection falls within the scope of the privacy interest, Van Der Westhuizen J in writing the 
judgment of the court held that it would be ‘undesirable’ to ‘impose’ an ‘arbitrary demarcation 
line between degrees of intrusion’ that would ‘invoke’ the right to privacy.60 Doing so, he held, 
‘would have the negative effect of placing certain administrative inspections beyond the reach 
of judicial review.’ 61  It was concluded that the relevant provision governing regulatory 
 
56 K Rodriguez ‘Tackling state surveillance and protecting human rights’ (2012) available at https://www.eff.or 
g/deeplinks/2012/12/tackling-state-surveillance-and-human-rights-protecting-universal-freedoms, accessed 08 
January 2017. 
57 A Preston ‘The death of privacy’ (2014) available at https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/aug/03/ 
internet-death-privacy-google-facebook-alex-preston, accessed 11 January 2016. 
58 Ibid at 37-38. 
59 Supra note 42 para 25. See also Gaertner and Others v Minister of Finance and Others 2014 (1) SA 442 (CC) 
para 47: ‘the right to privacy embraces the right to be free from intrusions and interference by the state and 
others in one’s personal life.’ 
60 Supra note 47 para 59. 
61 Supra note 47 para 59. 
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inspections limited the constitutional right to privacy and Van Der Westhuizen J went further 
to consider whether the limitation of the right passed ‘constitutional muster.’ 62  Van Der 
Westhuizen J importantly referred to a proportionality analysis in relation to legislation that 
limited the right to privacy, including an applicant’s expectation of privacy and the breadth of 
the legislation: 
‘Legislation may not be so broad as to have the real potential to reach into private homes. In 
assessing whether legislation could have achieved its desired ends through less damaging 
means, a court will determine whether the legislation could have required a warrant, and a court 
will consider whether a warrant requirement would frustrate the state’s regulatory objectives 
and whether in the absence of a warrant the legislation provides sufficient guidance to 
inspectors as to the limits of the inspections.’63 
It is not intended in the thesis to provide detailed analysis on the legal protections of 
the right to privacy in South African law.64 Suffice to add the following: the right to privacy is 
a qualified right. Its interpretation in the context of a world in a year 2020 information age 
raises challenges as regards our understanding in terms of the dichotomy of notions and 
boundaries between what constitutes public interest and what constitutes private interest.65 
Notions of privacy have significantly changed in the last decade to the extent that innovations 
in digital communications technologies have resulted in an ‘unprecedented willingness’ to 
share ‘once-private information with online contacts, service providers and the general 
public.’ 66  At the press of ‘accept’ on a touchscreen device, large volumes of personal 
information are now created as a result of day-to-day online activities, seemingly without any 
guarantee of whom can access that information once the digital record has been created.67 
Changes to privacy notions as coined in the description ‘modern attitudes to privacy’ are 
therefore not without relevance. 68 This may for example have a bearing on (diminished) 
reasonable expectations of privacy in a particular type of data at a particular time, or perhaps a 
sort of argument for dispensing with the constraints on the state’s retention or use of such data? 
 
62 Supra note 47 para 59. 
63 Supra note 47 para 50. 
64 Helpful texts in this regard include I Currie & J de Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook 6ed (2013) at 294-313; 
H Davis Human Rights and Civil Liberties (2003) and R Stone Textbook on Civil Liberties and Human Rights 
5ed (2004). 
65 Human Rights Council op cit note 32. 
66 Anderson op cit note 17 at 37. 
67 Rodriguez op cit note 56. 
68 Ibid at 37-38. See also D Bilchitz ‘Privacy, surveillance and the duties of corporations’ (2016) TSAR 45 and 
McKinley, D ‘New terrains of privacy in South Africa’ December 2016 available at https://www.mediaanddemo 
cracy.com/uploads/1/6/5/7/16577624/r2kmpdp_new_terrains_of_privacy_in_south__africa_masterset_small.pd
f, accessed February 2019. 
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To the contrary however, I am of the view that as more of our lives are lived online, and as 
more of our personal information is bound by a system of interrelated connectivity, devices and 
data, with the ability to gather and share our detailed information, the arguments for strict legal 
regulation on the powers of the state become, if anything, more compelling.69  
 
IV KEY LEGISLATIVE INSTRUMENTS 
The final part of this chapter will introduce the Regulation of Interception of Communications 
and Provision of Communication-Related Information Act 70 of 2002 70  and Electronic 
Communications and Transactions Act 25 of 2002 71  as key legislation in respect of the 
investigative powers of law enforcement and the security and intelligence agencies to obtain 
electronic evidence and subsequent admissibility of such evidence in criminal proceedings. 
Whilst there are criticisms, and more recently legal challenges to the constitutionality of certain 
provisions, RICA 2002 and the ECT Act 2002 are arguably the most important legislative 
instruments to consider the issue of electronic evidence. One of the criticisms levelled against  
this key legislation, enacted almost two decades ago, is the rigid application of its provisions 
such that the current era of the information age and a modern fast-paced environment of 
technological advancements, is treated as not making a difference, when they clearly do. This 
section is intended as a brief introduction to challenges for the law, and not to discuss in depth 
the full contents of the legislative provisions as these will considered (where relevant) in the 
chapters to follow.  
 
(a) Regulation of Interception of Communications and Provision of Communication-Related 
Information Act 70 of 2002 
(i) Background: The Interception and Monitoring Prohibition Act 127 of 1992 
In South African law during the 1990s the period between the adoption of the interim 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 200 of 1993, and ultimately the new 
democratic constitutional dispensation with the adoption of a Bill of Rights in the final 
Constitution of the Republic of South Act 108 of 1996, led to a repeal of  legislation dealing 
with safety and security that sustained apartheid as a political and social system of 
 
69 Anderson op cit note 17 at 38. 
70 Hereafter ‘RICA 2002’. 
71 Hereafter ‘ECT Act 2002’. 
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institutionalised racial segregation.72 Many were clearly inconsistent with the Constitution as 
the supreme law of the land.73  The Interception and Monitoring Prohibition Act 127 of 199274 
was enacted on 1 February 1993. It was drafted before the interim Constitution (1993), and 
remained operative for a number of years following the adoption of final Constitution and Bill 
of Rights (1996). While the IMP Act 1992 was drafted without the framework of the final 
Constitution and Bills of Rights, it was recognised in the drafting stages that the Act would 
have to withstand legal challenges on the constitutionality of its provisions. The following 
observation was made in S v Naidoo and Another,75 a case regarding the constitutionality of 
the IMP Act 1992 in relation to the limitation clause contained in s 33(1) of the interim 
Constitution:  
‘[T]he Monitoring Act was a law of general application, the provisions of which complied with 
the requirements of  s 33 of the interim Constitution. …What is clear is that, probably after the 
experience of police methods during the apartheid era, … the Legislature saw fit to repeal the 
old provisions relating to interception of personal articles, telephone communications, etc in 
terms of which various Ministers could authorise such actions and to replace those provisions 
with the obviously extremely stringent and limited provisions of the Monitoring Act. Such 
provisions are, as I have already indicated, in line with similar provisions in other countries.’76 
Although the IMP Act 1992 passed a constitutional legal challenge in Naidoo’s case, 
consideration had to be given for a review of an Act drafted before the new constitutional and 
democratic dispensation in South Africa by implication of the court’s observation of the legacy 
of apartheid and objectionable police methods used. The South African Law Reform 
 
72 See N Mandela Long Walk to Freedom (1994), A Sparks Tomorrow is Another Country (1994), F Welsh A 
History of South Africa (1998) , M Shaik The ANC Spy Bible (2020), H Dousmetzis The Man Who Killed 
Apartheid: The Life of Dimitri Tsafendas (2019), S Venter A Free Mind: Ahmed Kathrada’s Notebook from 
Robben Island (2005) and A Kathrada No Bread for Mandela: Memoirs of Ahmed Kathrada, Prisoner No. 
568/64 (2010). 
73 This included the Riotous Assemblies Act 17 of 1956; the Explosives Act 26 of 1956; the Intimidation Act 72 
of 1982; the Internal Security Act 74 of 1982; and the Regulation of Gatherings Act 205 of 1993. 
74 Hereafter ‘ IMP Act 1992’. 
75 1998 1 SACR 479 (N). The case involved a law enforcement authority that furnished false and misleading 
affidavits to a judge in order to obtain judge’s direction, in terms of the IMP Act 1992, permitting law 
enforcement to monitor certain telephones. The question before the court: ‘was the evidence obtained as a result 
of the issue of the [Judge’s] direction based on the false information furnished to him, evidence obtained in a 
manner that violates any right, of the accused, in the Bill of Rights?’ (at 522). The Court expounded on two 
schools of thought that had emerged, after the enactment of the interim Constitution, with regard to the 
admissibility of evidence obtained by unlawful means, ‘namely (a) that the Courts had a wide general discretion 
to exclude unlawfully or improperly obtained evidence on grounds of fairness and public policy, and (b) that the 
exercise of a judicial discretion was no longer permissible, and that if evidence had been obtained in breach of a 
constitutional right it had to be excluded unless the breach could be justified in terms of the constitutional 
'limitation' clause (namely s 33(1) of the interim Constitution, which corresponded with s 36(1) of the new 
Constitution)’ (at 491).  
76 Supra note 75 at 505.  
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Commission77 reviewed the IMP Act 1992 in a comprehensive legislative reform project titled 
‘Review of Security Legislation’.78 The IMP Act 1992 was reviewed ‘with reference to, and in 
comparison with, the legal position in France, the Netherlands, Belgium, Germany, Britain, the 
United States of America, Hong Kong and Canada.’79 The compelling reasons for a review of 
the IMP Act 1992 related to the impact of new technologies on the regulation of surveillance 
and interception of communications. The Law Reform Commission proposed a draft Bill, that 
sought to augment the legal provisions of the IMP Act 1992.80 Telecommunication service 
providers vehemently opposed the recommended proposals. The Mobile Telephone Networks 
(Pty) Ltd [MTN] was of the opinion that the Bill’s proposals  were  ‘grossly unreasonable, not 
only towards Service Providers or Network Operators but also to the general public.’81 Three 
 
77 The South African Law Reform Commission (prior to 2002 known as the South African Law Commission) is 
established by the South African Law Reform Commission Act 19 of 1973. The Law Reform Commission 
makes ‘recommendations to Government for the development, improvement, modernisation or reform of the 
law.’ The Law Reform Commission is accountable to the Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development. 
78 See South African Law Commission (Project 105) Review of Security Legislation Discussion Paper The 
Interception and Monitoring Prohibition Act 127 of 1992 (1998) and South African Law Commission (Project 
105) Review of Security Legislation Report The Interception and Monitoring Prohibition Act 127 of 1992 
(1999).  
79 South African Law Commission (Project 105) Review of Security Legislation Report The Interception and 
Monitoring Prohibition Act 127 of 1992 (1999) at xiii. The Law Reform Commission observed that ‘in general’, 
the IMP Act 2002 compared favourably with the legislation of the list countries (at xiii). 
80 The Interception and Monitoring Prohibition Amendment Bill 1999. Specific recommendations included: 
insertion of a definition of ‘call-related information’ service’ (clause 1(a)); the definition of ‘judge’ (clause 
1(b)); definition of ‘communication’ (clause 1(b)); expansion of the definition of ‘serious offence’ to include 
inter alia ‘planned or premeditated’ and offenses relating to: trafficking in firearms, ammunitions and 
explosives, death or serious bodily harm of any person, organised crime, money-laundering or the proceeds of 
crime (clause 1(c)); the definition of ‘telecommunication service’ (clause 1(d)); no person shall intercept or 
monitor any conversation or communication (clause 2(1)(b)); designation of judges and application for 
interception directives(clause 3(1)(a)); client/legal representative privilege (clause 3(7)); the remuneration of 
direct costs (clause 4(5)); ensuring capacity to intercept (clause 5A); acquiring of facilities and devices (clause 
5A(2)); the investment, technical maintenance and operating cost in enabling interception to be carried out by 
service providers (clause 5A(3)), routing of duplicate signals to relevant central monitoring centre (clause 
5A(4)); central monitoring centres to be equipped and maintained at State’s expense (clause 5A(5)); the 
Minister may issue a directive to comply with his or her directive specifying the security, technical and 
functional requirements of facilities and devices (clause 5A(6)); capacity, systems used and connectivity, etc 
(clause 5A(7)); period of three months to comply with directive (clause 5A(8)); provision of call-related 
information on an ongoing basis for a specified duration (clause 5B(1); routing the information to a designated 
central monitoring centre (clause 5B(2)); the judge may direct the provision of call-related information on an 
ongoing basis (clause 5B(3)); the provisions of the Act on the provision of call-related information excludes the 
use of any power in any other Act to obtain evidence or information in respect of a person, body or organisation 
(clause 5B(4)); telecommunication service providers to keep proper records of client identities and addresses in 
respect of whom a service is provided (clause 5B(4)); provision of information regarding identity (clause 
5B(6)); provision of name, identity number and address of person contracted for the use of a specified 
telecommunications number (clause 5B(7)); urgent applications (clause 6); evidence is subject to the decision of 
a Director of Public Prosecutions or an Investigating Director (clause 6A(1)); admissibility of evidence obtained 
as a result of monitoring/interception (clause 6A(2)); penalties (clause 8); and revocation of license (clause 8A).  
81 South African Law Commission (Project 105) Review of Security Legislation Report The Interception and 
Monitoring Prohibition Act 127 of 1992 (1999) at 133. Telkom expressed similar sentiments: ‘the proposals 
give rise to a plethora of problems’ in relation to obligations placed on telecommunication service providers (at 
128) and will need to be ‘re-examined’ and re-defined’ (at 130). M-Web responded that it remained 
‘unconvinced by the proposed amendments and stated that it ‘may not pass constitutional muster as there may 
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key issues came to the fore during the consultation process: (a) the circumstances in which it 
will be appropriate (and lawful) for law enforcement and security and intelligence agencies to 
undertake surveillance and interception of communications which was recognised as ‘essential 
to effective police work’;82 (b) the protection of individual rights, in particular, the right to 
privacy in view of ‘increasingly powerful and revealing technology’; and (c) the adoption of a 
legal framework that avoids a negative impact on development of innovation and new 
technologies. 83  Twenty-one years later, the tension between these three issues remain as 
important in the analysis of the current legal frameworks regulating the investigative powers 
of surveillance and interception of communications by law enforcement and security and 
intelligence agencies in South Africa. These are issues that need to be addressed and lie at the 
heart of analysis in the thesis. 
Although the Interception and Monitoring Prohibition Amendment Bill 1999 in the 
form proposed by the Law Reform Commission did not become law, many of its proposals 
came to be reflected in new legislation in the form of RICA 2002.84 There is no other legislation 
in South Africa specifically regulating the interception of communications. Similar to models 
adopted worldwide, RICA 2002 bans interception of communications content, creates 
exceptions for government agencies, permits access to information about the communications 
(metadata), establishes authorisation and oversight regimes, and compels communication 
service providers to provide intercept capabilities and/or access to data, including prescriptions 
on data retention and compelled decryption measures. 85  The RICA 2002 regulates the 
interception of certain communications relating to serious crimes, the provision of certain 
communication-related information, applications to a designated judge for the issuing of 
directions and entry warrants, the execution of directions and entry warrants by law 
enforcement officers and the prohibition of telecommunication services which do not have the 
capability of being intercepted. The Act also creates offences and prescribes penalties for any 
contravention of its provisions. It also prescribes that certain information of clients must be 
 
be no rational basis for the imposition of potentially overbroad obligations on a telecommunications [service 
provider] (at 135).  
82 Naidoo’s case supra note 75 at 505.  
83 South African Law Commission (Project 105) Review of Security Legislation Report The Interception and 
Monitoring Prohibition Act 127 of 1992 (1999) at 134-35. 
84 The Interception and Monitoring Prohibition Amendment Act 77 of 1995, assented to on 28 September 1995, 
was limited by its only provision for the amendment of s 1 of the IMP Act 1992 ‘so as to redefine “judge” to 
‘mean any judge of any provincial or local division of the Supreme Court of South Africa including…any 
retired judge.’ The IMP Act 1992 and the Amendment Act 1995 was subsequently repealed by RICA 2002.  
85 See G Hosein and CW Palow ‘Modern safeguards for modern surveillance: An analysis of innovations in 
communications surveillance techniques’ (2013) 74.6 Ohio State LJ 1071 at 1072. 
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obtained and kept by telecommunication service providers should it be required for detecting 
or investigating serious crime.86 
 
(ii) Interception of communications  
The use of interception in South Africa is currently governed by RICA 2002. Interception 
involves making available the contents of any communication to someone other than the sender 
or intended to a person other than then sender, recipient or intended recipient. As an intelligence 
gathering and investigative capability available to law enforcement and security and 
intelligence agencies, access to such information and communications by interception can be 
essential in the disruption, prevention and detection of criminal activities, including providing 
operational support leadings to arrests and prosecutions. At the time of its enactment into law, 
interception commonly related to telephony, such as intercepting voicemail messages. 
Technically, RICA 2002 refers to ‘communications’ and insofar as they relate to the ‘contents 
of communications.’ In the context of technological advancements this could include emails 
and other forms of communications such as VoIP services, such as Skype or Facetime.87 Does 
it matter? Arguably yes. Given that such investigative power is potentially a significant 
intrusion into privacy rights in a year 2020 information age, effective safeguards, transparency 
and oversight become of vital importance. 
Interception conducted under a lawful warranted process can only be used for specified 
purposes, including for prevention and detection of serious offences, or for matters related to 
national security or national economic interests. Interception is limited to the following 
structures of the state, collectively referred to in the thesis as law enforcement and security and 
intelligence agencies:88 (a) the South African Police Services; (b) the South African National 
Defence Force; (c) the National Intelligence Agency; (d) the South African Secret Service; (e) 
Directorate of Special Operations (now Head of an Investigating Directorate); (e) the National 
Prosecuting Authority; and (f) the Independent Complaints Directorate. The Right2Know 
 
86 Memorandum on the objects of the Regulation of Interception of Communications and Provision of 
Communication-Related Information Amendment Bill, 2006, Background of Bill clause 1. The Act was 
assented to on 30 December 2002,86 however, it only came into operation on 30 September 2005. See 
Proclamation R55 in Government Gazette 28075: ‘30 September 2005 as the date on which the said Act, with 
the exception of sections 40 and 62 of the Act, shall come into operation.’ Further in terms of Proclamation R23 
in Government Gazette 31189, ss 62(1) and  (5) of the Act came into operation on 30 June 2008. In its latest 
amendment, RICA 2002 has been amended by the General Intelligence Laws Act 11 of 2013. 
87 AA Gillespie Cybercrime: Key Issues and Debates (2019) at 337. 
88 Having regard to the definition of ‘applicant’, including ‘directorate’, ‘law enforcement agency’ and ‘law 
enforcement officer’ in s 1 of RICA 2002. 
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campaign diagrammatically presents an overview of the role of South Africa’s intelligence 
agencies as follows:89  
 
The investigative powers in relation to interception is controversial and has attracted 
attention in recent years, mostly because of allegations levelled against law enforcement and 
the security and intelligence agencies. The allegations include reports of unlawful surveillance 
practices, abuse of power, inadequate safeguards and remedies against unlawful interference 
with the right to privacy. In April 2017, the amaBhungane Centre for Investigative Journalism 
launched a legal challenge to the constitutionality of RICA 2002 following surveillance 
measures by the National Intelligence Agency90 against its director, SP Sole.91  The incidents 
 
89 Source: Right2Know ‘SPOOKED: Surveillance of journalists in SA’ June 2018 https://www.sanef.org.za/wp-
content/uploads/2018/07/R2K-Surveillance-of-Journalists-Report-2018-web.pdf., accessed 17 June 2019. 
90 Now the State Security Agency (hereafter ‘SSA’). 
91 Press release ‘AmaB challenges snooping law’ 20 April 2017 available at https://amabhungane.org/advocacy/ 
advocacy-amab-challenges-snooping-law/, accessed 19 June 2019.  
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cited in its papers included the illegal tapping of a journalists phones,  deliberate lying to judges 
in order to get electronic surveillance authorisation; using improperly obtained information to 
harass journalists investigating members of the police crime intelligence unit; security and 
intelligence surveillance of journalists investigating corruption; monitoring of private 
communications of journalists who challenged the censorship policies of the state broadcaster 
and bribery of telecommunication service providers to obtain phone records of media editors.92  
The legal challenge by amaBhungane Centre for Investigative Journalism has now also 
forced the state to address the constitutionality of the legal provisions of RICA 2002. The 
technicalities of how a communication is intercepted is likely to change as technology develops 
and as such it is important that the outcome of legislative reform remains dynamic, whether in 
the form of amendments to existing law or new legislation.93 The thesis will examine the 
‘concrete question’ of how the use of emerging surveillance technologies, as an intelligence 
gathering and investigative capability, should be regulated in South African law with sufficient 
safeguards against risk of abuse.94 This will be explored in the context of the regulatory 
framework in the RICA 2002 governing the investigative powers of law enforcement and the 
security and intelligence agencies, specifically, interception of communications (chapter 2), 
retention and acquisition of communications data (chapter 3), and access to electronic data 
protected by encryption (chapter 4).  
 
(iii) Retention and acquisition of communications data 
Arguably the most controversial investigative power, and one which poses challenges for the 
law in recent times, relates to the mandatory retention and acquisition of communications data.  
To law enforcement and the security and intelligence agencies ‘communications data is simply 
using the by-product of communications devices as evidence’ and is regarded as significant in 
criminal investigations, particularly serious offences.95 By 2017, it was reported that the yearly 
 
92 In a report, Protecting journalism sources in the digital age, published in 2017 by the United Nations 
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, it was found that that the legal frameworks that protect the 
confidential sources of journalism are under significant strain in the digital age by the challenges of mass 
surveillance, mandatory data retention, and disclosure by third party intermediaries. Available at http://www.un 
esco.org/new/fileadmin/MULTIMEDIA/HQ/CI/CI/pdf/news/protecting_journalism_sources_in_digital_age.pdf, 
accessed 30 June 2020. See also E van Diemen ‘“Spying case”: 8 times journalists believe they were snooped 
on, as RICA Act gets challenged in court’ 4 June 2019 available at https://www.news24.com/South Africa/News 
/spying-case-8-times-journalists-believe-they-were-snooped-on-as-rica-act-gets-challenged-in-court-20190604, 
accessed 17 June 2019. 
93 Gillespie op cit note 9 at 80. 
94 Hosein and Palow op cit note 85 at 1089.  
95 Gillespie op cit note 9 at 4-6. 
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average of requests to the four major telecommunication service providers in South Africa for 
communications data estimated about 51,286. Although it is difficult to gauge the increase in 
requests over the years,96 it appears that accessing communications data has quickly become 
mainstream, and almost routine for law enforcement and the security and intelligence 
agencies.97 Communications data has always been likened to ‘who’, ‘when’ and ‘where’ of a 
communication, but not the content of what was said or written.98 Differing authorisation 
procedures in RICA 2002 between interception (content) and communications data (‘envelope’ 
information, not its contents), reflect a legal construct that distinguishes between what kinds of 
information implicate greater or lesser privacy interests. This distinction is based on the fact 
that because the content of the communication cannot be accessed, it is therefore not as 
intrusive. 
The counter-argument is that technological advancements have arguably blurred this 
distinction. RICA 2002 lags behind the pace in an era of innovations in communications 
technology such that law enforcement and security and intelligence agencies are able to capture 
more information than previously possible, some reportedly by unlawful surveillance practices, 
raising significant concerns for individual rights. Having regard to a modern communications 
environment in which RICA 2002 operates in the year 2020 information age, and its 
implications for surveillance measures, the position in RICA 2002 based on underlying 
assumptions that communications data is less intrusive and not as revealing as the content of 
communications is no longer sustainable. Indeed, it has been noted that monitoring 
communications data over a period of time could reveal sensitive content and detailed 
understanding of a person’s life. Roberts notes that analysis and collation of this information 
could reveal ‘the number and nature of a person’s relationships, the state of his finances; his 
 
96 Section 42 of RICA 2002 prohibits the disclosure of any information received pursuant to the Act. This 
includes, by virtue of s 42(3), the disclosure of the fact that any demand for lawful interception or 
communications data has been issued under the Act. Telecommunication service providers in South Africa also 
take the view that to publish aggregate statistics would be to disclose the existence of one or more lawful 
interception or communications data demands. See Vodafone Group Plc Law Enforcement Disclosure Report 
2015 available at https://www.vodafone.com/content/dam/vodcom/sustainability/pdfs/vodafone_law_enforcem 
ent_disclosure_report_2015-4.pdf, accessed 10 March 2020.  
97 Gillespie op cit note 9 at 38-39 quoting Theresa May MP (Hansard, HC Deb 10 July 2014, vol 584, col 456.): 
‘Communications data has played a significant role in every Security Service counter-terrorism operation over 
the last decade. It has been used as evidence in 95 per cent of all serious organised crime cases handled by the 
Crown Prosecution Service. And it has played a significant role in the investigation of many of the most serious 
crimes in recent time, including the Oxford and Rochdale child grooming cases, the murder of Holly Wells and 
Jessica Chapman and the murder of Rhys Jones. It can prove or disprove alibis, it can identify associations 
between potential criminals, and it can tie suspects and victims to a crime scene.’  
98 Home Office Acquisition and disclosure of communications data – Code of Practice (TSO 2007) available at 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/426248/Acqui
sition_and_Disclosure_of_Communications_Data_Code_of_Practice_March_2015.pdf, accessed 4 July 2019. 
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political views, religion, sexual orientation, life plans and other aspirations; what opinions he 
might hold about others; his fears, predilections and foibles.’99  
This has implications for retention of communications data by telecommunication 
service providers so that it can be later acquired by law enforcement and the security and 
intelligence agencies. RICA 2002 makes provision for both retention and acquisition of 
communications data. As will be seen, the acquisition of communications data can only be for 
specified purposes, including for the prevention and detection of ‘serious offences’ or in the 
interests of ‘national security or compelling national economic interests’ if the reasonable 
grounds to believe’ threshold has been met.100 RICA 2002 also sets out a core provision in 
relation to mandatory retention of communications data. 101  What does this mean for our 
privacy interests, in context of a year 2020 information age, when telecommunication service 
providers are legally required to retain information about the way we use their services such as 
whom we called on a particular date and from a particular location, websites we visited and 
how often, our purchasing habits, our geolocation movements – all of which if collated and 
analysed can be quite revealing. 
There are differing views between those (a) who believe that the mandatory retention 
of our  communications data is ‘inappropriate’ and constitutes a serious interference with our 
privacy rights102 and those (b) who doubt whether the ‘mere retention’ of communications data 
amounts to any interference with privacy rights, and if it does, ‘it ought to be considered a 
relatively trivial interference.’103 The state is likely to argue that even if in principle there is an 
interference with privacy rights, the interference is ‘reasonable and justifiable in an open and 
democratic society’104 for the prevention and detection of serious offences. Roberts further 
expands on the differing views as regards weight to be attached to privacy rights on this issue 
of communications data: 
 
99 A Roberts ‘Privacy, data retention and domination: Digital Rights Ireland Ltd v Minister for Communications 
(2015) 78.3 The Modern Law Review 535 at 544. 
100 Section 17, 19. 
101 Section 30.  
102 Gillespie op cit note 9 at 340. See Roberts op cit note 99 at 535 and J Duncan, ‘Spies are all set to grab your 
metadata’ (11 September 2015) available at https://mg.co.z /article/ 2015-09-10-spies-are-all-set-to-grab-your-
metadata, accessed 30 June 2019. See also Liberty Liberty’s response to the Home Office consultation: 
“Protecting the public in a changing communications environment” at 19 available at https://www.libertyhum 
anrights. org.uk/sites/default/files/liber ty-s-communications-data-consultation-response.pdf, accessed 4 July 
2019, suggesting, with reference to S and Marper v United Kingdom EctHR 30562/04 and 30566/04 (4 
December 2008), that a similarity could be drawn to retention databases of DNA taken from suspects, victims 
and witnesses alike. 
103 Roberts op cit note 99 at 535.  
104 Section 36, Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1996.  
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‘It might be said that mere retention of communications data will have no obvious effect on the 
lives of the great majority of those in respect of whom data is retained. Views on what ought to 
be required by way of justification for the retention of data are likely to vary in a way that 
corresponds roughly with divergence of views on the value of privacy and gravity of the 
interference that individuals suffer where communications data are retained. We might expect 
those who believe that retention constitutes a particularly serious interference with privacy to 
say that data retention ought to be predicated on some degree of individualised suspicion, and 
that even where such suspicion exists, not every piece of communications data should be 
retained. Those who attach less weight to privacy interests, on the other hand, are more likely 
to accept the ‘needle in a haystack argument’; mass data retention will ensure that a few vital 
pieces of information are available to the state for the purposes of detecting and investigating 
serious crime, but in order to find the needle in the haystack, one has to first secure the 
haystack.’105 
Following from the above recognition that mandatory retention of communications data 
‘will have no obvious effect’ on the ‘great majority’, Roberts argues that ‘[t]he mere fact that 
there has been a loss of privacy’ does not necessarily lead ‘to the conclusion that those who 
have suffered the loss are thereafter subject’ to exercise of arbitrary power. 106 He argues that 
the central issue is ‘the extent that the loss of privacy leads to the acquisition of power to 
interfere on an arbitrary basis.’107 This is an important point. Having regard to the regulatory 
framework in RICA 2002 for mandatory retention and acquisition of communications data, we  
should be concerned with the exercise of arbitrary power by law enforcement and the security 
and intelligence agencies. The right to privacy is not absolute. Any interference is measured 
against whether it is ‘reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society’ and for 
legitimate reasons, in this instance for the prevention and detection of ‘serious offences’ or in 
the interests of ‘national security or compelling national economic interests’, and could trump 
privacy rights. Revelations by the amaBhungane case referred above suggests that the scope 
for arbitrary interference by law enforcement and the security and intelligence agencies is not 
speculative. As the analysis will demonstrate, the concerns about retention and acquisition of 
communications data in South Africa is not merely academic or abstract. These are key issues 
to be explored and central to analysis in chapter 3. 
 
 
105 Roberts op cit note 99 at 535.  
106 Ibid at 545.  
107 Ibid (emphasis in original text).  
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(iv) Electronic data protected by encryption  
As if these challenges are not formidable enough, they are in turn compounded by the 
increasingly accessibility and use of encryption technology.108 Encryption is considered to be 
one of the most effective ways of achieving data security and is now commonly used in 
protecting electronic data that is either ‘at rest’ such as files on a computer or storage devices 
(e.g. USB flash drives), or ‘in transit’ such as data being transferred via networks (e.g. the 
Internet or e-commence transactions). Messaging services such as ‘WhatsApp’ as a matter of 
course encrypt messages end-to-end, whereby its encryption technology ‘ensures only you and 
the person you're communicating with can read what's sent, and nobody in between, not even 
WhatsApp.’109 
 While encryption is a powerful tool for safeguarding sensitive information, especially 
in response to increased levels of privacy awareness, data breaches and identity theft, the use 
of robust digital encryption technologies have also presented opportunities for criminals to 
encrypt data, whether stored on a device or in transit, in order to conceal their criminal activities 
and so evade detection and prosecution. With encryption being so widespread, access to data 
protected by encryption poses challenges for law enforcement and security and intelligence 
agencies. Even when such electronic evidence has been lawfully obtained, a challenge faced is 
that seized data may be protected by some form of security measure, such as a password or 
other form of encryption thereby rendering the data inaccessible or unintelligible. 
 The concept of ‘practically uncrackable’ encryption is important to the process of 
encryption. 110  Without the key or password, criminal investigations involving access to 
potential evidence that is protected by encryption can require an extraordinary amount of time 
and resources to bypass encryption. An activity commonly known as ‘brute-force attack’111 
could be used, that is guessing every possible iteration of the key until the key is discovered. 
The type and complexity of the system and key length used in the encryption often determine 
the practical feasibility of performing a brute-force attack with longer keys exponentially more 
difficult to break than shorter ones. A measure of the strength of the encryption software is 
 
108 PN Grabosky & RG Smith Crime in the Digital Age: Controlling Telecommunications and Cyberspace 
Illegalities (1998) at 206. 
109 ‘End-to-end encryption’ available at https://faq.whatsapp.com/en/android/28030015/, accessed 13 July 2019.  
110 RM Thompson II & C Jaikaran ‘Encryption: Selected legal issues’ (2016) at 4 available at https://fas.org/sgp 
/crs/misc/R44407.pdf, accessed 7 April 2020.  
111 J Galbally, J Fierrez, M Martines-Diaz and J Ortega-Garcia ‘Evaluations of brute-force attack to dynamic 
signature verification system using synthetic samples’ (2009) paper presented at 10th International Conference 
on Document Analysis and Recognition available at http://atvs.ii.uam.es/atvs/files/2009_ICDAR_BruteForce_ 
Galbally_Published.pdf, accessed 17 October 2016.  
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how long it would theoretically take an unauthorised user to launch a successful brute-force 
attack to break the code.112 It has been noted that a thirteen digit passcode configuration on an 
iPhone would take about 25,000 years ‘to run every possibility.’113 Some options for law 
enforcement and security and intelligence agencies include: ‘find the key, guess the key, 
compel the key, exploit a flaw in the encryption software, access plaintext while the device is 
in use, and locate another plaintext copy,’114 each option however presents different practical, 
technological and legal hurdles.115 
A recourse for law enforcement and security and intelligence agencies in South African 
law is to ‘compel the key’.116 RICA 2002 provides a legal framework for compelled decryption 
by (a) disclosure of the decryption key; or (b) provision of decryption assistance117 to obtain 
access to the encrypted information or to put that encrypted information in an intelligible 
form.118 These powers anticipate, at the very least, that the potential disclosure of information 
may incriminate the suspect/target to whom a compelled decryption order is directed. As such, 
compelled decryption directions inevitably engages the constitutional right against self-
incrimination, and the difficult legal question of when would enforcement of such decryption 
direction violate such right.  
The issues are complex. Where a suspect/target refuses or fails to comply with 
compelled decryption, does subsequent prosecution and conviction violate the constitutional 
right against self-incrimination? Where a suspect/target complies with compelled decryption 
for access to information that may be incriminating, does subsequent use of that information 
in criminal proceedings violate the right against self-incrimination? These are keys issues 
addressed in chapter 4. 
  
 
112 ‘Password recovery speeds: How long with your password stand up’ (2016) available at http://www.lock 
down.co.uk/?pg=combi, accessed 17 October 2016 and ‘Some notes on big numbers’ http://www.quadibloc. 
com/math/bignum.htm, accessed 17 October 2016. For example, a 15-character, all lower-case password has 1.6 
sextillion combinations and would take in excess of 50,000 years of brute-force to decipher. An 8-character 
complex password has 7.2 quadrillion combinations and will likely be cracked in less than 84 days. 
113 OS Kerr & B Schneider ‘Encryption workarounds’ (2018) 106 Georgetown LR 989 at 1000. 
114 Ibid at 991. 
115 Ibid at 996-1011. 
116 Although, the South African Law Reform Commission identified encryption as a key challenge of new 
technologies in its review of the IMP Act 1992, no proposals addressed this issue in its final recommendations 
in the proposed Interception and Monitoring Prohibition Amendment Bill 1999. See South African Law 
Commission (Project 105) Review of Security Legislation Discussion Paper The Interception and Monitoring 
Prohibition Act 127 of 1992 (1998) and South African Law Commission (Project 105) Review of Security 
Legislation Report The Interception and Monitoring Prohibition Act 127 of 1992 (1999).  
117 Section 29(1)(a) and (b).  
118 Section 29(2). 
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(b) Electronic Communications and Transactions Act 25 of 2002 
An assessment of the treatment of electronic evidence in South African law gives weight to the 
statement that ‘electronic evidence is undeniably problematic.’119 In one South African work 
on the law of evidence, the authors remarked: ‘In leaving paper, we have also left almost all 
guarantees of authenticity and reliability ….’120 The concerns of electronic evidence as with 
other types of evidence, relate to concerns about authenticity and integrity such as ease of 
manipulation, destruction, deletion, alteration or fabrication (accidental or otherwise). With 
electronic evidence, there are added concerns that the evidence can also be modified without 
obvious signs of changes made.121 Sometimes the simplest act of switching on/off a computer 
or device can result in loss of information.122 The treatment of electronic evidence in South 
African law can be traced to 1976, and has since tested both the judiciary and the process of 
legislative reform, in particular in the South African law of evidence. 
 
(i) Background: Computer Evidence Act 57 of 1983 
The first reported case, a civil matter, in which the Appellate Division held that printouts of 
bank records generated by a computer would not be admissible, is our starting point. Prior to 
the ECT Act 2002, electronic evidence in South African law was regulated by Computer 
Evidence Act 57 of 1983.123 The Act was enacted in response to the difficulty created by Narlis 
v South African Bank of Athens.124 Notably twenty-six years before the ECT Act 2002 was 
enacted, Narlis is regarded as the one of the first cases in South African law demonstrating the 
need for legislative reform in view of technological advancements.  
The Appellate Division held that a computer printout cannot be received as evidence 
under the provisions of section 34 of the Civil Proceedings Act 25 of 1965.125 The application 
of the CPA 1965, drafted before the emergence of computers became widespread, raised 
questions about whether the definition of ‘document’ in the Act was wide enough to include 
computer generated documents. Section 33 of the CPA 1965 defined ‘document’ to include 
 
119 J Hofman ‘South Africa’ in S Mason (ed) Electronic Evidence: Disclosure, Discovery and Admissibility 
(2007) 459 at 459. 
120 Attributed to CWH Schmidt & DT Zeffertt Evidence para 133 as quoted in Hofman op cit note 119 at 459. 
121 South African Law Commission Issue Paper 26 (Project 126) Electronic evidence in criminal and civil 
proceedings: Admissibility and related issues (2010) at 9. 
122 Gillespie op cit note 9 at 339. 
123 Hereafter ‘CEA 1983’. In addition to the Civil Proceedings Evidence Act 25 of 1965 and the Criminal 
Procedure Act 51 of 1977. 
124 1976 (2) SA 573 (A). 
125 Hereafter ‘CPA 1965’. 
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‘any book, map, plan, drawing or photograph’ and on a literal reading too restrictive to 
encompass computer generated documents. Section 34(1) of the CPA 1965 provides that ‘in 
any civil proceedings where direct or oral evidence of a fact would be admissible, any statement 
made by a person in a document intending to establish the fact, shall on production of the 
original document be admissible as evidence of that fact’ provided that certain conditions are 
present.126 With specific reference to ss (1) of ‘any statement made by a person in a document’, 
the Appellate Division held that the computerised bank statements could not be admitted in 
terms of this section as the statements were not made ‘by a person’ as contemplated by the Act. 
Holmes JA stated: ‘it is essential to note that sec. 34(2) deals only with such a statement, as 
referred to in sub-sec. (1). And straightaway ones finds that sub-sec. (1) refers only to “any 
statement made by a person in a document” (my italics). Well, a computer, perhaps, 
fortunately, is not a person.’127 Foreseeing the challenging nature of the outcome, Holmes JA 
rightly remarked ‘[t]his is perhaps a matter which might well engage the attention of the 
Legislature in South Africa.’128 
The decision of the Appellate Division caused ‘much consternation’, particularly in the 
banking industry at the time which placed extensive reliance on usage of computers. 129 
Following the outcome of Narlis, the Clearing Bankers Association of South Africa requested 
the South African Law Reform Commission to investigate the need for specific legislation 
regulating the admissibility of computer-generated evidence in civil proceedings. In April 
1982, the Law Reform Commission’s report on ‘Admissibility in civil proceedings of evidence 
generated by computers’ was presented to the Minister of Justice.130 During 1983 the CEA 
1983 was passed, largely based on the draft Bill proposed by the Law Reform Commission. At 
the time of its enactment, the CEA 1983 was recognised as going ‘some way in overcoming 
the restrictions that the hearsay rule of evidence [placed] on the admissibility of computer print-
outs as evidence.’131 However, in terms of application, the CEA 1983 did not apply to criminal 
proceedings,132 evident from the preamble which read: ‘to provide for the admissibility in civil 
 
126 As set out in s 34(1)(b). Two conditions are stipulated: (a)the person who made the statement either had 
personal knowledge of the matters dealt with in the statement; or (b) where the document in question is or forms 
part of a record purporting to be a continuous record, made the statement (in so far as the matters dealt with 
therein are not within his personal knowledge) in the performance of a duty to record information supplied to 
him by a person who had or might reasonably have been supposed to have personal knowledge of those matters. 
127 Supra note 124 at 577. 
128 Supra note 124 at 578. 
129 S v Mashiyi and Another 2002 (2) SACR 387 (Tk) at 390. 
130 South African Law Commission (Project 6) Review of the Law of Evidence (1982). 
131 Mashiyi’s case supra note 129 at 390. 
132 In a 1986 report, the South African Law Commission considered whether scope of the CEA 1983 should be 
extended to criminal proceeding, however deferred any outcome pending further work (see South African Law 
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proceedings of evidence generated by computers and for matters connected therewith.’ By its 
application only in civil proceedings, the CEA 1983 therefore did not overcome problems faced 
by the courts relating to the admissibility of computer printouts in terms of s 34 of the CPA 
1965, as held in Narlis, insofar as criminal proceedings were concerned.133 
The CEA 1983 also caused numerous difficulties, specifically due its overly 
cumbersome technical requirements in relation to printouts. Section 3(1) of the Act provided 
that an ‘authenticated computer printout [was] admissible on its production as evidence of any 
fact recorded in it of which direct oral evidence would be admissible.’ Collier provides a 
succinct summary on the impact of the requirements of the Act: 
 ‘“Authenticated” meant that the printout must be accompanied by an authenticating affidavit 
and other supplementary affidavits necessary to establish the reliability of the information 
contained in the printout. The court could attach as much or as little evidential weight to the 
printout as the circumstances of the case dictated (s 4). The Act required that the deponent to 
the authenticating affidavit had to be a person qualified to depose thereto in two respects (s 
2(3)). First, by reason of his knowledge and experience of computers and the particular system 
in question; and, secondly, in respect of his examination of all relevant records and facts 
concerning the operation of the computer and the data and instructions supplied to it. The 
records and facts had to be verified by him if he had control of or access to them in the ordinary 
course of his business, employment, duties or activities (s 2(4)(a)). If not, then a supplementary 
affidavit was required from a person who had control of or access to them (s 2(4)(b)). Records 
and facts were sufficiently verified if the deponent stated that, to the best of his knowledge and 
belief, they comprised all the relevant records and facts.’134  
In Ex Parte Rosche,135 the CEA 1983 was heralded as a ‘facilitating Act not a restricting 
one.’136 The relevant evidence was a telephone company’s computer printouts which were 
automatically generated recording details of telephone calls, in this case the printouts reflected 
information of telephone calls made from a hotel in Mozambique to a guest house in South 
Africa. Although the provisions of the CEA 1983 were not met, the court accepted the printouts 
 
Commission Discussion Paper 99 (Project 108) Review of the law of evidence (1986)). The Law Commission 
published a discussion paper dealing with computer-related crime in 2001 (see South African Law Commission 
Discussion Paper 99 ( Project 108) Computer related crime: preliminary proposals for reform in respect of 
unauthorised access to computer, unauthorised modification of computer data and software applications and 
related procedural aspects (2001)). Further legislative reform proposals by the Law Commission were 
subsequently superseded by the enactment of the ECT Act 2002. 
133 Mashiyi’s case supra note 129 at 390. 
134 DW Collier ‘Electronic evidence and related matters’ in PJ Schwikkard & SE van der Merwe Principles of 
Evidence 3ed (2009) at 412.  
135 [1988] 1 All ER 318 (W).  
136 Supra note 135 at 328.  
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as real evidence and held them admissible137 ‘in the sense that it came about automatically and 
not as a result of any input of information by a human being’ and with ‘no room for dishonesty 
or human error.’138 
 
(ii) Law of Evidence Amendment Act 45 of 1988 
Could the provisions of the Law of Evidence Amendment Act 45 of 1988139 offer any potential 
assistance to admissibility of computer generated documents? Although the provisions of the 
Act ‘radically impacted on the application of the common law of hearsay’140 a view expressed 
at the time was that the LEA Act 45 of 1988 was ‘of little or of no assistance in regard to the 
acceptance of computer print-outs which contain processed information as evidence.’141 The 
reasoning was based on the provision of s 3(4) which defined ‘hearsay evidence’ to mean 
‘evidence, whether oral or in writing, the probative value of which depends upon the credibility 
of any person other than the person giving such evidence.’ This referred to the rationale in 
Narlis that ‘a computer is not a person and the logic expressed in that case in excluding 
computer print-outs as evidence for reason of them not being statements made by a person 
applies equally to s 3(4) of Act 45 of 1988.’142 
The only possible vehicle which could allow the admissibility of computer generated 





137 The trustworthiness and reliability of the printouts was established with the following evidence: (a) the 
information in handwritten records of the calls—they were carbon copies of the chits prepared by the telephone 
operator on duty at the hotel on the day in question, reflected the same information as in the printouts (although 
the operator could not be traced to give evidence) (at 326);  (b) evidence of the functional workings of the 
telephone recording equipment was adduced (at 328);  (c) evidence of the reliability of the information 
contained in the printout and similar printouts as being “accepted by both the telephone company and its 
subscribers as being correct over a number of years” (at 328); (d) information concerning the software qualities, 
namely (i) the software in this case did not generate random impulses as in the case of games; and (ii) it did not 
do creative interpretation of input as when virtual reality is created from an architect’s plan (at 329). 
138 Ex parte Rosche supra note 135 at 326. The court likened the printout in the present case as similar to the 
radar diagram produced in the English case of The Statue of Liberty: Owners of the Motorship Sapporo Maro v 
Owner of Steam Tanker, Statue of Liberty [1968] 2 All ER 195 (PDA) where such a document was admitted as 
evidence. 
139 Hereafter ‘CPA 1965’. 
140 Mashiyi’s case supra note 129 at 390. 
141 Supra note 129 at 390. 
142 Supra note 131 at 390-91. 
143 Hereafter ‘CPA 1977’. 
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(iii) Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 
Admissibility of computer printouts in criminal proceedings is based on s 221 (business 
records) and s 236 (banking records) of the CPA 1977. Section 236 allows for the admissibility 
of accounting records and documents in the possession of a bank, including a computer printout 
or device that recorded or stored the document, 144  subject to the requisite supporting 
affidavits,145 including an affidavit by a person stating that (a) they are in the service of the 
bank; (b) such accounting records and documents are the records of the bank; (c) the said 
entries or documents have been made compiled, printed or obtained in the usual and ordinary 
course of the business of the bank; and (d) such accounting records or documents are in the 
custody or under the control of such bank. Specifically, s 221 which provides that ‘in criminal 
proceedings in which direct oral evidence of a fact would be admissible, any statement 
contained in a document and tending to establish that fact shall, upon production of the 
document, be admissible as evidence’ provided that certain conditions are present. 146 The 
definition of ‘document’ in s 221(5) ‘includes any device by which information is recorded or 
stored’ and ‘“statement” includes any representation of fact whether made in words or 
otherwise.’ The CPA 1977 does not provide a definition of record.  
In S v Harper, 147  the scope and meaning of s 221 was considered in relation to 
admissibility of computer printouts. The court considered the question as to whether a 
computer printout is a document within the ordinary grammatical meaning of ‘document’ in s 
221(5). Milne J held that ‘the computer printouts consist of typed words and figures and 
would, prima facie, clearly fall within the ordinary meaning of the word “document”.’148 On 
the question of whether the computer itself, as a device or machine, would fall under the 
extended meaning of the definition of ‘document’ in s 221(5), Milne J stated:  
‘In my view, if the computer print-outs [in dispute] are ‘documents’ within the ordinary 
grammatical meaning of that word, then they are admissible. If they are not, then, in my view, 
they are inadmissible. … Computers do record and store information but they do a great deal 
else. … The extended definition of “document” is clearly not wide enough to cover a computer, 
at any rate where the operations carried out by it are more than the mere storage or recording 
of information. Quite apart from that, however, how would the document, that is in this case 
 
144 In terms of s 236(6), ‘“document” includes a recording or transcribed computer printout produced by any 
device by means of which information is recorded or stored.’ 
145 Section 236(1) and (2). 
146 As set out in s 221(1)(a) and (b) (emphasis added). 
147 1981 (1) SA 88 (D). 
148 Supra note 147 at 96. 
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the computer, be produced? Even if the section could be interpreted to mean that what must be 
produced is that part of the computer on which information is recorded or stored, that would 
mean the tape or disc on which it was stored, and this would be meaningless unless the 
electronic impulses on that tape or disc were to be translated or transcribed into a representation 
or statement intelligible to the ordinary human eye - or perhaps ear.’149 
Milne J continued:  
‘The section does not refer to the product of the device, nor does it refer to any document 
produced by the device, it refers to the document itself being produced. The section does not 
refer to the  product of the device, nor does it refer to any document produced by the device, it 
refers to the document itself being produced. The wording of the section, read with the extended 
definition contained in ss (5), is entirely appropriate to the production of microfilm as evidence 
since the microfilm itself can be produced. Furthermore microfilm is a means by which 
information is stored, and recorded. No process other than storage and recording is involved so 
far as I am aware.’150 
It is not surprising that the above dictum in Harper was interpreted to mean that if a 
computer performed ‘operations’ beyond ‘the mere storage or recording of information’ then 
the output of those operations, such as a computer printout of information sorted and collated, 
would be inadmissible.151 In principle, this meant the admissibility of computer generated 
information under s 221 of the CPA 1977 was only applicable in instances where the computer 
was merely recording or storing information. As such certain statements in the Harper case, 
were based on a misreading of the judgment of the court. This interpretation was relied on by 
the defence in S v De Villiers,152 arguing for the inadmissibility computer printouts of bank 
statements. In addition, the defence arguments strongly relied on academic commentary at the 
time where the learned authors in Hoffmann and Zeffertt, 153  based on Harper stated: 
‘a computer printout will not be admissible in terms of s 221.’154 Supported by the dictum, the 
authors further stated: ‘In other words, a computer printout produced by a computer that sorted 
and collated information would be inadmissible.155 This interpretation was rejected by O’Linn 
J, who held the computer printouts of bank statements admissible:  
 
149 Harper’s case supra note 147 at 95 (emphasis added). 
150 Supra note 147 at 95. 
151 See commentary in A St O Skeen ‘Evidence and computers’ (1984) 101 SALJ 675 and LH Hoffmann & DT 
Zeffertt South African Law of Evidence 4ed (1988) at 142. 
152 1993 (1) SACR 574 Nm. 
153 Hoffmann and Zeffertt op cit note 151 at 142. 
154 De Villiers’ case supra note 152 at 577. 
155 Supra note 152 at 577. 
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‘In my respectful view, the learned authors misread the dictum of Milne J. The learned Judge 
never held that “a computer print-out will not be admissible in terms of s 221” and that a 
computer print-out produced by a computer that sorted and collated information would be 
“inadmissible”. The words of Milne J quoted supra and relied on by the learned authors, dealt 
with the question whether the computer itself, the machine, would fall under the extended 
definition of “document” in ss (5) of s 221 of the Criminal Procedure Act, which includes in 
the definition of document – “any device by means of which information is recorded or stored”. 
Milne J in fact held that computer print-outs were ‘documents’ as contemplated by s 221 and 
were admissible.’156 
As correctly pointed out by O' Linn J, the dictum of Milne J was misread and that a 
general statement based on Harper’s case, to the effect that ‘in  other words a computer print-
out produced by a computer that sorted and collated information would be inadmissible’ was 
incorrect. As a Namibian case and therefore not binding on South African courts, Miller J in S 
v Mashiyi and Another157 took a different view to O' Linn J in De Villiers’ and held that the 
‘decision in Harper's case was at the time of its making clearly correct’ and was ‘accepted as 
being so.’158 The case concerned the admissibility of documents ‘which were generated or 
compiled by the Medscheme computer system which were retrieved from the Medscheme 
computer system for purposes of this trial.’159 The business of Medscheme in the procedure it 
followed in respect of claims received, processed and paid, was in two ways, electronically or 
written or printed on paper. In the matter before trial, the court was only concerned with ‘so-
called’ paper claims received by mail and processed by clerks in the assessing department, 
which depending on the claim, which also involved an assessor who captured information on 
the computer, and the computer then made the calculations regarding the amount to be paid to 
the service provider: 
‘The documents in dispute are all computer print-outs. Unlike the documents which are not in 
dispute, which documents are also computer print-outs, but which merely contained 
information which has been obtained from original paper documents and stored in the computer 
system, the disputed documents contain information which has been processed by the 
computer. The information contained in the disputed documents has been obtained after 
 
156 Supra note 152 at 577. 
157 Mashiyi’s case supra note 129. 
158 Supra note 129 at 392. 
159 Supra note 129 at 388. 
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treatment by arrangement, sorting, synthesis and calculation by the computer. It is not only 
information that has been retrieved and stored from other documents or any other source.’160 
With the acknowledgement that ‘there have been no statutory developments relating to 
the admissibility as evidence of computer generated information, in criminal proceedings 
since Harper’s case’ 161  Miller J concluded that he was ‘therefore unable, in terms of the 
prevailing law to admit as evidence the disputed documents which contain information that has 
been processed and generated by a computer.’162 The ruling on the admissibility of computer 
generated documents as evidence during a criminal trial exposed a serious lacunae in the South 
African law. Miller J further added his ‘voice to the call that this lacunae in our law be filled 
and for new legislation relating specifically to computer evidence in criminal cases be 
considered and promulgated.’163 
The court in S v Ndiki and Others164 observed that ‘[t]his resulted in the issue regarding 
the admissibility of computer generated documents being approached from the wrong 
premises.’ On a reading of the Harper judgment, this is the correct interpretation. With 
reference ‘to the question as to whether or not a computer print-out is a document within the 
ordinary grammatical meaning of that word’, Milne J in Ndiki concluded that the computer 
printouts are documents within the meaning of ‘document’ in s 221(5)165 and proceeded to 
establish whether the conditions set out in s 221(1)(a) and (b) were met:  
‘It seems to me necessarily envisaged that, because of the development of modern commerce 
and the necessity to store records relating to large sums of money and large numbers of people, 
special provisions would have to be made making evidence admissible that would not be able 
to be subject to the ordinary rigorous test of cross-examination. In so doing the Legislature has, 
in addition to stipulating compliance with the above pre-requisites [in terms of s 221(1)(a)(b)], 
also enjoined the matters which are to be taken into account in estimating the weight to be 
attached to the statements, and I refer to the provisions of ss (3).’166 
 
160 Supra note 129 at 388-90. 
161 Supra note 129 at 393. 
162 Supra note 129 at 393.  
163 Supra note 129 at 393.  
164 2008 (2) SACR 252 (Ck) at 260. 
165 Harper’s case supra note 147 at 97: ‘It seems to me, therefore, that it is correct to interpret the word 
“document” in its ordinary grammatical sense, and that once one does so the computer print-outs themselves are 
admissible in terms of s 221. Once that situation has been achieved, then it seems to me that the main thrust of 
the attack upon the admissibility of these documents disappears.’ 
166 Supra note 147 at 97. The narrow interpretation of Harper was applied by Miller J in the earlier case Mashiyi 
case supra note 129, such that s 221 of the CPA 1977 was ‘misread’ to exclude computer printouts on the 
reasoning that the disputed documents contained information which had been processed by the computer. 
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These challenging issues, in addition the overly cumbersome technical requirements of 
the CEA 1983 led to growing calls for legislative reform.167 Although initially in 1987 the 
South African Law Reform Commission expressed contentment with the CEA 1983, 168 in 
1995 the Commission recommended its repeal.169 Despite the recommendations of the Law 
Reform Commission, no new legislation on electronic evidence was forthcoming. 170 
Legislative intervention eventually came, seven years later, in the form of the ECT Act 2002. 
The CEA 1983 was repealed in its entirety and replaced with the ECT Act 25 of 2002.171 
Notably, the ECT Act 2002 was led through parliamentary processes by the Department of 
Communications. Although the Department of Justice and Constitutional Development172 took 
part in the consultation process preceding the Act, it appears that neither the DoJCD nor the 








167 Hoffmann & Zeffertt op cit note 151 at 142: ‘(B)ecause of what has been held in S v Harper and Another as 
regards the non-admissibility of computer print-outs in terms of s 221 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1977 (at 
least when the computer has processed data) there is a need for legislation that relates specifically to computer 
evidence in criminal cases.’ 
168 South African Law Commission (Project 6) review of the law of evidence report (1987). At 28: ‘For the 
present the Commission is not convinced of an immediate need for a general investigation into the effectiveness 
of Act 57 of 1983.’ 
169 South African Law Commission (Project 95) Working Paper 60 Investigation into the Computer Evidence 
Act 56 of 1983 (1985) at iv. 
170 The Law Reform Commission later turned its attention to legislative reform proposals in respect of computer 
crime in two papers issues: (a) South African Law Commission Issue paper 14 (Project 108) Computer related 
crime: Options for reform in respect of unauthorised access to computers, unauthorised modification of 
computer data, and software applications, related to procedural aspects (1998); and (b)South African Law 
Commission Discussion Paper 99 (Project 108) Computer-related crime: Preliminary proposals for reform in 
respect of unauthorised access to computers, unauthorised modification of computer data and software 
applications and related procedural aspects (2001). 
171 In terms of s 92 of the ECT 2002 the provisions of the CEA1983 are repealed in its entirety. The provisions 
of the Civil Proceedings Evidence Act 25 of 1965 and the CPA 1977 remain relevant and may be used to assist 
with the admissibility of particular types of electronic evidence, such as trade or business records 
172 Hereafter ‘DoJCD’ 
173 Hofman op cit note 119 at 460. For details of the consultation phase, see A Green Paper on Electronic 
Commerce for South Africa (November 2000) co-ordinated and compiled by the Department of 
Communications, Republic of South Africa. 
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(iv)  Chapter III of the ECT Act 2002 and corresponding Model Law on Electronic Commerce 
The ECT Act 2002 is based on a resolution adopted by the General Assembly of the United 
Nations Commission on International Trade Law regarding electronic commerce,174 referred 
to as UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Commerce.175  Its purpose is stated as follows: 
‘The Model Law on Electronic Commerce (MLEC) purports to enable and facilitate commerce 
conducted using electronic means by providing national legislators with a set of internationally 
acceptable rules aimed at removing legal obstacles and increasing legal predictability for 
electronic commerce. In particular, it is intended to overcome obstacles arising from statutory 
provisions that may not be varied contractually by providing equal treatment to paper-based 
and electronic information. Such equal treatment is essential for enabling the use of paperless 
communication, thus fostering efficiency in international trade.’176 
As one of sixty member states of UNCITRAL, South Africa together with other 
‘implementing states’ sought to give effect to the MLEC by the enactment of the ECT Act 
2002, which is based on the provisions of the MLEC. In terms of its preamble, the ECT Act 
2002 endeavours inter alia ‘to provide for the facilitation and regulation of electronic 
communications and transactions’ and ‘to promote universal access to electronic 
communications and transactions and the use of electronic transactions.’ A key object of the 
ECT Act 2002 is to ‘promote legal certainty and confidence in respect of electronic 
communications and transactions.’177 Section 3 further provides that the Act ‘must not be 
interpreted so as to exclude any statutory law or the common law from being applied to, 
recognising or accommodating electronic transactions, data messages or any other matter 
provided for in this Act.’ 
The ECT Act 2002 creates legal certainty on issues such as the validity and 
enforceability of electronic contracts, the time and place of contract information, and 
 
174 Hereafter referred to as ‘UNICTRAL’. See United Nations Commission on International Trade Law Model 
Law on Electronic Commerce with Guide to Enactment (1996) with additional art 5bis adopted by resolution of 
General Assembly 51/162 of 6 December 1996 available at https://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/electcom 
/05-89450_Ebook.pdf, accessed 3 March 2020 (hereafter MLEC Guide to Enactment). 
175 UNCITRAL was established by the General Assembly in 1966 (Resolution 2205 (XXI) of 17 December 
1966). In the establishment of the Commission, the General Assembly recognised that disparities in national 
laws governing international trade created obstacles to the flow of trade, and it regarded the Commission as the 
vehicle by which the United Nations could play a more active role in reducing or removing these obstacles. See 
https://uncitral.un.org/en/about, accessed 1 August 2019.  
176 UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Commerce (1996) available at http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/ 
uncitral_texts/electronic_commerce/1996Model.html, accessed 1 August 2019. 
177 Section 2(e). 
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formalities such as ‘writing’, ‘signature’ and ‘original’. 178  In doing so, it promotes the 
objectives of the MLEC, which include enabling or facilitating the use of electronic commerce 
and providing equal treatment between paper-based documentation and computer-based 
information. 179  This is referred to as a ‘functional equivalence’ approach. 180  In a lucid 
approach, functional equivalence recognises differences in use of traditional paper-based 
documentation and its computer-based equivalent. In doing so, the functional equivalence 
approach regulates the ‘functions of the traditional paper-based requirement with a view to 
determining how those purposes or functions could be fulfilled through electronic-commerce 
techniques.’181 Specifically, the functional equivalent approach has been taken in articles 6 to 
8 of the MLEC with respect to the concepts of ‘writing’, ‘signature’ and ‘original’, which 
correspond similarly in ss 12, 13 and 14 of the ECT Act 2002. 
Chapter III of the ECT Act 2002 explicitly deals with the law of evidence, specifically 
s 15 under the heading ‘admissibility and evidential weight of data messages’. The term 
‘electronic evidence’ is not referred to  in any law governing the admissibility of evidence. As 
with the MLEC, the ECT Act 2002, refers to the output of information by/in an electronic 
medium as ‘data message’ or ‘electronic transaction’. To the extent appropriate these terms 
will be used interchangeably with the preferred term ‘electronic evidence’ as an all-
encompassing term, broad enough to reflect information in its electronic form or medium as 
being generated or stored by a computer or other device.182 The corresponding equivalent of s 
15 of the ECT Act 2002 in the MLEC is article 9. The functional equivalence approach, we are 
told, does not apply to s 15/article 9: ‘A data message, in and of itself, cannot be regarded as 
an equivalent of a paper document in that it is of a different nature and does not necessarily 
perform all conceivable functions of a paper document.’183 Does this make the ECT Act 2002 
less effective in its treatment of electronic evidence? If the conclusion to be drawn is that 
 
178 The long title of the ECT Act 2002 provides: ‘To provide for the facilitation and regulation of electronic 
communications and transactions; to provide for the development of a national e-strategy for the Republic; to 
promote universal access to electronic communications and transactions and the use of electronic transactions 
by SMME’s [small, medium and micro-enterprises]; to provide for human resource development in electronic 
transactions; to prevent abuse of information systems; to encourage the use of e-government services; and to 
provide for matters connected therewith.’ 
179 MLEC Guide to Enactment op cit note 174 at 17. 
180 Ibid at 20-21. 
181 Ibid at 20.  
182 Adapted from Mason’s definition of ‘electronic evidence’ as ‘data (compromising the output of analogue 
devices or data in digital format) that is created, manipulated, stored or communicated by any device, computer 
or computer system or transmitted over a communication system that is relevant to the process of adjudication. 
See S Mason ‘Sources of digital evidence’ in S Mason (ed) Electronic Evidence: Disclosure, Discovery and 
Admissibility (2007) para 2.03. 
183 MLEC Guide to Enactment op cit note 174 at 21.  
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electronic evidence with specific reference to the admissibility and evidential weight 
provisions in s 15 of the ECT Act 2002 ‘cannot be regarded as an equivalent of a paper 
document in that it is of a different nature’,184 should stricter standards for admissibility, 
generally, and in the context of authenticity and integrity apply to electronic evidence in 
contrast to traditional paper-based documentation?  
In an alternative consideration, if the objective is to create a ‘media-neutral 
environment’185 such that there is no discrimination or disparity in the treatment of traditional 
paper-based documentation and its computer-based equivalent,186 then surely the functional 
equivalence approach should apply to the s 15 evidential provisions with reference to ‘data 
messages’ as electronic evidence? Hofman observes: ‘[t]here is little point in making a data 
message legally effective in the same way as a document if the data message cannot be used as 
evidence in the same way.’187 The need for a more balanced approach is reflected in s 4(2)(a) 
of the ECT Act 2002 which reads188: ‘[t]his Act must not be construed as requiring any person 
to generate, communicate, produce, process, send, receive, record, retain, store or display any 
information, document or signature by or in electronic form.’ The MLEC is explicit in its 
objective and approach. The legal recognition of those situations where parties opt to use 
electronic means ‘merely indicates that the form in which certain information is presented or 
retained cannot be used as the only reason for which that information would be denied legal 
effectiveness, validity or enforceability [and] should not be misinterpreted as establishing the 
legal validity of any given data message or of any information contained therein.’189 In terms 
of implications for the South African courts interpreting the provisions of the ECT Act 2002, 
specifically chapter III on evidence, potentially a court should interpret the Act such that its 
provisions on electronic evidence is the functional equivalent of laws governing other forms of 
evidence, such as traditional paper-based documentation.190  
In terms of its application and its provisions for general admissibility does the ECT Act 
2002 make all data messages, and therefore all electronic evidence, admissible? If so, does this 
mean that electronic evidence is exempt from the exclusionary rules of evidence? If the ECT 
Act 2002 does not make all electronic evidence admissible, then establishing the relationship 
 
184 Ibid (emphasis added).  
185 Ibid at 17.  
186 Ibid at 31.  
187 Hofman op cit note 119 at 461-2. 
188 Ibid. 
189 MLEC Guide to Enactment op cit note 174 at 31.  
190 Hofman op cit note 119 at 462. 
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between chapter III of the ECT Act 2002 and other laws governing the admissibility of 
evidence is therefore important for understanding the provisions s 15 of the ECT Act 2002. 
Further, the ECT Act 2002 does not make a distinction between records of a computer that 
simply stored or recorded information, and records of ‘operations’ performed by a computer 
beyond ‘the mere storage or recording of information.’ Does this distinction fall away as means 
of facilitating the admissibility of electronic evidence because – arguably, s 15 makes all 




INTERCEPTION OF COMMUNICATIONS 
 
I INTRODUCTION 
This chapter is about interception of communications. The chapter will explore in Part II the 
legal framework for interception in the Regulation of Interception of Communications and 
Provision of Communication-Related Information Act 70 of 2000,1 including circumstances in 
which lawful interception can take place, authorisation procedures and the protection of 
privacy interests through prohibiting unlawful interceptions. Part III deals with existing 
challenges in the legal framework of RICA 2002. The key challenges identified are twofold: 
(a) the scope and breadth of investigative powers by law enforcement and the security and 
intelligence agencies; being (b) unconstrained by out-dated legislative frameworks that have 
expanded the scope of their activities and the extent of their capabilities in an information age 
of innovations in technology. The RICA 2002 has been the subject of legal challenge and Part 
IV considers the future of interception of communications in South Africa. A conclusion is 
drawn in Part V.  
 
II REGULATION OF INTERCEPTION OF COMMUNICATIONS AND PROVISION 
OF COMMUNICATION-RELATED INFORMATION ACT 70 OF 2002  
 
(a) The meaning of interception 
RICA 2002 describes the process of interception as one by which a person monitors, views or 
diverts a communication in the course of its transmission ‘so as to make some or all of the 
contents of a communication available to a person other than the sender or recipient or intended 
recipient of that communication.’2 The meaning of ‘intercept’ is important. It includes the 
‘acquisition of the contents of any communication’ through the ‘monitoring’ of a 
communication, the ‘viewing’ of the contents and the ‘diversion’ of an ‘indirect 
communication from its intended destination to any other destination.’ 3  Central to the 
definition of intercept is the acquisition of the content of the communication and to make all 
 
1 Hereafter ‘RICA 2002’. 
2 Section 1. 
3 Ibid. 
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or some of the content available to a person other than the intended recipient or sender. 
Therefore, it is not necessary that the entire contents of a communication is intercepted, and 
partial disclosure will also be covered by the legal provisions of RICA 2002. It is important to 
note that core to the relevant  provisions regulating interception is the contents of the 
communication. The definition of ‘contents’ is stated as ‘when used with respect to any 
communication, includes any information concerning the substance, purport or meaning of that 
communication.’4 Information about the communication, known as communications data, such 
as the IP address of geolocation data can assist to identify or provide the location of the 
sender/recipient. The acquisition of this type of data by law enforcement and the security and 
intelligence agencies is considered in chapter 3. It is important to note that use of this type of 
data is not an interception as envisaged by ss 2-11. 
 
(b) Unlawful interception  
Any interception of communications outside of RICA 2002 would be unlawful, and the Act 
specifically criminalises unlawful interception.5 It prohibits the intentional interception or 
authorisation of an interception of any communication in the course of its occurrence or 
transmission. Section 2 constitutes the key provision in this regard and prescribes prohibition 
of unlawful interceptions. This means that no person may intentionally intercept or attempt to 
interception any communication in occurrence or transmission by using interception or 
monitoring devices. All activity that monitors the traffic on a telecommunication system is 
covered by s 2 in terms of prohibition of interception. To monitor means to record 
communications, including the mere fact that a communication was sent or a site visited.6 The 
definition of ‘communication’ is stated to ‘include both a direct communication and an indirect 
communication.’ Indirect communications include  a message or a part thereof in the form of 
data, text, visual images (text or symbols) in the subject line, text or symbols in filling in 
recipient’s address and any other form or combination of forms.7  
 
4 The term ‘contents’ in relation to any communication ‘includes any information concerning the substance, 
purport or meaning of that communication.’ The term ‘communication’ is defined to include ‘both a direct 
communication and an indirect communication’. 
5 Chapter 9, s 47-57.  
6 Section 1. 
7 Section 1. This definition is adopted directly from the Interception and Monitoring Prohibition Amendment 
Bill 1999, referred earlier in chapter 1 as proposed by the South African Law Reform Commission. Whereas the 
Law Reform Commission proposed this as the definition of ‘communication’ (clause 1(b)), RICA 2002 has 
adopted verbatim the definition of ‘communication’ as ‘indirect communications’. See South African Law 
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 The prohibition in s 2 refers to the interception of communications ‘in the course of its 
occurrence or transmission.’ This is the key part of the offence. On the issue of ‘in the course 
of its occurrence or transmission’ in what circumstances is it considered an interception? If law 
enforcement and security and intelligence agencies ‘view or hear’ the content of a 
communication after it has reached the intended recipient, or even at the same time as the 
recipient, does this amount to interception?8 By reference to the wording in s 2 ‘in the course 
of its occurrence or transmission’ the answer is that it is not an interception.9 Is it the case that 
interception is only when the communication is ‘moving’ or transient, that is, literally listening 
during a call or intercepting as a voice message was being left for the recipient or reading an 
email after the sender has ‘hit send’ as the communications are ‘in the course of its occurrence 
or transmission?’ In other words, once a voice message has reached a recipients’ voicemail or 
an email has reached the recipients’ inbox (but not yet accessed), there can be no interception 
because the course of ‘occurrence or transmission’ of the communication has been 
completed?10 RICA 2002 addresses such situations where a communication is awaiting in a 
stored space until it accessed by the intended recipient. For example, a voice message or email 
communication that is awaiting in a stored system for the intended recipient to access is 
considered to be ‘in the course of its occurrence or transmission’ and thus capable of being 
intercepted. 
The offence of unlawful interception in s 2 must be read in conjunction with s 1(2)(a) 
of RICA 2002 which extends the meaning of interception ‘if and only if’ the interception is 
effected in the case of – (i) a direct communication, in the course if its occurrence; or (ii) an 
indirect communication, in the course of its transmission; and s 1(2)(b) that the time which an 
indirect communication is being transmitted includes ‘any time when the telecommunication 
system by means of which such indirect communication is being, or has been, transmitted is 
used for storing it in a manner than enables the intended recipient to collect it or otherwise 
have access to it.’11 In other words, specifically s 1(2)(b) has the effect of applying to messages, 
such as voice messages, stored and awaiting to be accessed by the intended recipient. The 
 
Commission (Project 105) Review of Security Legislation Report The Interception and Monitoring Prohibition 
Act 127 of 1992 (1999). 
8 AA Gillespie Cybercrime: Key Issues and Debates (2019) at 81.  
9 See R (on the application of NTL) v Crown Court at Ipswich [2003] QB 131 (UK). 
10 See R v Coulson et al [2014] EWCA Crim 1119 (UK) at 1133 where the Court of Appeal rejected arguments 
that there could not be interception, and noted that the applicable legislation did not have a time limit on 
interception, or that any storage of the communications had to be transient for interception to apply or have any 
restrictions that such communications could only be read or heard once.  
11 Emphasis added. 
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section expressly mentions communications stored on a telecommunication system, including 
those made after transmission. Therefore, accessing those stored communications that have not 
yet been accessed by the intended recipient amounts to interception within the prescripts of 
RICA 2002 where they are accessed by someone else.   
Reference to ‘by means of a postal service or telecommunication system’ reflects the 
technicalities of interception at the time RICA 2002 was enacted into law, when postal services 
were the commonly used means of communication, and telephones used mainly for calls and 
voice messages. The technicalities of how law enforcement and security and intelligence 
agencies, in the era of the information age, intercept communications have changed 
significantly since the early 2000s. Interception is no longer limited to letters via postal 
services, landline telephones, voice messages on answering machines or basic mobile phone 
technology. Emails, instant messaging applications such as WhatsApp, and social networking 
sites, which allow both voice and video calls, are now mainstream and dominant means of 
communication. Much has been made of the concept of ‘technology neutrality’ and recognition 
of the fact that technology advancements, now in the information age evolves far too rapidly 
for technology-specific legislation. It is for this reason, probably, that parliament deliberately 
did not define ‘electronic’ or ‘computer’ or other technology-specific definitions in RICA 
2002, and why the Act has remained in operation for more than eighteen years.12  
The risk that the law would always fall behind the pace of technology because of the 
time required to amend existing legislation, or introduce new legislation, is undoubtedly a 
constant challenge for lawmakers, especially in the context of electronic evidence in criminal 
proceedings. The time for law reform and review of RICA 2002, eighteen years since coming 
into law, is now long overdue. In choosing the most appropriate and effective solutions in law 
to technological advancements in the information age, it is important that the legislation 
remains dynamic, and in leaving it to the courts, could be applied dynamically.13 Walden 
proposes two variants of the principle of technology neutrality that will need to be considered: 
(a) to the extent ‘that which is regulated offline should be regulated online’; and (b) the need 
to treat different types of technologies in a similar manner to the extent that they perform to 
 
12 See EURIM submission to the APIG Report on Communications Data (January 2003) as quoted in I Walden 
Computer Crimes and Digital Investigations (2007) at 60: ‘[t]he moment you try and do definitions which rely 
on some kind of implicit technology model, then you know that those definitions are doomed, certainly within 
ten years and probably within five.’ 
13 Gillespie op cit note 8 at 3, 80-81.  
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the same effect.14 As regards the former, this could potentially be the ‘functional equivalent’15 
approach in the use of traditional paper-based documentation and its computer-based 
equivalent referred to in chapter 1 earlier. 
However, a criticism of a technology neutral approach in terms of criminal procedure 
and evidence is that traditional notions of content (interception) and communications data, such 
that the latter is considered less intrusive than the former, is problematic and no longer 
sustainable in a year 2020 information age. The technology neutral approach of RICA 2002 
now means that law enforcement and the security and intelligence agencies have access to 
significant amounts of sensitive and revealing information, but under less protection than that 
of accessing the contents of information. This is a worrying trend. A failure to recognise the 
unique features of advancements in technology by applying historical distinctions have been 
noted by Hosein and Pascal: ‘[a]ttempts to be technology-neutral should be interrogated, lest 
in our blindness we reduce democratic protections and oversight under the deterministic veil 
of progress.’ 16  The RICA 2002 has been the subject of a successful constitutional legal 
challenge.17 If  South African lawmakers in updating the legislative frameworks in RICA 2002, 
insist on applying traditional investigative powers to new technologies through the continued 
adoption of technology-neutrality principles, it is important they recognise that state access to 
significant amounts of information is now the norm and stronger protections of privacy 
interests should be applied.18 
 
(c) Lawful authority for interception 
In terms of s 49(1) of RICA 2002: ‘Any person who intentionally intercepts or attempts to 
intercept, or authorises or procures any other person to intercept or attempt to intercept, at any 
place in the Republic, any communication in the course of its occurrence or transmission, is 
guilty of an offence.’ Sections 3-11 of RICA 2002 provide exceptions to the prohibition on 
 
14 Walden op cit note 12 at 60. See also B-J Koops ‘ Should ICT regulation be technology neutral’ in B-J Koops 
et al (eds) Starting Points for ICT Regulation (2006) 77-108. 
15 UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Commerce (1996) available at http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/ un 
citral_texts/electronic_commerce/1996Model.html, accessed 1 August 2019. 
16 I Hosein and A Pascual ‘Understanding traffic data and deconstructing technology-neutral regulations (2002) 
at available at 8 http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download;jsessionid=55CB1A20C3B31F16872328C4273 
EED 75?doi=10.1.1.475.5291&rep=rep1&type=pdf, accessed 12 March 2020.  
17 Press release ‘AmaB challenges snooping law’ 20 April 2017 available at https://amabhungane.org/advocacy/ 
advocacy-amab-challenges-snooping-law/, accessed 19 June 2019.  
18 This issue is also considered further in chapter 3 analysis of communications data under the heading ‘the 
envelope is the content’.  
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interception and monitoring of communications, whereby in certain instances, interception of 
communication is: (a) permitted under an interception direction (s 3); (b) by an individual/law 
enforcement officer who is a party to the communication (s 4); (c) by prior consent of the party 
to the communication (s 5); (d) in the course of carrying on with business (ss 6 and 10); (e) to 
prevent serious bodily harm (s 7); (f) to determine a location in the event of emergency (s 8); 
(g) authorised by other legislation (s 9); and (h) for the purposes of managing radio frequency 
spectrum (s 11). Lawful authority for interception is through a warrant, referred to in RICA 
2002 as an interception direction. The interception direction must be approved by a designated 
judge. Application to a designated judge for the issuing of an interception direction is set out 
in s 16-25 of RICA 2002. In terms of s 16(1) ‘an applicant may apply to a designated judge for 
the issuing of an interception direction’ which in terms of 16(5) may only be issued for 
specified purposes, including for the prevention and detection of ‘serious offences’ or in the 
interests of ‘national security or compelling national economic interests’ if the ‘reasonable 
grounds to believe’ threshold have been met. 
In terms of s 1 ‘interception direction’ is stated to mean ‘a direction issued under s 16(3) 
or 18(3)(a) and which authorises the interception, at any place in the Republic, of any 
communication in the course of its occurrence or transmission, and includes an oral 
interception direction issued under s 23(7).’ This is a key prescription of the legislation. The 
interception of communications in South African law as regulated by RICA 2002 is applicable 
only to domestic signal interception by express reference to ‘at any place in the Republic.’ In 
other words, the conduct of interception is only lawful if the interception is effected solely for 
communications ‘in the course of its occurrence or transmission’ within South Africa, 
approved by a designated judge and for certain specified purposes. In effect, the type of 
interception regulated by RICA 2002 is specifically for ‘targeted’ interceptions.  
Technological advancements have arguably blurred the distinction between domestic 
and foreign signals, and the technicalities of signal interception potentially mean that 
interception of foreign signals would capture the communications of persons sending and 
receiving communications within the borders of South Africa. 19  An important distinction 
between domestic and foreign signals could be information collected from systems such as 
 
19 See ‘Signals intelligence’ available at https://www.globalsecurity.org/intell/library/policy/army/fm/2-
0/chap8.htm, accessed 20 March 2020. For example, ‘communications intelligence’ (COMINT) that involves 
technical and intelligence information derived from intercept of foreign communications.  
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radars and other weapons systems, 20 or signals detected from weapons under testing and 
development.21 The key issue is the basis of lawful authority for foreign signal interception. 
This is because RICA 2002 only applies to domestic signal interception. If the communication 
to be intercepted originates outside South Africa, or passes through systems and services 
located outside South Africa (such as Facebook, WhatsApp or Gmail), or terminates within the 
borders of South Africa, even if sender and recipient are in South Africa, is there a law in South 
Africa regulating foreign signal interception if this is not regulated by RICA 2002? 
Further, if RICA 2002 is the lawful authority for ‘targeted’ interceptions as approved 
by a designated judge and for certain specified purposes, what is the lawful authority for ‘bulk’ 
interceptions in South Africa? The position of privacy and civil liberties groups is that there 
are no laws regulating foreign signal interception and bulk interception in South Africa. The 
counter argument by the state is that lawful authority for the conduct of interception of foreign 
signals and communications in bulk is the National Strategic Intelligence Act 39 of 1994.22 
These key issues are considered in detail further below.  
 
III WHY SHOULD WE BE CONCERNED ABOUT THE INTERCEPTION OF 
COMMUNICATIONS IN SOUTH AFRICA? 
RICA 2002 has been subject to significant criticisms, and recently the subject of legal 
challenge.23 Underlying majority of the criticisms is a fundamental concern regarding the 
scope and breadth of these investigatory powers. RICA 2002 was written before the onset of a 
modern fast-paced environment of technological advancements in the information age 
dominated by connectivity, data and devices. As an inherently backward looking piece of 
legislation, a key challenge is that RICA 2002 has not kept pace with the gamut of technological 
change, and concerns identified below are intensified such that the powers of law enforcement 
 
20 Referred as ‘electronic intelligence (ELINT). See ‘Intelligence: Signals intelligence’ available at https://www. 
cia.gov/new s-information/featured-story-archive/2010-featured-story-archive/intelligence-signals-intelligence-
1.html, accessed 20 March 2020.  
21 Referred as ‘foreign instrumentation signals intelligence’ (FISINT). See ‘Intelligence: Signals intelligence’ op 
cit note 20. 
22 Hereafter ‘NSI Act 1994’. See ‘Interception of communication and the NCC’ in Ministerial Review 
Commission Intelligence in a Constitutional Democracy 10 September 2008 Final Report to the Minster for 
Intelligence Services, the Honourable Mr Ronnie Kasrils MP (hereafter ‘The Matthews Commission’) at 180 
available at http://www.lse.ac.uk/international-development/Assets/Documents/PDFs/csrc-background-papers 
/Intelligence-In-a-Constitutional-Democracy.pdf, accessed 05 January 2016. 
23 amaBhungane Centre for Investigative Journalism NPC and SP Sole v Minister of Justice and Correctional 
Services and Others Case No: 25978/2017 (16 September 2019), subject to confirmation by the Constitutional 
Court. See applicants’ heads of argument available at https://amabhungane.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/ 
190212_amaB-heads-of-argument.pdf, accessed 24 March 2020. See also op cit note 77 below.  
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and the security and intelligence agencies are ‘left virtually unconstrained and unsupervised by 
out-dated legislative frameworks’ and ‘have unilaterally expanded the scope of their activities 
and the extent of their capabilities.’24 In a report dated 27 April 2016, the United Nations 
Human Rights Committee expressed hard-hitting criticisms of South Africa’s interception of 
communications practices under RICA 2002.25 The Committee specifically raised concerns 
about ‘relatively weak safeguards, oversight and remedies against unlawful interference with 
the right to privacy, 26  and ‘reports of unlawful surveillance practices, including mass 
interception of communications carried out by the National Communications Centre.’27 It was 
also concerned about the wide scope of the data retention regime under RICA 2002.28 The 
Committee recommended that the South African government ‘should take all measures 
necessary to ensure that its surveillance activities conform to its obligations under the 
Covenant, including article 17’29 and that any interference by the state with the right to privacy 
comply with the principles of legality, necessity and proportionality.30 The Committee further 
expressly recommended that the South African government should cease ‘engaging in mass 
surveillance of private communications without prior judicial authorization…and consider 
revoking or limiting the requirement for mandatory retention of data by third parties.’31 It was 
also emphasised that the state should also ensure that interception is carried out ‘only according 
to the law and under judicial supervision.’32 It was recommended that the state ‘should increase 
the transparency’33 of its legal regime and policies governing surveillance practice. Further, 
that it should ‘speedily establish independent oversight mechanisms to prevent abuses and 
ensure that individuals have access to effective remedies.’34  
 
24 Don’t Spy on Us ‘Don’t spy on us: Reforming surveillance in the UK’ September 2014 at 10 available at 
https://www.dontspyonus.org.uk/assets/files/pdfs/reports/DSOU_Reforming_surveillance.pdf, accessed 23 
February 2018. See also ‘Don’t Spy on Us: Response to the Inquiries into Privacy and Surveillance’ September 
2015 available at https://www.dontspyonus.org.uk/assets/site/dontspyonus/files/DSOU_Response _report_ WE 
B.pdf, accessed 23 February 2018. 
25 United Nations Human Rights Committee ‘Concluding observations on the initial report of South Africa’ 
CCPR/C/ZAF/CO/1 27 April 2016 available at http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/treatybodyexternal/Down 
load.aspx?symbolno=CCPR% 2FC% 2FZAF%2FCO%2F1&Lang=en, accessed 29 February 2018. 
26 Ibid at 8 para 42. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Article 17 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights reads: ‘1. No one shall be subjected to 
arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on 
his honour and reputation. 2. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or 
attacks’ available at http://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/ccpr.aspx, accessed 02 March 2018. 






The current framework of RICA 2002 on the investigative powers of interception is 
explored in this section. In the analysis, the concerns are identified as requiring essential reform 
necessary in South African law to protect against unlawful and arbitrary interference with the 
right to privacy balanced against the need to protect the capabilities of law enforcement and 
the security and intelligence agencies, particularly as these competing interests struggle under 
‘the strain of technological evolution on society.’35 The bulk of concerns, in general, fall into 
the following categories: (a) interception of communications carried out by the National 
Communications Centre; (b) notification of interception; (c) threshold for conducting 
interception of communications; (d) lack of any adversarial processes; and (e) appointment of 
designated judges and independence. 
 
(a) Interception of communications carried out by the National Communications Centre 
The RICA 2002 provides for the establishment of interception centres, including the Office for 
Interception Centres.36 The OIC is responsible for executing interception directions issued by 
the designated judge. The OIC operate under the prescripts of RICA 2002 ‘for the interception 
of communications in terms of this Act.’37 This means that in terms of its operations, the OIC 
focuses on the interception of domestic signals within the lawful authority of RICA 2002 to be 
approved by a designated judge and for certain specified purposes. 
A separate entity, the National Communications Centre,38 is the state’s national facility 
for intercepting and collecting electronic signals. The NCC, as the state’s main interception 
facility, ‘monitors the signals of ‘targets’ being known persons or organisations that have been 
identified for intelligence monitoring.’39 It also undertakes ‘“environmental scanning” which 
entails random monitoring of signals through the Centre’s bulk monitoring capability.’40 Its 
capabilities thus include interception of communications, both targeted and in bulk. The NCC 
is currently part of the State Security Agency,41 and by its nature operates under high levels of 
secrecy. The operational activities of the NCC, although not transparent or in any way or  
 
35 Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies A democratic license to operate: Report of 
the independent surveillance review (July 2015) available at https://rusi.org/sites/default/files/20150714_whr_2-
15_a_democratic_licence_to_operate.pdf, accessed January 2018 at ix (hereafter ‘RUSI’). 
36 Hereafter ‘OIC’. See RICA 2002, s 32-37.  
37 Section 32(1)(a).  
38 Hereafter ‘NCC’.  
39 The Matthews Commission op cit note 22 at 180. 
40 Ibid. 
41 Hereafter ‘SSA’, previously known as the National Intelligence Agency (hereafter ‘NIA’). 
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accountable to the public, are subject to the oversight of the Inspector-General of Intelligence.42 
What is known through oversight by the I-GI, a commission of inquiry, independent research 
and reports by civil liberties groups, is that bulk interception facilities located at the NCC and 
operated by the SSA do exist in South Africa and focus on foreign signal interception. The 
clients of the NCC include the South African Secret Service, the South African Police Services 
and the Financial Intelligence Centre. 
The term ‘bulk interception’ commonly refers to a process of obtaining large volumes 
of untargeted information from a wide range of people, most of whom are unlikely to be of 
interest to enforcement and security and intelligence agencies. An understanding of what this 
means to the state was recently presented in its response to a legal challenge to RICA 2002: 
‘Bulk surveillance in an internationally accepted method of strategically monitoring 
transnational signals, in order to screen them for certain cue words or key phrases. The national 
security objective is to ensure that the State is secured against transnational threats. It is 
basically done through the tapping of transnational signals, including, in some case, undersea 
fibre optic cables. … intelligence obtained from the interception of electromagnetic, acoustic 
and other signals, including the equipment that produces such signals. It includes any 
communication that emanates from outside the borders of [South Africa] and passes through or 
ends in [South Africa].43  
The investigative power of bulk interception is controversial. It is recognised that 
interception of communications in bulk is a vital tool to detect and contribute to the prevention 
of criminal activity, for intelligence and evidence gathering purposes to be able to identify 
threats and/or speedily establish links in criminal investigations. The associated technical 
process involves the use of ‘equipment interference’ and ‘bulk equipment interference.’44 The 
use of such techniques varies in complexity and scale. Equipment interference is a term used 
to gain covert access to information relating to a number of devices linked to ‘thematic’ 
investigations or operations. 45  ‘Bulk equipment interference’ is similar to ‘equipment 
interference’ but on a larger scale and performed without any known links between the 
 
42 Hereafter ‘I-GI’. The I-GI is a state entity tasked with the oversight of intelligence services. 
43 amaBhungane case supra note 23 para 143, the state’s response to concerns related to bulk interception in 
South Africa.   
44 Ibid. 
45 Home Office Gov.UK ‘Fact sheet: equipment interference’ 4 March 2016 available at https://assets.publishin 
g.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/530554/Equipment_Interference_Fa
ctsheet.pdf, accessed 21 June 2019. 
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targets/suspects.46 For example, this may involve the access to information from devices in a 
particular location in order to identify persons of interest. Therefore, this means that most 
information caught by such means will be irrelevant to any criminal or national security 
investigation and will contain significant details about innocent individuals whom are in no 
way implicated in an investigation or operation. Given the intrusive nature of the acquisition 
of the content of communications in bulk, especially at the stage that data is selected for 
examination, it is imperative that any regulation of bulk interception ensure constraints on a 
process that would effectively allow a ‘limitless number of unidentified individuals’ to have 
their communications intercepted.47 Regulation should also ensure that state can continue to 
acquire content data of communications in bulk, only when it is necessary and proportionate 
to do so and in full compliance with the law and under judicial supervision.  
The investigative power of bulk interception therefore cannot take place without lawful 
authority for doing so.48 If the ‘targeted’ interception of communications in South African law 
is regulated by RICA 2002 and is applicable only to domestic signal interception by express 
reference to ‘at any place in the Republic’ in terms of s 16(3) or 18(3)(a), what is the lawful 
authority for foreign signal interception and bulk interception by the NCC? 
In August 2006, the then Minister for Intelligence Services, Mr Ronnie Kasrils MP 
established the Ministerial Review Commission on Intelligence,49 with the aim of the review 
being ‘to strengthen mechanisms of control of the civilian intelligence structures in order to 
ensure full compliance and alignment with the Constitution, constitutional principles and the 
rule of law, and particularly to minimise the potential for illegal conduct and abuse of power.’50 
At the time, the catalyst for the establishment of the Commission was the intelligence crisis of 
2005 and 2006 involving the National Intelligence Agency 51  and indications of possible 
 
46 Home Office Gov.UK ‘Investigatory Powers Bill: Bulk powers’ 4 March 2016 available at https://assets. 
publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/530549/Bulk_Powers_Fact
sheet.pdf, accessed 21 June 2019.  
47 See Home Office Gov.UK ‘Fact sheets and guidance relating to the Investigatory Powers Bill’ 4 March 2016 
available at https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/investigatory-powers-bill-fact-sheets, accessed 21 
June 2019. 
48 Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of SA and Another: In Re Ex Parte President of The Republic of 
South Africa and Others 2000 (2) Sa 674 (CC) para 20: ‘The exercise of all public power must comply with the 
Constitution, which is the supreme law, and the doctrine of legality, which is part of that law.’ 
49 The Matthews Commission op cit note 22. 
50 Ibid at 27 and Appendix A at 286. 
51 Hereafter ‘NIA’. 
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misconduct and illegality of surveillance operations against a prominent businessman and 
political figure.52  
The following, inter alia, was presented to the Commission on the activities of the NCC: 
(a) the NCC collects signals intelligence and the mandate to do so derives from s 2 of the NSI 
Act 1994; 53 (b) the formation of the NCC flowed from a recommendation by the Pikoli 
Commission in 1996 that government should establish a single, national signals intelligence 
facility; (c) Cabinet accepted the Pikoli Commission’s recommendation to establish the NCC 
as a separate entity but declined to introduce legislation governing its activities; (d) in June 
2008, the then Minister for Intelligence Services, Mr Ronnie Kasrils MP tabled the Intelligence 
Services Amendment Bill and the National Strategic Intelligence Amendment Bill,54 which 
sought to provide for the establishment of the NCC and intended to ensure the legality and 
constitutionality of the NCC’s operations.55  
Preceding the findings of the Matthews Commission, the illegality and abuse of bulk 
interception powers by the NCC was documented by the I-GI: 
‘The targeting of South African individuals through the interception of their voice 
communications by means of the bulk scanning facilities of the National Communications 
Centre (NCC) was not in keeping with the practice and culture of bulk interceptions, the normal 
focus of which is the targeted bulk interception of foreign communications. These facilities 
were used in a way that constituted a gross abuse of the bulk interception facilities of the NCC 
and constituted a circumvention of the legal interceptions regime provided….’56 
In its submission to the Matthews Commission, the I-GI found the following in relation 
to the NCC: (a) ‘[t]here is no legislative mandate for the NCC and electronic collection of 
signals; (b) [t]he regulatory framework governing the NCC’s special powers is incomplete; (c) 
bulk interceptions are not usually subject to judicial control; and (d) [t]here is a lack of internal 
compliance mechanisms for operational activities.’57 The I-GI recommended that there should 
 
52 The Matthews Commission op cit note 22 at 26, 27. See footnote 2: Office of the Inspector-General of 
Intelligence ‘Executive summary of the final report on the findings of an investigation into the legality of the 
surveillance operations carried out by the NIA on Mr S Macozoma: Extended terms of reference report on the 
authenticity of the allegedly intercepted e-mails’ media briefing, 23 March 2006, available at www.intelli 
gence.gov.za/OversightControl/IG%20Exec%20Summary%2023%20Mar%2006.doc, accessed 05 January 
2016. 
53 Referring to ‘functions relating to intelligence’ in the Act. 
54 Hereafter ‘NCC Bill’.  
55 The Matthews Commission op cit note 22 at 182-84. In 2002 and 2008, Cabinet declined the opportunity to 
introduce legislation regulating NCC and its operational activities.  
56 Office of the Inspector-General of Intelligence op cit note 52 at 18.  
57 Submissions of the Inspector-General of Intelligence op cit note 52 referred in the final report of the 
Matthews Commission op cit note 22 at 184-185. 
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be ‘clearly defined parameters’ and ‘a statutory mandate and proper regulations’ regarding the 
operation activities of the NCC in order to minimise the risks of abuse and illegality.58  
The Commission’s report dated 10 September 2008, was addressed as the ‘Final Report 
to the Minister for Intelligence Services, the Honourable Mr Ronnie Kasrils, MP.’59 The main 
findings of the Commission noted that the mandate of South Africa’s intelligence agencies had 
become hopelessly politicised by being ‘drawn into the realm of party politics’60 and thus 
engaged in ‘unlawful and unconstitutional’61 monitoring and investigation of ‘legal political 
activity’ 62  and in doing so ‘undermined political rights that are entrenched in the 
Constitution.’63 The Commission stated that the ‘the politicisation of the intelligence process 
and product [had] a high risk of impairing the Agency’s command and control, oversight, 
accountability and ability to serve the national interest.’64 The Commission further found that 
accountability of the intelligence agencies to the public was weak, a ‘consequence of excessive 
secrecy’65 and that the mandate of the intelligence agencies was overly broad such that the 
agencies had come to see themselves as the main watchdog of society, almost separate to, and 
above the constitutional and democratic order.66 
Concerned that ‘intelligence organisations have not shed sufficiently the apartheid-era 
security obsession with secrecy’ 67  the Commission made ‘concrete recommendations’ in 
relation to transparency and oversight that included: (a) parliamentary consultation and 
debate, 68  (b) promulgation of ministerial regulations on intelligence in the Government 
Gazette, 69 (c) that ‘executive policy on intelligence and the operations of the intelligence 
 
58 Ibid. 
59 According to reports by the Right2Know campaign: ‘Though its findings were explosive, the Commission’s 
report has been officially sidelined on a technicality – it was ‘leaked’ to the media before being tabled before 
Cabinet. This has allowed state officials to refuse to recognise the report, saying it has “no status” because it 
was not properly processed.’ See Right2Know ‘Big Brother Exposed: Stories of South Africa’s intelligence 
structures monitoring and harassing activist movements’ at 14 available at https://www.r2k.org.za/category/pub 
lications/, accessed February 2019. 
60 The Matthews Commission op cit note 22 at 180 at 10. 
61 Ibid at 18. At 180: ‘the NCC appears to be engaged in signals monitoring that is unlawful and unconstitutional 
because it does not comply with the relevant legislation [RICA 2002 which prohibits the interception without 
judicial authorisation]. Similarly, the NIA policy on interception of communication is inconsistent with the 
Constitution and legislation.’ 
62 Ibid at 10. 
63 Ibid. 
64 Ibid. 
65 Ibid at 11. 
66 Ibid at 71-76. 
67 Ibid at 22 and 229. 
68 Ibid at 277. 
69 Ibid at 278. 
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services should be in the public domain70 (d) publication of annual reports of the intelligence 
services;71 and (e) endorsing the recommendation of the Auditor-General that ‘audit reports on 
the intelligence services be presented to Parliament as public documents, subject to the 
withholding of sensitive information as permitted by law.’72 
The Commission’s final report also made a number of important recommendations that 
the intelligence mandate of the key agencies should be ‘narrowed’ to focus primarily on serious 
crimes such as terrorism, organised crime, large-scale violence and systemic corruption, and 
not be ‘acting as a secret watchdog over political activity, political parties and government.’ 73 
Importantly, the Commission recommended the ‘NCC may not intercept the communication 
of a targeted person unless it has obtained an interception direction issued by the designated 
judge as provided for in RICA.’74 Further, that immediate steps should be taken to ensure that 
its policies and procedures on the interception provide for ministerial approval and judicial 
authorisation, and are in alignment with the Constitution and legislation.75 
All of this however was, and continued to be ignored with impunity by the state. In 
many ways, twelve years after the Matthews Commission, South Africa’s intelligence agencies 
appear to remain hopelessly politicised.76 Evidence of abuse and ‘inappropriate’ interest in 
‘lawful political and social activities’ by law enforcement and security and intelligence 
agencies in South Africa have been widely documented by the Right2Know campaign and the 




72 Ibid at 142-43. 
73 Ibid. 
74 Ibid at 300. 
75 Ibid. 
76 See earlier chapter 1 at 32 for incidents cited by amaBhungane Centre for Investigative Journalism in its legal 
challenge to the constitutionality of RICA 2002. 
77 Right2Know ‘SPOOKED: Surveillance of journalists in SA’ (June 2018) available at https://www.sanef.org. 
za/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/R2K-Surveillance-of-Journalists-Report-2018-web.pdf., accessed 17 June 2019; 
Right2Know ‘Big Brother exposed: Stories of South Africa’s intelligence structures monitoring and harassing 
activist movements’ available at https://www.r2k.org.za/category/publications/, accessed February 2019; 
Right2Know ‘Stop the surveillance! Activist guide to RICA and state surveillance in SA’ available at 
https://www.r2k.org.za/category/publications/, accessed February 2019; Right2Know ‘The Surveillance State: 
Communications surveillance and privacy in South Africa’ available at https://www.r2k.org.za/category/publi 
cations/, accessed February 2019; H Swart ‘Communications surveillance by the South African intelligence 
services’ (February 2016) available at https://www.mediaanddemocracy.com/ uploads/1/6/5/7/16577624/ 
comms-surveillance-nia-swart_feb2016.pdf, accessed February 2019; A Mare ‘An analysis of the 
communications surveillance legislative framework in South Africa’ (November 2015) available at https://www. 
mediaanddemocracy.com/uploads/1/6/5/7/16577624/comms-surveillance-framework_mare2.pdf, accessed 
February 2019; A Mare ‘A qualitative analysis of how investigative journalists, civic activists, lawyers and 
academics are adapting to and resisting communications surveillance in South Africa’ (March 2016) available at 
https://www.mediaand democracy.com/uploads/1/6/5/7/16577624/duncan_2_comm_surveillance.pdf, accessed 
February 2019.  
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focus on ‘state spying’ have targeted journalists whom have uncovered corruption, state 
capture, and abuse of power by the intelligence and prosecuting agencies in South Africa.78 
It is important to note that the Matthews Commission brought to the fore arguments by 
the state in 2008 that the interception of communications by the NCC lies beyond the prescripts 
of RICA 2002, and again in 2019 when RICA 2002 was the subject of legal challenge.79 RICA 
2002 prohibits interception of communications without lawful authority of a designated judge, 
which may only be approved for specified purposes. It was argued by the state that the signals 
operations by the NCC did not fall within the definition of ‘intercept’.80 Having regard to the 
definition of ‘intercept’ and ‘communication’ referred to earlier, which includes both direct 
and indirect communications, it is clear that the NCC’s signals operations are covered by the 
prescripts of RICA 2002.81 A further argument by the state in defence of the operational 
activities of the NCC being outside the prescripts of RICA 2002 is that RICA 2002 regulates 
the investigative activities of law enforcement, whereas interception of communications by the 
NCC is concerned with intelligence.82 This is an erroneous position. The RICA 2002 applies 
to law enforcement and the security and intelligence agencies, specifically by reference to s 1 
in which ‘applicant’ in the warrantry processes, includes inter alia officers of South African 
police and members of the intelligence services.83 
Another concern is that RICA 2002 does not provide a statutory basis for the use of 
equipment interference, targeted or in bulk. With no legal framework, it is not clear where, 
when, how and on what basis these sensitive techniques may be exercised. Further, there is 
also no legal framework for how data from bulk datasets is selected for examination. The lack 
of a statutory footing means that there is no constraint that ensures that the collection of data 
would be limited to only that which would be relevant to an investigation or operation.84 
Reports of unlawful activities by the intelligence agencies are indicative that gaps and 
weaknesses in the legislative framework of RICA 2002 appear to have been exploited to gather 
more information than was previously available, including significant details and movements 
about individuals whom are in no way implicated in any criminal or national security 
investigations. This was a key finding in the legal challenge to the constitutionality of RICA 
 
78 Right2Know ‘SPOOKED’ op cit note 77 at 2. 
79 amaBhungane case supra note 23 paras 147-166.  
80 The Matthews Commission op cit note 22 at 188. 
81 Ibid. 
82 Ibid at 188. 
83 Ibid at 188. See also RICA 2002, s 16(3) and (5). 
84 G Hosein and CW Palow ‘Modern safeguards for modern surveillance: An analysis of innovations in 
communications surveillance techniques’ (2013) 74.6 Ohio State LJ 1071 at 1090. 
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2002 by amaBhungane Centre for Investigative Journalism.85 The state contended that the NSI 
Act 1994 authorised bulk interceptions and relied specifically on s 2, as a function of the 
Agency, 86 stated throughout as its operative provision: ‘to gather, correlate, evaluate and 
analyse domestic and foreign intelligence (excluding foreign military intelligence).’87 The state 
also referred to s 2A(5) dealing with the role of the SSA to vet relevant members of the national 
intelligence structures for security clearances, which on a plain reading however does not 
contain any lawful authority for bulk interceptions.88 Section 2A(5) refers to ‘in the prescribed 
manner, gather information’ relating to (a) criminal records; (b) financial records; (c) personal 
information; or (d) any other personal information relevant to determine the security clearance 
of a person. Neither (a) nor (b) apply to interception. With regard to (c) personal information 
(which is not defined in the Act) and (d) any other personal information, arguably, this may 
apply to targeted interception for vetting purposes, and if so, RICA 2002 would apply.89 
However, there is no reference in the NSI Act 1994 regulating the investigative power of 
interception, targeted or in bulk. The court rejected contentions by the state that s 2 authorises 
such investigative powers of interception by reference to ‘to gather, correlate, evaluate and 
analyse domestic and foreign intelligence.’ The court noted such phrase is not supported by 
any authorisation processes, nor sets out where, when, how and on what basis these sensitive 
investigative powers may be used..90 Sutherland J held that to read any of the provisions of the 
NSI Act 1994 to include, by implication of lawful authority for interception both target and in 
bulk would be an ‘extravagance’ and ‘impermissible in terms of conventional techniques of 
statutory interpretation.’ 91  Accordingly the court found ‘no lawful authority’ for bulk 
interception by law enforcement and the security and intelligence agencies. As such the court 
declared: ‘bulk surveillance activities and foreign signals interception undertaken by the 
National Communications Centre are unlawful and invalid.’92  
Therefore, until such time as the operational activities are brought within legislative 
prescripts, the NCC’s signals operations fall within the provisions of RICA 2002 in relation to 
interception of communications. This means that for its signals operations, the NCC must in 
 
85 amaBhungane case supra note 23 paras 143-166.  
86 The structures contemplated include the National Intelligence Coordinating Committee, the SSA and the 
intelligence units within the Defence Force and the Police.  
87 amaBhungane case supra note 23 paras 149-150.  
88 Supra note 23 paras 151-154.  
89 Supra note 23 paras 151-154.  
90 Supra note 23 paras 150 and 155.  
91 Supra note 23 paras 151-162.  
92 Supra note 23 para 165, more than a decade after the Matthews Commission found the NCC ‘engaged in 
signals monitoring that is unlawful and unconstitutional’.  
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terms of s 16(1) ‘apply to a designated judge for the issuing of an interception direction’ which 
in terms of 16(5) may only be issued for specified purposes, including for the prevention and 
detection of ‘serious offences’ or in the interests of ‘national security or compelling national 
economic interests’ if the reasonable grounds to believe’ threshold has been met. To do so 
otherwise, would be to act without lawful authority and be unconstitutional. 
 
(b) Notification of interception 
RICA 2002 prohibits any notification to the suspect/target concerned about interception. In s 
16(7)(a) of RICA 2002 ‘[a]n application [for an interception direction] must be considered and 
an interception direction issued without any notice to the person or customer to whom the 
application applies and without hearing such person or customer.’ 93  This means that the 
application for an interception direction is made ex parte, without any notification to the 
suspect/target and without their presence in court. The Act goes so far as to prohibit disclosure 
of information in terms of the provisions of s 42(1): ‘[n]o person may disclose any information 
which he or she obtained in the exercising of his or her powers or the performance of his or her 
duties in terms of this Act.’ The suspect/target of an interception is not notified about the 
interception even after the conclusion of the investigation or the end of the period of the 
interception direction, unless the information obtained by means of any interception is 
admissible as evidence in criminal proceedings against the suspect/target.94 
This default position of blanket secrecy is argued as normal for investigation purposes, 
after all notification to the suspect/target may defeat the very purpose of the surveillance 
operation where there are risks than an investigation might be compromised, for example by 
witness intimidation or evidence being destroyed. The state vehemently maintains its position 
‘that absolute and invariable secrecy is required’ and that any notification of interception, 
whether pre- or post-surveillance, would effectively defeat the purpose of RICA 2002 as the 
very essence of the investigative power of interception is secrecy.95 This argument is extremely 
controversial, not least because the permanent position of blanket and invariable secrecy in the 
 
93 Emphasis added. Section 16(7) applies to the issuing of an entry warrant (ss 22(7)) except for ss 16(3)); a 
direction in respect of real-time (s 17(6))  and archived meta-data (s 19(6)), including combined applications 
under ss 18(3); decryption directions (ss 21(6)); and any amendments or extensions (ss 20(6)).  
94 Section 47. 
95 Attributed to South Africa’s Minister of Police, Bheki Cele in ‘Cele heads to ConCourt to fight surveillance 
ruling’ available at https://www.iol.co.za/news/politics/cele-heads-to-concourt-to-fight-surveillance-ruling-
37690897, accessed 24 March 2020. See also amaBhungane case applicants’ heads of argument supra note 23 
paras 85-91 for the state’s arguments on notification of interception. 
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legal provisions of RICA 2002 cannot be justified with regard to the right to privacy, which in 
this context must be understood together with the right of access to courts in the Constitution 
of the Republic of South Act 108 of 1996.96 The counter argument is that the right to privacy 
and the right of access to courts are not absolute rights, and any infringement can be justified 
in terms of s 36 of the Constitution, in that it is reasonable and justifiable in an open and 
democratic society, having regard to the factors specified in s 36.97 
While the state appears willing to accept that there are unlawful surveillance practices 
by ‘rogue elements’ within law enforcement and security and intelligence agencies, it also 
argues that any evidence obtained in contravention of RICA 2002 ‘is tainted in legal 
proceedings.’98 In theory this might be a sound argument. The argument by the state is that the  
constitutionality of RICA 2002 ‘must not be decided on the basis that some unscrupulous 
individual acting outside of the scope of legislation may abuse it or can abuse it.’99 However, 
reports of incidents and allegations of unlawful surveillance practices by law enforcement and 
security and intelligence agencies cannot be ignored. Civil rights campaigns and investigative 
journalism in South Africa indicate that unlawful surveillance practices are only revealed by 
accident, or by information leaks, public interest litigation or whistleblowing. One such 
example abuse by law enforcement and security and intelligence agencies is the ‘undisputed 
first-hand experience of the deponent’ in the amaBhungane case:100 
‘No rebuttal or explanation or effort to justify the interception is attempted [by the state]. No 
good reason exists not to hear the matter on the facts alleged by Sole alone. Because Sole has 
not right to demand disclosure, he, being forbidden by RICA from being informed, the fact of 
 
96 Hereafter ‘the Constitution’. Section 14 of the Constitution provides ‘[e]veryone has the right to privacy, 
which includes the right not to have – (a) their person or home searched; (b) their property searched; (c) their 
possessions seized; or (d) the privacy of their communications infringed’ and provides that “[e]veryone has the 
right to have any dispute that can be resolved by the application of law decided in a fair public hearing before a 
court or, where appropriate, another independent and impartial tribunal or forum.’ See amaBhungane case 
applicants’ heads of argument supra note 23 paras 85-91. 
97 Including ‘(a) the nature of the right; (b) the importance of the purpose of the limitation; (c) the nature and 
extent of the limitation; (d) the relation between the limitation and its purpose; and (e) less restrictive means to 
achieve the purpose.’ 
98 See amaBhungane case applicants’ heads of argument supra note 23 paras 85-91 for the state’s arguments on 
notification of interception. 
99 amaBhungane case applicants’ heads of argument supra note 23 para 93. 
100 Supra note 23. In 2015, in a case involving the decision to drop corruption charges against then-President of 
South Africa, Jacob Zuma, it was inadvertently revealed that the communications of an investigative journalist, 
Sam Sole, and a state prosecutor, Billy Downer, had been intercepted in 2008. This was discovered when 
Zuma’s attorney attached to court papers extracts from official interception conversations between Sole and 
Downer. Sole had been investigating the decision to drop the charges against Zuma, considered to an extremely 
controversial prosecutorial decision in South Africa at the time. Sole is an executive director of amaBhungane 
Centre for Investigative Journalism, an independent and non-profit investigative journalism newsroom in South 
Africa which aims to ‘develop investigative journalism to promote free, capable media and open, accountable 
and just democracy.’ Available at https://amabhungane.org, accessed 29 March 2020.  
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the spying only became public knowledge fortuitously. Sole’s efforts to obtain details, plainly 
fruitless in the light of the prohibition on disclosure, was furthermore met with contemptuous 
responses and unsubstantiated allegations that no irregularities occurred.’101  
 In this regard a ‘fundamental reorientation’102 is required in South African law in 
relation to notification of interception. The default position of blanket secrecy in RICA 2002 
means that complaints are unlikely to be made, thereby annulling any ability to challenge the 
legality of the interception measure retrospectively. 103  Therefore, any safeguards and 
guarantees against abuse or arbitrariness would escape scrutiny because the suspect/target of 
the surveillance has the right to challenge the validity of the interception direction and the 
admissibility of evidence if criminal proceedings are instituted.104 Where there is no criminal 
proceedings, directly or indirectly involving the subject/target of the interception, there is no 
recourse because disclosure is prohibited under ‘absolute and invariable secrecy’ under the 
RICA 2002. The key issue is that of secrecy, in this instance blanket secrecy, and the 
unwillingness of the state of concede at least on the possibility of post-surveillance notification 
to the suspect/target, if not on notification pre-surveillance. Twelve years earlier, the Matthews 
Commission expressed its concerns with the dangers associated with a culture of secrecy within 
law enforcement and security and intelligence agencies: 
‘The secrecy surrounding the intelligence organisations is not consistent with the Constitution. 
…The high level of secrecy is contrary to the spirit of the Constitution. …The Constitution is 
binding on all organs of state and the dangers associated with secrecy – lack of accountability, 
abuse of power, infringements of rights and a culture of impunity – apply to the intelligence 
organisations no less than to other sectors of the state. A fundamental reorientation is therefore 
required. Secrecy should not dominate and engulf the intelligence community but should be 
confined mainly to those areas where disclosure of information would cause significant harm 
to the lives of individuals, the intelligence organisations, the state or the country as a whole. 
The emphasis on secrecy with some exceptions should be replaced by an emphasis on openness 
with some exceptions.’105  
 
101 Supra note 23 para 19.  
102 The Matthews Commission op cit note 22 at 263. 
103 Liberty ‘Liberty’s briefing on the Investigatory Powers Bill for report stage in the House of Commons (June 
2016) at 64 available at https://www.libertyhumanrights.org.uk/sites/default/files/campaigns/ resources/Liberty 
%27s%20Briefing%20on%20the%20Investigatory%20Powers%20Bill%20for%20Report%20Stage%20in%20t
he%20House%20of%20Commons.pdf, accessed 22 May 2019.  
104 See amaBhungane case applicants’ heads of argument supra note 23 paras 85-91 for the state’s arguments on 
notification of interception. 
105 Ibid at 263. 
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A brief analysis of comparative jurisprudence demonstrates a very different approach 
to the position in South Africa law. For example in the United States of America, procedure 
for interception of communications provides for notification to the suspect/target ‘[w]ithin a 
reasonable time but not later than ninety days’, unless the authorities can show there is ‘good 
cause’ to withhold that information. 106  A similar model operates in Canada, where the 
suspect/target of an interception warrant for the purposes of law enforcement must be given 
notice within ninety days of an interception warrant expiring. This may be extended up to three 
years in terrorism cases, subject to judicial oversight, if in the ‘interests of justice.’107 Similar 
notification provisions apply in Germany and the Netherlands, with exemptions to protect (if 
required) the integrity of ongoing investigations. 
In terms of the German Code of Criminal Procedure, 108  the suspect/target under 
telecommunication surveillance shall be notified of surveillance measures. The notification 
should mention the suspect/target’s option of court relief and the applicable time limits and 
should be given as soon as possible without ‘endangering the purpose of the investigation, the 
life, physical integrity and personal liberty of another or significant assets including the 
possibility of continued use of the undercover investigator.’ However, notification will be 
‘dispensed with where overriding interests of an affected person that merit protection constitute 
an obstacle.’ In the Netherlands, the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure109 state that 
the public prosecutor must notify in writing the suspect/target of telecommunications or other  
technical devices of the surveillance ‘as soon as the interest of the investigation permits’ but 
not if it is not reasonably possible to do so. If the suspect/target learns of the exercise of 
surveillance power through means described in 126aa(1) or (4) of the Code, notification is not 
required. If the investigation relates to terrorist offences or another serious offence, information 
pertaining to the suspect/target’s name, address, postal code, town, number, and type of service 
of a user of a communication service may be requested, and the notice provisions of 126bb will 
not apply.  
In South Africa the state contends that secrecy is ‘inimical to the efficacy of the 
interception of a communication’ and the fact that suspect/target is not notified, whether pre- 
or post-surveillance, does not necessarily mean that the exercise of such investigative power 
 
106 18 U.S. Code § 2518(8)(d). 
107 Canadian Criminal Code, s 188, 195-196. 
108 Section 101(4)(3). 
109 Part VD, Chapter One, s126bb. 
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was not ‘reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society.’110 While it is recognised 
that in some circumstances it is necessary to protect the integrity of investigations, working 
methods and field operations by law enforcement and security and intelligence agencies, the 
position of the state that ‘absolute and invariable secrecy is required – forever, regardless of 
the circumstances’111 is not sustainable nor justifiable in terms of the s 36 limitation provision 
in the Constitution. It is possible for the suspect/target who has been made the subject of 
surveillance to be informed of that interception, when the operation is completed, and where 
no investigation, working methods or field operations by law enforcement and security and 
intelligence agencies might be prejudiced as a result. While pre-surveillance notification may 
be justified, the requirement of continued secrecy after termination of the surveillance 
operation ‘is not rationally linked to any legitimate purpose.’112 
  The requirement of notification to the suspect/target of surveillance as soon as possible 
is identified by the European Court of Human Rights as an important safeguard against abuse, 
and positioned that ‘as soon as notification can be made without jeopardising the purpose of 
the surveillance after its termination, information should be provided to the persons 
concerned.’113 In a number of cases including, Klass v Germany,114 Weber and Savaria v 
Germany115 and Roman Zakharov v Russia,116 the European Court of Human Rights referred 
to the importance of the target/suspect having access to an effective remedy before the courts 
as ‘inextricably linked’ to user notification.117 In Klass v Germany, the Court stated: 
‘Inextricably linked to this issue is the question of subsequent notification, since there is in 
principle little scope for recourse to the courts by the individual concerned unless he is advised 
of the measures taken without his knowledge and thus able retrospectively to challenge their 
legality.’118 
 
110 amaBhungane case applicants’ heads of argument supra note 23 paras 85. 
111 Supra note 23 paras 85. 
112 Supra note 23 para 93. 
113 Association for European Integration and Human Rights and Ekimhzhiev EctHR 62540/00 (28 June 2007) 
paras 90-91. 
114 EctHR 5029/71 (6 September 1978). 
115 EctHR 54934/00 (29 June 2006). 
116 EctHR 47143/06 (4 December 2015). The ECtHR found that that judicial remedies for those the 
subject/target of interception in Russia were generally ineffective, particularly in light of the total absence of 
any notification requirement to the interception subject/target, and without any meaningful ability of 
retrospective challenges to surveillance measures. 
117 See also Malone v United Kingdom EctHR 8691/79 (2 August 1984); Leander v Sweden EctHR 9248/81 (26 
March 1987); Amann v Switzerland EctHR 27798/95 (16 February 2000); Rotaru v Romania EctHR 28341/95 
(2 May 2000); Lambert v France EctHR 46043/14 (25 June 2015 rectified).  
118 Klass’ case supra note 114 para 57. 
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This was also confirmed by the court in Weber and Savaria v Germany, where the court 
reiterated that notification of surveillance measures is ‘inextricably linked to the effectiveness 
of remedies before the courts’ and therefore also ‘to the existence of effective safeguards 
against the abuse of monitoring powers’ having regard to the fact that there would be ‘little 
scope for recourse to the courts’ by the individual concerned unless they are informed of the 
measures taken without their knowledge and therefore able to challenge the legality of the 
surveillance measures retrospectively. 119  The court further reiterated its position on the 
question of subsequent notification of surveillance measures: 
‘However, the fact that persons concerned by secret surveillance measures are not subsequently 
notified once surveillance has ceased cannot by itself warrant the conclusion that the 
interference was not “necessary in a democratic society”, as it is the very absence of knowledge 
of surveillance which ensures the efficacy of the interference. Indeed, such notification might 
reveal the working methods and fields of operation of the Intelligence Service (see Klass and 
Others, cited above, § 58, and, mutatis mutandis, Leander, cited above, § 66). As soon as 
notification can be carried out without jeopardising the purpose of the restriction after the 
termination of the surveillance measure, information should, however, be provided to the 
persons concerned (see, mutatis mutandis, Leander, cited above, § 66, and Klass and Others, 
cited above, § 58).’120 
On the issue of blanket secrecy on notification to the suspect/target of an interception 
raised in the public interest litigation in the amaBhungane case,121 the High Court of South 
Africa agreed with the need for ‘post surveillance notification as is the case in other democratic 
societies.’122 The Court stated: 
‘Plainly, the illustration of the right to notice in other jurisdictions demonstrates that world 
opinion has embraced this right as a facet of a democratic social order, subject to safeguards 
against undoing the very objectives of legitimate surveillance. What is there to the SA condition 
that would justify a rejection of a post interception notice, subject to judge the judge authorising 
delays for good cause shown? None have been shown. Indeed, the two examples, one of clear 
abuse and the other of unexplained spying alluded to, point in the other direction. The resistance 
has been directed at circumstances which would justify a ban on notification; an absolutist 
stance.’123 
 
119 Weber’s case supra note 115 para 135. 
120 Supra note 115 para 135. 
121 amaBhungane case supra note 23 para 51.  
122 Supra note 23 para 51.  
123 Supra note 23 para 51 (emphasis added).  
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As such the court declared ss 16(7), 17(6), 18(3)(a), 19(6), 20(6) and 22(7) of RICA as 
inconsistent with the Constitution and therefore invalid ‘to the extent that it fails to prescribe 
procedure[s] for notifying the subject of the interception.’124 In terms of the order declared by 
the court, the declaration of invalidity is suspended for two years, allowing the legislature time 
to cure the defect. By way of interim relief, the court held that ss 16(11) and 16(12) must be  
read to include user notification within ninety days of the surveillance operation, with 
exceptional orders of deferred user notification.125  
This is the right outcome. As a starting point for the ‘fundamental reorientation’ in 
South African law, this potentially means the introduction of a new duty of general notification, 
such that subsequent notification to a suspect/target of an interception direction would be after 
the investigation or operation has been terminated, and subject to public interest exemptions in 
preserving the integrity of investigations, working methods and field operations by law 
enforcement and security and intelligence agencies.126 In my view, this could be taken further. 
Instead of creating a presumption of general notification such that notification to a 
suspect/target of an interception direction would be after the investigation or operation has 
been terminated, RICA 2002 should be amended ( or in new legislation) to  provide for a default 
mandatory notification mechanism.127 Provision for mandatory notification would allow a 
suspect/target of an interception direction to pursue a challenge of legality retrospectively even 
in circumstances where exercise of such investigative power was deemed ‘reasonable and 
justifiable in an open and democratic society.’  The brief analysis of comparative jurisprudence 
referred to earlier shows that  such a model operates in other countries, although it is accepted 
that notification may be less likely where doing so may prejudice the outcome of investigations, 
working methods and field operations by law enforcement and security and intelligence 
agencies. 128 Similar to the model in the United States, notification to a suspect/target of an 
interception direction should be by default, within ninety days of the surveillance operation, 
unless law enforcement and security and intelligence agencies can show ‘good cause’ to 
withhold that information. The provision of a potential disclosure under a default mandatory 
notification mechanism in South African law may just ‘create an additional impetus’ needed 
 
124 Supra note 23 paras 53-54.  
125 Supra note 23 paras 53-54.  
126 Liberty op cit note 103 at 64. 
127 JUSTICE Investigatory Powers Bill 2016: Part 8 Surveillance Oversight Briefing for House of Commons 
Committee Stage (April 2016) available at https://justice.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/JUSTICE-
Briefing-IP-Bill-HC-CS-Part-8.pdf, accessed 25 March 2020 paras 63-64. 
128 Ibid. 
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‘towards lawful decision making’ by law enforcement and security and intelligence agencies 
exercising these investigative powers.129 
 
(c) Threshold for conducting interception of communications 
Following the Matthews Commission in 2008 and failure by government to implement its 
recommendations, the findings of the UN Human Rights Committee in 2016 on South Africa’s 
regulation of electronic surveillance was seemingly inevitable and unsurprising. A key concern 
referred to the ‘relatively low threshold for conducting surveillance.’130 
Sections 16-25 of RICA 2002 sets out provisions in relation to applications for, and 
issuing of, directions and entry warrants. Recurrent in every investigative power in RICA 2002 
is the stated formulation of ‘reasonable grounds to believe’131 as the threshold for judicial 
authorisation of investigative powers by law enforcement and security and intelligence 
agencies. Authorisation is by a designated judge, and defined in the Act to mean ‘any judge of 
a High Court discharged from active service.’ In terms of s 16(1) ‘an applicant may apply to a 
designated judge for the issuing of an interception direction.’ Interception can be authorised by 
a designated judge ‘if there are reasonable grounds to believe’132 inter alia that a ‘serious 
offence has been or is being or will probably be committed’133 or where the information sought 
concerns ‘an actual threat’134 to ‘national security’ or ‘compelling economic interests of the 
Republic.’135 
An application for an interception direction to a designated judge must be in writing. 
The requirements of the application inter alia must indicate the identity of the law enforcement 
official, the identity of the suspect/target of an interception, including the grounds on which 
the application is made, particulars of the allegation, period of the interception direction.136 
The applicant must also demonstrate ‘the basis for believing that evidence relating to the 
ground on which the application is made will be obtained through interception.’ 137  The 
 
129 Ibid para 64. 
130 United Nations Human Rights Committee op cit note 25 para 43. 
131 RICA 2002, ss 16(5)(a), (b); 8(b)(ii); 17(4); 19(4); 21(4); 22(4)(b); 23(4)(b); 51(7)(b). See also Ugandan law 
in the Regulation of Interception of Communication Act 2010 which similarly requires ‘reasonable grounds’ 
threshold in section 5(1) for interception of communications.  
132 Section 16(5)(a). 
133 Section 16(5)(a)(i). 
134 Section 16(5)(a)(ii) and (iii). 
135 Ibid.  
136 Section 16(2). 
137 Section 16(2)(d)(ii). 
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applicant must also ‘indicate whether other investigative procedures have been applied and 
failed to produce the required evidence’ or ‘why other investigative procedures reasonably 
appear to be unlikely to succeed if applied or are likely to be too dangerous to apply in order 
to obtain the required evidence.’ 138  RICA 2002 also provides for the interception of 
communications in two scenarios of ‘urgency’. The first scenario provides for an application 
to be made orally, if the applicant is ‘of the opinion that it is not reasonably practicable, having 
regard to the urgency of the case or the existence of exceptional circumstance’ to be able to 
make a written application.’ 139  The second scenario of urgency provides for exceptional 
circumstances for interception without prior authorisation from a designated judge if there are 
reasonable grounds to believe that a party to the communication has caused, or may cause 
serious bodily harm to another person140;  threatens, or has threatened to cause serious bodily 
harm to another person141; threatens, or has threatened to take his or her own life.142 In these 
scenarios of urgency, the applicant ‘must as soon as practicable after the interception of 
communication’ submit inter alia a written confirmation of request and an affidavit to the 
designated judge.143 
Although RICA 2002 requires prior judicial authorisation for interception, a challenge 
created by the Act is that the authorisation procedure is too low, and as such does not provide 
for sufficient safeguards and guarantees against abuse. It has been suggested that the stated 
formulation of ‘reasonable grounds to believe’ as the threshold for judicial authorisation in 
RICA 2002 should be changed to a higher threshold of ‘reasonable suspicion’ or ‘high degree 
of probability.’144 Support for the higher threshold of ‘reasonable suspicion’ can be found in 
Roman Zakharov v Russia, a case concerning the system of secret interception of mobile 
telephone communications in Russia, the European Court of Human Rights referred to the 
‘reasonable suspicion’ threshold. In view of concerns that judicial scrutiny in Russia was 
limited in scope ‘to indicate that in their everyday practice Russian courts do not verify whether 
there is a reasonable suspicion against the person concerned,’145 the European Court of Human 
Rights asserted that the obligations of judicial authorisation is not met on the basis of some 
 
138 Section 16(2)(e). 
139 Section 23. 
140 Section 7(1)(a)(i). 
141 Section 7(1)(a)(ii). 
142 Section 7(1)(a)(iii). 
143 Section 8(4). 
144 Necessary and Proportionate International principles on the application of human rights to communications 
surveillance available at https://necessaryandproportionate.org/principles, accessed 27 March 2020 at 8. See 
amaBhungane case applicants’ heads of argument supra note 23 paras 191-221. 
145 Roman’s case supra note 116 para 263. 
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kind of involvement. The process of judicial authorisation must ensure that judges are 
‘sufficiently empowered’ to verify the existence of reasonable suspicion against the 
suspect/target:146  
‘Turning now to the authorisation authority’s scope of review, the Court reiterates that it must 
be capable of verifying the existence of a reasonable suspicion against the person concerned, 
in particular whether there are factual indications for suspecting that person of planning, 
committing, or having committed criminal acts or other acts that may give rise to secret 
surveillance measures, such as, for example, acts endangering national security.’147  
The concern is that ‘designated judge’,148 or ‘judge of a High Court’,149 or ‘a regional 
court magistrate’, 150  or ‘a magistrate’ 151  under the ‘reasonable grounds to believe’ 
authorisation threshold are not expressly directed to verify the existence of a ‘reasonable 
suspicion’ against the suspect/target concerned, or to apply the ‘reasonable and justifiable in 
an open and democratic society’ test. However, while some formulations of the threshold ‘are 
more strident than others’152 consideration should be s 16(2)(c) which requires an application 
for an interception direction to ‘contain full particulars of all the facts and circumstances.’ It 
can be assumed that all the information provided will be interrogated by a designated judge 
and if satisfied on the ‘reasonable grounds to believe’ threshold may approve the interception 
direction. Perspectives on this assumption are considered below. 
Arguments advanced in response to concerns of a low threshold under the stated 
formulation of ‘reasonable grounds to believe’ for conducting interception in South Africa law 
are said to unsubstantiated because RICA 2002 provides sufficient safeguards and guarantees 
against abuse. First, authorisation for interception is by a designated judge ‘if there are 
 
146 See P De Hert and PC Bocos ‘Case of Roman Zakharov v. Russia: The Strasbourg follow up to the 
Luxembourg Court’s Schrems judgment’ available at https://strasbourgobservers.com/2015/12/23/case-of-
roman-zakharov-v-russia-the-strasbourg-follow-up-to-the-luxembourg-courts-schrems-judgment/, accessed 16 
May 2019. See also M Rice ‘Surveillance: Zakharov v Russia and what it means for the Investigatory Powers 
Bill available at https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/zakharov-v-russia-refresher-on-how-far-europe-has-come/, 
accessed 16 May 2018.  
147 Roman’s case supra note 116 para 260. 
148 RICA 2002, ss 1, 7(4), (5), (6); 8(4)(b), (c); 8(5); 8(6); 16(1),(4), (5), (8)(a)(iii), (8)(b)(iii), (10), (10)(b); 
16(5); 17(1), (3), (4)(a), (b); 19(7), (8); 20(1), (3), (4); 21(1)(a),(b);22(3), (4)(a), (b), (5)(c), 6(b); 23(3), (4)(a), 
(b), (7), (8)(a), (b), (10), (11); 24, (a)(ii); 25(1), (2), (3).  
149 Ibid ss 191(1), (3)(4), (7); 48.  
150 Ibid ss 19(1), (3), (4), (7); 48. 
151 Ibid ss 19(1), 3), (4), (7); 48. 
152 amaBhungane case supra note 23 para 141 where the court referred to Goodwin v United Kingdom EctHR 
17488/90 (27 March 1996) which stated the threshold for compelling disclosure by a journalist of a source: 
‘Having regard to the importance of the protection of journalistic sources for press freedom in a democratic 
society and the potentially chilling effect an order of source disclosure has on the exercise of that freedom, such 
a measure cannot be compatible with Article 10 (art. 10) of the Convention unless it is justified by an overriding 
requirement in the public interest’ para 39 (emphasis added).  
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reasonable grounds to believe’ on one of the grounds referred in s 16(5)(a) and ‘there are 
reasonable grounds to believe’ that the interception of particular communications on the 
specified ground will be obtained by means of the authorised interception direction. 153 Second, 
there must be reasonable grounds for believing that the evidence relating to the specified 
ground on which the interception direction is based will be obtained through interception.154 
Third, other investigative procedures have been applied and have failed to produce the required 
evidence or are unlikely to succeed or too dangerous if applied. 155  Fourth, interception 
directions are limited  as the orders are only granted for a period of three months at a time.156   
I am not convinced that a change in semantics of the stated threshold of ‘reasonable 
grounds to believe’ is the right approach to set adequate guarantees against abuse by law 
enforcement and security and intelligence agencies.157 The state is unlikely to encounter any 
serious difficulty in demonstrating that the justification for interception pursues a legitimate 
aim, inter alia, that a ‘serious offence has been or is being or will probably be committed’158, 
or where the information sought concerns ‘an actual threat’ 159  to ‘national security’ or 
‘compelling economic interests of the Republic.’160 This is mainly because analysis by the 
courts tends to focus on the legislative framework itself for the exercise of these investigatory 
powers rather than on a specific surveillance measure used in a particular case. 161 It is also 
generally accepted by the courts that investigatory powers of surveillance are necessary for 
specified purposes, including for the prevention and detection of ‘serious offences’ or in the 
interests of ‘national security or compelling national economic interests.’162  
If it is accepted that interception of communications is capable of being reasonable and 
justifiable in an open and democratic society,163 the controversy arises in respect of risk of 
 
153 Section 16(5)(b)(i). 
154 Section 16(2)(d)(ii). 
155 Section 16(2)(e). 
156 Section 16(2)(d). 
157 amaBhungane case supra note 23 paras 128 and 141.  
158 Section 16(5)(a)(i). 
159 Section 16(5)(a)(ii) and (iii). 
160 Ibid.  
161 With reference to European human rights law, see Necessary and Proportionate International principles on 
the application of human rights law to communications surveillance: Background and supporting international 
legal analysis at 19 available at https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Privacy/ElectronicFrontierFoundat 
tion.pdf, accessed 29 March 2020. This report of legal analysis recognises that the need for surveillance 
measures to be more specifically ‘targeted’ is an aspect more closely tied to the question of the proportionality 
of the measure itself but, in practice, is rarely examined by the court in European human rights law. There are 
exceptions, see Uzunv Germany EctHR 35623/05 (2 September 2010) and Peck v the United Kingdom EctHR 
44647/98 (28 January 2003). 
162 See Klass’ case supra note 114. 
163 Having regard to the factors specified in s 36 of the Constitution, see op cit note 97. 
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abuse and exercising these investigatory powers without lawful authority. A contrasting 
position to acceptable justification is offered by the United Nations Special Rapporteur on 
Freedom of Expression, Frank LaRue, whom expressed concerns in a report that ‘vague and 
unspecified’ notions of ‘national security’ in particular had been unduly used to justify 
interception and access to communications without adequate safeguards. 164  The Special 
Rapporteur concluded:  
‘The use of an amorphous concept of national security to justify invasive limitations on the 
enjoyment of human rights is of serious concern. The concept is broadly defined and is thus 
vulnerable to manipulation by the State as a means of justifying actions that target vulnerable 
grounds such as human rights defenders, journalists or activists. It also acts to warrant often 
unnecessary secrecy around investigations or law enforcement activities, undermining the 
principles of transparency and accountability.’165 
Having regard to the potential for abuse inherent in such overly broad concepts, there 
are recommendations in the Necessary and Proportionate principles for states to adopt a more 
stringent standard as to what constitutes a ‘legitimate aim’ in relation to surveillance powers:  
‘For this reason, the “pressing and substantial objective” test applied in Canada and the 
“compelling government interest” test used in the United States were also discarded as being 
insufficiently rigorous. Instead, the Principles reflect a higher standard imposed in Germany. 
In particular, the German Constitutional Court has ruled that deeply intrusive measures such as 
a search of a computer by law enforcement agencies cannot be justified merely by reference to 
some vaguely defined general interest. The German Constitutional Court held that such a 
measure had to be justified on the basis of evidence that there is “a concrete threat to an 
important legally-protected interest,” such as a threat to the “life, limb or liberty of a person” 
or to “public goods, the endangering of which threatens the very bases or existence of the state, 
or the fundamental prerequisites of human existence.’166 
Irrespective of the descriptions of justification and semantics used, whether this is 
stated as ‘reasonable grounds to believe’ or ‘pressing and substantial objective’ or ‘compelling 
government interest’ or ‘a concrete threat to an important legally-protected interest,’ the key 
 
164 United Nations Human Rights Council ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of 
the right to freedom of opinion and expression, Frank LaRue’ A/HRC/23/40 (17 April 2013) at 3 available at 
https://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/17session/A.HRC.17.27_en.pdf, accessed 4 July 2019.  
165 Ibid at 15-16. Equally so by the Matthews Commission note 22 at 263-64:‘The justification for secrecy 
should not rest on the concept of ‘national security’. …If secrecy can be justified on these expansive and inexact 
grounds, then there is a great danger of excessive and spurious classification of information.’ 
166 Necessary and Proportionate International principles: Background op cit note 161 at 19-20 (footnotes 
omitted). 
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issue is the breadth of the powers exercised by law enforcement and the security and 
intelligence agencies. The concern in South African law is that interception and access to 
communications is without sufficient safeguards against the risk of abuse of power – even if 
they were adequate in theory, the safeguards are simply not effective in practice. 
As argued earlier, provision of a potential disclosure to the subject/target of interception 
under a default mandatory notification mechanism in South African law may act as a strong 
deterrent to prevent abuse of power needed ‘towards lawful decision making’ by law 
enforcement and security and intelligence agencies.167 If this is so, and a ‘one-threshold-fits-
all’ approach in RICA 2002 is regarded as satisfactory, then a key issue for consideration is 
whether RICA 2002 provides sufficient safeguards for interception with regard to what would 
be covered by legal privilege or the identification of an investigative journalist’s confidential 
source. The contention advanced is ‘that a higher threshold should be used in respect of 
surveilling journalists or lawyers, because the extent of the infringement to the right to privacy 
becomes amplified.’168 
Both lawyers and journalists have obligations to preserve confidential communications, 
respectively from clients or confidential sources. Should they be especially protected in relation 
to ordinary subjects of the state, having regard to the effect of interception in the performance 
of their professional roles and the efficacy with which those professional roles can be 
performed?169 These professional roles, especially considerations of journalist freedom apply 
to what has been called by the Strasbourg Court as ‘social watchdogs’, in particular, non-
governmental organisations whose work is important in informing the public and exposing the 
truth, including potentially unlawful action by the state.170 
It is therefore important to consider what protections are in place to manage interception 
of communications in relation to legal privilege and journalists’ confidential sources. The 
issues are twofold: (a) whether RICA 2002 expressly requires the applicant of an interception 
direction to inform the designated judge that the subject/target of the interception direction is 
a journalist or lawyer; and (b) if the interception direction includes communications covered 
 
167 JUSTICE op cit note 127 para 64. 
168 amaBhungane case applicants’ heads of argument supra note 23 paras 191-221. 
169 amaBhungane case supra note 23 para 112.  
170 See The Queen (on Application of National Council for Civil Liberties (Liberty) v Secretary of State for the 
Home Department and Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs [2019] EWHC 2057 (Admin) 
para 293. See also Sanoma Uitgevers BV v Netherlands [2011] EMLR 4; Telegraaf Media Nederland Landelijke 
Media BV v Netherlands (Application No 39315/06, judgment of Third Section, 22 November 2012); and Nagla 
v Latvia (Application No 72469/10, judgment of Fourth Section, 16 July 2013) 
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by legal privilege or the identification of an investigative journalist’s confidential source – is 
there sufficient protection in RICA 2002 expressly for situations where the subject/target of an 
interception is a lawyer or a journalist. 
With regard to the first issue, s 16(2)(c) comes into consideration which requires an 
application for an interception direction to ‘contain full particulars of all the facts and 
circumstances.’ By virtue of this section, the argument of the state is that the designated judge 
has a discretion to take into account if the subject/target whose communication is required to 
be intercepted is a lawyer or a journalist, and empowers the designated judge to impose certain 
conditions and restrictions. However, there is no statutory obligation in RICA 2002 that 
requires an applicant to inform the designated judge that the subject/target of the interception 
is a lawyer or a journalist. Even if a liberal reading of s 16(2)(c) is accepted, on the second 
issue there are no provisions in RICA 2002 prescribing limitation procedures or conditions in 
the event of the subject/target of an interception being a lawyer or a journalist.171  
There are no provisions to ensure the proper collection, storage, access to and use of 
intercepted communications. There are no safeguards concerning the number of persons, 
copies and times that intercepted communications are shared. There are no safeguards that such 
information must be destroyed as soon as there are no longer grounds for retention. The Act 
itself offers no guidance concerning the treatment and handling of intercepted communications 
covered by legal privilege or the identification of an investigative journalist’s confidential 
source, or even confidential personal information of the subject/target such as medical records. 
This is problematic. 
 The assumption that all the information provided will be interrogated by designated 
judge, overlooks the possibility that the designated judge will be misled.172 Reports of incidents 
and allegations of abusive and unlawful surveillance of campaigners, unionists, lawyers, 
journalists and opposing factions of ruling political party interests referred elsewhere in the 
thesis highlight the vulnerabilities in RICA 2002. In an incident involving journalists Stephan 
Hofstatter and Mzi wa Afrika, it was alleged that Crime Intelligence misled the designated 
judge by stating that the mobile numbers of the journalists belonged to automated teller 
machine bombing suspects. As a result thereof, the warrant authorised the interception of their 
 
171 amaBhungane case applicants’ heads of argument supra note 23 paras 191-221. 
172 amaBhungane case supra note 23 para 139.  
 80 
calls and text message, including metadata.173 In a Media Policy and Democracy Project, Mare 
remarked on the need for a higher authorisation threshold, especially in relation to journalists 
and lawyers: 
‘The Crime Intelligence Division of the South African Police Service (SAPS) also took 
advantage of the low threshold of targeted surveillance as set out in RICA to obtain judicial 
approval to intercept the mobile phones of two Sunday Times journalists (Stephan Hofstätter 
and Mzilikazi wa Afrika) in 2010 by giving fictional names and suggesting such interception 
was needed to investigate a criminal syndicate. Subsequently, the Sunday Times took the case 
to court and two officers were charged with violations of RICA. This incident has fuelled fears 
that other applications to tap the communications of journalists and public figures may have 
been granted under false pretences. Not only journalists have been targeted for state 
surveillance, but trade unionists have not been spared either, with media reports indicating that 
state intelligence officers were spying on senior National Union of Metalworkers of South 
Africa13 (NUMSA) officials as well as attempting to recruit some of their members work as 
spies.’174  
With specific reference to the relationship between journalist and their sources, there is 
general recognition of their important role and need for protection. 175  By allowing law 
enforcement and security and intelligence agencies to identify sources without clear safeguards 
would undermine these principles. A ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach to interception without the 
provision of special protections and clear safeguards for sensitive information as is the case in 
RICA 2002 is, it is argued, unsatisfactory and potentially unlawful. There are concerns 
regarding the risks of handling procedures for such intercepted information, in that it could be 
 
173 An account of this incident is reported in J Duncan ‘Communications surveillance in South Africa: The case 
of the Sunday Time’s newspaper’ available at https://www.academia.edu/9170517/Communications_surveillan 
ce_in_South_Africa_the_case_of_the_Sunday_Times_newspaper, accessed 19 June 2019. See also J Duncan 
‘The bugging of South Africa’ (29 July 2013) available at http://sacsis.org.za/site/article/1739, accessed 17 
May 2016; H Swart ‘Secret state: How the government spies on you’ (14 October 2011) available at http://mg. 
co.za/article/2011-10-14-secret-state/, accessed 17 May 2016. 
174 Mare op cit note 77. 
175 Nova Property Group Holdings Ltd 7 Others v Cobbett & Another 2016 (4) SA 317 para 38: ‘‘Access to 
information is crucial to accurate reporting and thus to imparting accurate information to the public. Interference 
with the ability to access information impedes the freedom of the press. The right to freedom of expression is 
not limited to the right to speak, but includes the right to receive information and ideas. Preventing the press 
from reporting fully and accurately, does not only violate the rights of the journalist, but it also violates the 
rights of all the people who rely on the media to provide them with ‘information and ideas.’ See also Bossasa 
Operations (Pty) Ltd v Basson & Another 2013 (2) SA 570 (GSJ) para 38: ‘…it is apparent that journalists, 
subject to certain limitations, are not expected to reveal the identity of their sources. If indeed the freedom of the 
press is fundamental and a sine qua non for democracy, it is essential that in carrying out this public duty for 
public good, the identity of sources should not be revealed, particularly when the information so revealed would 
not have been publicly known. The essential and critical role of the media, which is more pronounced in our 
nascent democracy, founded on openness, where corruption has become cancerous, needs to be fostered rather 
than denuded.’ See also Government of RSA v The Sunday Times 1995 (2) BCLR 182 (T) para 188. 
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abused or accessed (without lawful authority). RICA 2002 is not capable of providing adequate 
and effective guarantees against abuse.  
The court in the amaBhungane case described the role of investigative journalism as 
the ‘ferreting out of fact by enquiry, largely, from whistle-blowers and others who rat on their 
fellows and their bosses.’176 In the court’s view, the central issue was not about compelling 
journalists to reveal their sources but the ability of third parties to identify ‘who the rats are’ 
through intercepting a journalist’s communications. The court made reference to the harsh 
reality of corruption in South Africa and noted that ‘[i]n a country that is as wracked by 
corruption in both our public institutions and in our private institutions as ours is, and where 
the unearthing of wrongdoing is significantly the work of investigative journalists, in an 
otherwise, seemingly, empty field, it is hypercritical to both laud the press and ignore their 
special needs to be an effective prop of the democratic process.’177  
The court was not prepared to ignore the argument that investigative journalists in 
South Africa have attracted the attention of ‘powerful and influential’ individuals ‘who are 
capable of suborning the apparatus of the State to smell out their adversaries’178 and that this 
exacerbated the potential for abuse in the current framework of RICA 2002. The court made 
specific reference to the incident involving journalists Stephan Hofstatter and Mzi wa Afrika 
referred to above. The court found a deficiency in s 16 of RICA 2002 because ‘the peculiar 
position of journalists is not expressly catered for,’ and as with the need to protect legal 
privilege, the risk inherent of ‘spying on a journalist’ would be to investigate persons with 
whom that journalist is in contact, which the court expressed as conduct that ‘cannot be 
appropriate.’ 179  Pending confirmation by the Constitutional Court on the declaration of 
unconstitutionality, in terms of interim relief the court ordered mandatory notification under 
statutory obligation such that if the subject/target whose communication is required to be 
intercepted is a lawyer or a journalist, the applicant of an interception direction must inform 
the designated judge.180 The interim relief measures further expressly allow a designated judge 
to impose limitation or conditions as deemed necessary based on the fact that the subject/target 
is a lawyer or a journalist.   
 
176 amaBhungane case supra note 23 para 129.  
177 Supra note 23 para 131.  
178 Supra note 23 para 138.  
179 Supra note 23 para 136.  
180 Supra note 23 para 167.  
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This is an appropriate outcome. In doing so, it emphasises the need in the regulation of 
electronic surveillance in South African law to have regard to whether the level of protection 
to be applied in relation to the obtaining of information is ‘higher’ because of the ‘particular 
sensitivity’ of that information which identifies/confirms the source of journalistic information 
or is subject to legal privilege.181 The considerations which apply to the importance of legal 
privilege and journalists’ confidential sources in legislative amendments to RICA 2002, or in 
new law, must therefore require prior independent authorisation where an order is sought of 
subject/target who is  a journalist or a lawyer, or where the purpose of obtaining material (in 
exceptional or compelling circumstances) is to discover a journalistic source or legally 
privileged information. This could be taken further by (i) mandatory reporting to an 
independent oversight authority; and (ii) at the stage of selection for examination of journalistic 
or legally privileged material that has already been obtained under targeted or bulk powers. 
Where intercepted information has been obtained pursuant to a warrant, and at the stage at 
which a decision is to be made as to whether to examine that intercepted information, there 
should be an additional warrant requirement for selection for examination.182 Such a safeguard 
may include a consideration of rationale – where purpose of the criteria to be used for selecting 
such material for examination is to identify items subject to legal privilege or is journalistic 
material, or where the use of those criteria is likely to be revealing.183 The decision to be taken, 
preferably by an independent oversight authority, should be governed by exceptional and 
compelling guidelines, including a consideration of whether public interest in the selection for 
examination outweighs the public interest in the protection of information subject to legal 
professional or ‘source’ privilege.  In addition, whether there are less intrusive or any other 
means by which the information could reasonably be obtained and would suffice to serve the 
overriding public interest justifying interception and subsequent selection for examination of 
intercepted materials of particular sensitivity.184 The independent body must have the power 
to decline a disclosure order or to make a limited or qualified order so as to protect information 
from being revealed or accessed, including safeguards for handling, retention, use and 
 
181 See See also The Queen (on Application of National Council for Civil Liberties (Liberty) supra note 170 
paras 271-292 (legally privileged items) and paras 293-352 (the challenge in respect of confidential journalistic 
material).  
182 Supra note 181 para 302 (based on claimant’s challenges to the United Kingdom’s Investigatory Powers Act 
2016).  
183 See ss 153(2), (5), (6)-(8) and s 194(2), (3), (6)-(8), Investigatory Powers Act 2016. 
184 Section 153(5) and ss 194(3), Investigatory Powers Act 2016. See also The Queen (on Application of 
National Council for Civil Liberties (Liberty) ) supra note 170 paras 287 and 302 (based on claimant’s 
challenges).  
 83 
destruction of material.185 Any other alternative, in my view, would be a missed opportunity 
for safeguards appropriate to the use of powers of surveillance against journalists and lawyers. 
 
(d) Lack of any adversarial processes 
One of the key issues in the existing RICA 2002 model of prior judicial authorisation is the 
fact that applications for interception directions are inevitably made ex parte without notice. 
The provisions of ss 16(7)(a) applies with the necessary changes to the following investigative 
powers in RICA 2002: (1) application and issuing of a real-time communication-related 
direction in terms of ss 17(6); (2) a combined application and issuing of an interception 
direction, real-time communication-related direction and archive-related direction or 
interception direction supplemented by a real-time communication-related direction in terms 
of ss 18(3)(a); (3) application and issuing of an archive-related direction in terms of ss 19(6); 
(4) amendment or extension of existing direction in terms of s 20(6); (5) application and issuing 
of a decryption direction in terms of ss 21(6); (6) the issuing of an entry warrant in terms of ss 
22 (7). There is no adversarial process before the designated judge. Such a process appears to 
operate on the assumption that the designated judge is not misled and that the applicant of an 
interception direction will make a full disclosure on all the factors. 
The nature of such applications means that the designated judge will be asked to 
determine the application in secrecy based on one-sided information presented by the law 
enforcement and the security and intelligence officials. There is no robust scrutiny mechanism 
to hear complaints about conduct in connection with interception of communications. As 
Duncan states: ‘the granting of directions is an inherently one-sided process, which means that 
the judge has to take the information that is given to him on trust.’186 It is only as a result of 
sustained pressure from civil rights campaigns and investigative journalism in South Africa 
that unlawful surveillance practices have been revealed. 187  It has also led to significant 
disclosures from law enforcement and  security and intelligence agencies and to admissions of 
unlawfulness.188 
The lack of any adversarial process in RICA 2002 implicates s 34 of the Constitution 
which provides that: ‘[e]veryone has the right to have any dispute that can be resolved by the 
 
185 Supra note 181 para 302 (based on claimant’s challenges).  
186 Duncan op cit note 173 at 226.  
187 Op cit note 23,  77. 
188 Ibid. See amaBhungane case supra note 23 para supra note 23 paras 19-21. 
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application of law decided in a fair public hearing before a court or, where appropriate, another 
independent and impartial tribunal or forum.’ A key component in the right to a fair hearing, 
in particular the principle of audi alteram partem – to hear the other side. This is premised on 
the rationale that a party should be given an opportunity of being heard before an order is made 
that might adversely affect their rights. The Constitutional Court in South Africa has been clear 
that principle of audi alteram partem is one of the main pillars of the s 34 right to a fair-
hearing,189 and has emphasised that ‘even in an apparent ‘open and shut’ case, an affected party 
must be given an opportunity to meet the case advanced by an adversary.190 The importance of 
the principle of audi alteram partem, captured by the often quoted passage in John v Rees, was 
endorsed by the Constitutional Court:  
‘As everybody who has anything to do with the law well knows, the path of the law is strewn 
with examples of open and shut cases which, somehow, were not; of unanswerable charges 
which, in the event, were completely answered; of inexplicable conduct which was fully 
explained; of fixed and unalterable determination that, by discussion, suffered a change.’ 191 
The provision of a public advocate system in RICA 2002 has been suggested as a 
remedy to the unconstitutionality of s 16(7) by fulfilling the principle of audi alteram partem 
as a key pillar in the right to a fair hearing.192 In terms of such a system ‘the public advocate 
would be a practising legal representative and would be statutorily and ethically bound to 
represent and advance the interests and rights of the subject of surveillance in order to test the 
propositions put forward by the law enforcement agencies.’193 The counter argument advanced 
by the state is that such a proposed public advocate system would cause lengthy application 
processes and undermine the security services capacity to act promptly in the interests of 
national security.194 As such it was argued that consideration should be given to s 16(2)(c) 
which requires an application for an interception direction to ‘contain full particulars of all the 
facts and circumstances’ and ‘enhanced by the duty on an applicant to behave as counsel are 
expected to do in ex parte applications and make truly full disclosure including factors adverse 
 
189 See National Director of Public Prosecutions and Another v Mohamed NO and Others 2003 (4) SA 1 (CC) 
at para 36.  
190 See My Vote Counts NPC v Speaker of the National Assembly and Others [2015] ZACC 31, majority 
judgment para 176.  
191 [1970] Ch 345 at 402.  
192 amaBhungane case applicants’ heads of argument supra note 23 paras 120-122. 
193 Supra note 23 para 120.2. 
194 Supra note 23 para 120.2. 
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to the success of the application.’195 The argument contends that ‘at a practical level a public 
advocate, can do no more than a diligent judge would in any event do.’196  
However, it is not ‘apparent’ that applicants for interception directions ‘understand their 
ethical responsibilities.’197  In practical terms, having regard to annual statistics referred below, 
seemingly very few applications are refused by the designated judge and a major contributing 
factor is undoubtedly the lack of any kind of adversarial challenge, because the interests of the 
subject/target as the proposed subject of surveillance are not effectively represented.198 The 
numerous reports of incidents and allegations of abusive and unlawful surveillance practices 
by law enforcement and the security and intelligence agencies199 reveal vulnerabilities in the 
regulatory framework of RICA 2002, which in the absence of an effective oversight regime 
can be appropriately described as ‘neither transparent nor comprehensive.’200 
The other objections of the state to a public advocate system relate to security risks such 
that ‘it could lead to information being leaked because the circle of people with knowledge of 
the surveillance has been expanded.’ This is an important consideration. A recognised 
deficiency in RICA 2002 is the lack of adequate controls on the onward sharing of such data. 
This problem of unrestricted data-sharing is also a key issue in RICA 2002 for its failure to 
prescribe adequate safeguards for access to and use of intercepted communications in terms of 
handling procedures. Irrespective of the mechanism adopted, whether this might involve the 
appointment of a special advocate or panel of judges, the absence of an effective adversarial 
procedure for the authorisation of interception of communications in RICA 2002 is no longer 
sustainable. Lawmakers must now consider the introduction of suitable internal mechanisms 
to enable ex parte applications for interception directions to be properly challenged prior to 
 
195 amaBhungane case supra note 23 para 76.  
196 Supra note 23 para 76.  
197 Supra note 23 para 76.  
198 Necessary and Proportionate International principles op cit note 161 at 23. 
199 Examples cited in amaBhungane case applicants’ heads of argument supra note 23 para 204 include that the 
journalist, Athandiwe Saba's, phone records had been obtained in 2016 in terms of a s 205 warrant of the 
Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977, and such records may have been unlawfully provided by the SAPS and the 
NPA to a third party private investigator; the Mpumalanga province Premier David Mabuza announced in 
January 2015 that he was receiving briefings from State Security on the movements of journalists in the 
province, singling out Tom Nkosi, who is the founder and publisher of Mpumalanga investigative newspaper 
Ziwaphi, who Mr Mabuza alleged had met with Mr Mabuza's ‘enemies’ within the ruling party; and journalist 
Sipho Masondo, who was working on a series of investigations involving corruption in South Africa's water 
delivery projects, was informed by a source in crime intelligence that his calls were being intercepted. 
200 Attributed to Human Rights watch in submissions on oversight to D Anderson QC A question of trust: 
Report of the investigatory powers review (2015) Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation available at 
www.gov.uk/government/publications, accessed on 17 May 2016 at 235.  
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authorisation being granted.201 The court in the amaBhungane case agreed that ‘measures are 
needed to overcome the absence of [an] adversarial process’202 and declared s 16(7) of RICA 
as inconsistent with the Constitution, and as such invalid ‘to the extent that it fails to adequately 
provide for a system with appropriate safeguards to deal with the fact that the orders in question 
are granted ex parte.’203  
 
(e) Appointment of designated judges and independence 
The controversial terrain with regard to designated judges is twofold: (i) empowering 
provisions for the appointment of a designated judge; and (ii) independence safeguards for the 
designated judge. ‘Designated judge’ in terms of s 1 of RICA 2002 ‘means any judge of a High 
Court discharged from active service under s 3(2) of the Judges’ Remuneration and Conditions 
of Employment Act, 2001 (Act 47 of 2001), or any retired judge, who is designated by the 
Minister to perform the functions of a designated judge for purposes of this Act.’ There is 
further provision in s 1 for ‘Minister’ which ‘means the Cabinet member responsible for the 
administration of justice, except in Chapter 6 where it means the Cabinet member responsible 
for intelligence services.’ The referred ‘Minister’ for the purposes of this discussion is the 
Minister of Justice and Correctional Services. 
In arguments before  the Constitutional Court in the amaBhungane case on 25 February 
2020, the issue of the empowering provision in the appointment of the designated judge was 
first raised by Justice Chris Jafta, who asked Steven Budlender SC, counsel for amaBhungane 
and applicant Sole, whether there was any section in RICA 2002 empowering the Minister to 
appoint the designated judge.204 Counsel responded that the power of appointment was granted 
by implication in the definition of ‘designated judge’ in s 1 as one who is ‘designated by the 
 
201 See amaBhungane case supra note 23 para 80 where the court suggested that an alternative to a public 
advocate might be a panel of designated judges: ‘[t]hat might overcome the risk of tunnel vision and ensure a 
diversity of perspectives in the evaluative process. If three judges, say, were appointed and two had to approve 
an authorization, might that not be a better solution to balancing security of the information with the need to 
intensively interrogate the application?’ 
202 amaBhungane case supra note 23 para 81.  
203 Supra note 23 para 82. The declaration of invalidity is suspended for two years, allowing the legislature time 
to cure the defect. 
204 See ‘Top court questions surveillance laws’ (February 2020) available at https://mg.co.za/article/2020-02-
28-top-court-questions-surveillance-laws/, accessed 29 March 2020 and ‘Power of minister to appoint Rica 
judge in spotlight at ConCourt’ (February 2020) available at https://www.timeslive.co.za/news/south-africa/2020 
-02-25-power-of-minister-to-appoint-rica-judge-in-spotlight-at-concourt/, accessed 29 March 2020. See also J 
Duncan ‘The loophole in South Africa’s state spying laws’ (March 2020) available at https://www.dailymaveric 
k.co.za/article/2020-03-09-the-loophole-in-south-africas-state-spying-laws/amp/?__twitter_impression=true, 
accessed 31 March 2020.  
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Minister to perform the functions of a designated judge for purposes of this Act.’ It is reported 
that Chief Justice Mogoeng retorted ‘no, you can’t exercise a power from a definition.’ Counsel 
for the state conceded on the ‘apparently unanswerable question’ that there was no such 
empowering provision in RICA 2002. In response to a question from the Chief Justice on what 
should happen to the surveillance regime if the court found there was no power in RICA 2002 
for the Minister to appoint the judge, counsel for the state responded: ‘[t]his means the court 
will have to craft a just and equitable order that will address the lacuna.’205 This places the state 
contentions on the legality of RICA 2002 and its safeguards, which largely rests on 
authorisation by a designated judge in a difficult position.  
On the issue of institutional safeguards for the designated judge, it was argued that 
RICA 2002 failed to secure the independence of the designated judge because the designated 
judge is appointed at the instance of a member of the executive, the Minister.206 It was so 
contended that ‘permitting a member of the executive to select one judge without any other 
process in place for such a sensitive constitutional function undermines the public confidence 
in the designated judge’s independence and accordingly the constitutional requirement of 
independence.’207 It was argued by the applicants that the role of the Minister of Justice, at his 
discretion alone, in selecting a judge to perform ‘such an inherently contentious function’ 
which is carried out in secrecy was ‘to be an anathema to the independence of the designated 
judge:’208 As a remedy to insufficient protection for the designated judge’s independence, it 
was proposed that the designated judge must be selected following a proper public interview 
process before the Judicial Services Commission.209 The other argument raised related to 
designated judge’s term: ‘[t]here is no term specified under RICA for the designated judge. A 
term of one year has emerged as a matter of practice … the short duration and renewability of 
the designated judge’s term has the potential to undermine the independence of the designated 
judge.’210 It was argued on behalf of the applicants that ‘[s]ecurity of tenure requires protection 
against termination of employment or suspension at the discretion and behest of the 
 
205 Ibid.  
206 amaBhungane case applicants’ heads of argument supra note 23 paras 134 and 144. 
207 Supra note 23 para 144. 
208 amaBhungane case supra note 23 para 62.  
209 amaBhungane case applicants’ heads of argument supra note 23 para 144. 
210 Supra note 23 para 134. At para 141, remarks by the court in Helen Suzman Foundation v President, RSA: in 
re Glenister v President, RSA 2014(4) BCLR 841 (WCC) at para 68 were cited in support: [R]enewability of the 
term at the behest of the Minister is intrinsically inimical to independence. It is clear from the CC’s judgments 
in Glenister 2 and JASA that it is renewability as such, rather than the insufficiency of conditions or constraints 
imposed on renewability, which jeopardises independence. Renewability thus has no valid place in the scheme 
of a unit that is constitutionally required to be adequately independent.’ 
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Executive.’211 Further, ‘[t]he secrecy of the process is aberrant to the usual judicial role and 
thus a greater need…exists to bolster the perceived and actual independence of the incumbent. 
The present system…fails dismally.’212 In support of the importance of security of a designated 
judge’s tenure, reference was made to Constitutional Court judgments, as explained by 
Moseneke DCJ and Cameron J:213  
‘While it is not to be assumed, and we do not assume, that powers under the SAPS Act will be 
abused, at the very least the lack of specially entrenched employment security is not calculated 
to instil confidence in the members of the DPCI that they can carry out their investigations 
vigorously and fearlessly. In our view, adequate independence requires special measures 
entrenching their employment security to enable them to carry out their duties vigorously.’ 214 
Guidance on appointment of designated judges can be gleaned from the Investigatory 
Powers Act 2016215 in the United Kingdom which offers an appropriate alternative remedy. 
Approval of interception warrants is by a group of Judicial Commissioners,216 whom are 
appointed by the Prime Minister but only in consultation with, and by agreement with the Lord 
Chancellor, including the Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales, Scotland and Northern 
Ireland.217 This is intended to provide a degree of judicial independence by ensuring that 
appointments by the Prime Minister cannot be regarded as ‘tame’ nor appointment of a ‘former 
judge in return for patronage.’218 Judicial independence is also in part secured by security of 
their tenure. Judicial Commissioners are appointed for a renewable fixed terms of three 
years. 219  Other than instances where a Judicial Commissioner is bankrupt, has a 
disqualification order from being a director or is convicted and receives a sentence of 
imprisonment (whether suspended or not), a Judicial Commissioner may not be removed from 
office before the end of the term of appointment, unless a resolution approving the removal has 
been passed by each House of Parliament.220 The security of their tenure means that Judicial 
Commissioners cannot be removed from office if their decisions are contrary to the 
expectations of the state. 
 
211 amaBhungane case applicants’ heads of argument supra note 23 para 139-141. 
212 amaBhungane case supra note 23 para 62.  
213 Supra note 23 para 62.  
214 Glenister v President of the Republic of South Africa and Others 2011 (3) SA 347 (CC) (referred to as 
‘Glenister II’) para 222 (emphasis added). See also Helen Suzman Foundation case supra note 210 para 32 
215 Hereafter ‘IPA 2016’. 
216 Section 23-25. 
217 Section 227-240. 
218 Gillespie op cit note 8 at 341.  
219 Section 228(2). 
220 Section 228(4) and (5). 
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I am not convinced that the question of the designated judge’s independence as 
contemplated in RICA 2002, arguably ‘compromised by the selection process and de facto 
unlimited duration of appointment’ 221 is a failure in law. Chief Justice Mogoeng warned 
against impliedly maligning the integrity of judges, responding that once a judge was 
appointed, he or she was independent and, even after they retired, still received a salary pegged 
to the salary of active judges: ‘[y]ou’ve got to have something concrete to begin to question 
the independence of the judges. Just to say ‘Okay, it’s the minister who appointed her, [so] she 
must be, or she is potentially, the minister’s lackey’, I think it’s a bit dangerous.’222 Any 
suggestion of judicial impropriety ‘serving in any capacity at the pleasure of the Minister’223 
as claimed by the applicants is therefore without substance and short-sighted. Perhaps the issue 
arising from the appointment process is more historical and institutional rather than being a 
questionable issue of the designated judge’s independence.224 As the High Court in the matter 
observed ‘[t]he present appointment process of the designated judge is plainly on the wrong 
side of history.’225 The High Court ordered that subject to confirmation by the Constitutional 
Court, the Minister of Justice would continue to appoint the designated judge, but only on 
nomination from the Chief Justice and for a non-renewable term of two years. The 
Constitutional Court reserved judgment. 
 
IV THE FUTURE OF INTERCEPTION OF COMMUNICATIONS IN SOUTH AFRICA 
 
(a) ‘…central to all of it, is interception’226 
Concerns of the ‘broad intelligence mandate’ in South Africa was highlighted by the Matthews 
Commission that ‘[a]n overly broad definition of security and overly broad intelligence 
mandate can lead the intelligence agency to focus in an inappropriate manner on lawful 
 
221 amaBhungane case supra note 23 para 61.  
222 ‘Top court questions surveillance laws’ (February 2020) op cit note 204. 
223 Supra note 23 para 64.  
224 Budlender responded that he was not questioning the integrity of any individual judge, and his argument was 
an institutional one. He referred to earlier judgments of the Constitutional Court and argued there would be a 
‘reasonable perception that a judge hand-picked by the executive for a renewable term is not going to be seen as 
independent.’ As reported in ‘Top court questions surveillance laws’ (February 2020) op cit note 204. 
225 amaBhungane case supra note 23 para 64. At para 68, the court remarked impudently ‘it must be an 
embarrassment to the Minister of Justice to have to select and appoint the designated judge in terms of the 
present provisions of RICA.’ 
226 Attributed to a former intelligence operative in an article by H Swart ‘You always feel like somebody’s 
watching you? They probably are’ Daily Maverick (June 2016) available at https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/ar 
ticle/2016-06-03-you-always-feel-like-somebodys-watching-you-they-probably-are./, accessed 16 September 
2017. 
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political and social activities.’227 Notwithstanding the dramatic events that led to the Matthews 
Commission, including the Commission’s significant findings of apparent ‘unlawful and 
unconstitutional’228 surveillance practices by law enforcement and security and intelligence 
agencies, reports of such unlawful activities continued to emerge in post-democratic South 
Africa. In 2016, the state was asked to respond to the United Nations Human Rights Committee 
on its regulation of electronic surveillance, specifically on the following: ‘[i]nterception of 
communications outside the RICA regime would be unlawful, but, according to information 
before us, surveillance is being carried out outside the RICA regime. The Ministerial Review 
Commission on Intelligence, known as ‘Matthews Commission’ found that the National 
Communications Centre (NCC) carries out unlawful surveillance.’229 The state responded as 
follows: ‘[t]he Report was never officially adopted. The Report was finalised in 2008. 
However, even if the NCC was used for illegitimate interceptions, it was used in limited 
circumstances only and not officially sanctioned. …[A]dequate measures were implemented 
to curb any further abuses.’230 The state’s response is unconvincing, albeit conceding to the 
‘illegitimate’ conduct of the NCC in its operational activities. Concessions that it only 
happened in ‘limited circumstances’ and was ‘not officially sanctioned’ is hardly justification 
for such conduct and ignores the doctrine of legality.231 Contrary to the written submissions by 
the state, the conduct of the NCC acting without lawful authority or judicial supervision 
continued and without adequate measures capable of preventing abuse of power. 
Despite these concerning issues raised, including those by the Matthews Commission 
in 2008, and by numerous other entities in between, a decade later the Supreme Court of Appeal 
in Zuma v Democratic Alliance and Others232 noted with ‘unsettling’ concern ‘that different 
law enforcement agencies of government appear to be spying upon each other.’233 The court, 
in particular, was concerned about the authenticity and legality of the recorded conversations, 
 
227 The Matthews Commission op cit note 22 at 73. 
228 Ibid at 180. 
229 South Africa's written responses to the UN Human Rights Committee following South Africa's review ref 
50/2016 (10 March 2016) para 26.3 available at https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/Treaties/CCPR/Shared%20Docum 
ents/ZAF/INT_CCPR_AIS_ZAF_23518_E.pdf, accessed 2 April 2020. 
230 Ibid para 26.3.  
231 The rule that the principle of legality functions as a restriction on the exercise of public power in South 
Africa’s new constitutional order may be traced back to the Constitutional Court’s judgment in Fedsure Life 
Insurance v Greater Johannesburg Transitional Metropolitan Council 1999 (1) SA 374 (CC). At para 58, the 
Court stated that the doctrine of legality is ‘central to the conception of our constitutional order that the 
legislature and executive in every sphere are constrained by the principle that they may exercise no power and 
perform no function beyond that conferred upon them by law.’ See also Pharmaceutical Manufacturers’ case op 
cit note 48.  
232 2018 (1) SA 200 (SCA).  
233 See references earlier, including op cit note 77. 
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which was considered vital in the decision by the then acting National Director of Public 
Prosecutions to discontinue the prosecution of former President, Mr J Zuma on serious criminal 
charges. The court held that the authenticity and legality of the recorded conversations ‘ought’ 
to have received ‘greater consideration’ particularly as judicial authorisation for the recordings 
in terms of RICA 2002 requirements was not made available despite its ‘very specific 
requirements’ intended to ensure that no infringement of rights took place other than in the 
manner provided for by law.234  
Justice Yvonne Mokgoro is the designated judge appointed to adjudicate warrants in 
terms of RICA 2002 on which she is required to publish annual reports. The reports are 
presented to the parliamentary Joint Standing Committee on Intelligence,235 comprising of 
members of the six largest political parties in South Africa. The contents of the reports by the 
designated judge are considered by the JSCI and dealt with mostly in a classified manner. 
Publication of these reports by the JSCI are intermittent, with the most recent publicly available 
report covering the period 2014/2015.  In the report, Justice Mokgoro highlighted the 
following, acknowledged concerns of unfettered discretion and abuse of powers by law 
enforcement and security and intelligence agencies that do not appear speculative or ‘in limited 
circumstances’: 
‘There is a continued general public perception that some law enforcement and other 
institutions and/or officers use these intrusive interception methods to advance their own 
interests with no regard to the rights and values the RICA aims to protect in the context of the 
Constitution. The media, in particular the social networks, are inundated with reports, 
allegations and comments of manipulation and abuse of the interception system by officials and 
even individuals, ranging from– 
• obtaining of information in less than 36 hours, without the Designated Judge’s knowledge;  
• acquisition of cell phone billing and ownership records through crime intelligence, without 
the Judge’s knowledge or approval, in order to expedite the investigation; obtaining text 
messages and cell phone billing records needed for personal reasons, through a contact at 
crime intelligence and/or the service providers;  
• the popularity of interception method which is preferred over conventional methods of 
investigation;  
 
234 Supra note 232 para 63. 
235 Hereafter ‘JSCI’. It is one of only two bodies that oversee the intelligence services in South Africa. The other 
is the Inspector-General of Intelligence, which reports to the JSCI. 
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• the apparent lack of trust of the Designated Judge with regard to information gathered 
through crime intelligence;  
• failure of applicants to provide fact-based justification for an application to the Judge;  
• applicant’s need to comprehend that suspicion of crime without any factual basis is not 
sufficient for application for interception;  
• the tendency for vagueness of basis for an application, the cut and paste approach to an 
affidavit and the tendency to regard the authorisation for interception as a given and 
therefore the taking and  
• wide allegations of bribery of contacts at banks and telecommunications service providers 
etc.’236 
The report also provided statistical information of applications for directions, 237 
revealing significant increases in applications inter alia from the  Crime Intelligence 
Division238 and the State Security Agency:239  
Agency 2013/2014 2014/2015 












Reasons for the increase in application numbers are unknown. The state has argued that 
we should not worry about the  interception of communications because interception directions 
are rare. In a request for written responses from the state, the UN Human Rights Committee 
specifically referred to the following: ‘[a]ccording to the written replies, interception of 
communications occurs “in exceptional cases”. However, according to the Annual Report of 
the Joint Standing Committee on Intelligence, of the 387 directions sought under RICA, only 
 
236 Annual report on the interception of private communications 15 October 2015 available at http://pmg-
assets.s3-website-eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/intelligence.pdf, accessed 22 June 2019. See also P Du Toit ‘A 
judge's report shows SA's police, spies are requesting more wiretapping’ (20 December 2012) available at 
https://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/2016/12/20/parliament-isnt-happy-sas-police-spies-are-requesting-more-
wi_a_21631740/?_7trCw accessed 22 June 2019; J Duncan ‘New year’s resolution for 2017: Stop 
unaccountable state spying’ (8 January 2017) available at https://www.dailymaverick. co.za/article/2017-01-08-
new-years-resolution-for-2017-stop-unaccountable-state-spying/, accessed 22 June 2019; J Duncan ‘Op-Ed: 
What Ramaphosa needs to do to fix state spying, Part One: Rica and lawful interception’ (19 February 2018) 
available at https://www.dail maverick.co.za /article/2018-02-19-op-ed-what-ramaphosa-needs-to-do-to-fix-
state-spying-part-one-rica-and-lawful-interception/, accessed 22 June 2019; and J Duncan ‘Government’s 
thinking on surveillance law is regressive’ (5 June 2019) available at https://mg.co.za/article/2019 -06-05-
governments-thinking-on-surveillance-law-is-regressive, accessed 22 June 2019. 
237 Annual report on the interception of private communications’ op cit note 236 at 48-52. 
238 Hereafter ‘CID’. 
239 Hereafter ‘SSA’. 
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5 were refused. If that is the case, can one still say that interception occurs only in exceptional 
cases?’240 The state responded: ‘[t]aking into account that the total population of South Africa 
is in the region of 50 Million persons, it is submitted that the amount of interceptions which 
take place is relatively insignificant. Since only an “applicant” (which is a senior officer at the 
law enforcement agency), can approach the judge for a direction, various applications [are] 
already refused at Departmental level. Only applications which [have] real merit are sent 
through to the office of the designated judge.’241 
The state’s response is yet again unsatisfactory. Whilst 387 directions may not seem as 
a significant number to the state – if only 5 interception directions were refused by a designated 
judge out of 387 directions sought, this raises key questions about the robustness and 
effectiveness of the procedural safeguards in RICA 2002. A one hundred per cent success for 
the CID and an almost one hundred per cent success for the SSA appear to reveal a ‘long-
standing tendency’ for the designated judge to refuse ‘only a fraction’ of applications.242 For 
majority of the applications, it does not appear that any were disputed by the designated judge.  
The one-sidedness and bias towards the applicants is therefore almost inevitable, as 
RICA ensures that the application process is not adversarial.’ 243  The ripple effect is 
exacerbated by issues relating to blanket prohibition on user notification and lack of oversight 
mechanisms in RICA 2002. The success rate of application numbers is a disturbing trend, and 
the concluding remarks of Justice Mokgoro is compelling that we should not be ‘blinded’ to 
concerns of abuse and arbitrary interference with our rights.244 Justice Mokgoro goes further 
to question the purported success of interception as an investigative method in the prevention 
and detection of criminal activity as one that ‘is not easily discernible’ and ‘highly 
subjective.’245 
Another key concern relates to the unregulated use of international mobile subscriber 
identity catchers, known ‘IMSI catchers’ or ‘grabbers’. Justice Mokgoro’s report omits any 
mention of IMSI catchers and is limited to conventional interception. IMSI catchers are mobile 
 
240 South Africa's written responses to the UN Human Rights Committee op cit note 229 at para 26.5. 
241 Ibid para 26.5. See chapter three below at 118-124, where the provisions of s 205 of the Criminal Procedure 
Act 51 of 1977 are considered as a parallel process for law enforcement and security and intelligence agencies 
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under different standards of conduct and authorisation. The contrast in the numbers between s 205 subpoenas 
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for obtaining electronic information is remarkable. 
242 Duncan ‘New year’s resolution for 2017: Stop unaccountable state spying’ op cit note 236.  
243 Ibid.  
244 Annual report on the interception of private communications op cit note 236 at 52. 
245 Ibid at 52. 
 94 
interception devices that make it possible for law enforcement and security and intelligence 
agencies to intercept communications without having to involve third party telecommunication 
service providers.246 The use of ISMI catchers is intrusive and invasive technology that can be 
used to indiscriminately monitor communications in real-time, without user knowledge, by 
tracking and locating mobiles phones that are switched on in a particular area. With varying 
capabilities a basic model is limited to detecting the location of a device, but more sophisticated 
catchers can monitor internet communications and messenger services of a single device, or 
intercept communications of multiple devices, simultaneously, and store them.247 
The use of these types of invasive technology devices is not regulated by RICA 2002, 
and there is no corresponding evidence to support the contention that law enforcement and 
security and intelligence agencies apply for the issue of directions before its use.248 In response 
to whether the necessary RICA 2002 processes are followed for the use of ISMI catchers, a 
former crime intelligence official is reported to have stated: ‘No! No. That stuff is all illegal … 
All of it! Where are you going to find a judge who you can convince to quickly approve the 
thing for you on a 12-hour basis, in a place like Newcastle or Estcourt?’249 In 2015, concerns 
about the use of such technology was raised by the Parliament Joint Standing Committee on 
Intelligence which expressed its intentions to ‘revisit RICA with a view of whether any changes 
would be required to strengthen the Act in the likely event that the Judge is not sufficiently 
empowered to deal with matters such as grabbers.’ 250  To date there has been no such 
meaningful amendments to RICA 2002. The concerns are exacerbated in that the technical 
capabilities of law enforcement and security and intelligence agencies to conduct surveillance 
are ‘unknown’ and the state ‘refuses to respond to requests of more information under the 
policy that they cannot “disclose” operational details and capabilities.’251 
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In a another recorded and controversial incident, a telecommunication signal jamming 
device was used in Parliament unlawfully.252 On 12 February 2012, then President of South 
Africa, Jacob Zuma, was scheduled to deliver the annual State of Nation Address at a joint 
session of Parliament. As soon as the sitting began, the SSA, without seeking permission from 
Parliament, used a telecommunication signal jamming device that disrupted 
telecommunication signals inside the Chamber, depriving members of the Parliament and 
journalists from using their mobile phones to inform the public about the State of Nation 
Address. In a case brought by Primedia Broadcasting, an independent South African media 
company, and a number of local and international non-governmental organisations, the court 
found that the state’s use of a telecommunication signal jamming device to temporarily disrupt 
communications during the session without the permission of Parliament was unlawful. 
The  legal challenge by the amaBhungane Centre for Investigative Journalism to the 
constitutionality of RICA 2002 is a remarkable development in South African law. The 
outcome thereof even more so, as certain provisions of RICA 2002 have been declared 
inconsistent with the Constitution, and accordingly invalid.253 The question of whether the 
South African courts or the legislature are the more appropriate forums to address the use of 
these investigative powers by law enforcement and the security and intelligence agencies, is 
debatable.254 Indeed, the respondents in the matter, including inter alia the Minister of Justice 
and Correctional Services, Minister of State Security and Minister of Communications argued 
that the challenges to RICA 2002 as raised by the applicants were ‘premature’ and stated that 
‘the state is at work adapting RICA [2002]’ and ‘should be left to get on with the task.255 In 
rejecting the argument, the respondents were found wanting in demonstrating progress: ‘it must 
be asked what is the State actually doing?’256 Irrespective of arguments of prematurity, the 
court referred to Constitutional Court precedent stating ‘that there can be no merit in delaying 
a challenge to the inconsistency of a statute with constitutional norms on the ground that a 
repair job on the statute is work-in-progress.’257 Moreover, as observed by the court that ‘given 
the spirited resistance to almost every contention advanced by the applicant in criticising RICA 
[2002], there can be no expectation that the reforming legislation, which we are told is being 
 
252 Primedia Broadcasting v Speaker (784/2015) [2016] ZASCA 142 (29 September 2016). 
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contemplated at this time, is in the least benign towards the criticisms advanced and solutions 
offered to address the criticisms.’258  
The court noted the ‘several examples of abuse’ some undisputed, to which ‘no rebuttal 
or explanation or effort to justify the interception’ which only ‘became public knowledge 
fortuitously.’ 259 The court recognised that the risk of abuse and exercise of investigatory 
powers without lawful authority was ‘not academic in South Africa’260 Among them, the court 
noted that it was ‘common cause that at least one applicant [of an interception direction] lied 
blatantly to a designated judge to obtained an interception order in respect of the journalists 
Hofstatter and Wa Afrika, claiming falsely that their details were that of criminals. The 
designated judge, doubtless in good faith, was taken in by the lies and authorised a surveillance 
for a corrupt purpose.’261  
This reflects a fundamental imbalance in South African law. For many years the lack 
of effective oversight regimes and clear statutory authority for these investigative powers 
shielded law enforcement and security and intelligence agencies from oversight and public 
scrutiny. At a general level, concerns with the legislative framework of RICA 2002 are far from 
new. However, they have taken on a renewed intensity following the amaBhungane case. What 
is clear is that the outcome of this public interest litigation will now force parliament to address 
the constitutionality of RICA 2002, and the ‘concrete question’ of how the use of emerging 
surveillance technologies as an intelligence gathering and investigative capability should be 
regulated in South African law with sufficient safeguards against risk of abuse.262 Greater 
transparency is needed by law enforcement and security and intelligence agencies exercising 
these investigative powers. In the preceding analysis it has become clear that some of these 
investigative powers do not have a  clear and explicit basis in legislation. They include inter 
alia bulk interception, foreign signal surveillance, IMSI catchers and signal jamming devices. 
It is therefore important that broad powers such as bulk interception must be set out in 
legislation after full and proper public consultation and debate. In order to ensure accountability 
for surveillance, an independent oversight authority should be required to notify the 
subject/target of interception surveillance after an investigation or operation has terminated, 
unless there is an objectively justifiable reason for maintaining secrecy. There must also be the 
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introduction of suitable internal mechanisms to enable ex parte applications for interception 
directions to be properly challenged prior to authorisation being granted.  
I believe that a comprehensive review of all the investigative powers in RICA 2002 is 
necessary to ensure that the powers are used to its greatest potential with minimal interference 
with individual rights. The safeguards contained within the new law must be capable of 
preventing abuse of power.  
 
V CONCLUSION 
As the year 2020 information age continues to rapidly evolve with a modern fast-paced 
environment of technological advancements dominated by connectivity, data and devices, the 
stakes are extremely high. Leaning on policy remarks by the then newly elected South African 
President The Honourable Cyril Ramaphosa  and his ‘new deal’ for South Africa263 – in the 
context of interception of communications ‘the essence of a new deal’264 is between the South 
African government and its citizens: ‘[a] clear and transparent new legal framework and a more 
coherent, visible and effective oversight regime should be the basis for a public discussion 
about the appropriate and constrained power the…state should have to intrude into the lives of 
its citizens.’265 
The second deal would be the relationship between government and third party 
telecommunication service providers266 and the legal responsibilities on the latter in terms of 
RICA 2002. This relationship, including obligations of third party telecommunication service 
providers and the impact on individual right to privacy are key considerations in chapter three 
to follow. 
 
263 ‘Ramaphosa proposes a new deal for South Africa’ (November 2017) available at https://www.fin24.com/ 
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‘Ramaphosa: My new deal for SA – and 10-point action plan for jobs, growth, transformation’ (November 
2017) available at https://www.biznews.com/thought-leaders/2017/11/14/ramaphosa-new-deal-for-sa/, accessed 
25 February 2019. 





INVESTIGATORY POWERS IN RELATION TO COMMUNICATIONS DATA: 




Perhaps the most controversial investigatory power in recent times relates to communications 
data. It is an issue that poses challenges for the law. There are two worrying trends in South 
African law. First, legislation in the form of the Regulation of Interception of Communications 
and Provision of Communication-Related Information Act 70 Of 20021 has not kept pace with 
a modern fast-paced environment of technological advancements, particularly in relation to 
communications data. At the time of RICA 2002 coming into law, traditional investigative 
powers on surveillance of communications were established within a traditional technological 
environment;2 when communications data was regarded to be less intrusive than the content of 
a communication. This reflected a period when ‘the plain-old-telephone system’ was 
predominantly in use and communications data was simply information about the person 
calling or the person called, and the duration.3 Accordingly, one level of privacy protection 
was assigned to communications data, and another was applied for lawful access to the content 
communications.4 The differing authorisation procedures in RICA 2002 similarly reflect a 
legal construct that distinguishes between what kinds of information implicate greater (content) 
or lesser (communications data) privacy interests. This distinction is based on the fact that 
because the content of the communication cannot be accessed it is, therefore, not as intrusive. 
Second, the policy language developed in RICA 2002 sustained through technology-
neutral terminology now gives law enforcement and security and intelligence agencies in 2020, 
access to highly sensitive information under the lesser privacy protections envisaged for 
communications data almost two decades ago.5 The challenge for the law is aptly reflected by 
the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression, Frank LaRue, in concerns 
expressed in a report:  
 
1 Hereafter ‘RICA 2002’.   
2 I Hosein and A Pascual ‘Understanding traffic data and deconstructing technology-neutral regulations (2002) 
at 1 available at http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download;jsessionid=55CB1A20C3B31F1687 2328C4273 
EED 75?doi=10.1.1.475.5291&rep=rep1&type=pdf, accessed 12 March 2020.  
3 Ibid.  
4 Ibid.  
5 Ibid 7-8. 
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‘[L]egislation has not kept pace with the changes in technology. …legal standards are either 
non-existent or inadequate to deal with the modern communications surveillance environments. 
As a result, States are increasingly seeking to justify the use of new technologies within the 
ambits of old legal frameworks, without recognizing that the expanded capabilities they now 
possess go far beyond what such frameworks envisaged. … this means that vague and broadly 
conceived legal provisions are being involved to legitimize and sanction the use of seriously 
invasive techniques.’6 
Ever since electronic surveillance has become mainstream as an investigative power, it 
has been touted as ‘simply using the by-product of communication devices as evidence to 
identify and tackle crime’ with ‘repeated assurance’ of the fact that because content is not 
accessed, access to communications data is therefore ‘somehow’ not intrusive.7 The counter 
argument, however, is that such a position in the information age is ‘disingenuous’.8 A modern 
fast-paced environment of technological advancements now means that monitoring 
communications data over a period of time could reveal sensitive content and detailed 
understanding of a person’s life.9 
What does this mean for our privacy interests in 2020, when telecommunication service 
providers are legally required to retain our communications data, and for its acquisition by law 
enforcement and security and intelligence agencies now performing expanded and highly 
intrusive capabilities under investigative powers in RICA 2002 which was established with 
traditional technological environments in mind? Part II begins with an analysis of the 
obligations of telecommunication service providers in RICA 2002 with regard to mandatory 
data retention. This is followed by an examination of the investigatory powers of law 
enforcement and security and intelligence agencies to acquire communications data. The key 
issues identified relate to the process of authorising the acquisition of communications data, 
procedures in RICA 2002 for storing, accessing, examining, using and destroying the 
communications data. Completing the analysis is a consideration of s 205 of the Criminal 
Procedure Act 25 of 1977 as a parallel process for law enforcement and security and 
 
6 United Nations Human Rights Council ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of 
the right to freedom of opinion and expression, Frank LaRue’ A/HRC/23/40 (17 April 2013) at 13 available at 
https://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/17session/A.HRC.17.27_en.pdf, accessed 4 July 2019. 
7 AA Gillespie Cybercrime: Key Issues and Debates (2019) at 339. See also AA Gillespie ‘Regulation of 




intelligence agencies to obtain communications data from third party telecommunication 
service providers. Part III concludes the chapter. 
 
II COMMUNICATIONS DATA AND THE REGULATION OF INTERCEPTION OF 
COMMUNICATIONS AND PROVISION OF COMMUNICATION-RELATED 
INFORMATION ACT 70 OF 2002  
Any discussion on electronic surveillance often invokes Bentham’s panopticon 10  and the 
metaphor of Big Brother from George Orwell’s famous novel Nineteen Eighty-Four (1949) 
about a state that uses a bureaucratic apparatus, the ‘Thought Police’ and the figure of ‘Big 
Brother’ on an ever-present telescreen to intervene in the smallest details of its citizens daily 
lives.11 The word ‘surveillance’ is etymologically associated with the French word ‘surveiller’ 
which translates simply as ‘to watch over’. Both in ordinary language and within academic 
debate, the practice of ‘watching over’ has become synonymous with monitoring activities.12 
Leading the discourse of ‘Orwellian’ concerns and fears of ‘Big Brother tactics’ 13  Rule 
explains: 
‘Why do we find the world of 1984 so harrowing? Certainly one reason is its vision of life 
totally robbed of personal privacy, but there is more to it than that. For the ugliest and most 
frightening thing about that world was its vision of the total control of men’s lives by a 
monolithic, authoritarian state. Indeed, the destruction of privacy was a means to this end, a 
tool for enforcing instant obedience to the dictates of the authorities.’14 
 
10 T McMullan ‘What does the panopticon mean in the age of digital surveillance?’ (2015) available at https:// 
www.guardian.com/technology/2015/jul/23/panopticon-digital-surveillance-jeremy-bentham, accessed 26 
October 2016, sets out the basic idea of philosopher, Jeremy Bentham’s panopticon as: ‘there is a central tower 
surrounded by cells. In the central tower is a watchman. In the tower are prisoners – or workers, or children, 
depending on the use of the building. The tower shines bright light so that the watchman is able to see everyone 
in the cells. The people in the cells, however, aren’t able to see the watchman, and therefore have to assume that 
they are always under observation.’ 
11 See P Bernal ‘Data gathering, surveillance and human rights: recasting the debate’ (2016) 1.2 Journal of 
Cyber Policy 243 and D Lyon ‘Bentham’s panopticon: from moral architecture to electronic surveillance’ 
(1991) 98.3 Queen’s Quarterly 596. 
12 A Albrechtslund ‘Online social networking as participatory surveillance’ (2008) available at http://firstmon 
day.org/article/view/2142/1949, accessed 26 October 2016.  
13 A Albrechtslund ‘Surveillance and ethics in film: Rear window and the conversation’ (2008) Albany Journal 
of Criminal Justice and Popular Culture available at http://www.albany.edu/scj/jcjpc/vol15is2/Albrechtslund. 
pdf, accessed 26 October 2016. See also D Lyon The Electronic Eye: The Rise of Surveillance Society (1994) at 
57-80 for a chapter discussing Big Brother and the Panopticon as a metaphor in the context of computer 
surveillance. 
14 JB Rule Private Lives and Public Surveillance (1973) 16. See also NM Richards ‘The Dangers of 
Surveillance’(2013) 26 Harvard LR 1934 and B Keenan ‘Contingency and Surveillance: Framing the Risk of 
Taking Risks’ (2014) 2.2 Birbeck LR 293. 
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 Beyond Bentham’s panopticon and Orwell’s Nineteen Eighty-Four, what happens in 
the world of electronic surveillance where ‘in the panopticon the occupants are constantly 
aware of the threat of being watched…but state surveillance on the internet is invisible; there 
is no looming tower, no dead-eye lens staring at you every time you enter a URL.’15 The 
analogy is that because we have knowledge that our communications data is being retained, 
then we will use our devices appropriately because we will never know when our data will be 
accessed by law enforcement and security and intelligence agencies. 16  The relative 
intangibility of electronic surveillance (as opposed to CCTV, which offers a more physical 
sense of exposure in the tower by watchmen or thought police) is such that neither Bentham 
nor Orwell could have imagined the extent to which our communications data is ‘watched over’ 
and retained by third party telecommunication service providers, including for the acquisition 
of such data by law enforcement and security and intelligence agencies. 17  Retention and 
acquisition of communications data therefore has far-reaching implications for electronic 
surveillance activities for individual rights.18 Solove explains the challenges: 
‘Surveillance is a sweeping form of investigatory power. It extends beyond a search, for it 
records behaviour, social interaction, and everything that a person says and does. Rather than 
targeting specific information, surveillance can ensnare a significant amount of data beyond 
any originally sought. If watched long enough a person might be caught in some form of illegal 
or immoral activity. … Moreover, unlike a typical search, which is often performed in a short 
once-and-done fashion, electronic surveillance “continues around-the-clock for days or 
months”. … Part of the harm is simply not being watched, but in the lack of control that people 
have over the watchers. Surveillance creates the need to worry about the judgment of the 
watchers. Will our email be misunderstood? Will our confidential information be 
misunderstood? What will be done with the information gleaned from surveillance?’19 
Bernal observes that the main difference between Bentham’s panopticon (retention, and 
never knowing when we are watched) and electronic surveillance (acquisition) is that the latter 
has been designed in legislative frameworks for certain specified purposes, whereas retention 
of communications data by third party telecommunication service providers is performed for 
 
15 Ibid. 
16 Gillespie op cit note 7 at 339. 
17 Rule op cit note 14. 
18 D Trottier and D Lyon ‘Key Features of Social Media Surveillance’ in C Fuchs, K Boersma, A Albrechtslund 
and M Sandoval (eds) Internet and Surveillance: The Challenges of Web 2.0 and Social Media (2012) 89-105. 
19 DL Solove ‘Digital Dossiers and the Dissipation of Fourth Amendment Privacy (2002) 75 Southern 
California LR 1083 at 1092. 
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everyone.20 What this means in reality is that ‘whilst the retention of [communications] data 
does not require anyone to be suspected of a criminal offence’ it will be seen from the 
legislative framework of RICA 2002 that ‘the acquisition of data can only be for specified 
purposes’,21 including for the prevention and detection of ‘serious offences’ or in the interests 
of ‘national security or compelling national economic interests’ if the ‘reasonable grounds to 
believe’ threshold has been met.22 RICA 2002 also sets out a core provision in relation to 
mandatory retention of communications data by telecommunication service providers.23  
 
(a) Retaining communications data  
Communications data has always been likened to the ‘who’, ‘when’ and ‘where’ of a 
communication, but not the content of what was said or written. 24  RICA 2002 refers to 
communications data as ‘communication-related information. It does not provide such a  
simple definition, although its likeness to the ‘who’, ‘when’ and ‘where’ of a communication 
can be gleaned from the definition adopted. For the purposes of retention this is defined as ‘any 
information relating to an indirect communication which is available in the records of a 
telecommunication service provider, and includes switching, dialling or signalling information 
that identifies the origin, destination, termination, duration, and equipment used’ and the 
location of the user within the telecommunication system.’25 The definition of communications 
data is broad, and appears to exclude content of a communication which is defined in RICA 
2002 as ‘when used with respect to any communication, includes any information concerning 
the substance, purport or meaning of that communication.26 RICA 2002 further delineates its 
 
20 Bernal op cit note 11 at 250 and Gillespie op cit note 7 at 339. 
21 Gillespie op cit note 7 at 339-40 (emphasis in original). 
22 Section 17 and 19. See also Nampak (Pty) Ltd v Vodacom (Pty) Ltd and Others 2019 (1) SA 257 (GJ) para 2 
for a ‘novel’ application in which third parties can gain access to information held by telecommunication service 
providers to enable it to identify wrongdoers so as to take appropriate legal action against the perpetrators. In 
this instance, Nampak sought information from the relevant telecommunication service providers to be able to 
identify wrongdoers who robbed Nampak’s premises, in advance of any litigation having been instituted. The 
order, unopposed by the telecommunication service provider, was circumscribed by the court in terms of content 
of the information to be accessed, duration and destruction of the information provided, including a bar on user 
notification for three months. 
23 Section 30.  
24 Home Office Acquisition and disclosure of communications data – Code of Practice (TSO 2007) available at 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/426248/Acqui
sition_and_Disclosure_of_Communications_Data_Code_of_Practice_March_2015.pdf, accessed 4 July 2019. 
25 Section 1 (emphasis added). ‘Indirect communication’ is defined to mean ‘the transfer of information, 
including a message or any part of a message, whether- (a) in the form of- (i) speech, music or other sounds; 
data; (ii) text; (iii) visual images, whether animated or not; (iv) signals; or (v) radio frequency spectrum; or (b) 
in any other form or in any combination of forms, that is transmitted in whole or in part by means of a postal 
service or a telecommunication system.’   
26 Section 1.  
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provisions on communications data between real-time (immediately available up to 90 days 
after transmission) communication-related information and archived (stored after the 90 day 
transmission period) communication-related information, and its authorisation and warrantry 
process is referred to as a ‘direction’.27 
Section 30(1)(b) requires that ‘notwithstanding any other law’ a telecommunication 
service provider ‘must store’ communications data. This is the core provision in RICA 2002 in 
relation to mandatory retention of communications data by telecommunication service 
providers. Section 30 also grants the Minister of Communications the power to issue a 
‘retention directive’ in respect of that telecommunication service provider determining the 
‘type of communication-related information which must be stored’ and the ‘period for which 
such information must be stored’ which period may ‘not be less than three years and not more 
than five years from the date of the transmission of the indirect communication to which that 
communication-related information relates.’28 
The issuing of a retention directive by the Minister is not linked to any specified 
purpose, such as for the prevention and detection of ‘serious offences’ or in the interests of 
‘national security or compelling national economic interests.’ Further, the decision to issue a 
retention directive is not required to be approved by a judicial authority. There is no 
requirement to prove that such measure is necessary and proportionate. RICA 2002 effectively 
allows the state to require telecommunication service providers to perform untargeted and 
indiscriminate mandatory retention of communications data. Concerns about untargeted and 
indiscriminate mandatory retention of communications data raises questions about the 
‘increasing reliance’ on third party telecommunication service providers ‘to retain data “just in 
case” it is needed for government purposes’29 to be able to ‘preserve evidence of historic 
 
27 Section 1. For example, a direction issued under s 17(3) or s 18(3) means that a telecommunication service 
provider is directed to provide real-time communication-related information in respect of a customer, on an 
ongoing basis, as it becomes available. 
28 Section 30(2)(a)(iii) (emphasis added). 
29 Human Rights Council ‘The right to privacy in the digital age’ A/HRC/27/37 (30 June 2014) at 6-7 available 
at http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/RegularSessions/Session27/Documents/A.HRC.27.37_en.pdf, 
accessed 04 January 2016 at 9. D McKinley ‘New terrains of privacy in South Africa’ December 2016 at 16 
available at https://www.mediaa nddemocracy.com/uploads/1/6/5/7/16577624/r2kmpdp_new_ terrains_ of_ 
privacy_in_south__africa_masterset_small.pdf, accessed February 2019. See also A Mare & J Duncan ‘An 
analysis of the communications surveillance legislative framework in South Africa’ (November 2015) at 20 
available at https://www.mediaandd emocracy.com/uploads/1/6/5/7/16577624/comms-surveillance-
framework_mare2.pdf, accessed February 2019: ‘RICA does not specify what kind of ‘capability’ is required, 
this facilitates unknown and unregulated equipment to be built into networks/systems, leaving users completely 
in the dark and compromising the integrity of the entire system. …this introduces vulnerabilities into the 
network…there is no information in the public domain about how these security holes haves been abused or 
what, if anything, has been or is being done about it.’ 
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criminality.’ 30  The bulk of communications data retained by telecommunication service 
providers will therefore be irrelevant to any investigation or operation.31 Section 30(1)(a) 
requires that a telecommunication service provider ‘must provide a telecommunication service 
which has the capability to be intercepted.’ Beyond this obligation, RICA 2002 does not specify 
the type of ‘capability’ or what is allowed by telecommunication service providers nor any 
protections against abuse or arbitrary interference such as safeguards relating to retention, 
disclosure and destruction of retained data. This means that retention of communications data 
by third party telecommunication service providers is performed for everyone32 for a period 
between three and five years and does not require anyone to be suspected of a criminal offence 
or for the data to be retained for any specified purpose. 
As referred earlier in chapters 1-2, the Constitution Republic of South Africa Act 108 
of 1996 confers upon everyone the right to privacy, including the right not to have their person 
or home searched, their property searched, their possessions seized, or the privacy of their 
communications infringed.33 The section itself places no limits on the right. This does not 
mean, however, that the right to privacy is protected against the general limitation clause 
contemplated in s 36 of the Constitution. Nor does the Constitution accord hierarchical 
precedence to any particular right entrenched in the Bill of Rights over other rights referred to 
therein. 34  In determining the constitutionality of alleged violations of rights, a two-stage 
approach is applied by the courts underpinned by a limitations justification.35 
In terms of the Constitution the right to privacy may be limited provided the limitation 
is justified.36 That s 30 of RICA 2002 infringes on the right to privacy is not disputed by the 
 
30 D Anderson QC A question of trust: Report of the investigatory powers review (2015) Independent Reviewer 
of Terrorism Legislation available at www.gov.uk/government/publications, accessed on 17 May 2016. 
31 G Hosein and CW Palow ‘Modern safeguards for modern surveillance: An analysis of innovations in 
communications surveillance techniques’ (2013) 74.6 Ohio State LJ 1071 at 1092. 
32 Bernal op cit note 11 at 250 and Gillespie op cit note 7 at 339. 
33 Hereafter ‘the Constitution’. Other constitutional rights implicated by RICA 2002 provisions on untargeted 
and indiscriminate mandatory retention of communications data include the right of access to courts (s 34); the 
right to freedom of expression and the media (s 16); and the right of legal privilege protected by sections 34 and 
35 of the Constitution. However, paramount to concerns about the constitutionality of RICA 2002 in general 
relate to the right to privacy, and hence dealt with in more detail. The other constitutional rights are analysed to 
the extent that the discussion focuses on other particular challenges with RICA 2002 provisions, such as legal 
privilege. 
34 Johncom Media Investments Limited v M and Others 2009 (4) SA 7 (CC) para 19.  
35 See Coetzee v Government of the Republic of South Africa 1995 (4) SA 631 (CC) para 9. See also Moise v 
Greater Germiston Transitional Local Council: Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development Intervening 
(Women’s Legal Centre as Amicus Curiae) 2001 (4) SA 491 (CC) para 7; S v Williams and Others 1995 (3) SA 
632 (CC) para 54.  
36 See earlier chapter one at and 19-25 and chapter two at 66-68. 
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state, which relies on the justificatory argument that it ‘is a less invasive form of surveillance.’37 
The legal construct of communications data distinguished between what kinds of information 
implicate greater (content) or lesser (communications data) privacy interests. Based on the 
distinction between content and envelope information, it was originally envisioned and 
reasoned that the content of communications was deserving of stronger safeguards than 
communications data:  
‘[E]very communications network features two types of information: the contents of the 
communications, and the addressing and routing information that the networks use to deliver 
the contents of communications. The former is “content information” and the latter is ‘envelope 
information’. The essential distinction between content and envelope information remains 
constant across different technologies, from postal to e-mail. … The envelope information is 
the information derived from the outside of the envelope, including mailing and return address, 
the stamp and postmark, and the size and weight of the envelope when sealed.’38 
However, while the above distinction works well in relation to the physical aspects of 
a postal letter, the effects thereof cannot be said to remain ‘constant across different 
technologies, from postal to e-mail.’39 In 2020, the value and sensitivity of communications 
have dramatically increased, such that the envelope information can be regarded as intrusive 
as the content of a communication. 40  A modern fast-paced environment of technological 
advancements not only means instantaneous communications, it has also made available 
volumes of transactional information about our privates lives. 41  For example, while the 
numbers dialled from a private telephone will reveal nothing of the contents of the 
 
37 amaBhungane Centre for Investigative Journalism NPC and SP Sole v Minister of Justice and Correctional 
Services and Others Case No: 25978/2017 (16 September 2019), subject to confirmation by the Constitutional 
Court. See applicants’ heads of argument paras 45-51 available at https://amabhungane.org/wp-content/uploads 
/2019/06/ 190212_amaB-heads-of-argument.pdf, accessed 24 March 2020.  
38 OS Kerr ‘Internet surveillance law after the USA Patriot Act: The Big Brother that isn’t’ (2003) 97 
Northwestern University LR 607 at 611-16. 
39 Ibid. 
40 Applying the distinction between content and envelope information to an Internet Protocol address and to a 
Uniform Resource Locator, which is used to specify addresses on the World Wide Web, is another example 
demonstrating that the distinction is not always clear and certain. The non-content part of an Internet 
communication, referred to as a ‘header’, and every communication sent across the Internet includes both the 
originating and destination IP address. A list of IP addresses can reveal a wealth of information about our  
Internet activities: ‘That A has telephoned B on a particular date from a particular location is actually quite 
intrusive … If a [member of parliament] logged on to a site selling Viagra, that tells you quite a lot. If a 16-year-
old girl goes on to a website about abortion that tells you an awful lot about her too. I don't think there's a black-
and-white distinction between communications data and content.’ Attributed to the former Information 
Commissioner Richard Thomas quoted in Liberty Liberty’s response to the Home Office consultation: 
“Protecting the public in a changing communications environment” at 19 available at https://www.libertyhum 
anrights.org.uk/site / default/files/liberty-s-communications-data-consultation-response.pdf, accessed 4 July 
2019. 
41 See MW Clark ‘Cell phones as tracking devices’ (2007) 41 Valparaiso University LR 1414. 
 106 
conversations, the list of numbers cannot be said to be without content, and could easily reveal 
the identities of persons and places called which, if collated, could reveal sensitive details of a 
person’s life.42 A lengthy telephone call may well suggest that ‘two people on opposite ends 
of the line knew each other or at least had something substantial to discuss.’ 43  In other 
situations, it may reveal activity in relation to a suspect/target of an investigation or operation 
that informs law enforcement and security and intelligence agencies of the location of the 
suspect/target, the time and duration of, including whom s/he spoke to.44 For journalists with 
confidential sources, disclosure of their mobile phone contacts as communications data is just 
as revealing.  
In terms of opportunities for law enforcement and security and intelligence agencies, 
this means the ability to access the ‘what’ of communications held by telecommunication 
service providers, that is, information about our locations, online activities and related 
information about e-mails and messages we send or receive – all of which under RICA 2002 
is deemed to be less invasive and therefore worthy of lesser privacy protections.45 This was 
confirmed by the state as recently as 2016 in which it reiterated its position: ‘the interception 
of direct and indirect communications are regarded as extremely intrusive and a higher level 
of judicial authorisation is required before law enforcement is entitled to this information. Call 
related information is regarded as less intrusive and a lower standard of judicial authorisation 
is necessary before it can be made available.’46  
I am of the view the ‘envelope is the content’47 and so it is argued that the distinction 
between the content of communications and its communications data in a year 2020 
information age is no longer sustainable. The type of communication-related information 
which telecommunication service providers must retain ‘include data necessary to trace and 
identify the source of a communication and its destination, to identify the date, time, duration 
and type of a communication, to identify users’ communication equipment, and to identify the 
location of mobile communication equipment, data which consist, inter alia, of the name and 
address of the subscriber or registered user, the calling telephone number, the number called 
 
42 DJ Solove ‘Reconstructing electronic surveillance law’ (2004) 72 The George Washington LR 1701 at 1726. 
43 Kerr op cit note 38 at 643. 
44 Ibid. 
45 United Nations Human Rights Council ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur’ at 5 op cit note 6. 
46 South Africa's written responses to the UN Human Rights Committee following South Africa's review ref 
50/2016 (10 March 2016) at 2 available at https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/Treaties/CCPR/Shared%20Documents/ 
ZAF/INT_CCPR_AIS_ZAF_23518_E.pdf, accessed 2 April 2020.  
47 Solove op cit note 42at 1727.  
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and an IP address for Internet services.’48 In doing so, it makes it possible to identify the 
person(s) with whom a user has communicated, including by what means, the time, the place 
and the frequency of communications during a given period.49 This type of information ‘taken 
as a whole, may allow very precise conclusions to be drawn concerning the private lives of the 
persons whose data has been retained, such as the habits of everyday life, permanent or 
temporary places of residence, daily or other movements, the activities carried out, the social 
relationships of those persons and the social environments frequented by them.’50 
RICA clearly infringes the constitutional right to privacy which  brings us to the second 
leg of the enquiry, namely, whether the limitation on the right to privacy in RICA 2002 is 
reasonable and justifiable as envisaged in s 36 of the Constitution. The process of determining 
whether a limitation of the right to privacy is reasonable and justifiable within s 36 involves 
the balancing of competing interests. It entails taking account of the considerations enumerated 
in s 36. This process has been described by the court as a proportionality analysis.51 In National 
Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality and Another v Minister of Justice and Others, the 
limitation exercise was defined in these terms: 
‘The balancing of different interests must still take place. On the one hand there is the right 
infringed; its nature; its importance in an open and democratic society based on human dignity, 
equality and freedom; and the nature and extent of the limitation. On the other hand there is the 
importance of the purpose of the limitation. In the balancing process and in the evaluation of 
proportionality one is enjoined to consider the relation between the limitation and its purpose 
as well as the existence of less restrictive means to achieve this purpose.’52  
In Johncom Media Investments Limited v M and Others, the Constitutional Court 
provided further guidance on the proportionality analysis: ‘[t]o effect a proper balance, the 
right infringed must be identified, and its nature as well as its importance in a particular context 
must be considered. The purpose of the limitation must be pin-pointed, together with its extent, 
so as to determine the relation between the limitation and the purpose it is designed to achieve. 
We must also consider whether the purpose could be achieved by less restrictive means.’53 In 
other words, for a limitation to be permissible, it is not enough that it serves one of the 
 
48 Digital Rights Ireland Ltd (C-293/12) and Kärntner Landesregierung and Others (C-594/12) CJEU (08 April 
2014) para 26. 
49 Supra note 48 paras 26-27. 
50 Supra note 48 para 27. 
51 Phillips and Another v Director of Public Prosecutions and Others 2003 (3) SA 345 (CC) para 22. 
52 1999 (1) SA 6 (CC) para 35 (footnote omitted). 
53 Johncom’s case supra note 34 para 24.  
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enumerated legitimate aims, it must be necessary for reaching the legitimate aim.54 Similarly, 
interpretation of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights clearly indicates that 
it is not sufficient that the restrictions serve the permissible purposes, it requires restrictive 
measures to conform to the principle of proportionality: the measure must be appropriate to 
achieve its protective function, the measure must be the least intrusive instrument amongst 
those which might achieve the desired result, and the measure must be proportionate to the 
interest to be protected.55 
The key issue in this regard is the balance between the right of privacy and the right of 
the state to infringe on those privacy rights in the furtherance of its goals, notably the need to 
investigate and combat crime. In South Africa's written responses to the United Nations Human 
Rights Committee following South Africa's Review, the state explained that RICA 2002 is ‘a 
response to crimes committed through modern communication devices.’56 The ‘legitimate 
purpose’ of RICA was explained by the state as follows:  
‘The sole reason why the RICA was put on the Statute Book is to provide for a mechanism to 
investigate and combat serious crimes which are planned, facilitated or executed through the 
use of electronic communications. Most constitutional democracies followed this route in order 
to investigate crime.’57   
While it is accepted that RICA 2002 is necessary for reaching a legitimate aim, that is, 
to ‘investigate and combat serious crimes’58 in the circumstances it is argued that the limitation 
on the right to privacy cannot be justified. In the analysis of factors (d) and (e) of s 36 of the 
Constitution, respectively, the relation between the limitation and its purpose and less 
 
54 South Africa's written responses to the UN Human Rights Committee op cit note 46 at 1-2.  
55 Human Rights Committee General Comment No. 27 (1999) CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.9, reproduced in Human 
Rights Instruments (2008) Compilation of general comments and general recommendations adopted by Human 
Rights Treaty Bodies HRI/GEN/1/Rev.9 (Vol. I) paras. 11-16. Although explained on Article 12 (freedom of 
movement), the same principles apply to the interpretation of Article 17.  
56 South Africa's written responses to the UN Human Rights Committee op cit note 46.  
57 Ibid at 6. The long title of RICA 2002 further conveys the intended purpose of the legislation, inter alia: ‘To 
regulate the interception of certain communications, the monitoring of certain signals and radio frequency 
spectrums and the provision of certain communication-related information; to regulate the making of 
applications for, and the issuing of, directions authorising the interception of communications and the provision 
of communication- related information under certain circumstances; to regulate the execution of directions and 
entry warrants by law enforcement officers and the assistance to be given by postal service providers, 
telecommunication service providers and decryption key holders in the execution of such directions and entry 
warrants.’ 
58 Ibid at 6. The South African state further responded on legitimacy: [t]hese laws act as a shield and sword 
against the protection of human rights and specify how the State must exercise its powers in the investigation of 
criminal offences facilitated through the use of communication technologies. That is precisely what RICA aims 
to do. From a Constitutional perspective the interception of communications can be justified in terms of the 
limitation clause to our constitution (section 36).’ 
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restrictive means to achieve the purpose, the state falls short in its adamant position on 
mandatory data retention. The RICA 2002 provisions that require telecommunication service 
providers to perform untargeted and indiscriminate mandatory retention of communications 
data cannot be justified.  
The state was specifically asked to respond to the following by the United Nations 
Human Rights Committee: ‘Article 30(1)(b) of RICA requires retention of communications 
data. Could you explain how the mandatory retention of communications data is justified under 
Article 17 of the Covenant?’59 Article 17 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights reads: ‘1. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his 
privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his honour and reputation. 
2. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks.’60 
The totality of the state’s unsatisfactory response was recorded as follows: ‘[t]he information 
which is being stored is typically call related information. In the past it has solved various 
serious criminal cases in the Republic. The UK, Australia, New Zealand and certain countries 
in Europe also keep this information for the purposes of criminal investigations. Information 
must be stored for a 5 year period.’61 The state’s response misses the key point, specifically 
concerns about the regulation of mandatory retention of communications data and 
infringements of rights, not the value of communications data as the state referred to in 
response. The state was unable to demonstrate, effectively, how the RICA 2002 provisions on 
untargeted and indiscriminate mandatory retention of communications data as a restrictive 
measure on the right to privacy conforms to the principle of proportionality, how the measure 
is appropriate to achieve its protective function, how the measure is the least intrusive 
instrument amongst those which might achieve the desired result, and how the measure is 
proportionate to the interest to be protected. 62  As an umbrella response to justify all its 
electronic surveillance provisions in RICA 2002 as proportional, the state reverted as follows: 
[i]n terms of the RICA an interception can only be authorised if ‘other investigative procedures 
have been applied and have failed to produce the required evidence or reasonably appear to be 
unlikely to succeed if applied or are likely to be too dangerous to apply in order to obtain the 
required evidence and that the offence therefore cannot adequately be investigated, or the 
information therefore cannot adequately be obtained, in another appropriate manner (s 
 
59 South Africa's written responses to the UN Human Rights Committee op cit note 46 at 10.  
60 Available at http://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/ccpr.aspx, accessed 02 March 2018 
61 South Africa's written responses to the UN Human Rights Committee op cit note 46 at 11.  
62 Ibid at 1-2.  
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16(5)(c)).’63 However, does such provision apply to mandatory retention of communications 
data by telecommunication service providers? No, it does not. The issuing of a retention 
directive by the Minister to telecommunication service providers is not linked to any specified 
purpose, such as the prevention and detection of ‘serious offences’ or in the interests of 
‘national security or compelling national economic interests.’ Further, the decision to issue a 
retention directive is not required to be approved by a judicial authority. 
 In applying s 36(1)(d) of the Constitution, which requires consideration of the relation 
between the limitation and its purpose, it is clear that the provisions to perform untargeted and 
indiscriminate mandatory retention of communications data is not rationally linked to the 
legitimate purposes the state seeks to achieve. In terms of Constitutional Court guidance, this 
analysis evaluates the logical relationship between the purpose sought to be achieved by the 
provision and the means used.64 The aim of the evaluation is not to determine whether some 
measure will achieve the purpose better, only whether the selected measures could rationally 
achieve the same end.65 
Section 36(1)(e) asks whether  there is a  less restrictive means to achieve the purpose.   
The Constitutional Court has been very clear that where a right is being limited, if there are 
less-restrictive means available by which the same end could be achieved, these less-restrictive 
means must be used.66 If the provisions of legislation are ‘overbroad in its reach’ the extent of 
the infringement on rights is considered ‘substantially disproportionate to its public purpose.’67 
In S v Manamela and Another (Director-General of Justice Intervening), the Constitutional 
Court has stated that s 36 limitations analysis ‘however, does not permit a sledgehammer to be 
 
63 Ibid at 1-2.  
64 Minister of Safety and Security v South African Hunters and Game Conservation Association 2018 (2) SACR 
164 (CC) para 14. See also amaBhungane case applicants’ heads of argument supra note 37 paras 67-68. 
65 Ibid. 
66 See amaBhungane case applicants’ heads of argument supra note 37 paras 67-68. 
67 Mistry v Interim National Medical and Dental Council of South Africa and Others 1998 (4) SA 1127 (CC) 
para 30: ‘To sum up: irrespective of legitimate expectations of privacy which may be intruded upon in the 
process, and without any predetermined safeguards to minimise the extent of such intrusions where the nature of 
the investigations makes some invasion of privacy necessary, section 28(1) gives the inspectors carte blanche to 
enter any place, including private dwellings, where they reasonably suspect medicines to be, and then to inspect 
documents which may be of the most intimate kind. The extent of the invasion of the important right to personal 
privacy authorised by section 28(1) is substantially disproportionate to its public purpose; the section is clearly 
overbroad in its reach and accordingly fails to pass the proportionality test laid down in S v Makwanyane and 
Another’ (footnote omitted). 
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used to crack a nut.’68 The enactment of a provision which infringes on constitutional rights 
must be ‘appropriately tailored and more narrowly focussed.’69  
Although the s 30(1)(b) provision in RICA 2002 will likely be deemed legitimate in its 
aim of investigating and combatting serious crime, it does not pass the proportionality test that 
the Constitutional Court applies to evaluate the appropriateness of the measure undertaken to 
achieve its legitimate aim. It can be rightly regarded as ‘overbroad in its reach’ and 
‘substantially disproportionate to its public purpose.’ To a great extent, the provision in RICA 
2002 interferes with the right to privacy for an unspecified length of time, falling between three 
and five years. There are also no safeguards and protections to be followed for storing, 
accessing, examining, using and destroying the communications data.  
European human rights jurisprudence often cite the joined cases of Digital Rights 
Ireland Ltd (C-293/12) and Kärntner Landesregierung and Others (C-594/12). 70  The 
European Court of Justice found that a Council of the European Union adopted Directive 
2006/24/EC, which regulated Internet Service Providers’ storage of telecommunications data 
that could be used to fight serious crime in the European Union, to be invalid to the extent that 
such directive ‘entails a wide-ranging and particularly serious interference with those 
fundamental rights in the legal order of the European Union, without such an interference being 
precisely circumscribed by provisions to ensure that it is actually limited to what is strictly 
necessary.’71 The Court of Justice of the European Union found that the data retention directive 
was problematic in that: 
‘it did not require any relationship between the data whose retention is provided for and a threat 
to public security and, in particular, it is not restricted to a retention in relation (i) to data 
pertaining to a particular time period and/or a particular geographical zone and/or to a circle of 
particular persons likely to be involved, in one way or another, in a serious crime, or (ii) to 
persons who could, for other reasons, contribute, by the retention of their data, to the prevention, 
detection or prosecution of serious offences.’72 
 
68 2000 (3) SA 1 (CC) para 34. 
69 See Islamic Unity Convention v Independent Broadcasting Authority and Others 2002 (4) SA 294 (CC) para 
49 and South African National Defence Union v Minister of Defence and Another 1999 (4) SA 469 (CC) para 
18: ‘At the second stage of the constitutional enquiry, the relevant questions are what is the purpose of the 
impugned provision, what is its effect on constitutional rights and is the provision well-tailored to that purpose.’ 
70Digital Rights Ireland case supra note 48. 
71 Supra note 48 para 65. 
72 Supra note 48 para 59. See Privacy International Submission to the joint committee on the draft Investigatory 
Powers Bill (21 December 2015) available at https://privacyinternational.org/sites/default/files/2017-12/ 
Submission_IPB_Joint_Committee.pdf, accessed 2 July 2019 para 225: ‘Even before the CJEU issued its 
judgment in Digital Rights Ireland, the constitutional or administrative courts of Bulgaria, Cyprus, the Czech 
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The retention of communications data is untargeted and indiscriminate in South African 
law, and without any protection against arbitrary interference. Unlimited in scale, and a 
generous duration period for retention, the majority of information retained by 
telecommunication service providers for an unspecified length of time, falling between three 
and five years in terms of RICA 2002, will be irrelevant to any criminal or national security 
investigation. The untargeted and indiscriminate mandatory retention of communications data, 
without suspicion, unjustifiably violates the right to privacy. In S and Marper v United 
Kingdom, a case concerned the ‘blanket and indiscriminate’ retention of DNA samples from 
persons arrested but not charged or convicted, the Grand Chamber of the European Court of 
Human Rights held that ‘the mere retention and storing of personal data by public authorities, 
however obtained, are to be regarded as having direct impact on the private-life interest of an 
individual concerned, irrespective of whether subsequent use is made of the data.’ 73  In 
comparison with the features of the European Union adopted Directive 2006/24/EC on data 
retention, the RICA 2002 provisions require telecommunication service providers to perform 
untargeted and indiscriminate mandatory retention of communications, and similarly does not: 
‘provide for sufficient safeguards to ensure effective protection of the data retained against the 
risk of abuse and against any unlawful access and use of that data. 
… 
lay down rules which are specific and adapted to (i) the vast quantity of data whose retention 
is required…, (ii) the sensitive nature of that data and (iii) the risk of unlawful access to that 
data, rules which would serve, in particular, to govern the protection and security of the data in 
question in a clear and strict manner in order to ensure their full integrity and confidentiality. 
… 
does not ensure the irreversible destruction of the data at the end of the data retention period.’74 
 
Republic, Germany and Romania declared part or all of the relevant national legislation implementing the Data 
Retention Directive to be unlawful. Following the Digital Rights Ireland judgment, the courts of Austria, 
Slovenia, Belgium, Bulgaria, the Netherlands, Poland, Romania, and Slovakia have struck down national laws 
that had implemented or replicated the Data Retention Directive (or, in the case of Romania and Bulgaria, 
subsequent amendments to the original implementing laws).’ 
73 EctHR 30562/04 and 30566/04 (4 December 2008) para 121. 
74 Supra note 73 para 121. See also Scarlet Extended SA v SABAM (CC-70/10) CJEU (24 November 2011), the 
CJEU similarly held that a filtering system proposed by rights-holders in order to combat copyright 
infringement was unlawful on the basis that it would require internet service providers to engage in real-time 
‘preventative monitoring’ of customers’ communications. The court held that such a measure would be 
incompatible with European Union Directives, namely with Article 15(1) of Directive 2000/31, which prohibits 
imposition of an obligation on an Internet service provider to carry out general monitoring of the information 
that it transmits on its network, and would be against the fundamental rights of Internet users to the protection of 
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Notably, in European human rights jurisprudence there is recognition of a margin of 
appreciation that states’ enjoy for the way in which a measure is designed to achieve its stated 
aim in light of present day threats of serious criminal activity. In Centrum för Rättvisa v 
Sweden,75 for instance, the case concerned a complaint brought by a public interest law firm 
alleging that domestic legislation permitting the bulk interception of electronic signals in 
Sweden for foreign intelligence purposes breached its Article 8 privacy rights. Although the 
Court found some shortcomings in the Swedish legislation, in particular its intelligence sharing 
regime and the lack of public reasons for decisions reached by one of its oversight bodies, it 
held that the Swedish system of bulk interception provided adequate and sufficient safeguards 
against arbitrariness and the risk of abuse. In doing so, the Court gave a wide margin of 
appreciation to states to adopt bulk interception regimes in light of ‘the current threats facing 
many Contracting States (including the scourge of global terrorism and other serious crime, 
such as drug trafficking, human trafficking, sexual exploitation of children and cybercrime), 
advancements in technology which have made it easier for terrorists and criminals to evade 
detection on the internet, and the unpredictability of the routes via which electronic 
communications are transmitted.’76 
In its analysis, the European Court of Human Rights has considered the Convention 
compatibility of regimes which expressly permit the bulk interception of communications on 
two occasions: first in Weber and Saravia v Germany77 and then also in Liberty and Others v 
The United Kingdom:78   
 
their personal data and freedom of expression guaranteed under the European Union Charter of Fundamental 
Rights. 
75 EctHR 35252/08 (19 June 2018). 
76 Supra para 112. 
77 EctHR 54934/00 (29 June 2006). At para 109: ‘In Weber and Saravia the applicants complained about the 
process of strategic monitoring under the amended G10 Act, which authorised the monitoring of international 
wireless telecommunications. Signals emitted from foreign countries were monitored by interception sites 
situated on German soil with the aid of certain catchwords which were listed in the monitoring order. Only 
communications containing these catchwords were recorded and used. Having particular regard to the six 
“minimum safeguards” the Court considered that there existed adequate and effective guarantees against abuses 
of the State’s strategic monitoring powers. It therefore declared the applicants’ Article 8 complaints to be 
manifestly ill-founded.’  
78 EctHR 58243/00 (1 July 2008). At para 109: ‘In Liberty and Others the Court was considering the regime 
under the Interception of Communications Act 1985 which allowed the executive to intercept communications 
passing between the United Kingdom and an external receiver. … The Court held that the domestic law at the 
relevant time did not indicate with sufficient clarity, so as to provide adequate protection against abuse of 
power, the scope or manner of exercise of the very wide discretion conferred on the State to intercept and 
examine external communications. In particular, it did not set out in a form accessible to the public any 
indication of the procedure to be followed for selecting for examination, sharing, storing and destroying 
intercepted material.’ 
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‘The Court has expressly recognised that the national authorities enjoy a wide margin of 
appreciation in choosing how best to achieve the legitimate aim of protecting national security. 
… the Court considers that the decision to operate a bulk interception regime in order to identify 
hitherto unknown threats to national security is one which continues to fall within 
States’ margin of appreciation. Nevertheless, it is evident from the Court’s case-law over 
several decades that all interception regimes (both bulk and targeted) have the potential to be 
abused, especially where the true breadth of the authorities’ discretion to intercept cannot be 
discerned from the relevant legislation …Therefore, while States enjoy a wide margin of 
appreciation in deciding what type of interception regime is necessary to protect national 
security, the discretion afforded to them in operating an interception regime must necessarily 
be narrower.’79 
In this regard, the Court applied the identified six minimum safeguards on electronic 
surveillance that contracting states must incorporate in order to be sufficiently foreseeable to 
minimise the risk of abuses of power. Following a careful assessment of the minimum 
safeguards developed by the Grand Chamber in its 2015 judgment in Roman Zakharov v 
Russia,80 the court found that the Swedish system of signals intelligence provided adequate 
and sufficient guarantees against arbitrariness and the risk of abuse. The court noted that the 
regulatory framework had been reviewed several times with a view to notably enhancing 
protections of privacy, and had in effect developed in such a way that it minimised the risk of 
interference with privacy and compensated for the lack of openness of the system. Specifically 
the court found that the scope of the electronic surveillance powers and its treatment of data 
clearly defined in law; the scope and duration of signals intelligence were clearly regulated, 
the authorisation of the measures was detailed and entrusted to a judicial body and there were 
several independent bodies; the procedures to be followed for storing, accessing, examining, 
using, communicating and destroying the intercepted data were clearly defined, as well as the 
arrangements for supervising the implementation of the measures, and also considered any 
notification mechanisms and the remedies provided for by national law.81 
A key lesson for South African law is that ‘discretion afforded’ to the state in operating 
an electronic surveillance regime ‘must necessarily be narrower.’ There can no longer be 
untargeted and indiscriminate mandatory retention of communications data applicable to 
everyone without the requirement of a suspicion that a crime has been committed. Specifically 
 
79 Centrum för Rättvisa supra note 75 paras 112-113 (emphasis added). 
80 EctHR 47143/06 (4 December 2015). 
81 Centrum för Rättvisa supra note 75 paras 115-178. 
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on retention of communications data, there should be the introduction of targeted retention 
orders instead. I believe that the Investigatory Powers Act 2016 82 adopted in the United 
Kingdom offers a remedy for lawmakers in South African to consider. Powers to require 
retention of certain data is  exercised by the Secretary of State, for specified purposes including 
inter alia in the interests of national security or public safety or the economic well-being of the 
United Kingdom.83 The decision to give the notice to require a telecommunications operator 
to retain relevant communications data must have been approved by a Judicial 
Commissioner.84A retention notice must not require any communications data to be retained 
for more than twelve months.85 Before giving a retention notice, the Secretary of State must, 
inter alia, take into account: (a) the likely benefits of the notice; (b) the appropriateness of 
limiting the data to be retained; (c) the likely number of users (if known) of any 
telecommunications service to which the notice relates; and (d) the technical feasibility of 
complying with the notice.86 Before giving such a retention notice, the Secretary of State must 
take reasonable steps to consult any operator to whom it relates.87 In terms of procedures to be 
followed for storing, accessing, examining, using and destroying the communications data, a  
telecommunications operator who retains relevant communications data must: ‘(a) secure that 
the data is of the same integrity, and subject to at least the same security and protection, as the 
data on any system from which it is derived, (b) secure, by appropriate technical and 
organisational measures, that the data can be accessed only by specially authorised personnel, 
and (c) protect, by appropriate technical and organisational measures, the data against 
accidental or unlawful destruction, accidental loss or alteration, or unauthorised or unlawful 
retention, processing, access or disclosure.’ 88 A telecommunications operator who retains 
relevant communications data must destroy the data if the retention of the data ceases to be 
authorised and is not otherwise authorised by law.89 The destruction of the data may take place 
at such monthly or shorter intervals as appear to the operator to be practicable.90  
 
82 Hereafter ‘IPA 2016’. 
83 Section 87(1)(a). 
84 Section 87(1)(b). In terms of approval of retention notices by Judicial Commissioners, s 89 provides that in 
deciding whether to approve a decision to give a retention notice, a Judicial Commissioner must review the 
Secretary of State's conclusions as to whether the requirement to be imposed by the notice to retain relevant 
communications data is necessary and proportionate for one or more of the stated specific purposes. 
85 Section 87(3). 
86 Section 88(1). 
87 Section 88(2). 
88 Section 92(1). 
89 Section 92(2). 
90 Section 92(3). 
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(b) Acquiring communications data  
As has been rightly pointed out, communications data ‘is ultimately retained so that it can be 
later acquired’91 by law enforcement and security and intelligence agencies. To acquire access 
to communications data, law enforcement and security and intelligence agencies must apply 
for a ‘direction’ to a judicial officer. RICA 2002 distinguishes between two kinds of 
communications data: real-time (immediately available up to 90 days after transmission) and 
archived (stored after the 90 day transmission period) with differing authorisation procedures 
for access. For law enforcement and security and intelligence agencies to gain access to real-
time communications data, as with interception directions, there must be an application to a 
designated judge for the issuing of a real-time communication-related information direction.92 
There are different judicial officers for applications, almost a separate process, to access 
archived communications data. ‘If only’ access to archived communications data ‘is required’, 
there must be an application to a ‘judge of a High Court’93, or ‘a regional court magistrate’94, 
or ‘a magistrate’.95 It is not clear why different judicial officers are required for applications 
apply for real-time and archived communications data in RICA 2002. The position of the state, 
after all, is to regard access to all communications data as less intrusive than accessing the 
content of a communication.96 The threshold for the referred judicial officers to issue a real-
time and archived communications data direction is ‘reasonable grounds to believe.’97 The 
stated specified purposes for access to real-time and archived communications data is the same, 
namely, inter alia, that a ‘serious offence has been or is being or will probably be committed,’98 
or where communication-related information sought by law enforcement and security and 
intelligence agencies concerns ‘an actual threat’ 99  to ‘national security’ or ‘compelling 
economic interests of the Republic’.100 There are no specified procedures to be followed for 
storing, accessing, examining, using and destroying the communications data, whether real-
 
91 Gillespie op cit note 7 at 343. 
92 Sections 1, 7(4), (5), (6); 8(4)(b), (c); 8(5); 8(6); 16(1),(4), (5), (8)(a)(iii), (8)(b)(iii), (10), (10)(b); 16(5); 
17(1), (3), (4)(a), (b); 19(7), (8); 20(1), (3), (4); 21(1)(a),(b);22(3), (4)(a), (b), (5)(c), 6(b); 23(3), (4)(a), (b), (7), 
(8)(a), (b), (10), (11); 24, (a)(ii); 25(1), (2), (3). 
93 Sections 19(1), (3)(4), (7); 48.  
94 Sections 19(1), (3), (4), (7); 48. 
95 Sections 19(1), (3), (4), (7); 48. 
96 South Africa's written responses to the UN Human Rights Committee op cit note 46 at 2: ‘[communications 
data] is regarded as less intrusive and a lower standard of judicial authorisation is necessary before it can be 
made available.’   
97 Sections 17(4) and 19(4).  
98 Sections 17(4)(a) and 19(4)(a). 
99 Sections 17(4)(b) and 19(4)(b). 
100 Sections 17(4)(b) and 19(4)(b).  
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time or archived. In respect of both types of communications data, it is stated that the direction 
issued ‘may specify conditions or restrictions relating to the provision’ of real-time or archived 
communications data. 101  
A direction for real-time communications data ‘may be issued for a period not 
exceeding three months at a time, and the period for which it has been issued must be specified 
therein.’102 As regards a direction for archived communications data it ‘must state the period 
within which the archived communication-related information must be routed or provided.’103 
In terms of s 19(7) ‘[i]f a judge of a High Court, regional court magistrate or magistrate issues 
an archived communication-related direction, he or she must, as soon as practicable thereafter, 
submit a copy of the application and communication-related direction to a designated judge.’ 
However, there is no indication of a requirement that the designated judge must review the 
conclusions or information on which approval of an archived communication-related direction 
is based or whether it is necessary and proportionate for one or more of the stated purposes in 
s 19(4). Further applications for access to real-time or archived communications data do not 
require law enforcement and security and intelligence agencies to indicate whether ‘other 
investigative procedures have been applied and have failed to produce the required evidence 
or reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed if applied or are likely to be too dangerous to 
apply in order to obtain the required evidence and that the offence therefore cannot adequately 
be investigated, or the information therefore cannot adequately be obtained, in another 
appropriate manner.’104 In other words, there is no proportionality analysis for real-time or 
archived communications data directions. 
To fully understand the challenges with this split regime for real-time or archived 
communications data directions in RICA 2002, it becomes important to consider the provisions 
of s 205 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977. The implications thereof and obligations 





101 Sections 17(5)(c) and 19(5)(d).  
102 Section 17(5)(d).  
103 Section 19(5)(c).  
104 As applicable to interception directions in terms of s 16(5)(c).  
 118 
(c) The provisions of s 205 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 
Section 205 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977105 further provides another evidence 
gathering mechanism in relation to powers of law enforcement and security and intelligence 
agencies to access information related to communications, such as cellular phone records, 
including itemised billing, identification of the subscriber to a specified cellular number, and 
where the cellular handset was geographically located during a call.106 Similar to applications 
for archived communications data in RICA 2002, s 205 provides that an application must be 
made to a ‘judge of a High Court, a regional court magistrate or a magistrate.’  
Originally, s 205 did not have anything to do with communications data or with the 
obligation of telecommunication service providers to provide information to the state. The 
main purpose of s 205 is regulation of how a witness is called to provide evidence in court. 
Where an alleged offence has taken place, s 205 allows a ‘judge of a High Court, a regional 
court magistrate or a magistrate’ upon the request of a Director of Public Prosecutions or a duly 
authorised public prosecutor, to summons ‘any person who is likely to give material or relevant 
information as to any alleged offence, whether or not it is known by whom the offence was 
committed.’107 A person ‘who refuses or fails to give the information’ contemplated above 
‘shall not be sentenced to imprisonment’ unless ‘the judge, regional court magistrate or 
magistrate concerned … is also of the opinion that the furnishing of such information is 
necessary for the administration of justice or the maintenance of law and order.’108 Section 205 
is now ‘subject to the provisions’ of s 15 of RICA 2002.109 In other words, s 15 of RICA 2002 
allows law enforcement and security and intelligence agencies to use s 205 to obtain 
communications data from telecommunication service providers. Where a complainant has 
opened criminal charges, upon the request of a Director of Public Prosecutions or a duly 
authorised public prosecutor, information relevant to the alleged offence, regardless of its 
severity, can be obtained from a telecommunication service provider by using s 205. In the 
same way, communications data is viewed as evidence, and the telecommunication service 
 
105 Hereafter ‘CPA 51 of 1977’. 
106 See S v Phillip Miller and 8 Others 2016 (1) SACR 251 (WCC) (2 September 2015), Haysom v Additional 
Magistrate, Cape Town and Another 1979(3) SA 155 (C), S v Matisonn 1981(3) SA 302 (A), Nel v Le Roux NO 
and Others 1996(3) SA 562 (CC), S v de Vries and Others 2009(1) SACR 613 (C). 
107 Section 205(1). 
108 Section 205(4). 
109 Section 205(1). Section 15 of RICA 2002 reads as follows: ‘(1) Subject to subsection (2), the availability of 
the procedures in respect of the provision of real-time or archived communication-related information provided 
for in section 17 and 19 does not preclude obtaining such information in respect of any person in accordance 
with a procedure prescribed in any other Act; (2) Any real-time or archived communication-related information 
which is obtained in terms of such other Act may not be obtained on an ongoing basis.’ 
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providers is ordered to provide those records, and to testify about those records in court if 
necessary. The witness in this instance is an employee representative of the telecommunication 
service provider. The telecommunication service provider's representative must appear at court 
on the date specified in the s 205 subpoena or provide the information ‘prior to the date on 
which he or she is required to appear before a judge, regional court magistrate or magistrate’ 
in which case the representative will be excused from appearing in court.110 Law enforcement 
and security and intelligence agencies do not have power to intercept real-time communications 
data in terms s 205. Further communications data may not be obtained from a 
telecommunication service provider in terms of s 205 on the basis that an offence is likely to 
be committed in future. In both these instances, the provisions of RICA 2002 must be used to 
obtain the relevant communications data.  
There are concerns that s 205 has created a parallel process for law enforcement and 
security and intelligence agencies to obtain communications data from third party 
telecommunication service providers, with less oversight and protections than RICA 2002.111 
These concerns do not appear unfounded. A comparison of statistics between s 205 applications 
and RICA 2002 applications for communications data indicate that s 205 applications are used 
more by law enforcement and security and intelligence agencies than RICA 2002 directions. 
As observed by Duncan: 
‘In essence, the largest part of communications surveillance in South Africa is legislated by the 
Criminal Procedures Act via the ordinary courts, despite all the special provisions introduced 
by Rica. For an indication of the relatively small portion of interception-related court orders 
that are actually issued by the Rica judge, it’s useful to look at the statistics from the country’s 
largest service provider, Vodacom. For the 2016/2017 financial year, the company was served 
with 1,075 interception directions (court orders) issued in terms of Rica by the Rica judge. For 
the same period, they received 19,850 Section 205 court orders from ordinary magistrates and 
judges. So, the Rica judge oversaw only 5.4% of all interception cases related to Vodacom 
customers.’112 
In statistics obtained by a privacy advocacy group, the Right2Know Campaign, 
information from South Africa’s leading telecommunication service providers reveal that they 
 
110 Section 205(4). 
111 Right2Know ‘SPOOKED: Surveillance of journalists in SA’ (June 2018) at 4 ,36 available at https://www. 
sanef.org.za/wp -content/uploads/2018/07/R2K-Surveillance-of-Journalists-Report-2018-web.pdf., accessed 17 
June 2019.  
112 J Duncan ‘The loophole in South Africa’s state spying laws’ (March 2020) available at https://www.dailyma 
verick.co.za/article/2020-03-09-the-loophole-in-south-africas-state-spying-laws/amp/?__twitter_impression= 
true, accessed 31 March 2020. 
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received ‘twenty-five to fifty thousand s 205 warrants’ from law enforcement and security and 
intelligence agencies, in contrast to ‘five or six hundred RICA warrants.’113 Spokesperson for 
the Right2Know Campaign, Murray Hunter explains that situation is problematic for several 
reasons and that s 205 is ‘essentially a loophole’ that allows law enforcement and security and 
intelligence agencies to bypass the privacy protections in RICA 2002:114 
‘these numbers are “shocking”, and says the fault lies in poor legislation. “These policies have 
let government spying go out of control. We never thought we’d find out that this loophole was 
being used to the tune of 70,000 or more phone numbers a year. It’s a rate of surveillance that’s 
easily 50 times what we’ve previously seen reported through RICA statistics. All this is further 
proof that the people of South Africa need to take back control of their privacy.”’115 
The contrast in the numbers between s 205 subpoenas and RICA 2002 directions for 
access to communications data retained by telecommunication service providers is attributed 
to the less stringent provisions in s 205 that allows law enforcement and security and 
intelligence agencies to avoid the designated RICA judge and make applications before a 
‘judge of a High Court, a regional court magistrate or a magistrate.’116 This likely reflects the 
position of the state that communications data retained by telecommunication service providers 
is considered to be less intrusive, and therefore should be more easily accessible by law 
enforcement and security and intelligence agencies.117 Further, while RICA 2002 stipulates 
that communications data, real-time or archived, may only be obtained for purposes inter alia 
that a ‘serious offence has been or is being or will probably be committed’118 or where the 
information sought concerns ‘an actual threat’ 119  to ‘national security’ or ‘compelling 
economic interests of the Republic’;120 s 205 is far more wide-ranging in scope and may be 
 
113 Right2Know ‘SPOOKED’ op cit note 111 at  4.   
114 Duncan op cit note 112. 
115 Spokesperson for privacy advocacy group Right2Know (R2K), Murray Hunter quoted in H Swart ‘Cell 
phone privacy: Law enforcement pulls 70,000 subscribers’ call records each year – and that’s a minimum  
estimate’ (23 August 2017) available at https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2017-08-23-cell-phone-
privacy-law-enforce ment-pulls-70000-subscribers-call-records-each-year-and-thats-a-minimum-estimate/, 
accessed 5 July 2019. See also H Swart ‘Your cellphone records and the law: The legal loophole that lets state 
spying run rampant’ 20 May 2018 available at https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2018-05-20-your-
cellphone-records-and-the-law-the-legal-loophole-that-lets-state-spying-run-rampant/, accessed 5 July 2019. 
116 Section 205(1). 
117 As spokesperson for privacy advocacy group Right2Know (R2K), Murray Hunter stated: ‘When lawmakers 
passed Rica, they assumed that the information about your communication was less sensitive than the contents 
of the communication. That assumption is out-of-date and just wrong, and has put whistle-blowers, journalists 
and others at risk, and left all of us vulnerable to spying’ as quoted in H Swart ‘Your cellphone records and the 
law: The legal loophole that lets state spying run rampant’ op cit note 115. 
118 Sections 17(4)(a) and 19(4)(a). 
119 Sections 17(4)(b) and 19(4)(b). 
120 Ibid.  
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invoked where a person is able ‘to give material or relevant information as to any alleged 
offence.’121 Therefore, access to retained communications data in s 205(1) is not limited to the 
purpose of combatting ‘serious’ crimes, and is wide-ranging  and includes ‘any alleged 
offence.’ Further, access to communications data under s 205 and RICA 2002 is not subject to 
review by any independent administrative body. Rightly so, it is argued: 
‘[T]he law needs to set to a new, universal standard … The Section 205 procedure needs to be 
thrown into the bin. Any interception of communications has to go through a specially 
appointed judge, who is expertly attuned to issues of privacy and digital rights, who is 
transparent and publicly accountable. No more back doors, no more loopholes.’122 
It must be acknowledged that the acquisition of communications data by law 
enforcement and security and intelligence agencies in 2020 cannot continue on the state’s 
insistence that we apply traditional investigatory powers to new technological infrastructures. 
The acquisition of communications data today is far from tradition we knew two decades ago 
with the ‘plain-old-telephone system.’123 It must be recognised communications data as highly 
sensitive and deserving of strong privacy protections in law. As referred earlier on retaining 
communications data, I believe that the Investigatory Powers Act 2016124 adopted in the United 
Kingdom offers a standard to consider as a starting point for reform in South African law. In 
terms of the 2016 Act there are three steps in authorising the acquisition of communications 
data. Firstly, in terms of s 61(1)(a) it must be for a specified purpose when read with s 61(7). 
In terms of stated purposes, inter alia, it is necessary to obtain the data for the purpose of 
 
121 In 1996, the Constitutional Court in Nel v Le Roux N O & Others 1996 (3) SA 562 (CC) rules that s 205 did  
not infringe a number of fundamental constitutional rights, including equality, privacy, freedom of speech and 
expression, an accused’s right to be presumed innocent and to remain silent, and an accused’s right against self-
incrimination. The Constitutional Court held that s 205 was ‘narrowly tailored as possible to meet the legitimate 
state interest of investigating and prosecuting crime’ without infringing the constitutional rights of the examinee 
(para 20). See also Panday v Minister of Police and Others (12044/10) [2012] ZAKZDHC 20; 2012 (2) SACR 
421 (KZD) (18 April 2012) para 7 in reference to Nel’s case, Murugasen J observed: ‘[d]espite a scrutiny of 
Section 205, when the Constitutional Court held that the provisions thereof were not unconstitutional, the Court 
did not find it necessary to interfere with the procedure envisaged by the section as being inconsistent with the 
Constitution or potentially unconstitutional, or prescribe any procedural formality to preserve the 
constitutionality, although it is apparent that applications in terms of Section 205 although demanding ‘the 
exercise of invasive and compulsive powers’ are subject only to the exercise of judicial discretion by the 
presiding officers after due consideration of the facts disclosed in the application.’ Thus, Murugasen J was 
satisfied that such scrutiny was adequate prevent abuse and arbitrary interference with individual rights. See also 
R v Parker 1966 (2) SA 56 (RA); Bernstein and Others v Bester NO and Others (1996 (2) SA 751 (27 March 
1996). 
122 Spokesperson for privacy advocacy group Right2Know (R2K), Murray Hunter quoted in H Swart ‘Your 
cellphone records and the law: The legal loophole that lets state spying run rampant’ op cit note 115. 
123 Hosein and A Pascual op cit note 2 at 8. 
124 Hereafter ‘IPA 2016’. 
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preventing or detecting serious crime,125 in the interests of national security126 and in the 
interests of the economic well-being of the United Kingdom so far as those interests are also 
relevant to the interests of national security.127 Secondly, it is necessary to obtain the data: (i) 
for the purposes of a specific investigation or a specific operation, or (ii) for the purposes of 
testing, maintaining or developing equipment, systems or other capabilities relating to the 
availability or obtaining of communications data. 128  Thirdly, authorisation for access to 
communications data must be proportionate to what is sought to be achieved.129 There are 
additional restrictions in relation to internet connection records,130 and many other restrictions 
which ensure there is independent oversight on the need for such investigatory powers.131 The 
use of emergency powers for acquiring communications data is for situations where there is 
‘an imminent threat to life or another emergency’132 or an opportunity to obtain information in 
circumstances where the opportunity is rare, the time to act is short, and the need to obtain the 
information is significant and in the interests of national security.133 An authorisation for the 
acquisition of communications data will be for a period of one month.134 Authorisations can 
be renewed 135  and should be cancelled where it is no longer necessary. 136  Duties of 
telecommunication service providers are clearly stated, specifically they are under a statutory 
duty to comply with an authorised request.137 In relation to the obtaining of communications 
data for the purpose of identifying or confirming a source of journalistic information, the 
authorisation does not take effect until such time as it is approved by a Judicial 
Commissioner.138 The applicant of an authorisation order for acquisition of communications 
data ‘must consult a person who is acting as a single point of contact.’139 As an expert, the 
single point of contact is ‘specially trained in communications-data handling and will build up 
a rapport with the various communication providers to ensure that information can flow 
 
125 Section 61(7A). 
126 Section 61(7)(a). 
127 Section 61(7)(c). 
128 Section 61(1)(b). 
129 Section 61(1)(c). 
130 Section 62. 
131 Section 63. 
132 Section 63(3)(a). 
133 Section 63(3)(c). 
134 Section 65(1). 
135 Section 65(2). 
136 Section 65(4). 
137 Section 66(1). 
138 Section 77. 
139 Section 76. 
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securely and appropriately’ and ‘not least because they may be aware of a less-intrusive way 
of getting the information.’140 
Duties in connection with the operation of filtering arrangements for the 
communications data falls on the Secretary of State whom must secure the data such that: ‘(a) 
only the Secretary of State and designated individuals are permitted to read, obtain or otherwise 
process data for the purposes of support, maintenance, oversight, operation or administration 
of the filtering arrangements, and (b) no other persons are permitted to access or use the 
filtering arrangements except in pursuance of an authorisation or for the purpose mentioned in 
section 67(1)(a).’141 The Secretary of State must further: ‘(a) put in place and maintain an 
adequate security system to govern access to, and use of, the filtering arrangements and to 
protect against any abuse of the power of access, an (b) impose measures to protect against 
unauthorised or unlawful data retention, processing, access or disclosure.’142 The provisions of 
the Act in this regard continue. The Secretary of State must: ‘(a) put in place and maintain 
procedures (including the regular testing of relevant software and hardware) to ensure that the 
filtering arrangements are functioning properly, and (b) report, as soon as possible after the end 
of each calendar year, to the Investigatory Powers Commissioner about the functioning of the 
filtering arrangements during that year.’143 
My proposals for change in the concluding chapter of the thesis, in part, are done in the 
context of acquisition and retention of communications data, inter alia, with a focus on the 
overall importance of clear and accessible laws that avoids different sets of rules in different 
legislation covering essentially the same investigative activities. While the degree of intrusion 
into privacy rights is not affected by whether it involves the conduct of law enforcement or the 
intelligence agencies – whether one or the other, maximum oversight and transparency is just 
as necessary.144 They key issue is oversight and its effect on the electronic surveillance culture 
of the state: to subject law enforcement or the intelligence agencies to different sets of rules for 
essentially the same investigative activities could give rise to a ‘dilution in the regulatory’ 
frameworks.145 As has happened in South Africa where different sets of rules, in different laws, 
have resulted in different standards of oversight and different standards of conduct in the 
exercise of intrusive powers. This has happened in the preferred use of s 205 of the CPA 51 of 
 
140 Gillespie op cit note 7 at 345. 
141 Section 69(3). 
142 Section 69(5). 
143 Section 69(6). 
144 Anderson op cit note 30 at 255. 
145 Ibid. 
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1977 to obtain communications data from third party telecommunication service providers – 
the exercise of such powers prompted the tendency to follow whichever rule ‘was perceived to 
be less strictly regulated.’146 None of this should apply in a proposed new legal framework for 
South African law. 
 
(d) Procedures in RICA 2002 for storing, accessing, examining, using and destroying the 
communications data  
A key concern linked to the issue of the state requiring telecommunication service providers to 
perform untargeted and indiscriminate mandatory retention of communications data is the lack 
of specified procedures in RICA 2002 to be followed for storing, accessing, examining, using 
and destroying the communications data. ‘At the very least’ RICA 2002 ‘should specify the 
minimum technical requirements for securing retained data, and describe how any breaches 
will be addressed and revealed to oversight bodies and the public.’147 It does not do so, and in 
the manner of its operation at an ‘unacceptable level of risk’148 can be approximated to being 
a ‘honeypot for casual hackers, blackmailers, criminals large and small.’ 149  The lack of 
specified procedures in this regard attracts the risk that that the information ‘may be hacked 
into or may fall accidentally into the wrong hands, and that, if this were to happen, potentially 
damaging inferences about people’s interests or activities could be drawn.’150  
In a reported incident of abuse within telecommunication service providers, an 
employee at a telecommunication service provider was allegedly paid ZAR3,750 by a private 
investigator for the phone records of a South African journalist. The journalist had become 
aware of this after being informed by the telecommunication service provider that an employee 
had illegally accessed his account. 151  The illegally obtained information of the journalist 
 
146 Ibid. 
147 Privacy International op cit note 72 para 188. 
148 Ibid at 47. 
149 Attributed to a Liberal Democrat peer, Lord Strasburger in A Travis ‘MPs call communications data bill 
“honeypot for hackers and criminals”’ 31 October 2012 The Guardian available at https://www.theguardian. 
com/technology/2012/oct/31/communications-data-bill-honeypot-hackers-criminals, accessed 4 July 2019. 
150 Liberty ‘Liberty’s briefing on the Investigatory Powers Bill for report stage in the House of Commons June 
2016’ at 47 available at https://www.libertyhumanrights.org.uk /sites/ default/files/campaigns/resources/Liberty 
%27s%20Briefing%20on%20the%20Investigatory%20Powers%20Bill%20for%20Report%20Stage%20in%20t
he%20House%20of%20Commons.pdf, accessed 22 May 2019 quoting Joint Committee on the Draft 
Communications Bill: Report 11 December 2012 at 28-29. 
151 Right2Know ‘SPOOKED: Surveillance of journalists in SA’ op cit note 111 at 17-19. 
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subsequently found its way into the public domain.152 There are likely many more unreported 
incidents of abuse where telecommunication service providers are not as forthcoming. 
 Comparative European human rights jurisprudence is clear that  minimum safeguards 
that should be set out in law as ‘effective guarantees against abuse’153 including specifically 
for the protection of sensitive information, such as ‘legal’ or ‘source’  privilege. The European 
Court of Human Rights in S and Marper v United Kingdom154 emphasised the importance of 
‘minimum safeguards’: 
‘[The Court] reiterates that it is as essential, in this context, as in telephone tapping, secret 
surveillance and covert intelligence-gathering, to have clear, detailed rules governing the scope 
and application of measures, as well as minimum safeguards concerning, inter alia, duration, 
storage, usage, access of third parties, procedures for preserving the integrity and 
confidentiality of data and procedures for its destruction, thus providing sufficient guarantees 
against the risk of abuse and arbitrariness.’155  
In the amaBhungane case,156 the applicant submitted that RICA 2002 was deficient in 
how it governed where and how intercepted data was stored, who had access to that data and 
how that was regulated, whether copies of the data could be made, whether copies had to be 
recorded, whether access could be shared within the intelligence or security communities, 
whether the data had to be destroyed and how irrelevant material would be separated and 
destroyed from the relevant material. 157 The court agreed and s 35 (powers, functions and 
duties of [Interception Centre] Director) and s 37 (keeping records by heads of interception 
centres and submission reports to Director) of RICA 2002 were declared inconsistent with the 
Constitution and accordingly invalid insofar as it failed to ‘prescribe proper procedures to be 
followed when state officials are examining, copying, sharing, sorting through, using, 
destroying and/or storing the data obtained from interceptions.’158 
In respect of both types of communications data, RICA 2002 provides that the direction 
issued ‘may specify conditions or restrictions relating to the provision’ of real-time or archived 
 
152 Ibid. See also P Bruce ‘The price of writing about the Guptas’  29 June 2017 available at https://www.busine 
sslive. co.za/bd/opinion/columnists/2017-06-29-peter-bruce--the-price-of-writing-about-the-guptas/, accessed 5 
July 2019. 
153 Weber’s case supra note 77 para 95, 106. 
154 EctHR 30562/04 and 30566/04 (4 December 2008). 
155 Supra note 154 para 99. 
156 amaBhungane case supra note 37 paras 98-108. 
157 Supra note 37 para 98. 
158 Supra note 37 para 108. 
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communications data.159 The reference to ‘may’ is hardly pre-emptive in terms of any legal 
obligations on the state for the protection of communications data. There must be safeguards 
in legislation on storing, accessing, examining, using and destroying communications data, 
such that it provides adequate safeguards against abuse of treatment of personal data and thus 
serve to protect individuals’ personal integrity.160 These safeguards would equally apply to 
intercepted data, targeted and in bulk. Warrants should not be lawfully granted unless proper 
handling arrangements are in place.161 An independent judicial authority must have the power 
to refuse an application for a warrant to intercept or obtain communications data in the absence 
of proper mechanisms for retention and destruction of retained data. Therefore in the process 
of authorisation, an independent judicial authority must be satisfied that the warranted data, 
once obtained, will be appropriately safeguarded. Handling arrangements safeguarding the 
retention of warranted data may include the following to ensure that (i) the number of persons 
involved, extent of any disclosure, including the extent of any copying and number of copies 
made are kept to the minimum necessary;  (ii)  the retained data must be stored in a secure 
manner; and  (iii)  each copy made of any material or data must be destroyed as soon as its 
retention is no longer necessary or lawfully authorised.162 
    
III CONCLUSION 
However the state chooses to respond to the above concerns, one thing is certain: the 
investigative powers of law enforcement and security and intelligence agencies to conduct 
electronic surveillance activities will not be a simple matter of adapting the ‘square pegs’ of 
traditional investigative powers to fit into the ‘round holes’ of the information age and a modern 
fast-paced environment of technological advancements. Communications data now being 
collected is different from that collected in the past and can no longer be simply regarded as 
less intrusive and subject to a lower standard of judicial authorisation. There must there be 
sufficient safeguards in place against the risk of abuse of discretionary powers in the retention 
and acquiring of communications data. This includes ensuring that warranted data once 
obtained must be on the basis of arrangements for retention safeguards in related provisions. If 
 
159 Section 17(5)(c) and 19(5)(d).  
160 Centrum för Rättvisa supra note 75 para 147. 
161 For example, see handling arrangements in provisions of the IPA 2016 referred earlier.  
162 See The Queen (on Application of National Council for Civil Liberties (Liberty) v Secretary of State for the 
Home Department and Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs [2019] EWHC 2057 (Admin) 
paras 353-392 (the challenge in respect of MI5’s handling arrangements and provision of the IPA 2016.).  
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not, an application for a warrant should not be granted. Another key area identified as requiring 
reform relates to addressing concerns that s 205 of the CPA 51 of 1977 has created a parallel 
process for the state to obtain communications data from third party telecommunication service 
providers, with less oversight and protections than RICA 2002.  
Another investigatory power identified in the thesis as requiring essential reform in 
South African law, relates to access to data protected by encryption from a suspect/target of an 




OBTAINING EVIDENCE FROM A SUSPECT/TARGET OF AN INVESTIGATION: 




The ability and use of encryption to conceal information is not new: ‘[i]n 1807, during the 
treason trial of Aaron Burr, the prosecution attempted to decipher Burr’s encrypted messages 
by forcing his private secretary to testify about their plaintext meaning. Even further back, in 
1587, Mary Queen of Scots was convicted of treason and then beheaded when her role in an 
assassination plot against Queen Elizabeth was revealed by the decryption of private letters 
among the conspirators.’1 Encryption ‘is a technological implementation of cryptography: 
information is converted to an unintelligible form – encoded – such that it can only be translated 
into an understandable form – decoded – with a key.’2 There are different types of encryption. 
Encryption by a passcode, pattern or password is the modern-day and information era method 
of protecting electronic information, especially on most smartphone mobile devices. Doing so 
unlocks the device and decrypts its contents.3 Essentially, a passcode, pattern or password is 
‘a unique combination of characters that acts as a key’ that must be typed into the device to 
unlock the encrypted device.4 Biometic features such facial recognition or fingerprint-based 
encryption technology are also common measures. More sophisticated applications such as 
cryptography involve the process of scrambling stored or transmitted information such that it 
is unintelligible without the correct key. 
Companies such as Apple and Samsung, including other social media and messenger 
communication platforms such as WhatsApp and Facebook, as a matter of course have made 
end-to-end encryption standard in its services. In this type of encryption, only the sender and 
recipient hold the keys to encrypt and decrypt messages, and the service provider has no way 
of accessing the actual content of the communications. 5  Similarly, encryption in 
 
1 OS Kerr & B Schneider ‘Encryption workarounds’ (2018) 106 Georgetown LR 989 at 991 referring to D Kahn 
The Codebreakers: The story of secret writing (1996) 119-124. 
2 See ‘What is encryption’ in Google transparency report available at https://support.google.com/transparency 
report/answer/7381231, accessed 13 April 2020. 
3 OS Kerr ‘Compelled decryption and the privilege against self-incrimination’ (2019) 97 Texas LR 767. 
4 Ibid 768. 
5 See ‘What are some types of encryption’ in Google transparency report available at https://support.google. 
com/transparencyreport/answer/7381231, accessed 13 April 2020. 
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transit protects the flow of information from the end user to a third-party’s server. For example, 
in online financial transactions, when on a shopping site and credit card credentials are entered, 
a secure connection protects our information from interception by a third party while in transit 
only the user and the server they connect to can decrypt the information.6 According to recent 
report, as at 29 March 2020, Google has achieved ninety-five percent encryption across its 
products and services by default.7 Encryption at rest protects information when it is not in 
transit.8 For example, the hard disk in a computer may use encryption at rest to ensure the files 
are protected from unauthorised access. 
While encryption is a powerful tool for safeguarding sensitive information, especially 
in response to increased levels of privacy awareness, data breaches and identity theft, the 
proliferation of robust digital encryption technologies have also presented opportunities for 
criminals to encrypt data in order to conceal their criminal activities and so evade detection 
and prosecution.  For example,  in 2016 the FBI sought to access the encrypted phone of one 
of the accused’s’ of the December 2015 San Bernardino shooting, who was killed during the 
attack. In order to access the contents of the phone, the FBI wanted Apple to create or to enable 
installation of bespoke software to circumvent the security protections built into all of its 
iPhones.9 Apple argued it was a demand too sweeping to be compatible with responsible 
security practices and individual privacy rights.10 
The focus of this chapter is on another legally and very different situation, the end-point 
user who is compelled to either enter or provide a passcode or decrypt the data contained in a 
device pursuant to legitimate legal process set out in law, as opposed to compelled assistance 
on the part of the device and software manufacturer. With modern-day types of encryption 
being frequently used, this means that law enforcement and security and intelligence agencies 
cannot easily have access to such electronic information, real-time or archived, from third party 
 
6 Ibid. 
7 See ‘Encryption traffic across Google’ in Google transparency report available at https://transparencyreport. 
google.com/https/overview?hl=en, accessed 13 April 2020. 
8 See ‘What are some types of encryption’ op cit note 5. 
9 See A Selyukh ‘A year after San Bernardino and Apple-FBI, where are we on encryption?’ (Dec  2016) 
available at https://www.npr.org/sections/alltechconsidered/2016/12/03/504130977/a-year-after-san-bernar 
dino-and-apple-fbi-where-are-we-on-encryption, accessed 8 April 2020 and by the same author ‘Apple vs. The 
FBI: The unanswered questions and unsettled issues’ available at https://www.knkx.org/post/apple-vs-fbi-unan 
swered-questions-and-unsettled-issues, accessed 8 April 2020. See also ‘Apple v. FBI concerning an order 
requiring Apple to create custom software to assist the FBI in hacking a seized iPhone’ available at 
https://epic.org/amicus/crypto/apple/, accessed 8 April 2020. 
10 The Oscar Pistorius trial provides a South African example. See ‘How police accessed Pistorius’s iPhone 
(March 2014) available at https://wwwtechcentral.co.za/how-police-accessed-pistoriuss-iphone-47127/, 
accessed 8 April 2020. 
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telecommunication service providers as they perhaps once could be able to do so. They must 
seize encrypted devices, which of course can be validly obtained. However, once they have the 
seized encrypted device, the challenge is that they will be unable to decrypt and access the 
device and its contents without a password or passcode. 
A recourse for law enforcement and security and intelligence agencies in South African 
law is to ‘compel the key’. Part II is an overview of the powers of law enforcement and security 
and intelligence agencies to compel decryption. The Regulation of Interception of 
Communications and Provision of Communication-Related Information Act 70 of 200211 
provides a legal framework for compelled decryption from the suspect/target of an 
investigation. RICA 2002 compels (a) disclosure of the decryption key; or (b) provision of 
decryption assistance12 to obtain access to the encrypted information or to put that encrypted 
information in an intelligible form.13 The provision also enables law enforcement and state and 
security officials to serve a direction requiring disclosure of an encryption key to enable such 
encrypted data to be made intelligible. Part III considers certain legal issues that may arise in 
relation to compelled decryption. Compelled decryption directions inevitably engage the 
constitutional right against self-incrimination.14 These powers anticipate, at the very least, that 
the potential disclosure of information may incriminate the suspect/target to whom a compelled 
decryption order is directed. This chapter examines the constitutional protections against self-
incrimination, as it applies to decryption orders by a designated judge directing a suspect/target 
of an investigation to provide assistance in the decryption of specific encrypted data or devices.  
Applying the constitutional law framework on the right against self-incrimination, two distinct 
issues arise with regard to compelled disclosure and modern technology: (a) compelled 
disclosure of a user’s passcode (reveal/enter the passcode); and (b) compelled entry of  a 
biometric based information (by placing a finger on a device or by facial recognition).  
 
11 Hereafter ‘RICA 2002’. 
12 Section 29(1)(a) and (b).  
13 Section 29(2). 
14 See Kerr op cit note 3 at 768 for recent cases and differing outcomes in the United States of America: In re 
Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated March 25, 2011 (Doe II) 670 F.3d 1335, 1349 (11th Cir 2012) 
(declaring that the government could not compel decryption); United States v Apple MacPro Computer 851 
F.3d 238, 248 & n.7 (3d Cir 2017) (allowing compelled decryption), cert. denied, 138 S Ct 1988 (2018); United 
States v Spencer No. 17-cr-00259-CRB-1, 2018 WL 1964588 (ND Cal Apr 26, 2018) (same); United States v 
Fricosu 841 F. Supp. 2d 1232, 1237 (D Colo 2012) (allowing compelled decryption); United States v Mitchell II 
76 M.J. 413, 424–25 & n.5 (CAAF 2017) (Ryan, J dissenting) (allowing compelled decryption, in dissenting 
opinion); State v Stahl 206 So. 3d 124, 136–37 (Fla Dist Ct App 2016) (same); Seo v State 109 N.E.3d 418, 
425–31 (Ind Ct App. 2018) (compelled decryption not allowed), transfer granted, opinion vacated, 2018 WL 




The South African courts have yet to address these issues. The realities of a fast-paced 
environment of modern technology may well require such rethinking of doctrines to adequately 
safeguard constitutional rights into the future. In the analysis, a nuanced understanding of the 
interaction between modern technology and legal doctrine will therefore be integral in the 
development of doctrinal principles that involve ‘reveal-the-passcode’, ‘use-a-fingerprint-or-
facial-recognition’, ‘enter-the-passcode’ or ‘produce-the-decrypted-data’ scenarios. Part IV 
considers the development of a doctrinal approach in South African law. A conclusion is drawn 
in Part V. 
     
II REGULATION OF INTERCEPTION OF COMMUNICATIONS AND PROVISION 
OF COMMUNICATION-RELATED INFORMATION ACT 70 OF 2002 AND 
ACCESS TO DATA PROTECTED BY ENCRYPTION 
One of the most controversial provisions of RICA 2002 allows law enforcement and state and 
security officials to require a subject/target to disclose the key, or decrypt encrypted data. The 
preamble to RICA 2002 states: ‘to regulate the execution of directions and entry warrants by 
law enforcement officers and the assistance to be given by … decryption key holders in the 
execution of such directions and entry warrants.’ The relevant provision of RICA 2002 gives 
to law enforcement and state and security officials the power to require a person to put 
encrypted electronic information into intelligible form - that is, to provide access to it, decrypt 
it or decode it. The purpose of compelled decryption is that law enforcement and security and 
intelligence agencies encounter encrypted data more frequently and that this trend will continue 
as encryption becomes more pervasive, posing challenges to, among others, criminal 
investigators seeking to put encrypted information into intelligible form. A compelled 
decryption direction15 is often a useful default, and can be used in a wide range of cases, and 
sophisticated technical resources are not required.16 It does raise, however, certain practical 
and legal issues. 
As regards applications and issuing of a decryption direction, in terms of s 21 of RICA 
2002, an applicant of a decryption direction must specify, if known: (i) the decryption key 
which must be disclosed, or (ii) decryption assistance which must be provided, and the form 
 
15 ‘“Decryption direction” means a direction issued under section 21(3) in terms of which a decryption key 
holder is directed to-(a) disclose a decryption key; or (b) provide decryption assistance in respect of encrypted 
information, and includes an oral decryption issued under section 23(7).’ 
16 The subject/target of a decryption direction may of course refuse to hand over the key, or use it to decrypt a 
device or information. See Kerr and Schneider op cit note 1 at 1004. 
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and manner in which it must be provided.17 The application for a decryption direction is made 
to a designated judge and may ‘only be issued’ if ‘there are reasonable grounds to believe’ that: 
(i) the communication contains encrypted information; (ii) the decryption key holder specified 
in the application is in possession of the encrypted information and the decryption key; (iii) the 
purpose for which the interception direction was issued would be defeated if the decryption 
direction was not issued; and (iv) it is not reasonably practicable for the applicant to obtain 
possession of the encrypted information without the issuing of a decryption direction.18 The 
designated judge must also give consideration to the following: (i) the extent and nature of the 
encrypted information; and (ii) any adverse effect that the issuing of a decryption direction may 
have on the business of the decryption holder.19 In terms of s 21(5)(d), a decryption direction 
may ‘specify conditions or restrictions relating to decryption authorised.’ In addition, a 
decryption direction ‘may be issued for a period not exceeding three months at a time.’20 
Section 16(7) which provides for blanket prohibition on notification to the subject/target of the 
application, also applies in respect of the issuing of a decryption direction.21  
The empowering provision of compelled decryption is s 29. The decryption key holder 
must (a) disclose the decryption key; or (b) provide decryption assistance.22 In complying with 
a decryption direction, a decryption key holder (a) must only disclose the decryption key or 
provide decryption assistance which is necessary to obtain access to the encrypted information 
or to put that encrypted information in an intelligible form; (b) may only disclosure the 
decryption key or provide decryption assistance to the authorised person; and (c) may not 
disclose any other information which is not specified in the interception direction.23 Provision 
is also made for a decryption key holder who is in possession of both the encrypted information 
and the decryption key who (a) may use the decryption key in his possession to provide 
decryption assistance; and (b) must make a disclosure of the encrypted information in an 
 
17 Section 21(2)(c). 
18 Section 21(4)(a). Section 1 sets out the following definitions and interpretation of relevant key terms: 
‘“decryption assistance” means to-(a) allow access, to the extent possible, to encrypted information; or (b) 
facilitate the putting of encrypted information into an intelligible form’; ‘“decryption key” means a key, 
mathematical formula, code, password, algorithm or any other data which is used to-(a) allow access to 
encrypted information; or (b) facilitate the putting of encrypted information into an intelligible form’; 
‘“decryption key holder” means any person who is in possession of a decryption key for purposes of subsequent 
decryption of encrypted information related to indirect communications; “intelligible form” means the form in 
which electronic data was before an encryption or similar process was applied to it.’ 
19 Section 21(4)(b). 
20 Section 21(5)(e). 
21 Section 21(6). 
22 Section 29(1). 
23 Section 29(2) (emphasis added). 
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intelligible form. 24  A decryption key holder required to provide decryption assistance in 
respect of encrypted information will be regarded as having complied with a decryption 
direction, if (a) the decryption key to the encrypted information is by disclosure of the key 
(instead of providing decryption assistance); and (b) makes such disclosure of the decryption 
key to the authorised person in accordance with the decryption direction and within the time 
period specified by which decryption assistance was to be provided.25 If a decryption key 
holder is (a) not in possession of the encrypted information, or (b) incapable of complying with 
the decryption direction, without the use of a decryption key that is not in their possession, 
‘must endeavour to comply, to the best of his or her ability, with that decryption direction.’26 
An authorised person to whom the decryption key is disclosed: (a) may only use the decryption 
key for the encrypted information specified in the decryption direction; and (b) must, on or 
before expiry of the period of the decryption direction, destroy all records of the disclosed 
decryption key, if in the opinion of the applicant (i) there will be no criminal or civil 
proceedings; or (ii) such records will not be required in criminal or civil proceedings as 
evidence or for the purposes of an order of court.27 A decryption holder, or employee of a 
decryption holder who fails to comply with a decryption direction is guilty of an offence and 
subject to penalties, including fines and/or imprisonment.28 
 
III COMPELLED DECRYPTION: LEGAL ISSUES  
In keeping with the analytical layout of this thesis, which follows the temporal development of 
an investigation, this section of the chapter focuses on a type of investigative power requiring 
a subject/target to disclose the key to a device, or decrypt encrypted data in terms of RICA 
2002. There are many aspects to the encryption debate, in particular, levels of concern amongst 
law enforcement and intelligence agencies by the increased trend towards user-controlled 
encryption. Recent privacy-enhancing changes introduced by companies such as Google, 
Apple, WhatsApp, include encryption by default on its devices and operating systems, and 
effectively mean that the encryption of devices and the information contained therein are now 
user-controlled. I therefore also examine below the other necessary accompanying aspect of 
the encryption debate insofar as it relates to user rights. 
 
24 Section 29(3). 
25 Section 29(4). 
26 Section 29(5). 
27 Section 29(8). 
28 Section 51(4). 
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(a) The right against self- incrimination  
The courts in South Africa have yet to address compelled disclosure of a user’s passcode 
(reveal/enter the passcode) and compelled entry of  a biometric based information (by placing 
a finger on a device or by facial recognition), but has provided some insight in dicta on how it 
might rule on this issue. The right against self-incrimination has been recognised, and is deeply 
rooted in common law,29 and also in certain statutory provisions.30 In terms of constitutional 
protections, the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 199631 places the right 
against self-incrimination,32 as with the right to remain silent, in s 35 which provides for the 
‘rights of arrested, accused and detained persons’ in relation to a fair trial ‘not to be compelled 
to give self-incriminating evidence.’33 
The jurisprudence of the South African courts has been rather rudimentary on the 
distinction between self-incriminating testimonial communications and incriminating non-
testimonial real evidence34 in relation to evidence ‘emanating from the accused’35 by some 
degree of compulsion.36 Thus, a suspect/target may be compelled to provide physical evidence 
that may be incriminating such as a blood sample37, to provide a palm print38, or finger prints39, 
 
29 Blunt v Park Lane Hotel [1942] 2 KB 53 257, Goddard LJ stated: ‘no one is bound to answer any question if 
the answer thereto would, in the opinion of the judge, have a tendency to expose [him] to any criminal charge, 
penalty or forfeiture which the judge regards as reasonably likely to be preferred.’  
30 For example, s 14 of the Civil Proceedings Evidence Act 25 of 1965 and s 203, 217 and 219A of the Criminal 
Procedure Act 51 of 1977.  
31 Hereafter ‘the Constitution’.  
32 S v Gqoza (1) 1994 1 BCLR 1 (Ck); 1994 2 SACR 228 (Ck); S v Maseko 1996 9 BCLR 1137 (W); Wehmeyer 
v Lane 1994 2 BCLR (C); 1994 4 SA 441 (C). 
33 Section 35(1) and s 35(3)(j). 
34 Email communication Professor PJ Schwikkard, 16 July 2019. 
35 PJ Schwikkard & SE van der Merwe Principles of Evidence 4ed (2015) at 253: ‘Ever since the decision in Ex 
Parte Minister of Justice: In Re Rex v Matemba, and even after constitutionalization, our courts have – in line 
with the majority decision in Schmerber v California and the common-law rule as formulated by Wigmore – 
consistently held that the privilege against self-incrimination is confined to testimonial utterances or 
communications (statements and pointings out) and does not extend to real evidence emanating from an 
accused, such as hair samples, blood samples, fingerprints, voice, handwriting, and even a bullet lodged in the 
body of a suspect.’ (footnotes omitted). 
36 Ibid at 145-149 and 253-256. See also DT Zeffertt & DT Paizes The South African Law of Evidence 2ed 
(2003) at 607-613. 
37 S v Binta 1993 (2) SACR 553 (C); S v Orrie and Another 2004 1 SACR 162 (C). See also Schmerber v 
California 384 US 75 (1966) at 763-64: ‘it is clear that the protection of the privilege reaches an accused’s 
communications, whatever form they might take.’ 
38 Ex parte Minister of Justice: In re R v Matemba 1941 AD 75; R v Camane 1925 AD 570. 
39 S v Huma and Another (2) 1995 (2) SACR 411 (W); S v Maphumulo 1996 (2) SACR 84 (N); Msomi v 
Attorney-General of Natal 1996 (8) BCLR 1109 (W).     
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or a voice exemplar40, submit to an operation41, provide a handwriting sample42, to stand in a 
line-up43, and to wear a particular set of clothing.44 Real evidence ‘emanating from an accused’ 
may well be incriminatory against the accused. The question that arises is whether such acts of 
compulsion conflict with s 35(1)(c) of the Constitution, which provides for the right ‘not to be 
compelled to give self-incriminating evidence.’ This brought to the fore judicial debate as to 
whether the right against self-incrimination applied to real evidence, and if so, should the 
evidence be excluded.45 
In  R v Camane and Others, 46  Innes CJ analysed the same some sixteen years 
before Matemba’s case, and in referring to autoptic evidence held that ‘a man may be 
compelled, when in Court, to do what he would rather not. His features may be of importance, 
and he may be made to show them; his complexion, his stature, mutilations, or marks on his 
body, may be relevant points, and he may be compelled to show them to the Court.’47 Despite 
the clarity of Innes CJ’s judgment, competing approaches as to whether such evidence derived 
from an accused’s physique violates the right against self-incrimination continued to endure in 
South Africa law. Sixteen years later, Watermeyer JA in Ex Parte Minister of Justice: In Re 
Rex v Matemba48 confirmed the approach taken in Camane. The accused was charged with a 
house-breaking and before trial a print of the palm of one of the accused’s hands was 
‘compulsorily taken’ by a police officer without his consent. At trial the print taken from the 
accused’s palm was tendered as evidence for the purpose of making a comparison with the 
 
40 R v Gericke 1941 CPD 211; Levack v Regional Magistrate, Wynberg and Another 2003 (1) SACR 187 (SCA). 
See also United States v. Dionisio 410 U.S. 1, 6 (1973) where the Court held: ‘[t]he voice recordings were to be 
used solely to measure the physical properties of the witnesses’ voices, not for the testimonial or communicative 
content of what was to be said.’ 
41 Minister of Safety and Security v Gaqa 2002 (1) SACR 654 (C) and Minister of Safety and Security v Xaba 
2004 (1) SACR 149 (D). 
42 S v Duna and Others 1984 (2) SA 591 (CkS). See also Gilbert v California 388 U.S. 263, 265 (1967) stating: 
‘[a] mere handwriting exemplar…is an identifying physical characteristic.’ 
43 See United States v Wade 388 U.S. 218 (1967) that ‘privilege prohibits compulsion to disclose any knowledge 
he might have or to speak his guilt.’ 
44 In Holt v United States 218 U.S. 245, 251 (1910) the Court stated: ‘[b]ut the prohibition…is a prohibition of 
the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communications from him, not an exclusion of his body as 
evidence.’ 
45 For case law on the common law right against self-incrimination, see Goorpurshad v R 1914 35 NLR 87 and 
R v Maleke 1925 TPD 491. In the latter case, the court refused to admit evidence of a footprint obtained by 
compelled force. At 534, it was held: ‘[I]t compels an accused person to convict himself out of his own mouth; 
that it might open the door to oppression and persecution of the worst kind; that it is a negation of the liberty of 
the subject and offends against our sense of natural justice and fair play ....’ 
46 Supra note 38. 
47 Supra note 46 at 575. Cited with approval in Levack’s case supra note 40 para 17;  S v Zuma and Others 1995 
(2) SA 642 (CC) para 31, and in Ferreira v Levin NO and Others; Vryenhoek and Others v Powell NO and 
Others 1996 (1) SA 984 (CC) paras 23, 96. 
48 Supra note 38. 
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print found on the window sill, and thus to identify the accused as the person who had broken 
into the premises.49 
The adoption of the principle of constitutional supremacy and a Bill of Rights in the 
1990’s gave rise to renewed debate. The task of explaining ‘that “autoptic evidence” – evidence 
derived from the accused’s own bodily features – does not infringe the right to silence nor the 
right not to be compelled to give evidence has continued to fall upon’ the courts.50 
In S v Huma and Another (2),51 in a matter dealing with the taking of fingerprints the 
accused claimed the protections of the constitutional right against self-incrimination. Claassen 
J found the ‘objection’ to be ‘entirely without substance’ as the privilege against self-
incrimination did not apply to procedures relating to the ascertainment of bodily features such 
as identification parades, the taking of finger- and footprints, blood samples and the showing 
of bodily scars.52 These procedures, he held, relate to what has been termed ‘real’ evidence, as 
opposed to oral or testimonial evidence by the accused.53 In support thereof, Claassen J found 
the ‘logic and reasoning of Brennan J compelling’54 in Schmerber v California55 where the 
court held that the right against self-incrimination ‘protects an accused only from 
being compelled to testify against himself or otherwise provide the State with evidence of a 
testimonial or communicative nature, and that the withdrawal of blood and use of the analysis 
in question in this case did not involve compulsion to these ends.’56 In doing so, the court 
referred to ‘[t]he distinction which has emerged’ in that the right against self-incrimination 
protects ‘against compelling “communications” or “testimony”’ but does not violate the 
constitutional right against self-incrimination where ‘that compulsion which makes a suspect 
or accused the source of “real or physical evidence”.’57  
This approach was adopted by the Supreme Court of Appeal in Levack v Regional 
Magistrate, Wynberg and Another a case in which Cameron JA concluded that ‘[t]he 
 
49 Supra note 38 at 77, 82-83. Cf S v Sheehama 1991 (2) SA 860 (A). 
50 Levack’s case supra note 40 para 19 with reference to Nkosi v Barlow NO en Andere 1984 (3) SA 148 (T) at 
151-152; Binta’s case supra note 37 at 562d-e;  Huma’s case supra note 39 at 237-240; and Maphumulo’s case 
supra note 39 at 87-90. 
51 1995 (2) SACR 411 (W). 
52 Supra note 51 at 417. 
53 Supra note 51 at 417. 
54 Supra note 51 at 419. 
55 Schmerber’s case supra note 37. 
56 Supra note 55 at 761 (footnotes omitted). 
57 Supra note 55 at 764. 
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explanations given in these cases apply in all details to the human voice.58 It falls within the 
same category as complexion, stature, mutilations, marks and prints.’59 An order was granted 
that the accused in the presence of their legal representatives give the state voice samples as 
specified by a named ‘voice expert’ and the purpose was to compare the samples with tape 
recordings of telephone conversations in the state’s possession, for possible later use during 
the trial. The grounds of review relied on by the appellants included inter alia that ‘an order 
that voice samples be provided under compulsion would effectively breach the appellants’ 
constitutionally protected privilege against self-incrimination and result in an unfair trial.’60 
Applying the distinction made in case law, Cameron J held that ‘there is no difference in 
principle between the visibly discernible physical traits and features of an accused and those 
that under law can be extracted from him through syringe and vial or through the compelled 
provision of a voice sample. In neither case is the accused required to provide evidence of a 
testimonial or communicative nature, and in neither case is any constitutional right 
violated.’61 Put differently, it would be wrong to suppose that requiring appellants to submit 
voice samples infringed their right to remain silent or not to give self-incriminating evidence.62 
The other approach of the appellant’s argument that a compelled order violates the 
appellants’ fair trial rights was also rejected by Cameron J.63 The alternate view is to apply a 
generous interpretation to the content of the privilege against self-incrimination and recognise 
that the ascertainment of bodily feature may infringe the privilege, but that it is a justified 
limitation of the right not to self-incriminate in terms of s 36 of the Constitution having regard 
to the factors specified.64 
In  S v Orrie and Another,65 the High Court found that ‘there can be little doubt’ that 
the involuntary taking of a blood sample for the purposes of DNA profiling is both an 
 
58 This is also the position in the United States of America. See Wade’s case supra note 43; Gilbert’s case supra 
note 42; and Dionisio’s case supra note 40. 
59 Supra note 40 paras 17, 19. 
60 Supra note 40 para 7. 
61 Supra note 40 paras 20-21 (footnotes omitted).  
62 Supra note 40 paras 15-23. 
63 Supra note 40 paras 22-23 (footnotes omitted). Cameron JA: ‘At present the only question before us is 
whether an order requiring an accused to supply in the presence of defence lawyers voice samples indicated by a 
State-designated ‘expert’ is competent. Those samples have not yet been procured. The ‘expert’s’ report has not 
yet been prepared. Its value and the weight that should properly be accorded it have not arisen for 
determination.’ 
64 Including ‘(a) the nature of the right; (b) the importance of the purpose of the limitation; (c) the nature and 
extent of the limitation; (d) the relation between the limitation and its purpose; and (e) less restrictive means to 
achieve the purpose.’ See earlier chapter 2 at 66-70 and chapter 3 at 104-111.  
65 2004 1 SACR 162 (C). See also Ferreira’s case supra note 47, which dealt with s 417(2)(b) of the Companies 
Act 68 of 1973 that compelled a person summoned to an enquiry to testify and produce documents, even though 
the evidence may be incriminating. At para 259 Sachs J observed that ‘the more that self-incrimination takes the 
 
 138 
infringement of the right to privacy and an infringement of the right to bodily security and 
integrity.66 Bozalek J held that the infringement was justifiable: ‘to the extent, however, that 
the involuntary taking of a blood sample from an accused for the purposes of compiling a DNA 
profile for use in criminal proceedings infringes his or her right to privacy, dignity and bodily 
integrity, I am of the view that the limitation clause in the Constitution (s 36 of Act 108 of 
1996) permits the limitation of these rights, through the medium of s 37 of the Criminal 
Procedure Act.’67 As also held by the Privy Council in Brown v Stott,68 the right against self-
incrimination is not absolute and incursions may be justified where the demand for 
incriminating information pursues a legitimate aim (e.g. a response to a social problem of 
dangerous driving) and the incursion is no greater than necessary. 
An interesting question arises: in following the rudimentary treatment in legal 
precedent, is the distinction between self-incriminating testimonial communications and 
incriminating non-testimonial real evidence ‘emanating from the accused’ as clear-cut and 
precise? Notably, four dissenting Justices in Schmerber, in equally compelling dissenting 
opinions, thought not.69 Black J, with whom Douglas J joined in dissent, argued that the 
 
form of oral communication, the more compelling will the protection be; the more objective or real the existence 
of the incriminating material, on the other hand, the more attenuated. …pre-trial procedures of a non-
communicative or non-testimonial kind, such as compulsory fingerprinting, blood tests, blood-alcohol tests, 
attendance at identity parades, DNA and other tests of an objective nature, or, in company fraud matters, hand-
writing tests, all of which would seem to fall directly under the concept of freedom and personal security, have 
become well-established processes regarded in many parts of the world as being consistent with the values of an 
open and democratic society based on freedom and equality, and in suitably controlled conditions, would have 
far less difficulty in passing section 33 scrutiny in terms of our Constitution.’ 
66 Supra note 65 at 168. 
67 Supra note 65 at 169. See also Gaqa’s case supra note 41 at 658; which involved an application to surgically 
remove a bullet from the accused’s body contrary to the accused’s express wishes, Desai J held that the relevant 
provisions of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 ‘permit the violence necessary to remove the bullet’ and 
that although the ‘proposed surgical intervention to remove the bullet would undoubtedly be a serious affront to 
the respondent's human dignity and an act of State-sanctioned violence against his bodily and perhaps also 
psychological integrity’ the infringement of rights was justifiable. Cf Xaba’s case supra note 41. 
68 [2001] 2 WLR 817. At 836: ‘The jurisprudence of the European Court very clearly establishes that while the 
overall fairness of a criminal trial cannot be compromised, the constituent rights comprised, whether expressly 
or implicitly, within article 6 are not themselves absolute. Limited qualification of these rights is acceptable if 
reasonably directed by national authorities towards a clear and proper public objective and if representing no 
greater qualification than the situation calls for … The Court has also recognised the need for a fair balance 
between the general interest of the community and the personal rights of the individual, the search for which 
balance has been described as inherent in the whole of the Convention.’ 
69 Chief Justice Warren at 773 found it ‘sufficient’ to reiterate his dissenting opinion in Breithaupt v Abram 352 
U. S. 432,  352 U. S. 440, as the basis on which to reverse this conviction. Justice Black  found that the officers 
violated Schmerber's right against self-incrimination. At 778, he wrote, ‘[b]elieving with the Framers that these 
constitutional safeguards broadly construed by independent tribunals of justice provide our best hope for 
keeping our people free from governmental oppression, I deeply regret the Court's holding.’ Justice Douglas (at 
778-79) also reiterated his dissent in Breithaupt v Abram supra, as the basis on which to reverse this conviction, 
and also referred to ‘a zone of privacy enumerated in Griswold v Connecticut, 381 U. S. 479 that ‘[n]o clearer 
invasion of this right of privacy can be imagined than forcible bloodletting of the kind involved here.’ Finally, 
Justice Fortas held that the right against self-incrimination applies, and at 779 stated ‘the State has no right to 
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‘compulsory extraction of petitioner's blood for analysis so that the person who analyzed it 
could give evidence to convict him had both a “testimonial” and a “communicative nature”.’70 
The report of the blood test was ‘testimonial’ or ‘communicative’ because the test was 
performed in order to obtain the testimony of others, communicating to the jury facts about the 
petitioner's condition: ‘[t]he sole purpose of this project, which proved to be successful, was to 
obtain “testimony” from some person to prove that petitioner had alcohol in his blood at the 
time he was arrested. And the purpose of the project was certainly “communicative” in that the 
analysis of the blood was to supply information to enable a witness to communicate to the court 
and jury that petitioner was more or less drunk.’71 Black J found it ‘unfortunate’ that the 
majority relied ‘so heavily for its very restrictive reading of the Fifth Amendment's privilege 
against self-incrimination on the words “testimonial” and “communicative”.’72 The use of 
these particular words he argued ‘are not models of clarity and precision.’ 73  Brennan J 
considered the same and noted that ‘all evidence received in court is “testimonial” or 
“communicative” … [b]ut the Fifth Amendment relates only to acts on the part of the person 
to whom the privilege applies, and we use these words subject to the same limitations. A nod 
or headshake is as much a “testimonial” or “communicative” act in this sense as are spoken 
words. But the terms as we use them do not apply to evidence of acts noncommunicative in 
nature as to the person asserting the privilege, even though, as here, such acts are compelled to 
obtain the testimony of others.’74 
At present it appears to be an open question in South African law. In my view, even if 
in future cases, the South African courts take the approach of the dissenting opinions in 
Schmerber, particularly that of Justice Black, acts of compulsion in terms of certain statutory 
provisions may well survive a constitutional challenge.75 Although the court may find that the 
compelled act infringes the right against self-incrimination, the limitations clause in this regard 
will certainly be in the reckoning, such that an infringement can be justified in terms of s 36 of 
the Constitution, if it is reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society, having 
regard to the factors specified in s 36.76 While this makes good sense, a notably different 
 
commit any kind of violence upon the person, or to utilize the results of such a tort, and the extraction of blood, 
over protest, is an act of violence.’ 
70 Supra note 40 at 774. 
71 Supra note 40 at 774. 
72 Supra note 40 at 774. 
73 Supra note 40 at 774. 
74 Supra note 40 at footnote 5. 
75 See Schwikkard and Van der Merwe op cit note 35 at 149. 
76 See Orrie’s case supra note 37. See also S v R and Others 2000 (1) SACR 33 (W) in which Willis J found that 
although ‘an involuntary blood test unquestionably constituted an invasion of privacy’ (at 39) and a person's 
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approach was taken by the Supreme Court of Canada in R v Stillman,77 where the majority held 
that for the purposes of s 24(2) of the Charter that ‘the compelled use of the body or the 
compelled provision of bodily substances in breach of a Charter  right for purposes of 
self-incrimination will generally result in an unfair trial just as surely as the compelled or 
conscripted self-incriminating statement.’78 In doing so, the majority favoured the dissenting 
reasons of Black J and Douglas J, and ‘were of the view that taking the blood constituted a 
breach of the right against self-incrimination.’79 The issue was whether evidence relating to the 
analysis of hair samples and teeth impressions forcibly taken rendered the trial unfair. In the 
classification of evidence, the court drew a distinction between ‘conscriptive’ and ‘non-
conscriptive’ evidence.80 Cory J said the following: 
 ‘If the accused was not compelled to participate in the creation or discovery of the evidence 
(i.e., the evidence existed independently of the Charter  breach in a form useable by the state), 
the evidence will be classified as non-conscriptive.  The admission of evidence which falls into 
this category will, as stated in Collins, supra, rarely operate to render the trial unfair.  If the 
evidence has been classified as  non-conscriptive the court should move on to consider the 
second and third of the Collins factors, namely, the seriousness of the Charter  violation and 
the effect of exclusion on the repute of the administration of justice.’81 
In doing so, Cory J went further to include in the category of conscriptive evidence, 
‘real’ evidence as ‘referring to anything which is tangible and exists….quite independently of 
a Charter breach’ which he noted as ‘key to their classification that they do not necessarily 
exist in a useable form.’82 In an example he said: ‘in the absence of a valid statutory authority 
or the accused’s consent to take bodily samples, the independent existence of the bodily 
 
right to bodily integrity, there would also be times when fairness would require that evidence, albeit obtained 
unconstitutionally, nevertheless to be admitted (at 40). Having regard to the cumulative weight of various 
factors, including the consent given by the accused, the evidence sought to be adduced by the State was 
admitted in the interests of a fair trial (at 42-43).  
77 (1997) 113 CCC (3d) 321 (SCC) ((1997) 144 DLR (4th) 193 (SCC), overruled in 2009 by R v Grant [2009] 2 
SCR 353. Therefore, reliance on this judgment in the interpretation of the fair trial requirement in s 35(5) is 
according to Schwikkard and Van der Merwe op cit note 35 at 255 ‘unnecessary’ and ‘artificial.’ 
78 Supra op cit note 77 para 223 (DLR). 
79 Supra op cit note 77 paras 84-86 (DLR). At para 86: ‘It has, for a great many years, been considered unfair 
and indeed unjust to seek to convict on the basis of a compelled statement or confession. If it was obtained as a 
result of a breach of the Charter its admission would generally tend to render the trial unfair. Similarly, to 
compel an accused to use his body or to provide bodily substances in order to incriminate himself would 
generally render the trial unfair.  This is so because the compelled production of bodily parts or substances is 
just as great an invasion of the essence of the person as is a compelled conscripted statement. The unauthorized 
use of a person’s body or bodily substances is just as much compelled “testimony” that could render the trial 
unfair as is a compelled statement.’ 
80 Supra op cit note 77 paras 75-83 (DLR). 
81 Supra op cit note 77 paras 75-83 (DLR). 
82 Supra op cit note 77 paras 76 (DLR). 
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evidence is of no use to the prosecution since there is no lawful means of obtaining it.’83 
Therefore, depending on the circumstances, the admission of real evidence, may well have a 
detrimental effect on the administration of justice. 
Another interesting issue that arises in the consistently held distinction by our courts 
between self-incriminating testimonial communications and incriminating non-testimonial real 
evidence emanating from the accused, is the interpretation of the fair trial requirement in s 
35(5) of the Constitution in relation to real evidence which has been discovered as a result of 
self-incriminating testimonial communications unconstitutionally obtained from the accused. 
Is it the case that the real evidence discovered should be treated as self-incriminating derivative 
evidence which, if admitted would violate the right against self-incrimination and therefore 
render the trial unfair? Put differently, should real evidence be excluded because it was 
unconstitutionally obtained, and admitting it would render the trial unfair or was otherwise be 
detrimental to the administration of justice.84 Or is it the case that focusing the enquiry on the 
classification of the evidence, which distinguishes between the nature of the evidence –
testimonial or real, is misleading, since the question should be whether the accused was 
compelled to provide the evidence?85 
 
83 Supra op cit note 77 paras 76 (DLR). 
84 See R v Collins (1987) 33 CCC (3d) 1 (SCC) ((1987) 38 DLR (4th) 508 (SCC), a Canadian decision, in which 
it was held that such evidence ‘will rarely operate unfairly for the reason alone’ that it was obtained in a manner 
that violated the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (hereafter ‘the Canadian Charter) (at 526 DLR). The 
court drew a distinction between real and testimonial evidence, and expressed doubt that real evidence, 
discovered derivatively as a result of unconstitutional conscription, could render a trial unfair: ‘[t]he real 
evidence existed irrespective of the violation of the Charter and its use does not render the trial unfair’ (at 526 
DLR). This doctrine was invoked by the trial court in the South African case, S v Tandwa and Others 2008 (1) 
SACR 613 (SCA). The trial judge admitted the real evidence (the money from a bank robbery and an AK 47 
rifle). At 646: ‘The evidence is real evidence which existed independently from the pointing out made by 
accused no, 8 it was common cause that the accused was in possession of the money and he provided an 
exculpatory explanation for his possession thereof. The inclusion of such evidence would not render the trial 
unfair within the meaning thereof and on any of the aspects as contained in section 35(3) which aspects are not 
intended to be exhaustive. On the contrary, and especially in the light of the accused being in a position of 
providing an exculpatory explanation for his possession thereof it would in my view be detrimental to the 
administration of justice to exclude such evidence.’ See also S v Mkhize 1999 (2) SACR 632 (W) (a pistol) and 
S v R (blood samples) supra note 76, that the admissibility of unconstitutionally obtained evidence did not 
render the trial unfair. 
85 As noted by the Supreme Court of Canada in R v Stillman supra op cit note 77 para 76 (DLR): ‘What has 
come to be referred to as ‘real’ evidence will not necessarily fall into the ‘non-conscriptive' category. There is 
on occasion a misconception that ‘real’ evidence, referring to anything which is tangible and exists as an 
independent entity, is always admissible.’ At para 78: [t]he concept of ‘real’ evidence without any further 
description is misleading. It will be seen that, in certain circumstances, evidence such as the gun in R v 
Burlingham, [1995] 2 SCR 206, 97 CCC (3d) 385, 124 DLR (4th) 7, may come into the state's possession as a 
result of the accused's compelled participation or ‘conscription’ against himself. Thus, while the evidence is 
‘real’ it is nevertheless conscriptive evidence.’ This approach, observed Schwikkard and Van der Merwe op cit 
note 35 at 258, is an ‘extreme example of the “fruits of the poisonous tree” doctrine.’ 
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In South African law once it is established that evidence was obtained as a result of a 
breach of a constitutional right the evidence may be excluded in terms of s 35(5) of the 
Constitution, which provides as follows: ‘Evidence obtained in a manner that violates any right 
in the Bill of Rights must be excluded if the admission of that evidence would render the trial 
unfair or otherwise be detrimental to the administration of justice.’86 The central principle 
embodied in s 35(5) is the ‘exclusion of unconstitutionally obtained evidence despite its 
relevance and regardless of the fact that it would otherwise have been admissible.’ 87 
Ultimately, ‘the law must strive to reconcile two highly important interests’ as noted by Lord 
Cooper in Lawrie v Muir: ‘(a) the interest of the citizen to be protected from illegal or irregular 
invasions of his liberties by the authorities, and (b) the interest of the State to secure that 
evidence bearing upon the commission of crime and necessary to enable justice to be done 
shall not be withheld from Courts of law on a merely formal or technical ground. Neither of 
these objects can be insisted upon to the uttermost.’88 As noted by the court in S v Tandwa and 
Others,89 a ‘notable feature’ of s 35(5) is that it does not provide for automatic exclusion of 
unconstitutionally obtained evidence – evidence must be excluded only if it (a) renders the trial 
unfair; or (b) is otherwise detrimental to the administration of justice.  
Admitting evidence that renders the trial unfair will always be detrimental to the 
administration of justice,90  however, there may be cases when the trial will not be rendered 
unfair, but admitting the impugned evidence will nevertheless be detrimental to 
 
86 The section is, in some respects, very similar to s 24(2) of the Canadian Charter, the relevant parts of which 
read: ‘Where … a court concludes that evidence was obtained in a manner that infringed or denied any rights 
guaranteed by this Charter, the evidence shall be excluded if it is established that, having regard to all the 
circumstances, the admission of it in the proceedings would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.’ 
In S v Naidoo and Another 1998 (1) SACR 479 (N) at 502, McCall J held: ‘Having regard to the similarity 
between s 35(5) of the new Constitution and s 24(2) of the Canadian Charter (but bearing in mind the 
differences between the two enactments), and also the provision in s 39(1)(c) that when interpreting the Bill of 
Rights, a court may consider foreign law, I am of the view that it is more helpful to interpret the provisions of s 
35(5) with reference to the Canadian decisions than to those South African cases dealing with a more general 
discretion based on the decision in People v O'Brien.’ 
87 Schwikkard and Van der Merwe op cit note 35 at 199. The right against compelled and non-compelled self-
incrimination, trial fairness and a court’s discretion have been considered in a number of cases. See S v 
Lottering 1999 12 BCLR 1478 (N) where the court was prepared to exercise discretion in a ‘value judgment’ 
(para 1483B) linked to ‘notions of basic fairness and justice’ and held that warnings intended to protect the right 
against self-incrimination did not automatically demand the exclusion of evidence (in this instance non-
compelled self-incrimination testimonial communication made by the accused). See also S v Nombewu 1996 (2) 
SACR 396 (E); S v Nell 2009 (2) SACR 37 (C); S v Seseane 2000 (2) SACR 225 (O); S v Soci 1998 (2) SACR 
275 (E). 
88 1950 SC (J) 19 at 26-7, as quoted by Schwikkard and Van der Merwe op cit note 35 at 202. 
89 Supra note 84. 
90 In Naidoo’s case supra note 86 at 527, McCall J noted that the words ‘or otherwise’ in s 35(5) meant that an 
unfair trial is always detrimental to the administration of justice. 
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the administration of justice on the basis of considerations of broad public policy. 91  In 
determining whether the trial is rendered unfair, in a broader enquiry, courts must take into 
account competing social interests.92  In Key v Attorney-General, Cape Provincial Division 
and Another,93 Kriegler J described the fair trial inquiry as follows: 
‘What the Constitution demands is that the accused be given a fair trial. Ultimately ..., fairness 
is an issue which has to be decided upon the facts of each case, and the trial Judge is the person 
best placed to take that decision. At times fairness might require that evidence 
unconstitutionally obtained be excluded. But there will also be times when fairness will require 
that evidence, albeit obtained unconstitutionally, nevertheless be admitted.’94  
The court's discretion must be exercised ‘by weighing the competing concerns of 
society on the one hand to ensure that the guilty are brought to book against the protection of 
entrenched human rights accorded to accused persons.’95 In doing so, Cameron JA , Mlambo 
JA and Hancke AJA in Tandwa referred to ‘relevant factors’ including ‘the severity of the 
rights violation and the degree of prejudice, weighed against the public policy interest in 
bringing criminals to book.’96 In a case that involved the discovery of real evidence (money 
from a bank robbery and an AK 47 rifle) from the accused under duress and torture by police 
brutality, the learned justices emphasised the importance of excluding evidence in instances of 
a flagrant and deliberate violation of an accused’s constitutional rights: 
‘Rights violations are severe when they stem from the deliberate conduct of the police or are 
flagrant in nature. There is a high degree of prejudice when there is a close causal connection 
between the rights violation and the subsequent self-incriminating acts of the accused. Rights 
violations are not severe, and the resulting trial not unfair, if the police conduct was objectively 
reasonable and neither deliberate nor flagrant.’ 97  
 
91 Tandwa’s case note 84 at 648.  
92 Supra note 84 at 648. In S v Mphala and Another 1998 (1) SACR 654 (W) at 657, Cloete J said: ‘So far as the 
administration of justice is concerned, there must be a balance between, on the one hand, respect (particularly by 
law enforcement agencies) for the Bill of Rights and, on the other, respect (particularly by the man in the street) 
for the judicial process. Overemphasis of the former would lead to acquittals on what would be perceived by the 
public as technicalities, whilst overemphasis of the latter would lead at best to a dilution of the Bill of Rights 
and at worst to its provisions being negated.’ 
93 1996 (2) SACR 113 (CC) at 196. 
94 Supra note 93 at 196. 
95 Lottering’s case supra note 87 at 1483, where it was held that the accused's pointing out of evidence should be 
admitted even though he had not been warned of his rights: constitutional rights violations only render the trial 
unfair (and justify exclusion of evidence) if they are deliberate or flagrant. 
96 Supra note 84 at 648.  
97 Supra note 84 at 648. See Seseane’s case supra note 87 where the deliberate nature of police conduct in not 




Against the background that ‘central in this inquiry is the public interest’98 and that  
s 35(5) ‘is designed to protect individuals from police methods that offend basic principles of 
human rights’99 the court found that the admission of derivative evidence blemished by police 
brutality was undeniably detrimental to the administration of justice and that ‘[a]dmitting real 
evidence procured by torture, assault, beatings and other forms of coercion violates the 
accused's fair trial right at its core, and stains the administration of justice.’100 It is submitted 
that in these circumstances of ‘barbarous and unacceptable conduct’101 by the police, the facts 
of the case demanded the exclusion of the evidence. The ‘basic principles of human rights’ and 
notions of basic fairness and justice must be applied to the facts of a case and, by reference to 
the approach of our courts, this necessarily involves considerations of public interest in 
determining whether the trial is rendered unfair by admitting the impugned evidence. 
In S v Naidoo and Another, 102  a case considered to be a ‘bold’ interpretation of s 
35(5),103 the law enforcement authority furnished false and misleading affidavits to a judge in 
order to obtain judge’s direction, in terms of Interception and Monitoring Prohibition Act 127 
of 1992 permitting law enforcement to monitor certain telephones. The two main issues before 
the court was (a) whether the fact that the direction was granted on the basis of false, in some 
respects grossly false, as noted by the court, and misleading information invalidated the 
direction given by the judge and thus deprived the monitoring of its legality;104 and (b) would 
the admission of evidence of the contents of the conversations render the trial unfair or 
otherwise be detrimental to the administration of justice?105 In respect of the first issue, the 
court found that the direction issued by the judge was invalid. Further, that there was a violation 
of the accused’s right to personal privacy and, in particular, the right not to be subject to 
the  violation of private communications. 106  On the second issue, the court held that the 
admission of the evidence of the two telephonic conversations, which violated the right against 
self-incrimination, would render the trial unfair and would be detrimental to the administration 
of justice, and fell to be excluded in terms of s 35(5) of the Constitution.107 The conflicting 
 
98 Supra note 84 at 649.  
99 Supra note 84 at 649.  
100 Supra note 84 at 649. 
101 Supra note 84 at 649.  
102 Supra note 86. 
103 Schwikkard and Van der Merwe op cit note 35 at 199. 
104 Supra note 86 at 523. 
105 Supra note 86  at 525-31. 
106 Supra note 86 at 525. 
107 Supra note 86 at 531. See also S v Nkabinde 1998 (8) BCLR 996 (N) where it was held that the accused’s 
right to privacy was violated when law enforcement authorities monitored conversations between the accused 
and his lawyers. 
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interests underlying the exclusion of relevant evidence is reflected in the following observation 
of the court:  
‘There may be those members of the public who will regard the exclusion of the evidence as 
being evidence of undue leniency towards criminals. The answer to that is that crime in this 
country cannot be brought under control unless we have an efficient, honest, responsible and 
respected police force, capable of enforcing the law. One of the mistakes which must be learnt 
from the past is that illegal methods of investigation are unacceptable and can only bring the 
administration of justice into disrepute, particularly when they impinge upon the basic human 
rights which the Constitution seeks to protect.’108 
On the issue of whether the admissibility of the evidence would have rendered the trial 
unfair, McCall J distinguished between a confession or admission conscripted against an 
accused and evidence of an unlawfully monitored telephonic conversation. He found that both 
types of evidence ‘offended the right against self-incrimination’ and ‘which inevitably “strikes 
at one of the fundamental tenets of a fair trial”.’109 He concluded that the admission of the 
evidence of the two telephonic conversations would render the trial unfair: 
‘To admit evidence provided by an accused person against himself without his knowledge as a 
result of the unlawful monitoring of his conversation with someone else would offend against 
the notion of basic fairness in no less a measure than the admission of evidence of a confession 
or admission made by an accused person without having been informed of his right to legal 
representation, which has been held to result in an unfair trial...’110 
Two crucial elements of the judgment are worthy of further discussion, the second of 
which is considered more contentious. First, the court was clearly correct in finding the 
accused’s right to privacy had been infringed as a result of police dishonesty in obtaining the 
monitoring direction and in its finding that to exclude the evidence on the basis that the 
admissibility of the impugned evidence would be detrimental to the administration of justice.  
The police conduct in providing false and misleading information in their application for the 
direction for the monitoring operation weighed heavily in favour of the exclusion of 
unconstitutionally obtained evidence. 111  It rendered the accused's trial unfair because it 
introduced into the process of proof against him evidence obtained by a flagrant and deliberate 
disregard of rules governing the investigative powers of law enforcement which seek to protect 
 
108 Supra note 86 at 531. 
109 Supra note 86 at 527. 
110 Supra note 86 at 527. 
111 Supra note 86 at 515. 
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constitutional rights. The approach of our courts to invoke with vigour the renunciation of such 
conduct, not merely in principle, but in police practice, is apt.112 
Second, however, it is not clear that the court was correct in its finding that that there 
had been an infringement of the right against self-incrimination such that trial fairness would 
have been affected by the admissibility of the impugned evidence. While there was certainly 
bad faith and unreasonable conduct of the police, and while my position should not be 
construed as a sanction of police practice to ignore constitutional rights protections, this is very 
different from the admission of derivative evidence obtained in circumstances involving some 
form of compulsion as a result of torture or obtained in the absence of a constitutional rights 
warning or legal representation, which would be undeniably detrimental to the administration 
of justice. In the circumstances of the case coupled with considerations of public policy, it is 
submitted that it is not detrimental to the interests of justice to admit the disputed evidence. 
The focus of the enquiry perhaps should have been on the nature and extent of the infringement 
of the accused’s constitutional right to privacy, and not on the participation of the accused in 
certain voluntary inculpatory conversations which took place without knowledge of the 
unlawful monitoring – potentially, the accused would have participated in the voluntary 
inculpatory conversations even if there had been no unlawful monitoring.113 
This distinction between the nature of the rights infringed is important. In relation to 
privacy rights, invasions of privacy seldom breach the right to a fair trial but evidence obtained 
as a result of the breach generally falls to be excluded in terms of the second leg of s 35(5) 
enquiry, namely, detrimental to the administration of justice.114 An infringement of the right to 
a fair trial, such as a violation of the right against self-incrimination will inevitably render a 
trial unfair, however the admissibility status of real evidence obtained as a consequence of 
conscripted evidence is less clear. As was in the case, S v Pillay and Others115 that followed 
Naidoo’s case, and can be considered a sequel, as other persons were later charged on the same 
facts that led to prosecution of the accused in Naidoo. 116  The police, using information 
improperly obtained, raided accused 10’s house and found some of the robbery money 
concealed in the ceiling, where it had been placed by one of the alleged perpetrators of the 
 
112 For examples on the extent to which good faith, or the absence thereof, by law enforcement authorities can 
be considered in the exclusion of unconstitutionally obtained evidence, see also S v Hena and Another 2006 (2) 
SACR 33 SE; S v Madiba 1998 1 BCLR 38 (D) and Mphala’s case supra note 92. 
113 Schwikkard and Van der Merwe op cit note 35 at 250-51. 
114 Email communication Professor PJ Schwikkard, 2 September 2019. 
115 2004 (2) SACR 479 (N) (SCA). 
116 See Schwikkard and Van der Merwe op cit note 35 at 251. 
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robbery – this was discovered on the undertaking by the police to accused 10 that she would 
not be prosecuted and would be used as a State witness in the event that she gave them the 
information they required. Accused 10 was subsequently convicted in the court a quo as an 
accessory after the fact to robbery. 
The real evidence admitted by the court a quo  was the discovery of the money 
concealed in the roof. On the issue whether the admission of real (or derivative) evidence would 
render a trial unfair, and having considered in particular Canadian jurisprudence, Mpati DP 
and Motata AJA held that ‘while evidence derived (real or derivative evidence) from 
conscriptive evidence, ie self-incriminating evidence obtained through a violation of a 
[constitutional] right, will be excluded on grounds of unfairness if it is found that, but for the 
conscriptive evidence, the derivative evidence would not have been discovered’117 – in the 
present case, that information sourced from the illegal monitoring operation of accused 10’s 
telephone line, which ultimately led to the discovery of the robbery money, was not 
conscriptive evidence. Scott J said: 
‘That discovery would not have been made but for the monitoring of the telephone 
conversation. But the telephone conversation would have taken place whether it was monitored 
or not. It was not created by the infringement, nor was there any question of compulsion. A 
conversation in such circumstances may result in a form of self-incrimination, but no more so 
than any other conduct of an accused subsequent to the commission of the offence which may 
point to the latter's guilt.’118 
On the second leg of the enquiry, that is whether the impugned evidence should be 
excluded on grounds that to include it will be detrimental to the administration of justice, the 
majority judgment in that case, per Mpati DP and Motata AJA, excluded evidence obtained as 
a result of an illegal monitoring operation. The majority judgment considered that although the 
admission of the evidence in question, obtained through an unauthorised surveillance 
operation, would not render the trial unfair, it should be excluded as detrimental to the 
administration of justice: ‘[t]here is no doubt that the money found in the ceiling of the house 
of accused 10 was found as a result of a violation, firstly, of her constitutional right to privacy 
(s 14 of the Constitution) in that her  private communications were illegally monitored 
following the unlawful tapping of her telephone line, and, secondly, her right to remain silent 
and her right against self-incrimination (s 35 of the Constitution), in that she was induced to 
 
117 Supra note 115 at 432.  
118 Supra note 115 at 447. 
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make the statement that led to the finding of the money in the ceiling of her house.’119 It was 
held that even with considerations of public interest, what happened in accused 10’s house 
‘should not be considered in isolation, as if removed from the original violation of accused 10’s  
right to privacy, ie the illegal monitoring of her telephone communications.’120 The court noted 
that each case will depend upon its own facts, and while there may well be cases of ‘serious 
infringement of constitutionally guaranteed rights’ where the interests of the public would not 
be served by the exclusion of evidence obtained because of such infringement, the present case 
was not one of them.121 It was held that the derivative evidence sought to be admitted should 
be excluded on the grounds that its inclusion will bring the administration of justice into 
disrepute. As the evidence of the discovery of the money was the only evidence against accused 
10, its exclusion meant there was no evidence upon which she could be convicted. Her appeal 
accordingly succeeded and conviction and sentence was set aside. 
Having regard to the issue of trial fairness and the admissibility of unconstitutionally 
obtained derivative evidence, it is submitted that our South African courts should not deviate 
from the well-settled distinction between self-incriminating testimonial communications and 
incriminating non-testimonial real evidence emanating from the accused. This means that in a 
situation where real evidence discovered is unconstitutionally obtained as a result of 
conscripted or self-incriminating evidence, the real evidence should not necessarily be 
excluded as conscriptive which, if admitted, would render the trial unfair. Scott JA in Pillay 
cautions against automatically excluding derivative real evidence: ‘[t]o hold that the derivative 
evidence, ie the discovery of the money in the roof, would render the trial unfair in such 
circumstances would be to extend the application of the reasoning in the Burlingham case 
simply too far.’122 He further noted that a ‘rigid application’ of such an approach ‘could lead 
to some startling results’123 and ‘if adopted as an invariable rule, would be in conflict with the 
 
119 Supra note 115 at 430.  
120 Supra note 115 at 432-36.  
121 Supra note 115 at 432-36.  
122 Supra note 115 at 447. See reference to Burlingham case supra note 85, where evidence of the discovery of 
the murder weapon at the bottom of a frozen river was excluded on the basis that its discovery resulted from a 
compelled disclosure made by the accused in circumstances involving a breach of the appellants' right to 
counsel in terms of the Charter. Further at 447, Scott J held: ‘But save in circumstances involving some form of 
compulsion or, on the strength of Burlingham's case, when derived from an infringement giving rise to self-
incriminatory evidence which would not otherwise have existed, it is difficult to see how real evidence having 
an independent existence can ever be said to render the trial unfair.’ 
123 Supra note 115 at 446.  
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decisions of the Constitutional Court’124 in cases such as Ferreira,125 wherein specifically as 
regards derivative evidence arising from compelled self-incrimination, Ackermann J said: 
‘As far as s 25(3) is concerned, the trial Judge is obliged to ensure a “fair trial”, if necessary by 
his or her discretion to exclude, in the appropriate case, derivative evidence. Ultimately this is 
a question of fairness to the accused and is an issue which has to be decided on the facts of each 
case. The trial Judge is the person best placed to take that decision. The development of the law 
of evidence in this regard is a matter for the Supreme Court. The essential content of the right 
is therefore not even touched.’126 
It should not be the case that the admission of derivative real evidence will 
automatically rend a trial unfair.127 Section 35(5) contains a constitutional directive in terms of 
which exclusion is mandatory ‘if the admission of that evidence would render the trial unfair 
or  otherwise be detrimental to the administration of justice.’128  If admission of the evidence 
would not render the trial unfair then the court must determine whether it would otherwise be 
detrimental to the administration of justice. Whether the admission of evidence will bring the 
administration of justice into disrepute requires a value judgment, which necessarily involves 
considerations of  public interests.129 There are certainly situations where the admissibility of 
unconstitutionally obtained real or derivative evidence will be a focus of the fair trial 
requirement enquiry in s 35(5), especially if it is ‘inextricably tainted’130 by ‘torture, assault, 
beatings and other forms of coercion.’131 In situations, however, where the real or derivative 
evidence is not tainted  by police brutality or any other form of coerced conduct that procured 
its discovery by violating the accused's fair trial right at its core,132 the court must exercise its 
discretion in terms of s 35(5) and in doing so, the ‘fruits of the poisonous tree’ doctrine should 
not be invoked to the extreme. 
 
 
124 Supra note 115 at 447.  
125 Supra note 47.  
126 Supra note 125 para 153, in the context of the interim Constitution. 
127 See Schwikkard and Van der Merwe op cit note 35 at 259. 
128 Ibid at 256. 
129 Pillay’s case supra note 115 at 433. 
130 Tandwa’s case supra note 84 at 641.  
131 Supra note 84 at 649. See also Ferreira’s case supra note 47 para 150 in which Ackermann J observed: 
‘Where, for example, derivative evidence is obtained as a result of torture there might be compelling reasons of 
public policy for holding such evidence to be inadmissible even if it can be proved independently of the 
accused. Otherwise, the ends might be allowed to justify the means. The admission of evidence in such 
circumstances could easily bring the administration of justice into disrepute and undermine the sanctity of the 
constitutional right which has been trampled upon.’ 
132 Tandwa’s case supra note 84 at 649.  
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(b) The impact of new technologies 
A central theme of the analysis presented in the thesis is the impact of modern fast-paced 
environment of technological advancements, and its effect on the traditional investigative 
powers of law enforcement and security and intelligence agencies. It is within this context that 
I offer a doctrinal argument for a particular application of the right against self-incrimination 
to compelled acts of decryption. Although I have no particular terminology coined for this 
doctrinal argument as it may apply in South African law, Kerr usefully refers to this as 
‘equilibrium-adjustment’.133 Some courts have indicated a willingness to reconsider traditional 
constitutional law doctrines given the impact of new technologies.134 In a judgment of the 
Supreme Court of the United States, in Carpenter v United States, 135 the Supreme Court 
indicated that changes in technology have necessitated an approach to traditional doctrinal 
principles, more nuanced than a ‘mechanical interpretation’. 136  The Court recognised the 
necessary use of modern technology and its unique challenges to the law, especially in the shift 
in the balance between state in its use of investigative powers and its impact on individual 
rights: ‘the progress of science has afforded law enforcement a powerful new tool to carry out 
its important responsibilities. At the same time, this tool risks Government encroachment of 
the sort the Framers…drafted the Fourth Amendment to prevent.’137 The Court referred to 
‘seismic shifts in digital technology’ that gave the state so much power that it upset traditional 
expectations of use of such powers, and which threatened abuses.138 The Court further wrote: 
‘[w]hen confronting new concerns wrought by digital technology, it becomes important ‘not 
to uncritically extend existing precedents.’139 Can these arguments by the Supreme Court, 
decided in the context of search and seizure laws in relation to electronic data,140 apply to the 
right against self-incrimination and compelled disclosure cases? I think so. 
 
133 Kerr op cit note 3 at 791: ‘New technologies constantly threaten the balance of power. To ensure that 
mechanical application of old rules does not create a dystopia in which new technologies either give the 
government too much powers (which could lead to abuses) or too little power (which would not protect the 
public), the Court often adjusts old rules to restore the prior equilibrium of government power.’ See also OS 
Kerr ‘An equilibrium-adjustment theory of the Fourth Amendment’125 (2011) Harvard LR 476  at 488, in 
which he wrote: ‘The resulting judicial decisions resemble the work of drivers trying to maintain constant speed 
over mountainous terrain. In an effort to maintain the pre-existing equilibrium, they add extra gas when facing 
an uphill climb and ease of the pedal on the downslopes.’ 
134 Kerr op cit note 3 at 790. 
135 138 S Ct 2206 (2018). 
136 Supra op cit note 135. 
137 Supra op cit note 135 at 2223. 
138 Supra op cit note 135 at 2219. 
139 Supra op cit note 135 at 2222. 
140 I do not wish to belabour the point, suffice to acknowledge the different spheres of investigatory powers. 
Investigations in the information age now mean more overlaps between these two types of powers, and 
implications for state access to electronic data. The United States Supreme Court has long ago recognised in 
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(c) Different scenarios of compelled acts relating to encrypted devices  
Applying the constitutional law framework on the right against self-incrimination, two distinct 
issues arise with regard to compelled disclosure and encryption that is now commonplace in 
modern life: (i) compelled disclosure of a user’s passcode (reveal/enter the passcode); and (ii) 
compelled entry of  a biometric based information (by placing a finger on a device or by facial 
recognition). A nuanced understanding of the interaction between modern technology and legal 
doctrine will be integral in the development of doctrinal principles that involve ‘reveal-the-
passcode’, ‘use-a-fingerprint-or-facial-recognition’, enter-the-passcode’ and ‘produce-the-
decrypted-data’.141 Each of these actions of compelled decryption aims ultimately to allow the 
state to access encrypted devices, or to have such encrypted information put in an intelligible 
form. For example, each time a user of a smartphone device enters a password or passcode to 
‘unlock’ a phone, in doing so, the act decrypts the contents of the smartphone, or at the very 
least makes them available to be decrypted.142 Further, once the smartphone is unlocked, it also 
decrypts all its applications (unless individually password protected) and storage memory such 
that messages, documents, photos and other files and records on the device can be accessed.143   
It is recognised that not all cases will neatly fit into these two categories of issues and 
other scenarios exist.144 However, they constitute a useful starting point in South African law 
for a theoretical foundation for the understanding of compelled decryption, and useful for 
making sense of past cases and for reasoning about future cases and the laws’ adaptability to 
future technological developments. 145  In the analysis, this chapter also highlights some 
challenges to applying doctrinal principles established in the traditional physical world to 
electronic devices and information in acts of compelled decryption. 
 
Schmerber’s case supra note 37 at 767 that: ‘[t]he values protected by the Fourth Amendment... substantially 
overlap [with] those  ... [that] the Fifth Amendment helps to protect.’ See D Terzian ‘Forced decryption as 
equilibrium – Why it's constitutional and how Riley matters’ (2014-2015) 109 Northwestern University LR 
Online 56 at 60, who argues that the right against self-incrimination should be included in the ‘equilibrium 
adjustment’. See also Kerr op cit note 3 at 792-794 in which he considers arguments that the right against self-
incrimination is ‘properly sensitive to the new technological implications’ in doctrinal development.  
141 See A Cohen & S Park ‘Compelled decryption and the Fifth Amendment: Exploring the technical 
boundaries’ (2018) 32.1 Harvard Journal of Law & Technology 170; L Sacharoff ‘What am I really saying 
when I open my smartphone? A response to Orin S. Kerr’ (2019) 97 Texas LR 63; J Kiok ‘Missing the 
metaphor: Compulsory decryption and the Fifth Amendment’ (2015) 24.53 Public Interest LJ 53. Kerr op cit 
note 3; Kerr and Schneider op cit note 1. 
142 See also L Sacharoff ‘Unlocking the Fifth Amendment: Passwords and Encrypted Devices’ (2018) 87 
Fordham LR 203 at 221. 
143 Ibid. 
144 For example, compelling a suspect/target to hand over a document in which the password or passcode has 
been written down. 
145 See Cohen and Park op cit note 141 at 196.  
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(i) Compelled disclosure of a user’s passcode (reveal/enter) 
The following analysis is on the constitutional implications of compelling a suspect/target of 
an investigation to decrypt a digital device, for example by revealing or entering a passcode or 
password to unlock and have access to the contents of the device.146 The South African courts 
have held that certain compelled acts, characterised as non-testimonial, though incriminating, 
are not within the protections of the right against self-incrimination.147  It is in this context that 
the question arises whether the state can force a person to enter the password, which decrypts 
their phone.148 
From a doctrinal perspective, for the right against self-incrimination to apply: the 
evidence sought must be (a) compelled by the state (b) it must be incriminating, and (c) it must 
be testimonial. Potentially, the first two requirements are easily satisfied in terms of RICA 
2002 when a designate judge orders a suspect/target of an investigation to enter  a passcode to 
decrypt a locked device that may likely contain evidence incriminating against the 
suspect/target., The question that remains: are passcodes ‘testimonial’? Understanding the 
meaning of ‘testimonial’ is key to understanding, within this context, the right against self-
incrimination. International jurisprudence, particularly from the United States of America, 
offers some insight on the issue, albeit one in which courts have not yet come to a consensus 
on whether compelled passcodes are ‘testimonial’. The Fifth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution provides, in the relevant part, that ‘[n]o person … shall be compelled in any 
criminal case to be a witness against himself.’ 
In one type of scenario, law enforcement and the security and intelligence agencies may 
require a suspect/target of a compelled decryption direction to verbally state the password or 
passcode, or write it down. Arguably, these methods of compelling a password or passcode 
directly involve testimony ‘in its purest form’ and therefore should trigger direct protections of 
the right against self-incrimination.149 These types of compelled verbal statements of facts will 
usually be considered testimonial, and it is likely that the scenario of a suspect/target being 
compelled to verbally state the password or passcode will be no exception.150 The Supreme 
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Court has held that in such instances ‘the vast majority of verbal statements thus will be 
testimonial’ because they likely ‘convey information or assert facts.’151 
I now consider a type of scenario central to the debate on whether the compelled act is 
‘testimonial’: a compelled decryption direction requiring a suspect/target of an investigation to 
enter the password or passcode into the device to enable law enforcement and the security and 
intelligence agencies to access the encrypted device and its contents. In this scenario, the device 
itself unlocks when the password or passcode is entered, without keeping a record of it, nor is 
the entering of the password or passcode observed by anyone.  Having regard to the provisions 
of RICA 2002, if a designated judge approves an application for a decryption direction for a 
suspect/target of an investigation to enter passcode or password to decrypt a locked mobile 
phone, computer or an electronic file, does such decryption direction infringe the right against 
self-incrimination? Put differently, is the compelled act of entering a password or passcode to 
a device ‘testimonial’ and therefore subject to protection against self-incrimination?  
In the last decade, the American courts have not been able to agree on an answer 
offering a range of standards for how the right against self-incrimination should apply in such 
compelled decryption cases. According to Doe v United States (Doe I) 152 in order to be 
“testimonial” an accused’s communication, or act, ‘must itself, explicitly or implicitly, relate a 
factual assertion or disclose information.’153 
It has also become common in the formulation of ‘testimonial’ in compelled decryption 
cases to refer to the contents of the mind, with the use of analogy and metaphor. In Justice 
Stevens’ dissent in Doe I, he stated: ‘A defendant can be compelled to produce material 
evidence that is incriminating … But can he be compelled to use his mind to assist the 
prosecution in convicting him of a crime? I think not. He may in some cases be forced to 
surrender a key to a strongbox containing incriminating documents, but I do not believe that 
he can be compelled to reveal the combination to his wall safe – by word or deed.’154 Similarly, 
the Eleventh Circuit wrote: ‘[t]he touchstone of whether an act of production is testimonial is 
whether the government compels the individual to use “the contents of his own mind” to 
explicitly or implicitly communicate some statement of fact.’155 The Supreme Court in United 
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States v Hubbell stated: ‘[i]t was un- questionably necessary for respondent to make extensive 
use of  “the contents of his own mind” in identifying the hundreds of documents responsive to 
the requests in the subpoena.’156 In another definition of ‘testimonial’ offered, somewhere in-
between ‘disclos[ing] information’ and ‘us[ing] his mind to assist’ used in Doe I, is the 
‘extortion of information from the accused’157 that attempts to force him ‘to disclose the 
contents of his own mind’158 and that the right against self-incrimination ‘protects against 
any disclosures that the witness reasonably believes could be used in a criminal prosecution or 
could lead to other evidence that might be so used.’159  
This line of reasoning as to whether the evidence is ‘testimonial’ turns on whether the 
state is forcing a suspect/target in the act of compelled decryption to ‘disclose the contents of 
his own mind.’160 If this is applied, the extent to which a suspect/target is forced to ‘use his 
mind’ is central to determining whether an act of production of the passcode is testimonial161 
and the use of the contents of the mind of the suspect/target would be sufficient to make the 
act of compelled disclosure of a passcode ‘testimonial.’162 A competing  interpretation is that 
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the use of the contents of the mind of the suspect/target is not in itself sufficient,163 and there 
must be in addition an explicit or implicit communication of a statement of fact.164  
This leads to the question of whether the state can compel a suspect/target of an 
investigation to disclose a password or passcode to decrypt a device, or computer or file, if 
such act is considered ‘mentally taxing.’165 Referring to Justice Stevens’ dissent in Doe I on 
the first interpretation above, the state could not compel disclosure of a passcode because the 
suspect/target would be ‘us[ing] his mind to assist the prosecution in convicting him of a 
crime’166 regardless of what other information is known by the state. Potentially, this means 
that even if the compelled act of decryption does not communicate anything testimonial, and 
is simply a physical act, the act itself would require the ‘extensive use of the mind’ of the 
suspect/target.167 In United States v Kirschner,168 the defendant was required ‘to provide all 
passwords used or associated with the … computer … and any files.’ 169 The court found that 
requiring Kirschner to provide his password would be testimonial since ‘the government is not 
seeking documents or objects’ but rather ‘seeking testimony … requiring [Kirschner] to 
divulge through his mental processes his password – that will be used to incriminate him.’170  
The court’s reasoning relied on the analogy of a password decrypting a computer to a 
combination unlocking a safe, citing Justice Stevens’ dissent in Doe I, which stated that a 
defendant may be ‘forced to surrender a key to a strongbox’ but not ‘to reveal the combination 
to his wall safe — by word or deed.’171 Similarly, in In re Grand Jury Subpoena to Sebastien 
Boucher (Boucher I):172 [s]ince the government is trying to compel the production of the 
password itself, the foregone conclusion doctrine cannot apply. The password is not a physical 
thing … It is pure testimonial production rather than physical evidence having testimonial 
aspects.’173  
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The court in Fisher v United States174 created a two-part doctrinal framework as regards 
compelled acts: (i) the act-of-production doctrine; and (ii) the foregone conclusion doctrine. 
The court held that the Fifth Amendment does not afford protection to the compelled 
production of the contents of papers, and at the same time it announced an exception: 
depending on the circumstances of particular cases, a compelled act is testimonial when the act 
of producing the evidence implies ‘tacit averments’ that ‘has communicative aspects.’ 175 
Fischer provides an often cited statement and example: ‘The act of producing evidence in 
response to a subpoena nevertheless has communicative aspects of its own, wholly aside from 
the contents of the papers produced. Compliance with the subpoena [for a taxpayer’s financial 
records] tacitly concedes the existence of the papers demanded and their possession or control 
by the taxpayer. It also would indicate the taxpayer's belief that the papers are those described 
in the subpoena.’176 In other words, the ‘testimonial’ act protected by the Fifth Amendment is 
not the content of papers, but the physical act itself of producing the evidence: ‘[i]n light of the 
records now before us, we are confident that however incriminating the  contents of the 
accountant's workpapers might be, the act of producing them—the only thing which the 
taxpayer is compelled to do—would not itself involve testimonial self-incrimination.’177 In 
doing so, the court referred to three aspects of testimonial statements implicit in the act of 
compelled production: (i) ‘existence’; (ii) ‘possession or control’; and (iii) authenticity by ‘the 
belief that the papers are those’ required by the act of compulsion.178 A concern that arises with 
the court’s formulation is the sheer breadth, such that potentially every act of compulsion will 
be testimonial as it will communicate statements implicit in the act concerning ‘existence’, 
‘possession or control’ and authenticity. 179  Possibly with this concern in mind, the court 
imposed two limitations.180 The first refers to the act of compulsion to be ‘deemed to be 
sufficiently testimonial.’ Although the court did not provide any direction as to how it would 
determine if a compelled act is ‘sufficiently testimonial’.181 The second limitation brings us to 
the other part of Fisher’s doctrinal framework: the testimonial aspects of a compelled act 
should not be considered ‘testimonial’ when the ‘existence and location’ of the documents is a 
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‘foregone conclusion.’182 This meant that because the tax authority already knew the existence 
and location of the documents, the taxpayers disclosure on compulsion would not implicitly 
relay an incriminating fact to the government: 
‘It is doubtful that implicitly admitting the existence and possession of the papers rises to the 
level of testimony within the protection of the Fifth Amendment. The papers belong to the 
accountant, were prepared by him, and are the kind usually prepared by an accountant working 
on the tax returns of his client. Surely the Government is in no way relying on the “truthtelling” 
of the taxpayer to prove the existence of or his access to the documents. Wigmore § 2264, p. 
380. The existence and location of the papers are a foregone conclusion and the taxpayer adds 
little or nothing to the sum total of the Government's information by conceding that he in fact 
has the papers. Under these circumstances by enforcement of the summons “no constitutional 
rights are touched. The question is not of testimony but of surrender.” In re Harris, 221 U.S. 
274, 279 (1911).’183 
The exception-to-the-exception formulation as expounded in Fisher – the state could 
compel decryption if the testimonial communication is regarded as a foregone conclusion.184 
The foregone conclusion doctrine is an application of the right against self-incrimination ‘by 
which the Government can show that no testimony is at issue.’185 Specifically, ‘[w]hen the 
‘existence and location’ of the documents under subpoena are a “foregone conclusion” and the 
witness “adds little or nothing to the sum total of the Government's information by conceding 
that he in fact has the [documents],” then no Fifth Amendment right is touched because the 
“question is not of testimony but of surrender”.’186 Therefore, the act of entering a password 
or passcode to decrypt a device may be compelled by the state if the testimonial communication 
implicit in the physical act of doing so is a foregone conclusion.187  
Another often referred case in which the testimonial aspects of compelled acts of 
production was considered and deemed to merit Fifth Amendment protections is United States 
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v Hubbell.188 This case of various tax-related and fraud charges, including the investigation of 
possible violations of federal law, resulted in the compelled production of 13,120 pages of 
documents following a subpoena requesting eleven categories of documents. The court ruled 
that the act of production was testimonial because the ‘breadth of the description’ of the 
requested documents made their ‘collection and production … tantamount to answering a series 
of interrogatories asking a witness to disclose the existence and location of particular 
documents fitting certain broad descriptions.’189 On the foregone conclusion aspect of the 
Fisher test, the court held that the facts in this case ‘plainly [fell] outside of’ the scope of the 
“foregone conclusion” rationale.’190 In Fisher, the government ‘knew that the documents were 
in the attorneys’ possession and could independently confirm their existence and authenticity’ 
whereas in this case, the government failed to demonstrate any ‘prior knowledge of either the 
existence or the whereabouts of the … documents ultimately produced by the respondent.’191 
In view of the testimonial aspects of the defendant’s act of compelled production, with the very 
broad nature of the subpoena, specifically, that the government acknowledged that it could not 
satisfy the ‘reasonable particularity’ standard prescribed, 192  it was held that the Fifth 
Amendment protections applied in this case.193  
After Hubbell and Fisher, determining whether an act of production is testimonial 
appears to depend largely on ‘the government’s knowledge regarding the documents before 
they are produced.’194 The court in Hubbell noted that the government need not ‘have actual 
knowledge of the existence of each and every responsive document.’195 The majority of circuit 
courts have held, however, that the government must establish its knowledge of the three 
aspects of testimonial statements implicit in the act of compelled production, that is,  
(i) existence, (ii) possession, and (iii) authenticity of the requested documents with “reasonable 
particularity.’ 196  The Ninth Circuit has noted [i]t is the government’s knowledge of the 
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existence and possession of the actual documents’ and ‘not the information contained therein, 
that is central to the foregone conclusion inquiry.’197 
Aside from the question of whether the doctrine of the foregone conclusion in Fisher 
is jurisprudentially sound, is it possible for its principles to be applied consistently in compelled 
decryption cases? 198  Yes, potentially so. Although the foregone conclusion exception 
originated in the context of the compelled production of documents in response to a 
government subpoena,  the courts have since extended its application and underlying principles 
to acts of compelled production of passwords to encrypted electronic devices. However, 
ongoing legal debate on the matter is not in agreement with the ‘correct way’ to interpret Fisher 
and its application to compelled decryption and as to how these cases should be decided.199 
Two alternative doctrines have been proposed by (i) Kerr, a password based rule, and (ii) 
Sacharoff, a content based rule. Kerr argues that ‘a simple rule should apply’, that is, the right 
against self-incrimination ‘poses no barrier to compelled decryption as long as the government 
has independent knowledge that the suspect knows the password and the government presents 
the password prompt to decrypt the device to the suspect. When a suspect is presented with a 
password prompt and is ordered to enter the password, the only implied testimony is that the 
suspect knows the password. That testimony will be a foregone conclusion that defeats the 
assertion of the privilege when the government can independently show that the person already 
knows the password.’200 Sacharoff offers a counter argument: ‘The rule should not be, as Kerr 
argues, whether the government can show the suspect knows the password to the device. 
Rather, the rule should be whether the government already knows the person possesses the 
files on the device and can identify them with reasonable particularity. This rule, after all, is 
precisely what the case law requires in an ordinary document production situation.’ 201 
Sacharoff ‘proposes a rule of particularity: when law enforcement agents have a warrant to 
search a locked, encrypted device, they can compel the suspect to enter her password to decrypt 
only those files that agents (1) know she possess, and (2) can describe with reasonable 
particularity.’202 Under this doctrine, the ‘government knows the suspect possess a particular 
document that it can describe with reasonable particularity then the suspect’s act of production 
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adds little to the government’s overall knowledge. That production, therefore, would not count 
as testimonial.’203 
Which of these opposing, alternative, doctrines should apply depends on whether the 
foregone conclusion doctrine applies to the device and knowledge of password when presented 
with a password prompt to decrypt the device (i.e. device only at password prompt), or to the 
contents of the device. This debate has further widened the split among the courts in the United 
States of America on what test to apply to compelled decryption cases. It appears increasingly 
likely that the Supreme Court will address the question. 
In my view, if the court treats the device only at password prompt as the relevant scope 
of inquiry, that is, whether the government can independently establish that the suspect/target 
of the compelled decryption direction knows the password to the device – the standard may 
not be a difficult endeavour for the government to satisfy in many cases, especially with 
personal devices such as a smartphone where this is found on the suspect/target. Recently, the 
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court agreed with Kerr’s password-based rule and adopted 
this standard. In Commonwealth v Jones, 204  the central legal issue concerned whether 
compelling the defendant to enter the password to the smartphone would violate his right 
against self-incrimination. The court held that when the government seeks an order compelling 
a suspect/target to decrypt an electronic device by entering a password, it requires the 
government to prove that the suspect/target knows the password beyond a reasonable doubt for 
the foregone conclusion exception to apply:205 
‘Accordingly, for the foregone conclusion exception to apply, the Commonwealth must 
establish that it already knows the testimony that is implicit in the act of the required production. 
Id. at 522-523. In the context of compelled decryption, the only fact conveyed by compelling a 
defendant to enter the password to an encrypted electronic device is that the defendant knows 
the password, and can therefore access the device. See id. See also Kerr, Compelled Decryption 
and the Privilege Against Self-incrimination, Tex. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2019) (manuscript at 
18) (“the only assertion implied by entering the password is that the person compelled knows 
the password”). The Commonwealth must therefore establish that a defendant knows the 
password to decrypt an electronic device before his or her knowledge of the password can be 
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deemed a foregone conclusion under the Fifth Amendment or art. 12 [art. 12 provides that “[n]o 
subject shall . . . be compelled to accuse, or furnish evidence against himself”].’206 
This means that before a suspect/target can be compelled to decrypt a device by entering 
a password, all that the government must demonstrate is that the suspect/target knows the 
password or passcode. The court’s decision has been described as ‘the death knell for a 
constitutional protection against self-incrimination in the digital age.’ 207 Lenk J writing a 
separate concurring judgment of the court argues so because ‘unlike the court’ he ‘thinks that 
compelled decryption of a cellular telephone or comparable device implicates more than just a 
passcode; what the government seeks is access to the files on the device, which the government 
believes will aid in inculpating the defendant.’208 His application of the foregone conclusion 
extends the scope of inquiry beyond the device only at password prompt:  
‘Given that the foregone conclusion doctrine is a narrow exception to the constitutional 
privilege against self-incrimination, the government may compel a defendant's decryption of 
such a device only when it can show that any testimonial aspect involved in that act of 
production is already known to the government. In other words, the government must 
demonstrate, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the accused knows the passcode to the device and 
that the government already knows, with reasonable particularity, the existence and location of 
relevant, incriminating evidence it expects to find on that device.  Because here the government 
met these requirements, I concur in the result.  I also agree with the court that the appropriate 
standard of proof is beyond a reasonable doubt.’209 
If a court were to treat the content contained on the device as the relevant scope of 
inquiry, the government would have to show that it knows the location, existence and 
authenticity of the purported evidence with reasonable particularity. While the courts do not 
demand that the government identify exactly the documents it requires, it does require some 
specificity in its requests to prevent a ‘quintessential fishing expedition’.210 In In re Grand Jury 
Subpoena (Doe II),211 the Eleventh Circuit rejected the government’s access to files stored on 
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an encrypted hard drive as ‘the Government has failed to show any basis, let alone shown a 
basis with reasonable particularity, for its belief that encrypted files exist on the drives, that 
[the defendant] has access to those files, or that he is capable of decrypting the files.’212 Will it 
be enough for the government to demonstrate location and existence of the files it requires by 
the knowledge that devices such as smartphone are capable of holding such content? Probably 
not. This argument was rejected in Hubbell: ‘[t]he Government cannot cure this [lack of prior 
knowledge] deficiency through the overbroad argument that a businessman such as respondent 
will always possess general business and tax records that fall within the broad categories 
described in this subpoena.’213 Therefore, on the basis of case law from the United States 
Supreme Court ‘the Government [need not] identify exactly the documents it seeks, but it does 
require some specificity in its requests—categorical requests for documents the Government 
anticipates are likely to exist simply will not suffice.’214 
Central to Kerr’s argument on the password-based rule that the only testimony implicit 
in the unlocking of the device by entering the password or passcode is the ‘assertion that the 
person knows that password.’215 While this may be true, Lenk J216 and Sacharoff217 counter 
argue that the act of compulsion by entering a password or passcode implicates more than just 
that fact of knowledge of the password or passcode. The central question in their argument is: 
‘what message does a person implicitly communicate in entering a password to open a 
device?’218 For one, it communicates that the person entering the password or passcode to 
unlock the device likely owns and controls the device and its contents: 
‘The difference in what messages get communicated plays out in determining how the 
government may satisfy the foregone conclusion doctrine. If the only message communicated 
is knowledge of the password, then Kerr is right: the government need only show the person 
knows the password. If, however, the act of opening the device also communicates that the 
person likely owns the device and the files on it, then the government must show that it already 
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knows of and can identify with reasonable particularity the actual files it seeks, or at least a 
class of files such as bank records for a particular account—a higher burden.’ 219  
Whether the inquiry can be limited to the question of whether suspect/target’s 
knowledge of the password itself is sufficient to support an application of the foregone 
conclusion doctrine, Lenk J in his judgment argues that the protections of the right against self-
incrimination ‘demands even more’.220 With reference to the doctrinal principle that although 
the government is not required to name every document it requires or what its contents contain, 
it must demonstrate, with reasonable particularity, the existence and location of some 
incriminating files it expects to find on the device – a departure from this constitutional doctrine 
states Lenk J is ‘imprudent, particularly in light of the vast amount of potentially incriminating 
information at risk.’221 Doing so otherwise will permit a ‘quintessential fishing expedition’222 
by the government ‘by ordering an individual to enter a passcode and to provide the 
government with unlimited, unencrypted access to a personal electronic device is precisely the 
sort of act against which the Fifth Amendment was designed to guard.’223  
 
(ii) Compelled entry of biometric based information 
Among the encryption options available for the user of devices during device setup, particularly 
smartphones and tablets, is the choice of protecting the device with a biometric feature such as 
with a fingerprint or facial recognition. Encryption based on the use of biometrics is 
increasingly common. I have opted for biometric protection on my devices for at least the last 
eight of my devices, and also for many applications installed on my devices, such as Internet 
banking.224 In opting for this type of device setup, or for specific applications, which I regard 
 
219 Ibid.  
220 Commonwealth v Jones supra note 204 at 1-9 at 7, Lenk J concurring judgment.  
221 Supra note 204 at 1-9 at 7-8, Lenk J concurring judgment. See also Sacharoff op cit note 141 at 71: ‘‘[i]n 
almost all cases, at least with personal devices such as a smartphone, a person’s ability to open the phone will be 
very powerful evidence of both facts: that she knows the password and that the device is hers.’ 
222 Hubbell’s case supra note 156 at 42. Further at 37, referred by Lenk J in support, that it was observed that the 
‘right against self-incrimination, in part, was structured to prevent government from “uncover[ing] uncharged 
offenses.”’ 
223 Supra note 204 at 1-9 at 8, Lenk J concurring judgment. See also, In re of United States District Court 
Northern District of California 354 F. Supp. 3d 1010 (N.D. Cal. 2019) at 1017: ‘The foregone conclusion 
doctrine not does not apply when the Government cannot show prior knowledge of the existence or the 
whereabouts of the documents ultimately produced in response to a subpoena. …Consequently, the Government 
inherently lacks the requisite prior knowledge of the information and documents that could be obtained via a 
search of these unknown digital devices, such that it would not be a question of mere surrender.’ 
224 Another common option available for users of Android phones is pattern-based protections that require the 
user to draw a ‘pattern on the screen, rather than enter a passcode. See ‘Set screen lock on an Android device’ 
available at https://support.goo gle.com/android/answer/9079129?hl=en, accessed 8 April 2020. 
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as the quickest and safest way of accessing my devices and the information contained therein, 
I have, of course, given little consideration to the potential implications on my legal rights. As 
it turns out, the legal ramifications of this choice may be significant, in the event that I am 
presented with a compelled decryption direction.225  
‘Unquestionably’ argues Terzian ‘the government can force people to produce 
biometric passwords like fingerprints.’226 A review of existing precedent in a series of cases 
on physical characteristics akin to real evidence appears to suggest, strongly, that decryption 
by use of biometric based information can be compelled with little difficulty. In these cases, as 
referred to earlier, the state has compelled a suspect/target to perform a physical act that 
potentially is inculpatory. The compelled act may incriminate, however, the courts have held 
repeatedly that protections of the right against self-incrimination do not apply. Likewise, the 
argument goes that the fingerprint is a physical feature of the body, and the act of pressing my 
finger onto a devices’ censor ‘does not constitute testimonial evidence’227 or disclose of the 
contents of my mind, or rely on my truthfulness as the fingerprint holder. The Minnesota 
Appeals Court found ‘that producing a fingerprint is more like exhibiting the body than 
producing document’ and so held ‘that providing a fingerprint to unlock a cellphone is not a 
testimonial communication’ under the right against self-incrimination:228 
 
225 See T Cushing ‘State appeals court says unlocking a phone with a fingerprint doesn’t violate the Fifth 
Amendment, TECHDIRT (January  2017) available at https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20170121/085109 
36531/state-appeals-court-says-unlocking-phone-with-fingerprint-doesnt-violate-fifth-amendment.shtml, 
accessed 14 April 2020: ‘you might be better off securing your phone with a passcode than your fingerprint. 
While a fingerprint is definitely unique and (theoretically. . .) a better way to keep thieves and snoopers from 
breaking into your phone, it’s not much help when it comes to your Fifth Amendment protections against self-
incrimination.’ 
226 Terzian op cit note 148 at 169.  
227 Huma’s case supra note 39; Maphumulo’s case supra note 39; Msomi’s case supra note 39.  
An act is not testimonial when the act provides ‘real or physical evidence’ that is ‘used solely to measure ... 
physical properties’ (Dionisio’s case supra note 40 at 7) or to ‘exhibit ... physical characteristics’ (Wade’s case 
supra note 43 at 222). The state can compel a suspect/target to act when the act presents the ‘body as evidence 
when it may be material’ (Schmerber’s case supra note 37 at 763 (quoting Holt’s case supra note 44)). In other 
words, the state may compel a suspect/target to ‘exhibit himself’ and present his ‘features’ so that it would be 
possible ‘compare his features’ with other available evidence of guilt. See also State v Williams 307 Minn. 
191, 239 N.W.2d 222, 225–26 (1976) holding that an order to ‘put on a hat found at the scene of the crime’ 
was not testimonial because the compelled physical act was for ‘the sole purpose of attempting to prove [the 
defendant's] ownership of [an] incriminating article.’ The United States Supreme Court has drawn a distinction 
between the testimonial act of producing documents as evidence and the nontestimonial act of producing the 
body as evidence. The court first held that the compelled exhibition of the body's characteristics was not 
testimonial under the Fifth Amendment in Holt. The court explained that it would be an ‘extravagant extension 
of the 5th Amendment’ to prevent a jury from hearing a witness testify that a prisoner, who was compelled to 
put on clothes, did so and that the clothes fit him. 
228 State v Diamond 905 NW.2d 870 (Minn 2018) at 875. See also Matter of Residence in Oakland, California, 
354 F. Supp. 3d 1010 (N.D. Cal. 2019). 
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‘We reach this conclusion for two reasons. … First, the State compelled Diamond to provide 
his fingerprint only for the physical, identifying characteristics of Diamond's fingerprint, not 
any communicative testimony inherent in providing the fingerprint. The State's use of 
Diamond's fingerprint was therefore like a "test" to gather physical characteristics, akin to a 
blood sample, a voice exemplar, trying on clothing, or standing in a lineup, in an effort to unlock 
the cellphone. … Second, Diamond's act of providing a fingerprint to the police was not 
testimonial because the act did not reveal the contents of Diamond's mind. … Here, Diamond 
merely provided his fingerprint so that the police could use the physical characteristics of the 
fingerprint to unlock the cellphone. The compelled act did not require Diamond to “submit to 
testing in which an effort [was] made to determine his guilt or innocence on the basis of 
physiological responses, whether willed or not.” See Schmerber 384 U.S. at 764, 86 S.Ct. 
1826’229 
The court concluded that ‘[b]ecause the compelled act merely demonstrated Diamond's 
physical characteristics and did not communicate assertions of fact from Diamond's mind, we 
hold that Diamond's act of providing a fingerprint to the police to unlock a cellphone was not 
a testimonial communication protected by the Fifth Amendment.’230 However, it may not be 
as straightforward as it seems and modern technology offers the possibilities of modifying 
biometric based decryption to include some non-biometric, testimonial aspects thereby 
enhancing protections offered by the right against self-incrimination.231 This possibility was 
acknowledged by the court in Diamond’s case: ‘[t]o the extent that providing a fingerprint to 
unlock a cellphone might require a mental process to unlock the phone, the police did not need 
to rely on that mental process here. … Diamond did not need to self-select the finger that 
unlocked the phone. He did not even need to be conscious. Diamond could have provided all 
of his fingerprints to the police by making his hands available to them, and the police could 
have used each finger to try to unlock the cellphone.’232 By the compulsion order, Diamond 
was required to ‘provide a fingerprint or thumbprint as deemed necessary by the Chaska Police 
Department to unlock his seized cell phone.’233  
 
229 Supra note 228 at 875-77. The court also referred to Baust’s case supra note 173 at 4, that providing a 
passcode was testimonial, but providing a fingerprint was not, because ‘[u]nlike the production of physical 
characteristic evidence, such as a fingerprint, the production of a password force[d] the Defendant to disclose 
the contents of his own mind.’  
230 Supra note 228 at 878. 
231 Cohen and Park op cit note 141 at 208-09. 
232 Supra note 228 at 877. 
233 Supra note 228 at 872. 
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What if what was required to unlock the device was not just ‘a fingerprint or 
thumbprint’ and required the use of multiple fingers to be placed in a particular order? Would 
that be considered ‘mentally taxing’ to the mental level of a password or passcode, and 
therefore testimonial? It is also a generally acknowledged feature of certain devices, in 
particular smartphone devices, that there are times when the device will not accept the 
biometric based feature and require the user to type in the password or passcode to unlock the 
device. For example, a password or passcode is generally required when a device has been 
restarted, inactive, or has not been unlocked by the user for a certain period of time, certainly 
as a security feature to ensure that someone without the passcode cannot readily access the 
contents of the device.234 The question that arises: if a user cannot be compelled to provide a 
passcode because it is a testimonial communication, should it be the case that a user cannot be 
compelled to provide one's finger, thumb, iris, face, or other biometric feature to unlock that 
same device as the proposed use of biometric features is also testimonial?235 The United States 
District Court Northern District of California thought so. In re of United States District Court 
Northern District of California, the court took the view that the use of a biometric feature to 
unlock an electronic device ‘is not akin to submitting to fingerprinting or a DNA swab, because 
it differs in two fundamental ways’:236 
‘First, the Government concedes that a finger, thumb, or other biometric feature may be used 
to unlock a device in lieu of a passcode. In this context, biometric features serve the same 
purpose of a passcode, which is to secure the owner's content, pragmatically rendering them 
functionally equivalent. …Second, requiring someone to affix their finger or thumb to a digital 
device is fundamentally different than requiring a suspect to submit to fingerprinting. A finger 
or thumb scan used to unlock a device indicates that the device belongs to a particular 
individual. In other words, the act concedes that the phone was in the possession and control of 
the suspect, and authenticates ownership or access to the phone and all of its digital contents. 
Thus, the act of unlocking a phone with a finger or thumb scan far exceeds the “physical 
evidence” created when a suspect submits to fingerprinting to merely compare his fingerprints 
to existing physical evidence (another fingerprint) found at a crime scene, because there is no 
comparison or witness corroboration required to confirm a positive match. Instead, a successful 
 
234 In re of United States District Court Northern District of California supra note 223 at 1015.  
235 Supra note 223 at 1015. See also Matter of Search of [Redacted] Washington, D.C., 317 F. Supp. 3d 523 
(D.D.C. 2018). 
236 Supra note 223 at 1015. 
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finger or thumb scan confirms ownership or control of the device, and, unlike fingerprints, the 
authentication of its contents cannot be reasonably refuted.’237 
The court referred to a similar situation in In re Application for a Search Warrant where 
it was observed that ‘[w]ith a touch of a finger, a suspect is testifying that he or she has accessed 
the phone before, at a minimum, to set up the fingerprint password capabilities, and that he or 
she currently has some level of control over or relatively significant connection to the phone 
and its contents.’238 The Northern District of California also gave preference to an aspect of 
Brennan J’s opinion of the court in Schmerber’s case where it was noted that the courts have 
usually held that it offers no protection against compulsion to submit to a blood sample, provide 
a palm print, or finger prints, or a voice exemplar, submit to an operation, provide a handwriting 
sample, to stand in a line-up, or to wear a particular set of clothing, walk or make a particular 
gesture.239 The distinction which has emerged in law (as also in South African law), albeit 
expressed in different ways, is that the privilege against self-incrimination protects against 
compelling ‘communications’ or ‘testimony’ but that a suspect/target may be compelled to 
provide ‘real or physical’ evidence since the privilege does not apply to real evidence.240 While 
the distinction provides ‘helpful framework for analysis’ Brennan J noted that ‘[t]here will be 
many cases in which such a distinction is not readily drawn.’241 He referred to testing such as 
lie detector tests ‘measuring changes in body function during interrogation’ and held: ‘[t]o 
compel a person to submit to testing in which an effort will be made to determine his guilt or 
innocence on the basis of physiological responses, whether willed or not, is to evoke the spirit 
and history of the Fifth Amendment. Such situations call to mind the principle that the 
protection of the privilege “is as broad as the mischief against which it seeks to guard”.’242 On 
this analysis, the Northern District of California concluded: ‘a biometric feature is analogous 
to the nonverbal, physiological responses elicited during a polygraph test, which are used to 
determine guilt or innocence, and are considered testimonial.’243 
The proposals suggested by Cohen and Park adds to the analysis that biometric based 
technology potentially blurs the doctrinal principles in precedent and the established distinction 
between testimonial (enter/reveal the passcode) and non-testimonial (biometric based). One 
 
237 Supra note 223 at 1015-16. 
238 236 F.Supp.3d 1066, 1073 (N.D. Ill. 2017). 
239 Supra note 37 at 764. 
240 Supra note 37 at 764. 
241 Supra note 37 at 764. 
242 Supra note 37 at 764-5, with reference to Counselman v Hitchcock 142 U.S. 547, 562. 
243 Supra note 223 at 1016. 
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such proposal involves the user choosing a ‘secret finger’ or multiple fingers, to be placed in a 
particular sequence on the sensor, to enable decryption of the decryption.244 Is it the case that 
‘knowledge of which finger or fingers to use’ is indistinguishable from ‘the contents of the 
user’s mind, even though the fingerprint itself would still be purely physical evidence’?245  The 
courts are not in agreement as to whether compelled entry of biometric based information 
should follow the distinction which has emerged in law that compulsion which makes a 
suspect/target the source of real evidence, in this instance biometric information, should be 
regarded as an act that is not testimonial that does not violate the privilege against self-
incrimination. 246  These are interesting developments to follow and could pose yet more 
complex challenges for the law if biometric based information is coupled with technology that, 
for example, erases all data on the device or directs the decryption to ‘decoy’ content.247 The 
main issue for South African law and facing the courts is that technology is outpacing the law 
as there will be many cases where the rudimentary distinction testimonial and non-testimonial 
will be challenged by technology. A recognition of this reality of the information age will 
require an adaption of existing doctrinal principles in the context of the right against self-
incrimination.248  
 
IV DEVELOPING A SOUTH AFRICA APPROACH 
With careful consideration of both technology and precedent, the modern realities of the 
information age will require a rethinking of the doctrinal principles of the right against self-
incrimination to adequately safeguard individual rights having regard to the role of passwords 
or passcodes in protecting our electronic information, balanced against the use of encryption 
as an obstacle to legitimate needs of law enforcement and the state and security agencies. 
Whether this can be applied with some level of consistency by the South African courts remains 
to be seen. Some key lessons can be drawn from the above analysis. That the doctrine of 
 
244 Ibid at 209. The other proposals considered include location-based decryption, situation-dependent 
decryption and voice command recognition.  
245 Ibid.  
246 The court in Diamond acknowledged In re Application for a Search Warrant 236 F.Supp.3d 1066, 1073–74 
(N.D. Ill. 2017) where it was held that the right against self-incrimination barred the compelled production of a 
fingerprint to unlock a phone because the act produced the contents of the phone. The court responded at 877: 
‘[e]ven if providing a fingerprint did reveal the contents of the mind, because the act of providing evidence of 
physical characteristics has no testimonial significance … Diamond's act would still be nontestimonial.’  
247 Ibid, as noted similar modifications could be applied to passcode based encryption.  
248 The United States Supreme Court has recently instructed courts to adopt rules that ‘take account of more 
sophisticated systems that are already in use or in development.’ See Carpenter supra note 135 at 2218-
19 quoting Kyllo v United States 533 US 27, 36, 121 S.Ct. 2038, 150 L.Ed.2d 94 (2001). 
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compelled decryption must take cognisance of the manner of the compelled act sought by the 
state in addition, of course, to the facts of the particular case. This chapter referred to two 
scenarios in particular, namely, (i) compelled disclosure of a user’s passcode (reveal/enter the 
passcode); and (ii) compelled entry of  a biometric based information (by placing a finger on a 
device or by facial recognition). 
In traditional cases, the jurisprudence of the South African courts has been rather 
rudimentary on the distinction between self-incriminating testimonial communications and 
incriminating non-testimonial real evidence. This means that when a physical item or feature, 
akin to real evidence, is the object of the compelled decryption direction, the almost seemingly 
natural outcome is to compel decryption.249 The most obvious illustration is the potential lower  
protection afforded to the right against self-incrimination available for biometric based 
encryption such as fingerprints. The opposite applies in cases involving compelled disclosure 
of a passcode or compelled production of encrypted data. When the state seeks compelled 
decryption to access a decrypted device, or computer of file, that is already in its possession, 
the manner in which the suspect/target of a decryption direction is required to furnish that 
information becomes significant. Much of the complexity, as illustrated by international case 
law, relates to the nature of ‘testimonial’ introduced by variations in modern technology.  
I believe that the courts in South Africa should be reluctant to interpret the right against 
self-incrimination to be more demanding in the context of compelled disclosure of a password 
or passcode. The impact of new technology means that bypassing encryption is a challenge for 
law enforcement and the security and intelligence agencies, and not simply an opportunity to 
access personal and private information in the context of compelled entering of a password or 
passcode.250 Essentially, they are seeking, through a compelled decryption direction, access to 
an encrypted device or information to enable a search pursuant to a warrant. They are not 
seeking compelled decryption because they want testimony, they are seeking compelled 
decryption because there is no other way to execute what would have been a routine search 
two decades ago. This is a consequence of the information age, not the evidence they want to 
access. 251  The information age has now inserted ‘powerful password gates.’ 252  The 
technological shift in the widespread use of encryption in the information era, means rather 
than technology expanding the state’s power in ways that call for new rules to avoid an 
 
249 Matemba’s case supra note 38. 
250 See Kerr op cit note 3 at 794-5. 




Orwellian Big Brother or Bentham’s panopticon, encryption now limits the powers of the state 
to execute otherwise lawful searches.253 I do not believe that this requires higher standards of 
application for the right against self-incrimination. In terms of RICA 2002, the state can already 
compel the suspect/target of an encryption direction to (a) disclose the decryption key; or (b) 
provide decryption assistance.254 This is a considerable investigative power of the state to 
access encrypted devices and information. It is often likely that law enforcement and the 
security and intelligence agencies will know the decryption holder who knows or can provide 
the passcode, and they can obtain a decryption direction compelling them to do so.255 In terms 
of RICA 2002, a decryption holder, or employee of a decryption holder who fails to comply 
with a decryption direction is guilty of an offence and subject to penalties, including fines 
and/or imprisonment.256 The decryption holder may decide to enter the password or passcode, 
and potentially incriminate themselves. This may not work in every investigation. The 
decryption holder may refuse to do so, or mislead by entering the incorrect password (they will 
likely have knowledge that a certain number of incorrect tries may lock the device forever), 
and would rather accept the offence and penalties than comply with a decryption direction. 
Some may claim to be forgetful, cannot be traced or dead. While most compelled decryption 
cases to date have involved illicit images, possession or distribution thereof, the widespread 
use of encryption also means a range of challenges for the state including data synced to 
encrypted cloud storage and computing, including encrypted communications and other more 
novel applications such as digital currencies and blockchain platforms. 257  The suggested 
doctrinal approach to the right against self-incrimination in compelled decryption cases, in light 
of the impact of widespread use of encryption in the information age, arguably should not leave 
 
253 Ibid at 796. However, see P Swire & K Ahmad ‘Encryption and globalization’ 13 (2012) Columbia. Science 
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law enforcement and the security and intelligence agencies helpless in being able to access 
decrypted devices or information.258 
The counter argument is that state access to our electronic information can be very 
invasive. The impact of new technologies means that law enforcement and security agencies 
can have access to more information than previously possible, most of which will be irrelevant 
to any investigation. The United States Supreme Court in Riley v California259 referred earlier 
in the thesis, recognised that a device, such as a smartphone ‘contains in digital form many 
sensitive records’ and ‘also contains a broad array of private information’260 all in one’s pocket 
or bag. Roberts CJ observed that the data stored on a smartphone is distinguishable from other 
physical objects that may be found on a person ‘in both a quantitative and qualitative sense.’261  
Does this mean that the protection afforded to the right against self-incrimination 
should be of a higher standard as a response to the reality of the impact of new technologies in 
the information age?262 No, the preferable approach is that the ‘basic principles of human 
rights’ and notions of basic fairness and justice must be applied to the facts of a case. This 
necessarily involves considerations of public interest in determining whether the trial is 
rendered unfair, especially in cases involving serious infringement of constitutionally 
guaranteed rights’, balanced against public interest that crime should be detected and the 
perpetrators punished. The primary concern should be the right to privacy which should be  
vigorously invoked. This potentially allows for more scope to justify the infringement of the 
privilege against self-incrimination or interpret the content of the right more narrowly. 
As argued in earlier chapters, there should be restrictions on the ability of the state to 
access our electronic information. These robust protections should come into play in the 
context of search warrants that restrict searches of encrypted devices seized by law 
enforcement and the state and security agencies, with a key goal the protection of ‘a principle 
against government fishing expeditions in which agents conduct vast, exploratory searches for 
unsuspected, new crimes against suspects or even non-suspects.’263 The Supreme Court in 
Riley is an example of the judiciary’s willingness to have new doctrinal principles apply to 
search of electronic devices, such that in the absence of ‘more precise guidance from the 
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founding era’ the court indicated that it was willing to perform a balancing test for cases 
involving information found on electronic devices and limit the scope of execution warrants 
on such devices.264 I believe this will be an important direction for developing a rule for the 
protection of passwords and passcodes. 
The testimonial aspects of entering a passcode to decrypt a device or information should 
be seen as separate and distinct from the evidence that the decrypted device or folder may 
reveal. 265 The response to higher protections needed for electronic information should be 
placed elsewhere, not in the form of the right against self-incrimination acting as an absolute 
barrier to state access.266 For example, there must be safeguards in South African legislation 
on storing, accessing, examining, using and destroying electronic information after it has been 
obtained by the state, such that it provides adequate safeguards against abuse of treatment of 
personal data and thus serve to protect individuals’ personal integrity and highly sensitive 
information integral to the right to privacy. The current framework in RICA 2002 is lacking in 
this regard. This is an opportune moment, in view of the constitutional challenges on RICA 
2002, to rectify the lack of safeguards and ensure that when a suspect/target has been compelled 
to decrypt a device that law enforcement and the state and security agencies cannot search 
anywhere, every file, folder, applications, deleted files and communications data. I find 
Sacharoff’s proposed rule of particularity agreeable in this context: 
‘It will assure a suspect that law enforcement limits its search to documents relevant to the 
crime by limiting it to those documents. The suspect will not have to worry that law 
enforcement will, having gained access to the device, scour its entirety looking at unrelated 
photos and videos, even if only out of curiosity. Instead, the suspect will know precisely which 
files the government has access to. It will similarly provide the suspect with an accounting of 
the files accessed. This will both give the suspect control and help make the people “secure in 
their … papers.”’267 
While decryption is often regarded as a right against self-incrimination question, the 
balancing of interests within a search and seizure framework cannot be ignored. It avoids an 
all-or-nothing approach in terms of which the compelled entering of  a password infringes the 
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right against self-incrimination as this would impose too high a burden on the state. 268 
Practically, a suspect/target either decrypts the entire device (all-) or none of it (-or-nothing). 
However, Sacharoff’s proposed rule of particularity avoids the all-or-nothing approach, giving 
law enforcement and the state and security agencies access to electronic information it can 
identify with reasonable particularity.269 In this regard, legal authorisation for access to such 
information should impose strong protections on obtaining a search warrant with limits on the 
resulting searches, having regard to the unprecedent ability of the state to greater access to 
more and more of our information that did not exist two decades ago. It must guard against 
unreasonable searches and general warrants. Moreover, the doctrinal approach suggested will 
act as a limit to  ‘fishing expeditions’ by law enforcement and the state and security agencies, 
and prevents them from exploratory searches of ‘vast repositories’ of personal information 
contained in devices, without limits.270 Privacy advocates may not agree, but I believe that it 
should provide some assurance that law enforcement and the state and security agencies will 
not sift through the entirety of our personal devices after being compelled to acts of decryption. 
Therefore, this approach that enables law enforcement and the security and intelligence 
agencies to only access electronic information it can identify with reasonable particularity, also 
means that compelled decryption of a suspect/target’s biometric based information cannot be 
viewed in isolation in terms of searches. The South African courts must be willing to rethink 
familiar and well-established constitutional doctrines in view of technological advancements. 
As it transpires, our Constitution has included the exclusionary rule, in s 35(5), but it 
does not apply to all evidence improperly obtained, only to evidence obtained in a manner that 
violates any right in the Bill of Rights. The court must exercise its discretion and this is 
precisely the approach which has been adopted in the Constitution in s 35(5) in relation to 
criminal trials: evidence obtained by the state as a result of a deliberate and conscious violation 
of constitutional rights of an accused person should be excluded ‘save where there are 
“extraordinary excusing circumstances”.’271 Although the courts are more likely to admit real 
evidence obtained as a result of a violation, due to its existence independently and irrespective 
of the violation, in each case the court will engage in a balancing exercise in terms of s 35(5) 
to determine whether the exclusion would render the trial unfair or be detrimental to the 
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interests of justice. 272 The arguments would appear to indicate that the ascertainment of bodily 
features will seldom infringe the right against self-incrimination. However, this does not 
exclude the possibility that in certain circumstances they might unjustifiably infringe the right 
to privacy or some other constitutional right. Further, when real evidence is obtained as a result 
of self-incriminating testimonial communications, justification for the admission of derivative 
evidence becomes tempered, and the evidence may be excluded as to admit it may render the 
trial unfair or  otherwise be detrimental to the administration of justice.273 
In developing a South African approach an important distinguishing feature of the legal 
regime between the United States of America and South Africa, is that the former has a 
relatively inflexible judicially created exclusionary rule together with a very narrow limitations 
jurisprudence. In the United States, subject only to certain exceptions, evidence obtained in 
violation of the Constitution is excluded.274 Unlike South Africa (and Canada), the United 
States does not have an explicit constitutional device for limiting rights. Section 36 of the South 
African Constitution which allows for the justifiable limitation of rights,  effectively means 
that the South African courts can afford a more generous approach to the contents of a right. 
Cases involving the compelled disclosure of a user’s passcode (reveal/enter) may well be 
considered by our courts to be testimonial and therefore an infringement of the right against 
self-incrimination. However, provided the ‘compulsion’ is authorised by a law of general 
application then the validity of that law, must be adjudged in accordance with the provisions 
of the limitation clause.275 If the limitation is justifiable, evidence acquired as a result of such 
a breach will not fall to be excluded in terms of the right (to privacy and, in particular, the 
privacy of communications) can be limited by a law of general application as enunciated in s 
36, which must be applied before the constitutional exclusionary rule in s 35(5).276 
Although the provisions of RICA 2002 in relation to compelled decryption are not 
necessarily unconstitutional, the solution perhaps to the issue of compelled decryption and the 
impact of new technologies in particular the scenarios referred, is to be found in new legislation 
that meets the requirements of the limitations clause. This means that if the infringement of 
 
272 Pillay’s case supra note 115. 
273 Tandwa’s case supra note 84.  
274 As expressed in cases such as Mapp v Ohio (1961) 367 US 643 and Miranda v Arizona 384 US 436. 
275 See earlier at 136, 138.. 
276 For a useful account of these cases see Naidoo’s case supra note 86 at 491-98 for the general approach 
adopted in South Africa prior to 1994, that if the evidence was obtained in breach of a constitutional right, it 
should be excluded unless the breach was justified in terms of s 33(1) of the interim Constitution.’ 
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rights is justified in terms of the limitation clause, then s 35(5) insofar as it relates to 
unconstitutionally obtained evidence does not apply.  
 
V CONCLUSION 
Encryption in 2020 is everywhere. It is almost routine for ordinary users to use encryption to 
protect the contents of communications, computers, tablets, and especially smartphone devices. 
If the password or passcode is strong, the encrypted data or device is ‘all but unbreakable’.277 
Compelling decryption is one option available to law enforcement and the security and 
intelligence agencies. As demonstrated in the above analysis, a nuanced understanding of the 
interaction between modern technology and legal doctrine will be integral in the development 
of doctrinal principles and robust approaches of the courts in compelled decryption cases. Such 
an approach asks the courts to look beyond precedent, and the rather rudimentary distinction 
between self-incriminating testimonial communications and incriminating non-testimonial real 
evidence, to the implications of such doctrinal approach in a technologically advanced context: 
what is the appropriate standard for how the right against self-incrimination should apply in 
cases of compelled decryption where encryption is commonplace? There is little consensus as 
regards the correct approach. Encryption presents an increasing obstacle to the legitimate needs 
of law enforcement and the approach suggested represents a balance of interests. The South 
Africa courts should interpret the right against self-incrimination in compelled decryption cases 
such that modern technology does not dramatically shift the balance of power against the public 
interest in preventing and detecting criminal activity. The limitations clause in this regard will 
certainly be in the reckoning, such that an infringement may be justified in terms of s 36 of the 
Constitution, if it is reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society, having regard 
to the factors specified therein. I do not expect that mine will be the final word on the issues 
identified and the suggested doctrinal approach for South African courts, but rather only a first 
step in stimulating much needed debate on compelled decryption cases in South African law. 
The final chapter of the thesis, chapter five, is a consideration of issues in relation to 
admissibility of electronic evidence in criminal proceedings. 
 
277 Riley’s case supra note 259 at 12-13. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
RETHINKING ADMISSIBILITY AND EVIDENTIAL WEIGHT OF ELECTRONIC 
EVIDENCE IN THE INFORMATION ERA 
 
I INTRODUCTION 
The introduction of electronic evidence in criminal legal proceedings raises unique challenges 
in the South African law on evidence. This chapter identifies two separate issues in this regard: 
(i) admissibility of electronic evidence and (ii) its weight. In doing so, analysis of relevant 
provisions of the Electronic Communications and Transactions Act 25 of 20021 are considered. 
Part II focuses on the provisions in the ECT Act 2002 dealing with the admissibility and 
evidential weight of electronic evidence. Part III considers electronic evidence in the context 
of the rules applicable to documentary, hearsay and real evidence. Part IV reconsiders the 
evidential weight of electronic evidence and new rules on and the business records exception, 
including authenticity and integrity. Part V completes the chapter with concluding remarks on 
rethinking admissibility and evidential weight of electronic evidence in the information era.  
 
II ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS AND TRANSACTIONS ACT 25 OF 2002 
Chapter III of the ECT Act 2002 explicitly deals with the law of evidence, specifically s 15 
under the heading ‘admissibility and evidential weight of data messages’ In terms of its sphere 
of application s 4 of the ECT Act 2002 states: ‘this Act applies in respect of any electronic 
transaction or data message.’ As the ECT Act 2002 is largely based on an electronic commerce 
model law that only applies to commercial activities,2 are there any concerns for the scope and 
application of the ECT Act 2002 in criminal proceedings? Arguably, on a strict interpretation 
of the Model Law on Electronic Commerce3 on which the ECT Act 2002 is based, the MLEC 
only applies to commercial matters, and as such chapter III should not extend to matters outside 
the commercial sphere, that is, non-commercial civil or criminal matters. However, to restrict 
the scope and application of chapter III to only commercial matters would be particularly 
problematic in the law of evidence, and contrary to the purposes of the ECT Act 2002 as an 
 
1 Hereafter ‘ECT Act 2002’. 
2 See UNCITRAL MLEC article 1: ‘This Law applies to any kind of information in the form of a data message 
used in the context of commercial activities”.  
3 UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Commerce (1996) available at http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/ 
uncitral_texts/electronic_commerce/1996Model.html, accessed 1 August 2019 (hereafter MLEC). 
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enabling Act which partly states in its long title: ‘to provide for the facilitation and regulation 
of electronic communications and transactions.’ The MLEC is not restrictive in this regard and 
does not prevent an enacting State from extending the scope of the MLEC to cover the use of 
electronic commerce outside the commercial sphere.4 Footnote *** in article 1 of the MLEC 
provides options for enacting States that would consider it appropriate to extend the scope of 
the Model Law beyond the commercial sphere. 5  Although the ECT Act 2002, does not 
expressly state for the application of chapter III to matters outside the commercial sphere, to 
interpret otherwise would ‘leave a serious lacunae in South African law and, in particular, in 
the South African law of evidence.’6 Nonetheless, the currently fragmented legal framework 
to admissibility of electronic evidence in criminal proceedings, based on an electronic 
commerce model law and commercial activities, has created challenges in South African law.  
The term ‘electronic evidence’ is not referred to in any law governing the admissibility 
of evidence. As with the MLEC, the ECT Act 2002, refers to the output of information by/in 
an electronic medium as ‘data message’ or ‘electronic transaction’. To the extent appropriate 
these terms will be used interchangeably with the preferred term ‘electronic evidence’. Section 
1 of the ECT Act 2002 sets out definitions of inter alia ‘data message’, ‘automated transaction’ 
as an electronic transaction and other relevant key terms: 
‘“data” means electronic representations of information in any form; 
“data message” means data generated, sent, received or stored by electronic means 
and includes – (a) voice, where the voice is used in an automated transaction; and 
(b) a stored record;’ 
“automated transaction” means an electronic transaction conducted or performed, 
in whole or in part, by means of data messages in which the conduct or data messages of one 
or both parties are not reviewed by a natural person in the ordinary course of such natural 
person’s business or employment.’  
Since coming into law almost two decades ago, the scope and significance of electronic 
evidence in criminal proceedings is broader than initially envisaged in the ECT Act 2002. 
Having regard to the types of devices now in frequent use, the medium of electronic evidence 
 
4 See United Nations Commission on International Trade Law Model Law on Electronic Commerce with Guide 
to Enactment (1996) with additional art 5bis adopted by resolution of General Assembly 51/162 of 6 December 
1996 at 31 available at https://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/electcom /05-89450_Ebook.pdf, accessed 3 
March 2020 (hereafter ‘MLEC Guide to Enactment’). 
5 Ibid at 3.  
6 J Hofman ‘South Africa’ in S Mason (ed) Electronic Evidence: Disclosure, Discovery and Admissibility 
(2007) 459 at 462. 
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has now far surpassed computers.7 The information age necessitates the expansion of the scope 
of electronic evidence to recognise the realities of a modern fast-paced environment of 
technological advancements.8 There are specific offences where evidence will typically be 
available exclusively in electronic form, which is particularly transient in nature. For example, 
this is the case for cyber-related crimes.9 The modern categorisation of electronic evidence 
often distinguishes between two types of electronic evidence. The first emphasises the 
relationship between electronic evidence and telecommunication service providers. 10  The 
second type relates to traditional evidence electronically stored, processed and transmitted that 
is specific to the case in question.11 This second type of electronic evidence is recognised in 
the ECT Act 2002 by the definition of ‘data message’ above, where the storage of data is a 
defining component. A definition of electronic evidence needs to be broad enough to recognise 
network activities that are also necessary as evidence in criminal investigations or criminal 
proceedings: ‘[d]ata held by providers of internet infrastructure services, such as domain name 
registrars and registries and privacy and proxy service providers, or regional internet registries 
for internet protocol addresses, may be of relevance for criminal proceedings as they can 
provide traces allowing for identification of an individual or entity involved in criminal 
activity.’12 RICA 2002 does this to an extent in the context of investigatory powers, but within 
 
7 See E Casey Digital Evidence and Computer Crime: Forensic Science, Computers and the Internet 2ed (2004) 
at 12 defined electronic evidence as ‘any data stored or transmitted using a computer that support or refute a 
theory of how an offence occurred or that address critical elements of the offence such as intent or alibi.’ 
8 H Wu & G Zheng ‘Electronic evidence in the blockchain era: New rules on authenticity and integrity’ 36 
(2020) 105401 Computer Law & Security Review 1. 
9 See AA Gillespie Cybercrime: Key Issues and Debates 2ed (2019). 
10 See Wu & Zheng op cit note 8 at 3 referring to the example in Chinese law, in 2015, in which the Supreme 
People’s Court defined electronic evidence in article 116 of the Interpretation of the Supreme People’s Court on 
the Application of the Civil Procedure Law ‘[e]lectronic data shall include e-mails, electronic data inter-change, 
online chatting records, blog, micro-blog, SMS, electronic signatures, domains and other information formed or 
stored in electronic media.’ 
11 Wu & Zheng op cit note 8 at 3 also provide an example of this type of electronic evidence as decreed by the 
Supreme People’s Court: ‘[e]lectronic data are data that are formed in the process of occurrence of a case, 
stored, processed, and transmitted in digital form, and can prove the case facts. Electronic data include but are 
not limited to the following information and electronic documents: (1) [i]nformation published through such 
network platforms as webpages, blogs, microblogs, moments, post bars, and network disks. (2) 
[c]ommunication information in such network application services as SMS, email, instant messaging, and 
communication groups. (3) [i]nformation including user registration information, identity authentication 
information, electronic trading records, communication records, and logon logs. (4) [e]lectronic documents 
including documents, pictures, audio and video records, digital certificates, and computer programmes. The 
testimony of witnesses, victim statements, and confessions and arguments of criminal suspects or defendants 
recorded in digital forms and other evidence are not electronic data. Where it is really necessary, these 
provisions may apply, mutatis mutandis, to the collection, taking, transfer, and examination of the relevant 
evidence.’ 
12 European Commission Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on European 
Production and Preservation Orders for electronic evidence in criminal matters Strasbourg, 17.4.2018 COM 
(2018) 225 final at 14 available at https://eclan.eu/files/attachments/.2504/L_Proposal _Regulation_e_evidence 
_2018.pdf, accessed 20 April 2020. 
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the definition of ‘data message’ as electronic evidence in the ECT Act 2002. Arguably, 
advancements in technology in the information age demands more, and for the recognition of 
electronic evidence beyond ‘voice’ and a ‘stored record’ in the definition of ‘data message’ in 
the Act. 
In relation to the first type of electronic evidence referred to above, the European 
Commission in recently proposed regulations for electronic evidence in criminal matters, 
defines ‘electronic evidence’ in article 2 as ‘evidence stored in electronic form by or on behalf 
of a service provider at the time of receipt of a production or preservation order certificate, 
consisting in stored subscriber data, access data, transactional data and content data.’ 13 
Although the term ‘evidence’ is not defined as such, the definition refers to four types of data 
which might constitute of evidence: subscriber data, access data, transactional data (these three 
categories commonly referred to jointly as ‘non-content data’)14 and stored content data.15 
‘Content data’ means ‘any stored data in a digital format such as text, voice, videos, images.’16  
When assessing the relevance and admissibility of evidence, the provision of a broader 
definition of electronic evidence allows some flexibility to the courts as to how to take them 
into account especially with regard to authenticity and integrity. In this chapter, I addresses the 
specific problem created by the volatile nature of electronic evidence. Admissibility and 
evidential weight of electronic evidence is addressed  in s 15 of the ECT Act 2002: 
‘(1) In any legal proceedings, the rules of evidence must not be applied so as to deny the 
admissibility of a data message, in evidence- 
(a) on the mere grounds that it is constituted by a data message; or 
(b) if it is the best evidence that the person adducing it could reasonably be expected to obtain, 
on the grounds that it is not in its original form. 
 
13 Ibid at 39.  
14 Ibid at 39 where the following definitions are provided: ‘subscriber data’ means ‘any data pertaining to the 
identity of a subscriber or customer such as the provided name, date of birth, postal or geographic address, 
billing and payment data, telephone, or email’ including inter alia the type of service and its duration; ‘access 
data’ means ‘data related to the commencement and termination of a user access session to a service, which is 
strictly necessary for the sole purpose of identifying the user of the service, such as the date and time of use, or 
the log-in to and log-off from the service, together with the IP address allocated by the internet access service 
provider to the user of a service, data identifying the interface used and the user ID’ and  ‘transactional data’ 
means ‘data related to the provision of a service offered by a service provider that serves to provide context or 
additional information about such service and is generated or processed by an information system of the service 
provider, such as the source and destination of a message or another type of interaction, data on the location of 
the device, date, time, duration, size, route, format, the protocol used and the type of compression, unless such 
data constitutes access data.’ 
15 Ibid at 14. 
16 Ibid at 39. 
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(2) Information in the form of a data message must be given due evidential weight. 
(3) In assessing the evidential weight of a data message, regard must be had to-  
(a) the reliability of the manner in which the data message was generated, stored or 
communicated;  
(b) the reliability of the manner in which the integrity of the data message was maintained;  
(c) the manner in which its originator was identified; and any other relevant factor. 
(4) A data message made by a person in the ordinary course of business, or a copy or printout 
of or an extract from such data message certified to be correct by an officer in the service of 
such person, is on its mere production in any civil, criminal, administrative or disciplinary 
proceedings under any law, the rules of a self regulatory organisation or any other law or the 
common law, admissible in evidence against any person and rebuttable proof of facts contained 
in such record, copy, printout or extract.’ 
The corresponding equivalent of s 15 of the ECT Act 2002 in the MLEC is article 9. 
The MLEC Guide to Enactment states that its purpose ‘is to establish both the admissibility of 
data messages as evidence in legal proceedings and their evidential value.’17 On admissibility, 
article 9 establishes that data messages ‘should not be denied admissibility as evidence in legal 
proceedings on the sole ground that they are in electronic form.’ 18  With regard to the 
assessment of the evidential weight of a data message, the MLEC Guide to Enactment provides 
useful guidance as to how the evidential value of data messages should be assessed, for 
example, depending on whether they were ‘generated, stored or communicated’ in a reliable 
manner.19  
The admissibility of electronic evidence in criminal proceedings, situated in a law based 
on an electronic commerce model law and commercial activities raises interesting questions in 
the law of evidence, particularly, its interaction with other statutory provisions on admissibility 
of evidence. The meaning and application of s 15, insofar as it applies to electronic evidence 
as hearsay or real evidence, or both, is a key and controversial issue. Does s 15 prescribe a rule 
of admissibility for all electronic evidence, irrespective of hearsay representations contained 
therein? In other words, is electronic evidence exempt from the evidential rules on hearsay by 
virtue of s 15? Or does s 15 prevent hearsay representations in electronic evidence from being 
treated like real evidence, the latter  which needs only to be relevant to be admissible? Or is it 
 
17 MLEC Guide to Enactment op cit note 4 at 44. 
18 Ibid para 70. 
19 Ibid para 71. 
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the case for real evidence that in order for electronic evidence to be admissible, authenticity is 
a pre-requisite for admissibility? Electronic evidence must according to s 15(2) be given ‘due 
evidential weight’. Electronic evidence has very different characteristics to ordinary 
documentary or material evidence. Such evidence can be easily subject to errors in code or 
software and hardware functionality, alteration, deletion and modification. Yet authentication 
and integrity of electronic evidence is often based on the application of rules as they relate to 
documentary evidence. For example, documents that fall within exceptions to the exclusionary 
rule against hearsay, such as the business records exception, directly translated for electronic 
records in my view has now created a problematic presumption in the context of electronic 
evidence of business records. An examination of authenticity and integrity of electronic 
evidence should require a consideration by the courts through the whole process of electronic 
evidence from the time of its creation to the time of being admitted into evidence.20  
 
III ADMISSIBILITY OF ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE  
(a) Does s 15 make all electronic evidence exempt from the evidential rules regulating 
hearsay? 
In terms of s 3(4)  of the Law of Evidence Amendment Act 45 of 198821 hearsay evidence is 
defined as ‘evidence, whether oral or in writing, the probative value of which depends upon 
the credibility of any person other the person giving such evidence.’ Section 3(1) provides that 
hearsay evidence is inadmissible and will only be admitted if one of the following three 
conditions is met: (i) consent is given by the party against whom it is sought to be admitted; 
(ii) the person on whose credibility the probative value of the evidence depends will testify 
later and (iii) admission would be in the interests of justice. 
For the purposes of the discussion on electronic evidence, I believe that there is little to 
be gained by examining the history of the formulation of the evidentiary rule excluding 
hearsay, including all the exceptions. Suffice to add that the primary reason for excluding 
hearsay was its ‘general unreliability – the fact that it rested for its evidential value on the 
untested memory, perception, sincerity and narrative capacity of a declarant or actor who was 
not subjected to the oath, cross-examination or any of the other procedural devices to which 
our adversary system of trial procedure subjects a witness giving original evidence.’22 The 
 
20 Wu & Zheng op cit note 8 at 5. 
21 Hereafter ‘LEA Act 1988’. 
22 DT Zeffertt  & DT Paizes The South African Law of Evidence 2ed (2003) at 400 (emphasis in original text).  
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traditional approach was to exclude evidence in the absence of a recognised exception ‘not 
because a court could not be assured of its reliability, but that its reliability was effectively 
unknowable due to the absence of an ability to cross-examine.’23 If objections to exclusionary 
rule were overcome, then the rationale for the exclusion no longer applied.24  
The application of the principles of the exclusionary rule on hearsay to electronic 
evidence is complex and, as will be seen from the analysis below, raises ‘unique issues that 
will often make electronic evidence stand apart from other forms of evidence.’25 There is no 
reference to ‘data message’ or ‘electronic’ evidence in s 3(4). What does this mean for s 15, 
specifically for the application that ‘the rules of evidence must not be applied so as to deny the 
admissibility of a data message’? Is a data message hearsay within the meaning of the LEA 
Act 1988? If yes, does s 15 override the normal rules applying to hearsay evidence to make 
data message exempt from the exclusionary rule on hearsay? Or is a data message subject to 
the exclusion within the meaning of s 3 of the LEA Act 1988? 
One interpretation of s 15, a generous and wide interpretation, would allow 
admissibility for all electronic evidence, irrespective of hearsay representations contained 
therein, and a court’s discretion would merely relate to an assessment of evidential weight 
based on the factors enumerated in s 15(3).26 An alternative interpretation is that s 15 allows 
for admissibility of electronic evidence, subject to the ordinary rules of evidence including 
those applicable to hearsay. The approach of the South African courts has been to favour the 
latter. I am in favour of the former inclusionary approach. If fact-based issues of authenticity 
and integrity can be ‘substantively satisfied’ then hearsay as an exclusionary rule of evidence 
should no longer be warranted for electronic evidence based on the scope of inquiry in  
s 15(1) to (3).27 Schwikkard and Van der Merwe, in an earlier edition, noted: ‘[t]he definition 
of ‘data message’ is sufficiently broad to include hearsay evidence and accordingly the section 
subjugates the hearsay rule in so far as the admissibility of computer printouts are concerned 
The courts appear to have no discretion in respect of the admissibility of a data message but 
rather they are required to exercise their discretion when they assess the weight to be attached 
 
23 C Gallavin & D Seng ‘Hearsay’ in S Mason & D Seng (eds) Electronic Evidence 4ed (2017) 70 at 73. In S v 
Molimi 2008 (3) SA 608 (CC) para 65, the Constitutional Court stated that ‘[t]he rationale of excluding hearsay 
as inadmissible is a recognition of the unreliability and unfairness emanating from such evidence.  Its 
unreliability and susceptibility is said to be based on the so-called “hearsay damages” of insincerity and 
defective memory, perceptive powers and narrative capacity.’ 
24 Zeffertt & DT Paizes op cit note 22 at 400. 
25 Gallavin & Seng op cit note 23 at 71. 
26 See S v Ndiki and Others 2008 (2) SACR 252 (Ck). 
27 See Gallavin & Seng op cit note 23 at 71. 
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to the evidence.’28 However, in a subsequent edition they discarded this interpretation and 
noted: ‘[t]he exact meaning of this provision requires close consideration of the established 
principle that the law excludes documents as hearsay because of doubts about the reliability of 
their content. Therefore, should s 15(1) be given too wide an interpretation by making all data 
messages admissible then it would undermine the established law which governs manuscript 
documents.’29 
I am not unopposed to the approach of the South African courts, after all, emerging 
case law at the time in its ‘inclusionary as opposed to exclusionary’30 approach to the ECT Act 
2002 sought to rectify the exclusion electronic evidence in the form of computer printouts on 
the reasoning that the disputed documents contained information ‘obtained after treatment by 
arrangement, sorting, synthesis and calculation by the computer.’31 Indeed, as the court in  
S v Brown32 noted: ‘[c]learly, the overall scheme of the ECTA is to facilitate the admissibility 
of data messaging as electronic evidence.’ In 2020 we have now moved beyond the challenges 
of exclusion of electronic evidence simply because information contained therein had been 
processed by the computer. Whether the continued approach to either apply traditional rules of 
evidence to electronic evidence or to adjust the rules as deemed necessary is the central issue. 
I begin by considering the interpretation of s 15 of the ECT Act 2002 favoured by the courts.  
Zeffertt and Paizes suggest that a ‘data message’ ‘is clearly hearsay within the meaning 
of s 3(4) whenever it is tendered in evidence in circumstances where the probative value of the 
evidence depends, in this sense, on the credibility of such a person.’33 The ‘in this sense’ 
referred to by the authors concerns the case where the probative value of the evidence depends 
on the credibility of the person who programs the computer system or software to accurately  
register and process information contained in the computer printout.34 This raises the question 
 
28 PJ Schwikkard & SE van der Merwe in collaboration with DW Collier, WL de Vos, A St Q Skeen and E van 
der Berg Principles of Evidence 2ed (2002) at 385, acknowledging that provisions of the ECT Act 2002 are an 
improvement ‘on the prior, muddled, state of affairs and it is anticipated that the provisions will allow for a 
more equitable approach to computer generated evidence.’  
29 Schwikkard, PJ & SE van der Merwe Principles of Evidence 4ed (2015) at 441-43. 
30 Ndiki’s case supra note 26 at 258. See also S v Brown 2016 (1) SACR 206 (WCC) at 213: ‘[t]he ECTA 
follows an inclusionary rather than an exclusionary approach to the admission of electronic communications as 
evidentiary material.’ 
31 S v Mashiyi and Another 2002 (2) SACR 387 (Tk) at 390. At 393, Miller J concluded: ‘All that I can do is add 
my voice to the call that this lacunae in our law be filled and for new legislation relating specifically to 
computer evidence in criminal cases be considered and promulgated.’ Legislative intervention eventually came, 
seven years later, in the form of the ECT Act 2002. See also S v Harper 1981 (1) SA 88 (D). 
32 Supra note 30 at 213. 
33 Zeffertt & DT Paizes op cit note 22 at 394 (emphasis added). 
34 See La Consortium & Vending Cc T/A La Enterprises v MTN Service Provider (Pty) Ltd 2011 (4) SA 577 
(GSJ) at 591. 
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of the effect of applying s 15 to the admissibility electronic evidence – is it to be regarded as 
expansive in accordance with ‘the purpose of the legislature … to free as much computer-
generated evidence from the hearsay trap as could be justified without doing violence to the 
important values served by the exclusionary rule’35 on the basis that s 15(1) provides that ‘the 
rules of evidence must not be applied so as to deny the admissibility of a data message, in 
evidence’? If so, what does this mean in a situation where the evidence tendered is processed 
and generated by a computer, and not merely utilised for storing information? If it is accepted 
that such evidence is prima facie hearsay, can s 15 be used to admit it?36 Yes, it can, potentially 
on the basis of s 15(1) if the only hurdle to its admissibility is ‘on the mere grounds that it is 
constituted by a data message.’  
Another interesting issue that arises is: what if the evidence sought to be admitted is 
not ‘constituted by a data message’?37 The application of s 15 of the ECT Act 2002 and its 
relationship with s 3 the LEA Act 1988 was first considered in Ndlovu v Minister of 
Correctional Services and Another,38 in which the court was asked to consider electronic 
evidence in the form of a two page computer generated printout in diary form, from the 
computer system of Community Corrections (a section of the Department of Correctional 
Services). The electronic evidence showed that various violations of the plaintiff had been 
recorded by several different persons. On the testimony of two persons who recorded entries, 
the court held that their entries did not amount to hearsay. Entries by other persons who were 
not called to give evidence was held by the court to be hearsay. The evidence was ruled 
admissible by the court based on discretion to do so in terms of s 3 the LEA Act 1988, without 
being prejudiced by authenticity and original forms rules for documentary evidence. On the 
application of s 15 of the ECT Act 2002, the court took the view that the ECT Act 2002 
 
35 Zeffertt & Paizes op cit note 22 at 394. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Ibid at 395, the authors advocate an approach that ‘would leave all the work—as far as hearsay is 
concerned—to the other exceptions, a conclusion that is not indefensible in view of the wide sweep of section 
3(1)(c) of the Law of Evidence Amendment Act 45 of 1988 which allows for the reception of hearsay if the 
court is of the view, after considering the stipulated factors, that its admission would be in the interests of 
justice.’ Further, at 394: ‘[t]o answer this question, one has to ask what it would be if it were not constituted by 
a data message. If it were to be regarded as direct oral evidence furnished by a person upon whose credibility 
the probative value of the evidence depends, it would clearly not be hearsay and would be admissible. But if it 
were to be regarded as evidence tendered by a witness other than the person upon whose credibility the 
probative value of the evidence depends, it would still be hearsay and would, to be admissible, have to satisfy 
the requirements of section 3 of the 1988 Act or some other exception to the hearsay rule (such as section 221 or 
section 222 of the Criminal Procedure Act).’ 
38 [2006] 4 All SA 165 (W). 
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facilitates admissibility, but the rules relating to hearsay and documentary evidence have not 
been excluded entirely by s15:  
‘The provisions of section 15 require closer scrutiny. Subsection (1)(a) appears, on a quick 
reading, to render a data message admissible without further ado. However, it would be 
anomalous if that were the case, since the ECT Act would then elevate a data message 
evidentially above an ordinary document. Rather, on a proper reading, section 15(1)(a) 
prohibits the exclusion from evidence of a data message on the mere grounds that it was 
generated by a computer and not by a natural person, and section 15(1)(b) on the mere grounds 
that it is not in its original form. … Where the probative value of the information in a data 
message depends upon the credibility of a (natural) person other than the person giving 
evidence, there is no reason to suppose that section 15 seeks to override the normal rules 
applying to hearsay evidence. On the other hand, where the probative value of the evidence 
depends upon the “credibility” of the computer (because information was processed by the 
computer), section 3 of the Law of Evidence Amendment Act 1988 will not apply, and there is 
every reason to suppose that section 15(1), read with sections 15(2) and (3), intend for such 
“hearsay” to be admitted, and due evidential weight to be given thereto according to an 
assessment having regard to certain factors.’39  
The court found support of this approach with reference to Zeffertt & Paizes40 in that 
‘the purpose of the legislature was probably to free as much computer-generated evidence from 
the hearsay trap as could be justified without doing violence to the important values served by 
the exclusionary rule.’41 In La Consortium & Vending Cc T/A La Enterprises v MTN Service 
Provider (Pty) Ltd,42 the court adopted the preferred reasoning in Ndlovu. It was argued by the 
appellant that the computer generated documents created by a computer software system and 
relied upon by the respondent constituted hearsay evidence and consequently inadmissible. 
Having regard to the provisions of the LEA Act 1998 the court had to ‘determine whether the 
“data messages” relied upon should be admitted despite their containing hearsay evidence.’ 
Although the court ultimately determined that the electronic evidence constituted real evidence, 
and was correctly admitted into evidence, it expressed its interpretation of s 15 as follows: 
‘The definition of “data message” in s 1 is sufficiently wide to include  not only real, but also 
hearsay, evidence. This follows from the wide description of “data” as the “electronic 
representations of information in any form”, but also from the definition of “data message” as 
 
39 Ndlovu’s case supra note 38 at 172-73 (emphasis added).  
40 Zeffertt & Paizes op cit note 22 at 394. 
41 Ndlovu’s case supra note 38 at 18. 
42 Supra note 34. See also Sublime Technologies (Pty) Ltd v Jonker and Another 2010 (2) SA 522 (SCA). 
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“data generated, sent, received or stored by electronic means”, including “(a) voice, where the 
voice is used in an automated transaction; and (b) a stored record”. This, however, does not 
mean that hearsay is admissible just because it is contained in a data message. The principle 
of “functional equivalence” does not free data messages from the normal strictures of the law 
of evidence, but only from those referred to in s 15(1).  It follows that, despite the very wide 
words of s 15(4), any hearsay contained in a data message must pass the criteria set out in s 3 
of the Law of Evidence Amendment Act 45 of 1988.’43 
A similar approach to s 15 was also supported by the Supreme Court of Appeal in 
Firstrand Bank Limited v Venter. 44  As regards electronic evidence in the form of bank 
statements as proof of an overdrawn account, the court held that s 15 ‘facilitates the use of and 
reliance on a data message.’ 45  The interpretation of the ECT Act 2002 that ‘follows an 
inclusionary rather than an exclusionary approach to the admission of electronic 
communications as evidentiary material’ was also taken in  S v Brown. 46  The court was 
required to determine whether images found on a mobile phone were admissible as evidence. 
The images in question were downloaded from the mobile phone, reproduced in hard copy 
paper form and enlarged. It was contended by the accused that the images amounted to 
inadmissible hearsay evidence. Bozalek J held: 
‘Section 3(4) of the Law of Evidence Amendment Act 45 of 1988 defines hearsay evidence as 
evidence, whether oral or in writing, the probative value of which depends upon the credibility 
of any person other than the person giving such evidence. The three images which the state 
seeks to introduce as evidence are photographs, apparently of the accused, and, subject to proof 
of his identity and bearing in mind the limited purpose for which they are tendered, their 
probative value stands or falls by that simple fact. In this sense, at least, the images are more 
akin to being ‘real evidence’, but, however they are classified, they do not constitute hearsay 
evidence.’47 
The approach of the courts is also reflective of the ‘enabling character’48 of the ECT 
Act 2002 ‘by ousting [previous] evidence rules which would exclude electronic evidence 
purely because of its electronic origin.’ 49  This follows from s 15(1)(a) which states that 
‘admissibility of data messages’ must not be denied ‘on the mere grounds that it is constituted 
 
43 Supra note 34 at 592-93 (emphasis added). 
44 2012 JDR 1676 (SCA). 
45 Supra note 44 para 19. 
46 Supra note 30 at 213. 
47 Supra note 46 at 216. 
48 Schwikkard & Van der Merwe op cit note 28 at 443.  
49 Ibid at 442 with reference to the decision in Ndlovu’s case supra note 38.  
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by a data message.’ The MLEC Guide to Enactment in article 5 on ‘legal recognition of data 
messages’ states the following: ‘[i]nformation shall not be denied legal effect, validity or 
enforceability solely on the grounds that it is in the form of a data message.’50 Hofman argues 
that the basis of s 15 is the ‘form in which information is kept’ and not the content of the 
message.’51  
In terms of the prevailing interpretation of s 15 any hearsay representations contained 
in electronic evidence triggers s 3 of the LEA Act 1988 and must pass the criteria set out therein 
for admissibility purposes.  However,  if it is accepted – as I submit it must be – that form of 
electronic evidence in a year 2020 information age has become the norm in criminal legal 
proceedings, can it be argued that the ECT Act 2002 should make all electronic evidence 
admissible? Potentially, yes. I take the position that the ECT Act 2002 can be interpreted so as 
to make electronic hearsay evidence generally admissible. The definition of ‘data message’ in 
s 1 would be sufficiently wide to include not only real evidence, but to also include hearsay 
evidence by reference to ‘data generated, sent, received or stored’.52 The key issue is whether 
s 15 overrides the provisions of s 3 of the LEA 1988 when the evidence in issue is ‘constituted 
by a data message’. In Ndiki’s case, Van Zyl J noted that ‘[t]here is nothing specifically in the 
ECT Act 2020 that says that it does not.’53 In other words, electronic evidence, real or hearsay, 
could be admissible as evidence in terms of s 15(2) and the court's discretion would simply 
relate to an assessment of the evidential weight in terms of s 15(3). Therefore, if fact-based 
issues of authenticity and integrity can be ‘substantively satisfied’ the hearsay rule need no 
longer be warranted for electronic evidence. This is based on the scope of inquiry in s 15(1) to 
(3) and due evidential weight to be given according to an assessment having regard to certain 
factors.54  
 
50 MLEC Guide to Enactment op cit note 4 at 5. At 31: ‘Article 5 embodies the fundamental principle that data 
messages should not be discriminated against, i.e., that there should be no disparity of treatment between data 
messages and paper documents. … By stating that “information shall not be denied legal effectiveness, validity 
or enforceability solely on the grounds that it is in the form of a data message”, article 5 merely indicates that 
the form in which certain information is presented or retained cannot be used as the only reason for which that 
information would be denied legal effectiveness, validity or enforceability. However, article 5 should not be 
misinterpreted as establishing the legal validity of any given data message or of any information contained 
therein.’ 
51 J Hofman ‘South Africa’ in S Mason (ed) Electronic Evidence: Disclosure, Discovery and Admissibility 
(2007) 459 at 466. This is based on the definition in the ECT Act 2002, aligned to the MLEC: ‘data’ is 
‘electronic representations in any form’ and ‘data message is defined as ‘data generated, sent, received or stored 
by electronic means.’ See s 1, ECT Act 2002. 
52 Ndiki’s case supra note 26 at 258. 
53 Supra note 26 at 258. 
54 See Gallavin & Seng op cit note 23 at 71. 
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The MLEC was adopted by the Commission at its twenty-ninth session, in June 1996. 
The ECT Act 2002 came into law in 2002. The interpretation of the ECT Act 2002 favoured 
by the courts, and also in academic scholarship, is sensible and must be seen in the context of 
particular legislation at the time that excluded electronic evidence because of its electronic 
origin. The corresponding equivalent of s 15 of the ECT Act 2002 in the MLEC is article 9. 
The functional equivalence approach, we are told, does not apply to s 15/article 9: ‘A data 
message, in and of itself, cannot be regarded as an equivalent of a paper document in that it is 
of a different nature and does not necessarily perform all conceivable functions of a paper 
document.’ 55  Hofman argues differently, as have the South African courts, rejecting the 
position that s 15 makes all electronic evidence admissible stating that ‘it would go against the 
functional equivalence between data messages and documents by treating their evidential value 
differently.’56 Similarly, in Ndlovu’s case it was observed that the aim of s 15 ‘appears to be to 
place electronic information on the same footing as traditional paper-based transactions.’57 
The difference between the wording of s 15 (2), (3) and (4) and its article 9 equivalent 
in the MLEC is where I also find support for my argument. Section 15(4) has no equivalent in 
the MLEC. A literal wording of the section counters the doctrine of functional equivalence that 
should apply between electronic evidence and documentary evidence.58 
Section 15(2), (3) and (4) states: 
‘(2) Information in the form of a data message must be given due evidential weight. 
(3) In assessing the evidential weight of a data message, regard must be had to-  
(a) the reliability of the manner in which the data message was generated, stored or 
communicated;  
(b) the reliability of the manner in which the integrity of the data message was maintained;  
(c) the manner in which its originator was identified; and any other relevant factor. 
(4) A data message made by a person in the ordinary course of business, or a copy or printout 
of or an extract from such data message certified to be correct by an officer in the service of 
such person, is on its mere production in any civil, criminal, administrative or disciplinary 
 
55 MLEC Guide to Enactment op cit note 4 at 21.  
56 Hofman op cit note 51 at 464. In addition, he states: ‘it would go beyond the purpose of the ECT Act which is 
to regulate electronic commerce and not reform the law of evidence’ and ‘it would attribute to Parliament the 
intention to use detail buried in the ECT Act to bypass the wider debate about the admissibility of documentary 
evidence.’ 
57 Ndlovu’s case supra note 38 at 174. 
58 Hofman op cit note 51 at 472 argues for a ‘restrictive interpretation’ to the words ‘in the ordinary course of 
business.’ 
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proceedings under any law, the rules of a self regulatory organisation or any other law or the 
common law, admissible in evidence against any person and rebuttable proof of facts contained 
in such record, copy, printout or extract.’  
Article 9 states:  
‘(1) In any legal proceedings, nothing in the application of the rules of evidence shall apply so 
as to deny the admissibility of a data message in evidence:  
(a) on the sole ground that it is a data message; or,  
(b) if it is the best evidence that the person adducing it could reasonably be expected to obtain, 
on the grounds that it is not in its original form.  
(2) Information in the form of a data message shall be given due evidential weight. In assessing 
the evidential weight of a data message, regard shall be had to the reliability of the manner in 
which the data message was generated, stored or communicated, to the reliability of the manner 
in which the integrity of the information was maintained, to the manner in which its originator 
was identified, and to any other relevant factor.’  
The formulation of s 15(4) was most likely influenced by ss 221 and 236 of the Criminal 
Procedure Act 51 of 1977.59 Section  221 provides for admissibility of certain trade or business 
records ‘in criminal proceedings in which direct oral evidence of a fact would be admissible, 
any statement contained in a document and tending to establish that fact shall, upon production 
of the document, be admissible as evidence’ provided that certain conditions are present.60 The 
definition of ‘document’ in s 221(5) ‘includes any device by which information is recorded or 
stored’ and ‘“statement” includes any representation of fact whether made in words or 
otherwise.’ Section 236 allows for the admissibility of accounting records and documents in 
the possession of a bank, including a computer printout or device that recorded or stored the 
document,61 subject to the requisite supporting affidavits,62 including an affidavit by a person 
stating that (a) they are in the service of the bank; (b) such accounting records and documents 
are the records of the bank; (c) the said entries or document have been made compiled, printed 
 
59 Hereafter ‘CPA 1977’. 
60 As set out in s 221(1)(a) and (b) (emphasis added). For certain trade or business records to be admitted into 
evidence as proof of their contents if (a) the document is compiled in the course of that trade or business from 
information supplied by persons who have personal knowledge of the matters dealt with in the information 
supplied; and (b) the person who supplied the information recorded in the statement is dead, or is outside the 
country, or is unfit by reason of physical or mental condition to attend as a witness, or cannot be identified or 
found or cannot reasonably be expected to have any recollection of the matters dealt with in the information 
supplied. 
61 In terms of s 236(6), ‘“document” includes a recording or transcribed computer printout produced by any 
device by means of which information is recorded or stored.’ 
62 Section 236(1) and (2). 
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or obtained in the usual and ordinary course of the business of the bank; and (d) such accounting 
records or documents are in the custody or under the control of such bank.  
Although below I address concerns about the effect of s 15(4), and propose that it 
should be changed to incorporate a specific requirement that there must be some evidence of 
basic facts to demonstrate why a court should accept ‘a data message made by a person in the 
ordinary course of business’ that is ‘certified to be correct’ by an ‘officer’ of the business as 
‘proof of facts contained in such record, copy, printout or extract’ – this is done so in the context 
of a consideration of evidential weight, not at the stage of admissibility. After all s 15(4) has 
the effect of making electronic hearsay evidence ‘in the ordinary course of business’ generally 
admissible, irrespective of hearsay representations contained therein. Hofman argues that if s 
15(4) is interpreted as a broad exception for the admissibility of data messages, doing so would 
be contrary to the functional equivalence that ‘should apply’ between data messages and 
documents, and in his view ‘Parliament would not have used detail in the ECT Act to make 
such a significant change to the law of evidence.’63 Perhaps so on a restrictive interpretation. 
Although arguably, and more plausible, is that Parliament did so purposefully as s 15(4) goes 
beyond the ‘safe harbour’64 of the MLEC. Electronically stored information falling within the 
defined meaning of ‘data message in s 1 of the ECT Act 2002 is admissible in evidence in 
terms of s 15 of the Act. As noted in ABSA Bank Ltd v Le Roux And Others: ‘[s]ection 15(4) 
has a twofold effect. It creates a statutory exception to the hearsay rule and it gives rise to a 
rebuttable presumption in favour of the correctness of electronic data falling within the 
definition of the term “data message”.’65 The court held that ‘a proper construction’ of subrule 
32(2) of the Uniform Rules of Court ‘does not preclude the deponent to the supporting affidavit 
from relying on hearsay evidence to swear positively to the facts when he could permissibly, 
as a matter of law, adduce such hearsay evidence for the purpose of proving the facts at a trial 
of the action.’66 The court found that ‘support of such a construction is made even stronger 
when there is a statutory presumption in favour of the correctness of such evidence’: 
‘Thus, if the deponent to a supporting affidavit in summary judgment proceedings were to be 
able to aver that he is (i) an officer in the service of the plaintiff, (ii) that the salient facts— 
which should be particularised—are electronically captured and stored in the plaintiff's records, 
(iii) that he had regard thereto, (iv) that he is authorised to certify and has executed a certificate 
 
63 Hofman op cit cit note 51 at 472.  
64 Ibid at 471.  
65 2014 (1) SA 475 (WCC) at 485.  
66 Supra note 65 at 485. 
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certifying the facts contained in such record to be correct, and (v) on the basis thereof is able to 
swear positively that the plaintiff will—having regard to the provisions of s 15(4) of Act 25 of 
2002—be able to prove the relevant facts at the trial of the action by producing the electronic 
record or an extract thereof, the requirements of subrule 32(2) ) [of the Uniform Rules of Court] 
would be satisfied.’67 
In Director of Public Prosecution v Modise,68 the court was also prepared to interpret  
s 15 as being widely stated in its intent:    
‘The sections in question (Section 212 of the Criminal Procedure Act [proof of certain facts by 
affidavit or certificate] and Section 15 of the Electronic Communications and Transactions 
Act) in their terms are designed to and do allow evidence in the form of the facts and opinions 
contained in a document which complies with the section in question to be admitted in evidence 
at a trial notwithstanding that the person who listed the facts and formed the opinions in the 
document is not called as a witness. This is the key which unlocks and solves the problem. The 
documents are not designed to be expert notices containing information designed to inform 
opposing parties of what the evidence to be led at the trial is. These sections are specifically 
designed to enable the state to avoid the need to lead the evidence of a witness by way of 
producing him and then leading viva voce evidence. The facts and matters in a document are 
the evidence. The evidence is admissible if the provisions of this section are complied with. 
Nothing more is required.’69 
Notably while these two judgments apply to specific contexts of  summary judgment 
and s 212 affidavits, I argue that the merits of the approach can be applied in general to the 
admission of hearsay electronic evidnece. Such a construction of s 15 of an inclusionary 
approach to electronic hearsay evidence, in my view, is significant and would certainly be 
advantageous in a year 2020 information age where the form of evidence in an electronic 
medium has now become widespread, not only in business but in every aspect of our daily 
lives. Doing so enables the state to easily produce evidence which will generally be of a formal 
and uncontested nature and to place  it in documentary form before a criminal court without 
the need to call the witness. The advantage for criminal proceedings is immediately apparent 
by avoiding the ‘concomitant waste of money and time’ by having experts give evidence which 
is generally uncontested.70 While a robust consideration of authentication is required, I believe 
 
67 Supra note 65 at 485. Cf La Consortium & Vending supra note 34 at 592, the court adopted a restrictive 
interpretation to s 15(4): ‘[i]t follows that, despite the very wide words of s 15(4), any hearsay contained in a 
data message must pass the criteria set out in s 3 of the Law of Evidence Amendment Act 45 of 1988.’ 
68 2012 (1) SACR 553 (GSJ).  
69 Supra note 68 at 557 (emphasis added). 
70 Supra note 68 at 557. 
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that it should not be subject stringent tests that makes it difficult for authentic electronic 
evidence to be admitted into evidence. As I shall attempt to show when I deal with electronic 
evidence as real evidence. 
 
(b) Electronic evidence as real evidence  
The central issue in a number of cases appears to be  whether of electronic evidence  should be  
dealt with as documentary evidence or as ‘real evidence’. If s 15 does not make all electronic 
evidence admissible, and electronic evidence is considered the functional equivalent of 
documentary evidence, then in adopting this approach, the ordinary requirements of South 
African law of evidence for the admissibility of such evidence is that the document itself must 
be produced, which document, ordinarily speaking, must be the original, and the authenticity 
of the document must be proved.71 These requirements are, of course, qualified by specific 
provisions of ECT Act 2002. For example, s 15(1)(b) gives electronic evidence an exemption 
from the requirements of producing the original ‘if it is the best evidence that the person 
adducing it could reasonably be expected to obtain, on the grounds that it is not in its original 
form.’ In Ndiki’s case,72 during the course of a criminal trial the state sought to introduce 
certain documentary evidence consisting of computer-generated printouts. Van Zyl J set out 
the following approach  for considering the admissibility of documentary evidence: ‘determine 
the true nature of the computer print-outs in question, the class of documents they represent 
and whether the admissibility thereof is sanctioned by any of the provisions in the relevant 
legislation dealing with the admission of documentary evidence.’  
In doing so case law has drawn a distinction between ‘electronically generated’ and 
‘electronically created’ records,73 the critical difference being whether the electronic evidence 
was generated purely by the wholly automated operation of a computer or device, or was 
created based on relaying information supplied by a person.74 The ECT Act 2002 does not 
make such a distinction. There are some categories of electronic evidence that do not trigger 
 
71 See Brown’s case supra note 30 at 214-15. 
72 Ndiki’s case supra note 26 at 256. 
73 Schwikkard & Van der Merwe op cit note 28 at 445 use the term ‘computer-generated’ and ‘computer-
assisted’ in reference to the distinction. See also JC Smith ‘The admissibility of statements by computer’ [1981] 
Crim LR 387 who prefers the terms ‘direct computer evidence’ and ‘hearsay computer evidence’ to describe this 
distinction in analysis. 
74 The term ‘real evidence’ is best described in S v M 2002(2) SACR 411 (SCA) at 413: ‘[r]eal evidence is an 
object which, upon proper identification, becomes, of itself, evidence (such as a knife, photograph, voice 
recording, letter of even the appearance of a witness in the witness-box).’ 
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hearsay as an exclusionary rule of evidence. In these cases devices may as a result of internal  
processes create a record without human intervention or assistance and which is admissible as 
real evidence.75 In Ndiki’s case, the court held: ‘[e]vidence on the other hand that depends 
solely upon the reliability and accuracy of the computer itself and its operating systems or 
programs, constitutes real evidence. What s 15 of the ECT Act does, is to treat a data message 
in the same way as real evidence at common law. It is admissible as evidence in terms of ss (2) 
and the court’s discretion simply relates to an assessment of the evidential weight to be given 
thereto (ss (3)). The ECT Act is therefore inclusionary as opposed to exclusionary.’76 However, 
if there is human intervention or assistance in the performance of such processes either at the 
input, output or any intermediate stage, hearsay issues may arise, although in some cases 
exceptions to the hearsay rule may apply in terms of s 3 of the LEA 1988.77 Electronic evidence 
which falls within the definition of hearsay evidence in s 3 of the LEA 1988, the provisions of 
which are described as operating ‘exclusionarily’,78 may become admissible under s 3(1)(c) if 
the court having regard to the factors listed in that paragraph is ‘of the opinion that such 
evidence should be admitted in the interests of justice.’ 
The categorisation of evidence as real or documentary has implications for 
admissibility: if deemed to be real evidence, then the test for admissibility is whether it is 
relevant; if however it is deemed documentary evidence, the ordinary requirements in the law 
of evidence for the admissibility of documents applies, including hearsay considerations. In 
Ndlovu’s case, Gautschi AJ stated: ‘in order to be admissible in evidence, [documentary 
evidence] generally has to comply with three rules: (a) the statements contained in the 
document must be relevant and otherwise admissible; (b) the authenticity of the document must 
be proved; and (c) the original document must normally be produced. Section 15(1) does not, 
in my view, do away with these three requirements. The data message must be relevant and 
otherwise admissible, be proved to be authentic and the original be produced, unless (in regard 
to the latter aspect) section 15(1)(b) applies.’79 The court also took the view that s 3 of the LEA 
 
75 A third category exists, to the extent that a record may be comprised of information that is electronically 
generated and electronically created. For example, a suspect in a fraud case may use an Excel spreadsheet 
program to process financial figures relating to a fraudulent scheme. The electronic evidence as containing the 
output of the Excel program would derive from both the suspect’s input into the program and the mathematical 
operations of the program automating calculations. Another example is that of an email message, where the 
automatically generated header as revealing the names of the sender/recipient, including time/date and other 
relevant metadata constitutes the electronically generated part of the communication. The content of the 
communication would be relaying information supplied by a person. 
76 Ndiki’s case supra note 26 at 257-58. 
77 Supra note 26 at 264. 
78 Supra note 26 at 258. 
79 Ndlovu’s case supra note 38 at 165-66. 
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Act 1988 did not apply to electronically generated records ‘where the probative value of the 
evidence depends upon the “credibility” of the computer (because information was processed 
by the computer).’ 80  In La Consortium & Vending, the court adopted the distinction 
‘electronically generated’ and ‘electronically created’ records: ‘[t]he Oracle computer software 
system is, in addition, not merely utilised for storing information. It also creates additional 
information such as calculations as to what the appellant owes the respondent. This is real 
evidence the probative value of which depends on the reliability and accuracy of the computer 
and its operating systems.’81 Although the court found that the electronic evidence relied upon 
in the case not only constituted real evidence, but also included hearsay, having applied the 
considerations in s 3 of the LEA 1988, the court found that the evidence relied upon was 
correctly admitted as evidence.82 The ‘task’ of determining the admissibility of electronic 
evidence by distinguishing ‘between what would constitute hearsay evidence and what real 
evidence’ is one ‘that is not always without its difficulties.’83 In particular, the central issue of 
whether electronic evidence should more appropriately be dealt with as documentary evidence 
or as real evidence has challenged the courts. 
Section 221(5) of the CPA 51 of 1977 provides that a document includes any device 
‘by means of which information is recorded or stored.’ In Seccombe and Others v Attorney-
General it was noted that the word ‘document’ is ‘a very wide term and includes everything 
that contains the written or pictorial proof of something. It does not matter of what material it 
is made.’84 On this definition, a data message as envisaged in s 15 could be a document. 
The jurisprudence of the courts has evolved with the transition from analog to digital, 
albeit resulting in differing approaches to electronic evidence as a document or as real evidence 
in cases involving graphics, audio and video. In S v Mpumlo & Others it was held that a video 
film, like a tape recording, ‘is real evidence, as distinct from documentary evidence, and, 
 
80 Ndlovu’s case supra note 38 at 173. See also S v Mpumlo & Others 1986 (3) SA 485 (E) (video film); S v 
Ramgobin 1986 (4) SA 117 (N) (video tape recordings); Mdlongwa v The State (99/10) [2010] ZASCA 82 (31 
May 2010)( video footage of the bank recorded during the robbery); Motata v Nair NO 2009 (2) SA 575 (T); R 
v Cochrane [1993] Crim LR 48 (ATM receipts); R v Spiby (1990) 91 Cr APP R 186 (CA) (records of a 
telephone metering device); The Statue of Liberty  [1968] 1 WLR 739 (PD) (radar trackings); R v Dodson and 
Williams (1984) 79 Cr App R 220 (security camera photographs); R v Wood (1983) 76 Cr App R 23 (CA) 
(computer calculations of metal compositions); Kajala v Noble (1982) 75 Cr App R 149 (DC) (video recordings 
of camera output); R v Maqsud-Ali [1965] 1 WLR 1479 (CCA) (still photographs and audio recordings); Castle 
v Cross [1984] 1 WLR 137 (intoximeter breath test machines); R v McCarthy and Others [1998] RTR 374 
(CLA) (DVLA computer records); R v Clarke (Robert Lee)  [1995] 2 Cr App R 435 (CA) (facial mapping by 
way of video superimposition); R v Reynard [2005] EWCA Crim 550 (date/time stamp on emails). 
81 Supra note 34 at 594.  
82 Supra note 34 at 586 and 596.  
83 Ndiki’s case supra note 26 at 265. 
84 1919 TPD 270 at 277. 
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provided it is relevant, it may be produced as admissible evidence, subject of course to any 
dispute that may arise either as to its authenticity or the interpretation thereof.’ 85 Similarly, in 
Mdlongwa v The State, the court held that ‘video footage of the robbery constitutes real 
evidence.’86 In S v Baleka (1) Van Dijkhorst J also held: ‘I agree with the conclusions of 
Mullins J [in Mpumlo] that a video tape is real evidence.’87  
In S v Ramgobin,88 the court took a different approach in relation to whether certain 
audio and video tape recording are admissible evidence against the accused. The court was 
‘unable to agree’ with the basis of the finding in Mpumlo’s case that ‘a video film like a tape 
recording is real evidence.’ 89 The court held that for audio tape recordings and video tape 
recordings to be admissible in evidence in a criminal trial, it must be proved that the exhibits 
sought to be admitted: (i) are the original recordings and (ii) that, on the evidence as a whole, 
there exists no reasonable possibility of ‘some interference’ with the recordings.90 Further:  
‘The State must also prove that the tape recordings (and video recordings) do relate to the 
occasion to which it is alleged they relate, and that they are faithful and prove the identity of 
the speakers. These requirements overlap to some extent but they are not identical. There may 
be proof that the tape has not been altered, added to, edited or in any way interfered with, but 
the tape may not be accurate because it fails to reflect faithfully what it purports to reflect, eg 
because of apparatus malfunction. In regard to the need for proof of accuracy, there must be a 
witness to the event purportedly recorded on the tape who testifies that it accurately portrays 
that event. It need not be the person who made the recording, but may be anyone who witnessed 
the event. A further requirement is that it must be proved that the tapes are sufficiently 
intelligible “to be placed before the jury”, ie the Court.’91 
Zeffertt and Paizes92 support the stringent test for admissibility laid down in Ramgobin 
reflected in the tests set out above because tape recordings, ‘can be altered (and materially 
altered) in such a way that even experts cannot detect the alteration.’ These concerns also apply 
 
85 Mpumlo’s case supra note 80 at 490. 
86 Supra note 80 para 25. 
87 1986 (4) SA 192 (T) at 197. 
88 1986 (4) SA 117 (N). 
89 Supra note 88 at 126, specifically the following statements of Mullins J in Mpumlo’s case: ‘[a]t the time I 
gave my ruling in the present matter that the video film was admissible, there was, and still is, no evidence as to 
the last whereabouts of the original video film, or as to the correctness of the copy thereof used in Court. There 
may or may not be such evidence forthcoming later during the State case. I am satisfied however that even the 
lack of any such evidence would not affect the admissibility of the video films, but only if the authenticity 
thereof were attacked, the weight to be attached thereto.’ 
90 Supra note 88 at 135. 
91 Supra note 88 at 118. 
92 Ramgobin’s case supra note 88 at 121. 
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to electronic evidence. Hofman  argues that graphics, audio and video that are in a data-message 
form should be treated in the same way as documents, and expresses the view that to regard 
such material as real evidence ‘is conceptually simple and appeals to those who dislike 
excluding any evidence.’93 He argues: 
‘In data message form, graphics, audio and video are susceptible to error and falsification in 
the same way as data messages that embody documentary content. They cannot prove 
themselves to be anything other than data messages and their evidential value depends on 
witnesses who can both interpret them and establish their relevance. So long as South African 
law follows an exclusionary approach it would seem that graphics, audio, and video that are in 
data message form should be treated in the same way as documents.’ 94 
In such an approach electronic evidence is said to be ‘dangerous from an evidential 
point of view unless certain precautions are taken.’95 In Brown’s case, the court’s approach to 
images found in a cellphone reflects a guarded view on the admissibility of electronic evidence. 
Bozalek J held: ‘[g]iven the potential mutability and transient nature of images such as the 
images in this matter which are generated, stored and transmitted by an electronic device, I 
consider that they are more appropriately dealt with as documentary evidence rather than “real 
evidence”.’ 96  In Ndiki’s case, although Van Zyl J found that ‘the computer through its 
operating system processed existing information’ which ‘did calculations’ and ‘“created” 
additional information without human intervention’ constituted real evidence, the admissibility 
of this evidence would be ‘dependent upon the accuracy and the reliability of the computer, 
its operating systems and its processes.’97 In S v Koralev and Another,98 it was held that having 
regard to ‘the ease with which modern technology allowed such tampering to occur, it was 
essential that evidence in relation to such images be approached with extreme caution’ The 
court endorsed an approach that required proof of accuracy in the form of corroboration that 
the event depicted had actually taken place.99 The court held, that the images allegedly found 
on the appellant's computer were not the original images, since they were either downloaded 
from the Internet or transferred from a digital camera. The original images, therefore, would 
be those contained in the camera or in the original source from which they had been loaded 
 
93 Hofman op cit note 51 at 472-73. 
94 Ibid. 
95 S v Baleka (3) 1986 (4) SA 1005 (T) at 1023, reflecting the differing conclusion in Ramgobin’s case. 
96 Supra note 30 at 214. 
97 Ndiki’s case supra note 26 at 265 (emphasis added). 
98 2006 (2) SACR 298 (N). 
99 Supra note 98 at 300. 
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onto the Internet site.100 The absence of corroborating evidence together with evidence that at 
least one image was tampered with, the court found that the images failed to meet the 
requirements for admissibility. 
The controversy in South African case law has resulted in the issues regarding 
admissibility of electronic evidence being approached from the premise of authenticity and 
integrity as a pre-requisite to admissibility. In my view, this is not an appropriate approach. 
Unlike its predecessor, the repealed Computer Evidence Act 57 of 1983 which required proof 
of authenticity as a condition of admissibility, the ECT Act 2002 does not require electronic 
evidence to be authenticated as a condition of admissibility. The approach of the ECT Act 2002 
is preferred where issues regarding authenticity and integrity of the electronic evidence is 
central to an assessment of evidential weight, rather than its admissibility. In S v Baleka (3)101 
the court had the opportunity to consider the ruling on the admissibility of certain audio and 
video tape recordings in Ramgobin. Van Dijkhorst J stated: ‘I deal with tape recordings as I 
would deal with any other type of real evidence tendered where its admissibility is disputed. 
The test is whether it is relevant. It will be relevant if it has probative value. It will only have 
probative value if it is linked to the issues to be decided.’102 The court found that the stringent 
approach advocated by Milne JP in Ramgobin ‘leads to the unacceptable situation that a court 
refuses to consider relevant evidence because it might be fabricated, where the correctness of 
that evidence is not even placed in issue in cross-examination, but only its admissibility.’103 
Further, as it was not put to any witness at any stage in the case that the tape recordings were 
not a true reflection of what had happened, or that the tape recordings had been tampered with, 
the court held that ‘to exclude this evidence from consideration’ would ‘lead to a miscarriage 
of justice.’104 In S v Nieuwoudt,105 the Appeal Court endorsed the approach in Baleka (3). The 
court had to determine whether it is necessary, for the admission in evidence of audio tape 
recordings, to prove the authenticity of the tape recording. The court held that although it can 
be accepted that interferences (deliberate or otherwise) are seemingly a cause for suspicion, 
and even though the evidential value thereof might be less than what it otherwise would have 
been, there can be no objection to the admissibility of the recording.106  
 
100 Supra note 98 at 300. 
101 Supra note 95. 
102 Supra note 95 at 1026. 
103 Supra note 95 at 1023. 
104 Supra note 101 at 1023. 
105 1990 (4) SA 217 (A). See also S v Fuhri 1994 (2) SACR 829 (A). 
106 Supra note 105 at 232-33. 
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This preferred approach is aligned to the ECT Act 2002, which does not require as a 
condition of admissibility that electronic evidence be authenticated. Stringent tests relating to 
authenticity, integrity and truth or reliability of any information recorded in or reflected by the 
electronic evidence ought not apply for admissibility purposes.107 I disagree with the view that 
graphics, audio and video in the form of electronic evidence should be treated in the same way 
as documentary evidence, and to be admissible it should be produced, be original and be 
authenticated. In the cases referred to earlier, records created by devices as a result of their own 
processes, without human intervention or assistance, constituted real evidence, however, there 
were differing outcomes on the need for proof of accuracy and the reliability as requirements 
for admissibility. I also disagree with the conclusions that where such electronic evidence is 
regarded as real evidence it should be subject to an approach inherent in the stringent test for 
admissibility as laid down by Milne JP in Ramgobin, because it is considered ‘dangerous 
evidential material’ due to the fact that it ‘can be altered (and materially altered) in such a way 
that even experts cannot detect the alteration.’108 Milne JP held that before the tape recording 
would be admissible the state had to  prove beyond reasonable doubt: (i) that the recordings 
before court related to matters alleged in the indictment; (ii) by way of testimony of a witness 
who saw and heard the events allegedly recorded, that the recording accurately reflects the 
purported events; and  (iii) that the tape recordings are the original recordings and have not 
been interfered with in any way, whether by mistake or otherwise, since the original recordings 
were made.109  
In my view, the better approach to admissibility of electronic evidence is by Van 
Dijkhorst J in Baleka (3) who provided the following response and analysis to the advocated 
approach of Milne JP in Ramgobin. On the first test, it was agreed that to be admissible as real 
evidence, the electronic evidence must be relevant to the matter. However, that ‘relevancy must 
be proved beyond reasonable doubt’ was rejected – all that is needed in this respect, at 
admissibility stage of the proceedings, is that it be shown that prima facie the material tendered 
as evidence has some probative force.110 On the second test of witness testimony, the view that, 
before a tape recording is admissible, a witness had to testify that he saw and heard the events 
allegedly recorded and that the recording accurately reflected those events, was also rejected 
as not correct. Van Dijkhorst J held that there was no apparent reason why that proof of 
 
107 See Zeffertt & DT Paizes op cit note 22 at 434.  
108 Ramgobin’s case supra note 88 at 121. 
109 Baleka (3) supra note 95 at 1023, in summary by Van Dijkhorst J. 
110 Supra note 95 at 1023. 
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reliability and accuracy could only be furnished by viva voce evidence of a witness who saw 
and heard the events recorded – circumstantial evidence, after all, might, in a given case, lead 
to the same conclusion.111  
On the third test, the view that, at the stage where admissibility was to be decided upon, 
it had to be proved beyond reasonable doubt that the tape recordings were originals, relates to 
the tape recordings being treated as documentary evidence.112 Van Dijkhorst J found that the 
proposition that it has to be proved that the tapes have not been interfered with in any way, 
whether by mistake or otherwise, since the original recording was made, was too widely 
stated.113 If this proposition applied, held Van Dijkhorst J it would lead to the whole tape being 
inadmissible, without any room for the court to determine whether this interference materially 
affected the recording as a whole.114 It would be absurd, for example, to exclude a recording 
from which part of a conversation had been accidentally erased solely because of such defect. 
The better approach is that the remaining part of a recording from which a part has been erased 
without distorting the rest of the recording, may still admissible evidence (unless it 
is inadmissible on other grounds), even though the evidential value thereof might be less than 
what it otherwise would have been.115 
Van Dijkhorst J concluded that the approach advocated by Milne JP in Ramgobin 
effectively ‘leads to the unacceptable situation that a court refuses to consider relevant evidence 
because it might be fabricated’ and ‘where the correctness of that evidence’ is ‘placed in 
issue’ only on its admissibility.116 In keeping with my earlier submissions, s 15 should thus be 
interpreted in favour of its ‘apparently expansive purpose’ 117  as creating a single test of 
admissibility for all electronic evidence, whether in the form of documentary, hearsay or real 
evidence. The court’s discretion would therefore be based on the scope of inquiry in s 15(1) to 
(3) and due evidential weight to be given to such evidence according to an assessment thereto 




111 Supra note 95 at 1024-25. 
112 Section 15(1)(b) of the ECT Act 2002 now provides an exemption for the requirement of original. 
113 Supra note 95 at 1025. 
114 Supra note 95 at 1025. 
115 Nieuwoudt’s case supra note 105.  
116 Baleka (3) supra note 95 at 1023. 
117 Zeffertt & DT Paizes op cit note 22 at 434. 
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IV EVIDENTIAL WEIGHT: NEW RULES ON AUTHENTICITY AND INTEGRITY 
The basic requirements of admissibility for documentary evidence are not easily transferred to 
electronic evidence. They are production of the original document and authenticity.  
‘Authentication’ involves demonstrating that the evidence sought to be adduced is what it 
purports to be. It requires:  
‘satisfying the court that (a) the contents of the record have remained unchanged, (b) that the 
information in the records does in fact originate from its purported source, whether human or 
machine, and (c) that extraneous information such as the apparent date of the record is accurate. 
As with paper records, the necessary degree of authentication may be proved through oral and 
circumstantial evidence, if available, or via technological features in the system or record.’118 
Prior to the ECT Act, to authenticate electronic evidence in criminal proceedings it was 
necessary to demonstrate that the computer system or process that generated the evidence was 
working properly at all material times. Amongst other things that required proof of reliability, 
the proponent relying on electronic evidence was required to prove beyond reasonable doubt 
that at all material times the computer was operating properly or, if not, that any respect in 
which it was not operating properly or was out of operation, was not such as to affect 
production of the document or accuracy of its contents before evidence from a computer could 
be admitted into evidence.119  The ECT Act has altered the landscape, the focus of the debate 
is now on the long ignored issues relevant to establishing probative value or evidential weight 
of electronic evidence. 
 
(a) The admissibility of business records in terms of s 15(4) – a problematic presumption? 
Section 15(4) creates a statutory exception to hearsay as an exclusionary rule in favour of 
electronic evidence by making provision for ‘a data message made by a person in the ordinary 
course of business’ or for ‘a copy or printout of or an extract from such data message’ to be 
‘admissible in evidence’ and creates a rebuttable presumption of ‘proof of facts contained in 
such record, copy, printout or extract’ as ‘certified to be correct’. As noted earlier, the 
formulation of s 15(4) is most likely influenced the business records exceptions in s 221 
(business records) and s 236 (banking records) of the CPA 51 of 1977. The application and 
 
118 C Reed & L Davis ‘Electronic Commerce’ in C Reed and J Angel (eds) Computer Law (2000) 303 at 308. 
119 Prior to the ECT Act 2002, electronic evidence in South African law was regulated by Computer Evidence 
Act 57 of 1983. 
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interpretation of s15(4) by the courts can be described as straightforward and uncomplicated.120 
It was observed in Ndlovu’s case that s 15(4) provides for two situations in which electronic 
evidence, on its mere production, may be admissible: 
‘Section 15(4) provides an exception to the manner of proof and evidential weight ordinarily 
to be accorded to a data message. Section 15(4) provides for two situations in which a data 
message may on its mere production be admissible in evidence. The first is “a data message 
made by a person in the ordinary course of business”, which, juxtaposed with the words that 
follow, clearly refers to an original data message, and is required to have been made “in the 
ordinary course of business”. The second is a copy or printout of or an extract from such data 
message which is certified to be correct by an officer in the service of such person (being a 
person who made the data message in the ordinary course of business). Once either of these 
two situations is present, the data message is on its mere production admissible in evidence 
and rebuttable proof of the facts contained therein. Section 15(4) appears to be self-contained, 
and does not admit of or require a qualitative enquiry to be made in terms of sections 15(2) or 
(3) in regard to the weight to be attached thereto. It provides for its own weight, namely that 
the facts contained therein will be rebuttable proof, ie if not rebutted, then they will stand as 
evidence.’121 
If s 15(4) is regarded as ‘self-contained’ such that ‘the fact contained therein will be 
rebuttable proof’ and ‘if not rebutted’ the electronic record ‘will stand as evidence’, arguably 
the presumption may be difficult to rebut because the party seeking to contest the presumption 
will often not be in a position to challenge or offer substantial evidence to the contrary. 122 
Generally it is difficult to overcome the presumption, and assertions by the proponent seeking 
to rebut the presumption by casting doubt on the ‘correctness’ of ‘proof of facts’ relied upon, 
are often made without providing any foundation for the allegations.123 In most cases, the party 
facing the challenge will be in full control of the computer software or systems.124 In the 
absence of evidence to the contrary, the court will generally rely on the correctness of the 
record, copy, printout or extract. Understandably the aim of the presumption seeks to address 
the previous situation in law that sought to exclude electronic evidence because the disputed 
 
120 In Golden Fried Chicken (Pty) Ltd v Yum Restaurants International (Pty) Ltd 2005 BIP 269 (T) at 272: ‘[i]n 
terms of s 15(4) of that Act a printout of a data message can constitute prima facie proof if the data message was 
made by a person in the ordinary course of business and if the printout is certified to be correct by 'an officer in 
the service of such person.’  
121 Ndlovu’s case supra note 38 at 172-73. 
122 S Mason ‘Electronic evidence: A proposal to reform the presumption of reliability and hearsay’ 30 (2014) 
Computer Law and Security Review 80 at 81. 
123 La Consortium’s case supra note 34 at 594. 
124 See S Mason ‘The presumption that computers are “reliable”’ in S Mason & D Seng (eds) Electronic 
Evidence 4ed (2017) 101. 
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documents contained information which had been processed by a computer. The rationale for 
the presumption also alleviates the need to prove every item of evidence produced ‘in ordinary 
course of business’ to save ‘the time and expense of proving the obvious.’125 However, it does 
not necessarily follow that the function ‘by a person in the ordinary course of business’ is 
always performed correctly or as one would normally expect in a situation where the function 
is mediated by electronic systems and software.126 Van Buskirk and Liu argue that such a 
presumption is often difficult to rebut and note the following implications of an approach akin 
to an ‘aura of infallibility’:127  
‘Unless specific evidence is offered to show that the particular code at issue has demonstrable 
defects that are directly relevant to the evidence being offered up for admission, most courts 
will faithfully maintain the Presumption of Reliability. But because most code is closed source 
and heavily guarded, a party cannot audit it to review its quality. At the same time, however, 
source code audits are perhaps the best single way to discover defects. This difficulty gives rise 
to an important question: if a party cannot gain access to source code without evidence of a 
defect, but cannot get evidence of a defect without access to the source code, how is a party to 
rebut the Presumption? Rather than wrestle with, or even acknowledge, this conundrum, most 
courts simply presume that all code is reliable without sufficient analysis.’128 
Specifically on the application of s 15(4), Hofman also raises the following concerns, 
including potential constitutional law challenges:  
‘(a) First, an exception for communications made ‘in the ordinary course of business’ is much 
wider than the previous business record exceptions. Taken at face value, this exception could 
apply to any email or even a recorded voice message made in the course of business. 
(b) Second, s 15(4) is not only wider in scope than the previous business records exceptions, it 
differs from all of them (although not the exceptions for banking records) in making data 
messages not only admissible as evidence but also rebuttable proof of facts they contain. 
Attaching a probative value to bank records is acceptable because banks are regulated and 
supposedly responsible institutions whose records can be assumed to be reliable in much the 
way as the records of a public body. However, s 15(4) applies to records of any business is no 
guarantee that the records of that business are kept accurately or honestly.  
 
125 Ibid at 102 quoting Holt v Auckland City Council [1980] 2 NZLR 124 at 128. 
126 Ibid at 107. 
127 DW Elliott ‘Mechanical aids to evidence’ 1958 Criminal LR 5 at 7. 
128 E van Buskirk & VT Liu ‘Digital evidence: Challenging the presumption of reliability’ 1.1 (2006) Journal of 
Digital Forensic Practice 19 at 20 (footnotes omitted). 
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(c) Third, s 15(4) requires a certificate ‘by an officer in the service of such person’ for data 
messages to be admissible. This imposes less responsibility than the affidavit previously 
required for banking exceptions. There is also no need for the certificate to assert, as required 
in an affidavit, that the records have been under the control of the business.  
(d) Fourth, if the person wanting to submit this form of evidence does not control the computer 
system which contain it, it may be difficult to get the certificate required to make the evidence 
admissible. 
(e) Fifth, the wide range of evidence that s 15(4) makes admissible could lead courts to being 
asked to consider much larger volumes of evidence than at present. 
(f) Sixth, when applied in a criminal prosecution, for which s 15(4) explicitly provides, the 
presumption of truth the section creates is open to constitutional challenge as an unjustified 
shifting of the onus of proof onto the accused.’129 
These are valid concerns raised by Hofman. On his first and second point, the s 15(4) 
presumption is particularly relevant with regard to banking and also illustrates the nature of the 
problem. As set out by Mason: ‘[t]hat a bank benefits from the presumption that its computers 
and networks … puts an impossible burden on the customer. For a customer in dispute with 
his bank to challenge this presumption, he will require significant knowledge of the computers, 
systems and networks operated by the bank, how they work, and where the vulnerabilities 
might lie, including the results of relevant audits, both internal and external – a task well 
beyond the vast majority of customers, including most lawyers without the benefit of expert 
advice, which in itself is difficult to obtain.’130 The nature of the problem is not limited to 
banking, as s 15(4) as a business exception applies to electronic records ‘made in the ordinary 
course of business’ – of any business. 
Another problem with the s 15(4) presumption that deems electronic records made ‘in 
the ordinary course of business’ that is ‘certified to be correct by an officer’ of a business, 
admissible as ‘proof of facts contained in such record, copy, printout or extract’ is that there is 
no authoritative guidance to the meaning of the words ‘certified to be correct’ in the context of 
electronic evidence. It is presumed that because a ‘record, copy, printout or extract’ contains 
information that the ‘officer’ of a business might expect to see, it follows that the information 
recorded is ‘certified to be correct’. However, information contained in ‘such record, copy, 
 
129 Hofman op cit note 51 at 471-72 (footnotes omitted). See also Zeffertt & Paizes op cit note 22 at 434 and 852 
who also address the concerning constitutional issues of s 15(4). 
130 Mason op cit note 124 at 158. 
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printout or extract’ does not necessarily demonstrate that the information recorded is ‘correct’ 
and therefore to be readily accepted and trusted by the courts. ‘This is an important issue’ 
argues Mason ‘bearing in mind that the presumption is a presumption without the requirement 
of proof of a basic fact.’131 As also rightly noted by Hofman there ‘is no guarantee that the 
records of that business are kept accurately or honestly.’ 
On Hofman’s sixth point and the shifting of the onus of proof to the accused in criminal 
proceedings, a problematic issue with the presumption in s 15(4) is that it ‘asserts something 
positive.’132 The presumption acts to place an evidential burden on an opposing party, in this 
instance, an accused person contesting reliance on the presumption. It can be difficult to raise 
sufficient evidence to shift the burden. Can the opposing party seeking to challenge the 
presumption in s 15(4) convince a court to order the production of the relevant electronic 
evidence, including software code and operating system, if the ‘certified to be correct’ 
electronic evidence is to be tested properly? The opposing party is ‘required to prove a negative 
in the absence of relevant evidence from the program or programs that are relied upon.’133 In 
criminal proceedings, for an accused person ‘this has the unfair effect of undermining the 
presumption of innocence.’134  
 However, does s 15(4) shift the onus of proof or does it merely place an evidential 
burden on the party against whom the evidence is admitted? There is clear authority in our 
jurisprudence for the view that the presumption of innocence will be infringed whenever there 
is the possibility of a conviction despite the existence of a reasonable doubt.135 While several 
rebuttable presumptions of law which placed a burden of proof on the accused have been 
declared unconstitutional,136 a distinction must be drawn between placing an evidential or legal 
burden on the accused. The Consititutional Court has held that an evidentiary burden does not 
create the possibility of conviction despite the existence of a reasonable doubt, and therefore 
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will not infringe the presumption of innocence.137 Arguably, if the wording in s 15(4) that ‘a 
data messge … is on its mere production … admissible in evidence against any person and 
rebuttable proof of facts contained’ therein were to be generally considered as imposing no 
more than an evidentiary burden on the accused, then such an evidentiary burden merely 
requies ‘evidence sufficient to give rise to a reasonable doubt to prevent conviction’138 which 
unlike a legal burden does not create the possibility of conviction despite the existence of a 
reasonable doubt.139 
A particular challenge in applying the s 15(4) presumption is that the working accuracy 
of a computer or similar devices used to create a ‘a data message made by a person in the 
ordinary course of business’ is also presumed. Where a proponent is seeking to rely on the s 
15(4) presumption they would not need to lead evidence that the computer or similar devices 
used to create the electronic evidence ‘made by a person in the ordinary course of business’ 
was working properly at the time in question, unless there was evidence that it may not have 
been, in which case the proponent will need to prove that it was working properly. What this 
means is that in the absence of evidence to the contrary, the court will be asked to rely on the 
correctness of the ‘proof of facts contained in such record, copy, printout or extract’ that had 
been made ‘in the ordinary course of business’ as it was ‘certified to be correct by an officer’ 
of the business. The s 15(4) presumption appears to be reflective of the Latin expression ‘omnia 
praesumuntur rite esse acta’ which means ‘all acts are presumed to have been done rightly and 
regularly’ or ‘all things are presumed to have been done regularly and with due formality until 
the contrary is proved.’140 As noted earlier, it was observed in Ndlovu’s case that s 15(4) 
‘appears to be self-contained, and does not admit of or require a qualitative enquiry to be made 
in terms of sections 15(2) or (3) in regard to the weight to be attached thereto.’141 The idea of 
‘certified to be correct by an officer’ of the company relies on the assumption that concerns 
about the proper operation of the computer or similar devices are ‘reasonably rare’.142 This 
view is problematic as being ‘incomplete’ and ‘misleading’ because ‘accurate computer output 
depends not just on the proper operation of computers, but also proper human use (or abuse) 
of computers.’143 
 
137 Scagell and Others v Attorney-General of the Western Cape and Others 1997 (2) SA 368 (CC). 
138 Supra para 12. 
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The presumption in s 15(4) should be reconsidered. A rethinking of the articulation of 
the ‘in the ordinary course of business’ presumption should be linked to evidential foundations 
of the presumption in order to be ‘certified to be correct’. In other words, for such a 
presumption to be recognised, it should be necessary for the proponent seeking to benefit from 
the presumption to adduce sufficient evidence, that is proof of basic facts, to warrant the 
introduction of such a presumption.144 In non-presumption cases involving electronic evidence, 
the courts have referred to computer software system reliability. For example, in 
La Consortium & Vending, the court accepted the ‘correctness’ of ‘an accounting software 
package known as the Oracle Accounting System.’145 The court was satisfied with testimony 
‘as to the integrity of the system [and that] the system was audited on a regular basis by both 
the respondent’s internal auditors as well as external auditors.’146 The court’s assessment of 
the electronic evidence concluded as follows: 
‘The Oracle software system, manages a particular customer (in this instance the appellant) at 
every step of the process. The respondent led evidence concerning the reliability of the manner 
in which the data messages was generated, stored or communicated; the reliability of the 
manner in which the integrity of the data messages was maintained; the manner in which its 
originator was identified. These aspects were not challenged by the appellant under cross-
examination, and no evidence was led by the respondent in this regard. The Oracle computer-
software system is, in addition, not merely utilised for storing information. It also creates 
additional information, such as calculations as to what the appellant owes the respondent. This 
is real evidence, the probative value of which depends on the reliability and accuracy of the 
computer and its operating systems. Nor does there appear to be any cogent reason to suppose 
that any of the computer entries relating to, for example, the orders placed, were incorrect.’ 147 
I believe that the presumption in s 15(4) should not operate as a ‘self-contained’ 
section.148 Consideration must be given to more fully understanding meaning of the words 
‘certified to be correct’. This means that a party seeking to rely on the presumption in s 15(4) 
should establish what they mean by electronic evidence ‘certified to be correct’ made ‘in the 
ordinary course of business’. In Castle v Cross,149 Stephen Brown LJ’s preference for the 
presumption was in the cited formulation in Cross on Evidence which ‘requires the basic fact 
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– proof that the instrument be one of a kind which is common knowledge that they are more 
often than not in working order – to be established before the presumption could operate.’150 
The prosecution sought to rely on the presumption that intoximeter breath test machines were 
in order when they were used: 
‘A presumption which serves the same purpose of saving the time and expense of calling 
evidence as that served by the maxim omnia praesumuntur rite esse acta is the presumption that 
mechanical instruments were in order when they were used. In the absence of evidence to the 
contrary, the courts will presume that stopwatches and speedometers and traffic lights were in 
order at the material time; but the instrument must be one of a kind which it is common 
knowledge that they are more often than not in working order.’ 151  
It is not my intention in the suggested rethinking of the s 15(4) presumption that the 
proponent seeking to benefit from the presumption will be required to prove the authenticity 
and integrity of every item of evidence produced ‘in ordinary course of business’. The 
suggested proposal of rethinking the presumption in s 15(4) will be useful for cases involving 
electronic evidence that originates from complex networked systems, or where such evidence 
is several times removed from the device.152 Just because a business or an industry such as 
banks rely on electronic records ‘made in the ordinary course of business’ where the function 
is mediated by operating systems and software does not necessarily mean that the courts should 
readily accept the ‘certified to be correct’ by the ‘officer’ of the business as ‘proof of facts 
contained in such record, copy, printout or extract’. A failure to provide for proper scrutiny of 
‘such record, copy, printout or extract’ and emphasis on the s 15(4) presumption by relying on 
the assurances of ‘an officer’ of a business effectively means that ‘certified to be correct’ cannot 
be readily challenged in South African courts. 
It is argued that s 15(4) should be changed to incorporate a specific requirement that 
there must be some evidence of basic facts to demonstrate why a court should accept ‘a data 
message made by a person in the ordinary course of business’ that is ‘certified to be correct’ 
by an ‘officer’ of the business as ‘proof of facts contained in such record, copy, printout or 
extract’. Evidence of ‘correctness’ will not always be required. However, suitable procedural 
mechanisms can be put in place to allow a party to require relevant evidence of ‘correctness’ 
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where it is challenged and argued that the proponent of the evidence should not benefit from 
the presumption in s 15(4).153 
 
(b) Evidential weight of electronic evidence 
A data message must according to s 15(2) of the ECT Act 2002 be given ‘due evidential 
weight’. In assessing the evidential weight of a data message, s 15(3) of the Act requires that 
regard must be had to ‘the reliability of the manner in which the data message was generated, 
stored or communicated’; ‘the reliability of the manner in which the integrity of the data 
message was maintained’; ‘the manner in which its originator was identified’ and ‘any other 
relevant factor.’ The manner in which the technology is operated may have an impact on the 
weight to be attributed to its output such that the evidential value thereof might be less than 
what it otherwise would have been. As such, the probative value of the electronic evidence is 
applicable to the s 15(3) considerations particularly those relating to the manner in which the 
electronic evidence ‘was generated, stored or communicated’ and the reliability of the manner 
in which its integrity was maintained.154 As regards the assessment of the evidential weight of 
a data message, the use of terms such as ‘integrity’ and ‘reliability’ referred to in  
s 15(3) to an extent go beyond a simple showing chain of custody to demonstrating that the 
electronic evidence was ‘generated, stored or communicated’ within a reliable system or 
process:  
‘Integrity: this relates to how sound the data is, such as whether the data is damaged in some 
way, and whether it is complete, in that it possesses all the necessary parts and links. Integrity 
is not an absolute condition, but is a state of relationships, and whether the burden of proof will 
be achieved in any individual case will depend on the strength of the relationships to the data.  
Reliability: this is the capacity of a digital object to stand for the facts to which it purports to 
attest, which in turn is linked to ensuring sufficient procedural and technical attributes 
(including a combination of preventative measures, such as to prevent unauthorized 
amendments and changes, and verification measures to provide for a degree of assurance as to 
the identity of users and the provision of audit trails to the document when data is viewed and 
manipulated) are in place and working to provide for a degree of assurance that the digital 
 
153 Ibid at 192. 
154 See La Consortium & Vending supra note 34.  
 209 
object can be deemed to be reliable. In essence, reliability is associated with the degree of 
control exercised over the procedures that permit the data to be created. It is not absolute.’155   
In Firstrand Bank Limited v Venter, the court considered s 15(3) of the ECT Act 2002, 
the appellant (the bank) sued the respondent (Mr Venter) in the magistrate's court for the 
balance of an overdrawn current account together with interest.156 The bank relied on the 
evidence of the bank manager who allegedly concluded an oral agreement to open the 
respondent’s current account. Its only other witness was Ms Cawood, a commercial recovery 
analyst, employed by the bank in the recoveries department, and who produced and spoke to a 
certificate signed by herself in purported compliance with s 15(4) of the ECT Act 2002.157 The 
magistrate gave judgment for the bank. Mr Venter appealed, successfully, to the North Gauteng 
High Court. The principal findings of the court a quo included inter alia: (i) the bank manager 
was ‘not a credible witness at all. He blatantly lied at stages and he was evasive and vague on 
aspects he as bank manager should have been acquainted with’; (ii) the bank did not ‘succeed 
in proving the correct amount of its claim against Mr Venter either as to capital or interest’; 
and (iii) the evidence of Ms Cawood was ‘confusing’ and ‘insufficient to identify Mr Venter's 
bank account or the entries in it, and did not establish that the bank statements on which the 
bank relied had been prepared by any person on its behalf or had been computer-generated as 
contemplated in the Act.’158 On appeal by the bank, the order of the court a quo in favour of 
Mr Venter was set aside, and it was held that ‘the magistrate's approach … was correct and the 
appeal to the high court should not have succeeded.’159 In assessing the weight to be attached 
in the application of s 15(3) )(a), (b) and (c), the Supreme Court of Appeal Court found the 
following of relevance to the Bank successfully establishing the quantum of its claim as 
computed: ‘(1) the bank sent monthly statements detailing the state of the account to Mr Venter; 
(2) [Mr Venter], as he conceded, received the statements and perused them carefully; he did 
not testify that the statements differed in any way from those proved by Ms Cawood nor did 
he claim that any part was overlooked or unintelligible to him; (3) each month's statement 
contained details of all debits and credits including his overdraft limit, bank costs, credit and 
debit interest rates on balances, VAT, service fees, ATM charges and cash handling and deposit 
 
155 S Mason & A Stanfield ‘Authenticating electronic evidence’in S Mason & D Seng (eds) Electronic Evidence 
4ed (2017) 193 at 195-96 (emphasis in original text). 
156 Supra note 44 para 3.  
157 Supra note 44 para 3.  
158 Supra note 44 para 4.  
159 Supra note 44 para 17.  
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fees; (4) the defendant did not query any aspect of the account until long after the event, subject 
to what I shall have to say below.’160 
A valid challenge to evidential weight may render the electronic evidence inadmissible, 
just as a robust defence of evidential weight of electronic evidence may preserve its 
admissibility.161 Challenges to evidential weight can include that the records have not remained 
‘complete and unaltered’ from ‘the time when it was first generated  in its final form’162 as 
evidence; concerns regarding the reliability of the system or process that ‘generated, stored or 
communicated’ 163  the electronic evidence; or disputing the identity of the author or 
‘originator’164 of the electronic evidence.165 In assessing evidential weight in terms of s 15, a 
court may well rely on expert evidence.166 The court may also take upon the role of setting out 
instructions, in detail the nature of the action, a proponent of electronic evidence ought to 
undertake to establish evidential weight of electronic evidence. For example, the instructions 
set out, in a United States District Court, by Catoe MJ in Koosharem Corporation v SPEC 
Personnel, LLC167 are a useful guide. The court ordered a forensic examination of business and 
personal computers in a lengthy and detailed 20-point court issued protocol as a result of 
incomplete responses to discovery requests and contentions of irregularities in the emails that 
were produced that called into question the authenticity of the documents. The defendants 
produced approximately 1,936 pages of emails in response to the plaintiffs' discovery requests. 
According to the plaintiffs, many emails were missing their attachments and further it was 
contended ‘that not a single email produced by the defendants was an accurate copy of the 
original email, as the date and time stamp on every email had been modified to reflect the dates 
the emails were compiled rather than the dates they were sent.’168 The court agreed with the 
plaintiff’s motion for a forensic analysis and set out, inter alia, the following procedure for 
conducting the requested discovery and forensic analysis: (a) forensic analysis and data 
recovery to be conducted by an expert forensics firm; (b) the expert will conduct a search or 
run other appropriate programs to determine whether any emails or documents have been 
 
160 Supra note 44 para 7.  
161 Mason & Stanfield op cit note 155 at 196. 
162 Section 14, ECT Act 2002. 
163 Section 15(3)(a), ECT Act 2002. 
164 Section 15(3)(c), ECT Act 2002. 
165 Mason & Stanfield op cit note 155 at 196-97. 
166 See Jafta v Ezemvelo KZN Wildlife (2009) 30 ILJ 131 (LC) where the court considered the evidence of 
experts in the context of s 15 of the ECT Act 2002. 
167 United States District Court, D. South Carolina, Greenville Division Sep 29, 2008 Civil Action No. 6:08-
583-HFF-WMC (D.S.C. Sep. 29, 2008). 
168 Supra note 167 at 3-4.  
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deleted, destroyed, altered, or otherwise compromised and whether any programs have been 
installed that would alter, destroy, erase, modify, or otherwise compromise any portion of each 
computer or its contents for the specified period; (c) the expert will securely maintain the 
original data recovered in order to establish a chain of custody; (d) the expert will recover only 
the documents and email account or accounts used by individuals identified; (e) defendants’ 
counsel will review the data to identify any privileged or personal emails that it seeks to 
withhold from document production.169 
In certain defined circumstances, proof of facts by way of affidavit or certificate may 
also assist the court in assessing evidential weight. Some guidance can be obtained from South 
African case law dealing with accuracy and reliability of instruments such as those involving 
speed-trapping and breathe analyses. There are conflicting decisions, for example, as to how 
the accuracy of a gas chromatograph may be proved, and if the state may prove the accuracy 
of a gas chromatograph by way of a certificate in terms of s 212(4) of the CPA 51 of 1977. In 
S v Ross,170 Bozalek J held that proof of the proper calibration of the measuring instrument 
used could not be proved in terms of a 212(4) affidavit. In S v Van der Sandt,171 the court took 
a more judicious approach with a finding that s 212 (4) allows for the admission of an affidavit 
or certificate as prima facie proof of the facts stated therein:  
‘The section does not contain any indication that the requirements of proof of trustworthiness 
and correctness have thereby been jettisoned. There is no reason to do so. The purpose of the 
section is to obviate viva voce evidence in every case where this type of evidence is necessary, 
not to introduce a new type of evidence, viz expert factual evidence of a result without 
explanation or clarification. As stated in S v Dickenson (supra at 96A – C) this is not opinion 
evidence where the facts upon which the opinion is based must be set out with such detail as to 
enable the court to draw its own conclusion. Nevertheless an expert who utilises an instrument 
of measurement which is outside the scope of judicial notice should name it and explain its 
operation and why it is trustworthy. Proof of reliability can be dispensed with in cases where 
there is a high degree of likelihood that the machine is accurate or because it has been tested. 
Where the test entails the use of a yardstick, proof that it has been assized is normally accepted 
as evidence of correctness thereof. S v Mthimkulu (supra at 763G – 764G).’172 
 
169 Supra note 167 at 3-4.  
170 2013 (1) SACR 77 (WCC). 
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On the issue of whether the certificate must deal with the calibration of the instrument 
used against assized units of measure, Van Dijkhorst J held:  
‘A court of law should be practical. If a court can take judicial notice of  hearsay evidence about 
assized scales, as was done in S v Mthimkulu (supra), there can be no serious objection to 
judicial notice of the fact that there is a high likelihood that scientists in designated government 
laboratories when calibrating their instruments will do so against correct standards. The mere 
allegation of proper calibration will in my view be adequate prima facie proof thereof. This 
conclusion is in conformity with the wording of s 212(4) which requires no more than that the 
process be set out.’173 
The interpretation by Van Dijkhorst J is correct, and was appropriately followed in S v 
Eke.174 The appellant on a charge of drunk driving challenged the accuracy and  reliability of 
the blood specimen measurement process; namely, whether the instruments used to analyse the 
blood sample (gas chromatographs) had been properly calibrated before the sample was 
analysed. The appellant’s challenge was dismissed in the absence of evidence to rebut or 
challenge the certificate, its contents, having been prima facie proof, became conclusive 
proof.175 The court held that appellant must adduce evidence to counter the prima facie value 
of evidence provided by the state.176 The court noted that s 212 provided three cogent routes 
to do so: (a) she could have applied to the court below to exercise its discretion in terms of s 
212(12) to have the analyst subpoenaed to give oral evidence; (b) she could have herself 
subpoenaed the analyst to testify; and (c) if she had a factual basis to cast doubt on the accuracy 
of the result (that it could not be accurate because she consumed no alcohol at the time) she 
could have testified or called witnesses.177 
The court may also rely on technical processes as a means of assessing integrity and 
reliability. In determining whether the proponent of electronic evidence has met the evidential 
 
173 Supra note 171 at 136. 
174 2016 (1) SACR 135 (ECG). 
175 In S v Britz 1994 (2) SACR 687 (W), Eloff JP held that the mere fact that the appellant challenged the 
correctness of a s 212(4) certificate ‘is not sufficient to affect the prima facie value of the certificate’, and that 
the weight of the s 212(4) certificate ‘is only affected if there is proof to the contrary. The appellant has to 
adduce evidence to counter the prima facie value of the certificate.’ (at 690). 
176 As referred in support in Eke’s case, in Ex parte the Minister of Justice: In re R v Jacobson and Levy 1931 
AD 466 at 478-79, Stratford JA held: ‘Prima facie evidence in its usual sense is used to mean prima facie proof 
of an issue, the burden of proving which is upon the party giving that evidence. In the absence of further 
evidence from the other side, the prima facie proof becomes conclusive proof and the party giving it discharges 
his onus.’ Further, in S v Veldthuizen 1982 (3) SA 413 (A) at 416, Diemont JA held that the words ‘prima 
facie evidence’ used in s 212(4) were not to be ‘brushed aside or minimised’ and that they meant ‘that the 
judicial officer will accept the evidence as prima facie proof of the issue and, in the absence of other credible 
evidence, that that prima facie proof will become conclusive proof.’ 
177 Van der Sandt’s case supra note 171 at 146-47. 
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foundations of authenticating the evidence, a range of factors may need to be taken into account 
by the court, covering some or all of the technical processes associated with the preservation 
of electronic information.178 Authentication rests on being able to prove that the electronic 
evidence is what it purports to represent ‘and that it has not been altered or corrupted in such a 
way as to invalidate its evidential meaning.’179  The technical aspects of proving the evidential 
weight of electronic evidence on Rothenberg’s ‘archival principle of provenance’ means to 
provide ‘evidence of their origin, authorship, and context of generation, and then by proving 
that the records have been maintained by an unbroken chain of custodianship in which they 
have not been corrupted.’180 Rothenberg’s proposition is based on two conditions: ‘first, that 
an unbroken chain of custodianship has been maintained; and second, that no inappropriate 
modifications have been made to the records during that custodianship.’181 He points to the 
challenges:  
‘The first of these conditions is only a way of supplying indirect evidence for the second, which 
is the one that really matters. An unbroken chain of custodianship does not in itself prove that 
records have not been corrupted, whereas if we could prove that records had not been corrupted, 
there would be no logical need to establish that custodianship had been maintained. However, 
since it is difficult to obtain direct proof that records have not been corrupted, evidence of an 
unbroken chain of custodianship serves, at least for traditional records, as a surrogate for such 
proof.’ 182 
On the second of the two conditions above, that ‘no inappropriate modifications’ have 
been made to electronic evidence, a question that arises in the court’s assessment of evidential 
weight: will circumstantial indicators of authenticity suffice, or is more conclusive proof 
required for evidential weight in the assessment of reliability as it relates to the manner in 
which the electronic evidence was ‘was generated, stored or communicated’ and ‘the manner 
in which the integrity’ of electronic evidence was maintained?183 In my view, the threshold for 
evidential weight must be the same as for any other form of evidence: there must be prima 
facie evidence to support the claim.184 It is an issue that must be determined on the fact of each 
case, after all, the nature of evidence available to a court to make a determination on evidential 
 
178 Mason & Stanfield op cit note 155 at 199. 
179 J Rothenberg ‘Preserving authentic digital information’ (2000) available at https://www.clir.org/pubs/reports 
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183 As envisaged in s 15(3) of the ECT Act 2002. 
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weight will differ from case to case: [f]or instance, the print-out from a mainframe computer 
will demand a different approach in comparison to the data held on a personal computer; this 
in turn will be different if data is stored with a cloud service provider. The mainframe computer 
cannot be removed, so reliance must be placed on the print-outs and relevant expert evidence, 
which in turn raises the question of how is the reliability of the mainframe to be tested.’185 It is 
not always necessary to obtain ‘intricate details’ of a computer or similar device and its 
operating system before electronic evidence may be accepted into evidence, and the means by 
which the evidence is authenticated may not necessarily require the evidence of a qualified 
expert.186 
Proving evidential weight of electronic communications is possible through the use of 
compelling circumstantial evidence. Circumstantial evidence of the evidence itself has been 
frequently used to authenticate email, as the content of what the email says can often 
authenticate it.187 Another way of locating circumstantial evidence of the electronic evidence 
itself is by certain technical processes associated with the record. This involves unique 
identifiers attached to electronic information which also provides distinguishing information 
about the electronic evidence that can be used to verify, or challenge claims of reliability and 
integrity. This includes, for example, hash marks and time/date-stamps.188 To an extent, the 
 
185 Ibid at 277. 
186 Ibid at 216. As in the case of DPP v Brian Meehan 1 [2006] IECCA 104, [2006] 3 IR 468, the Republic of 
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187 See In the Interest of FP, a Minor 878 A.2d 91 (Pa Super 2005) where transcripts of instant messages 
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Okunick and U Viebeg ‘Long-term security for signed documents: Services, protocols and data structures’ in 
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technical focus of proving evidential weight ‘is to have checks and balances in place to 
demonstrate the history of how the data have been managed, which leads to the assertion that 
the data have not been modified, replaced or corrupted and must, therefore, be trustworthy.’189 
Although these technical processes are not without risks and standing alone may not be proof 
of wrongdoing,190 the information linked to electronic evidence can be an effective means of 
supporting an assertion that the electronic evidence has not been altered in any way. 
An argument often made in support of heightened standards for admissibility of 
electronic evidence is that any modifications or alterations to electronic evidence is difficult, if 
not impossible, to detect. As regards the use of digital images for example, it has been argued 
that ‘new authentication standards tailored to compensate for the susceptibilities inherent in 
digital imaging technology’191 should be adopted because ‘[t]he lack of an “original” for 
comparison with the offered image reduces the opportunity to verify that the image has not 
been altered or has only been altered in an acceptable manner, thereby increasing the likelihood 
that changes will not be discovered unless the proponent of the image reveals them.’192 This 
may not create much concern for evidence in a conventional paper-based format, which can be 
stored and retrieved as it was originally created. Electronic evidence, by nature of its 
computerised medium, may be transferred to another storage media or migrated to another 
form of software causing the evidence to undergo changes. This illustrates the need to pay 
careful attention to the manner in which electronic evidence is authenticated, more than 
whether it is the original or copy of the original. 
This is not a problematic issue in South African domestic law because whether or not 
an original exists ‘the rules of evidence must not be applied so as to deny the admissibility of 
a data message, in evidence … if it is the best evidence that the person adducing it could 
reasonably be expected to obtain, on the grounds that it is not in its original form.’193 Section 
14 of the ECT Act 2002 provides that electronic evidence satisfies the requirements of original 
form if it meets the conditions set out in that section. These are in terms of s 14(1)(a) that ‘the 
 
189 Mason & Stanfield op cit note 155 at 196. 
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of digital images’ (2002) 10 Journal of L and Policy 267 at 294. 
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193 Section 15(1)(b). 
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integrity of the information from the time when it was first generated  in its final form as a data 
message’ has passed assessment in terms of s 14(2) and, secondly, in terms of s 14(1)(b), ‘that 
information is capable of being displayed or produced to the person to whom it is to be 
presented.’ As regards the first requirement, s 14(2) provides that the integrity of electronic 
evidence must be assessed: ‘(a) by considering whether the information has remained complete 
and unaltered, except for the addition of any endorsement and any change which arises in the 
normal course of communication, storage and display; (b) in light of the purpose for which the 
information was generated; and (c) having regard to all other relevant circumstances.’ The 
terms of a s 14(2)(a) assessment aligns with definitions of integrity that refer to electronic 
evidence that ‘has not been altered in an unauthorised manner since the time it was created, 
transmitted, or stored by an authorised source.’194 The integrity of electronic evidence as such 
refers to the soundness and completeness of the evidence over time, or in transit, and whether 
it can be considered to be unaltered and uncorrupted in all material aspects. 195 The integrity of 
electronic evidence may also be demonstrated by records found embedded in the evidence itself 
or embedded in the accompanying communications data.196 
In order for integrity to exist and be demonstrated in terms of the statutory framework, 
it should not require that the electronic evidence be exactly the same ‘from the time when it 
was first generated in its final form’ as electronic evidence.197 In other words, integrity should 
not be absolute. For example, traditional physical paper documents with the passage of time 
may subject the physical features of the paper document to deterioration and loss (e.g. faded 
signatures or print). However, while the physical integrity of the paper document may be 
compromised, the paper document is essentially completed and uncorrupted if the articulation 
of the content of the document and any required annotations remain the same.198 Similarly with 
electronic evidence based in a computerised medium, technological obsolescence and media 
fragility may affect the features of the evidence ‘in the normal course of communication, 
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storage and display.199 This does not affect the integrity of electronic evidence. If there has 
been any change to the electronic evidence, the assessment of integrity is whether the evidence 
has remained materially complete and unaltered. In essence, the ability to prove evidential 
weight ‘is not [about] proving that an “original” exists’…[t]he issue is about trust, or the lack 
of trust.’200 It means ‘providing sufficient evidence to convince an adjudicator that the object 
that has been retrieved is a faithful representation of what is claimed to be the “original” or a 
reliable representation of the object that was relied upon by the originator.’201 
 
V CONCLUSION 
Notwithstanding the issues raised above, South African law has achieved its ‘enabling 
character’202 in the ECT Act 2002 ‘by ousting evidence rules which would exclude electronic 
evidence purely because of its electronic origin.’203 The introduction of electronic evidence in 
criminal legal proceedings raises unique challenges in the South African law on evidence. The 
meaning and application of s 15, insofar as it applies to electronic evidence as hearsay or real 
evidence, or both, is a key and controversial issue. I am of the view that a proper construction 
of s 15 should not preclude a rule of admissibility for all electronic evidence, irrespective of 
hearsay representations contained therein. Support of such a construction is made even stronger 
by the the application of s 15(4) as a rebuttable presumption of law in terms of which an 
assumption which is demanded by law must be accepted by the court in the absence of evidence 
or proof to the contrary. 204  If fact-based issues of authenticity and integrity can be 
‘substantively satisfied’ then hearsay as an exclusionary rule of evidence should no longer be 
warranted for electronic evidence based on the scope of inquiry in s 15(1) to (3). The issue of 
whether electronic evidence should more appropriately be dealt with as documentary evidence 
or as real evidence has challenged the courts. To an extent, it has resulted in the issues regarding 
admissibility of electronic evidence being approached from the premise of authenticity and 
integrity as a pre-requisite to admissibility. I have argued that this is not an appropriate 
approach. The preferred approach is aligned to the ECT Act 2002, which should not require as 
a condition of admissibility, that electronic evidence be authenticated. Stringent tests relating 
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to authenticity, integrity and truth or reliability of any information recorded in or reflected by 
the electronic evidence should not apply for admissibility purposes. I have proposed for the 
presumption in s 15(4) of the ECT Act 2002 to be reconsidered in South African law. 
Consideration must be given to more fully understanding meaning of the words ‘certified to be 
correct’. This means that s 15(4) should be changed to incorporate a specific requirement that 
there must be some evidence of basic facts to demonstrate why a court should accept ‘a data 
message made by a person in the ordinary course of business’ that is ‘certified to be correct’ 
by an ‘officer’ of the business as ‘proof of facts contained in such record, copy, printout or 
extract’. 
On matters of evidential weight, given the different format and applications in which 
electronic evidence exists, there is no ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach to weight that will work and 
a range of evidential issues may arise depending on the nature of the evidence and source of 
its origin. The concept of ‘original’ and circumstantial indicators for reliability of electronic 
evidence itself provide useful tools for a court’s assessment of evidential weight of electronic 
evidence. It is hoped that statutory reform initiatives will provide detailed guidelines and 
technical procedures for the judiciary and practitioners alike on the type of evidence that may 
be produced to establish the authenticity and integrity of electronic evidence. It is argued that 
while authentication standards for electronic evidence appear to vary from a moderate approach 
to a ‘most demanding’, calls for heightened standards of admissibility in relation to accuracy 
and authenticity should be rejected. While a robust consideration of authentication is required, 
I believe it should not be subject to stringent tests that makes it difficult for authentic electronic 
evidence to be admitted into evidence. The necessary safeguards after all are to be found in the 




I INFORMING THE DEBATE 
A central premise of the thesis is that evolving technological phenomena can and do present 
challenges to existing legal concepts on evidence and the investigatory powers of law 
enforcement and the security and intelligence agencies to obtain electronic evidence and for its 
admissibility in criminal proceedings. In the analysis I have critically described the legal, 
factual and technological debates of certain key investigative powers and evidential issues in 
the context of whether South African law has developed appropriately in response to 
advancements in technology or in ways that are cause for concern. 
In doing so, I have analysed through key themes and arguments the challenges of 
regulating investigative powers and electronic evidence in an era of evolving technological 
phenomena: (i) how those investigative powers are used in practise by law enforcement and 
security and intelligence agencies, with a focus on interception (chapter two), acquisition and 
retention of communications data (chapter three), and access to encrypted information (chapter 
four); (ii) issues relating to transparency and oversight in the legal framework that governs the 
use of those powers; (iii) the importance of privacy in the information age, ensuring safeguards 
and necessary and proportionate limitations; (iv) technology, by considering the information 
age and a modern fast-paced environment of technological advancements as the setting in 
which the law currently operates, from new capabilities in relation to encryption, 
communication, connectivity, devices and data; and (v) a consideration of what the law could 
be. I also considered interesting questions in the law of evidence on the impact of electronic 
evidence in criminal proceedings in terms of two issues, admissibility and its weight (chapter 
five). In the final analysis, the debates feature arguments for ‘more and fewer capabilities, more 
and fewer safeguards.’1 As observed by Bartlett: 
‘On one side there are civil liberties groups demanding increased privacy and transparency; on 
the other there are securocrats and law-enforcement spokesmen, under pressure to keep us safe 
and facing a bewildering array of security threats, insisting they need to monitor more of our 
online behaviour ... The debate is lurching between these nightmarish poles: we can choose a 
 
1 D Anderson QC A question of trust report of the Investigative Powers Review (2015) Independent Reviewer of 
Terrorism Legislation available at www.gov.uk/government/publications, accessed 17 May 2016 at 245. 
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dystopia where our every move is secretly monitored, recorded and analysed, or a world where 
criminals are able to do what they like.’2  
Albeit, the exaggerated rhetoric of Bartlett, if one thing is certain: technology has 
exposed the current frameworks in South African law in the context of the investigative powers 
of law enforcement and security and intelligence agencies to obtain electronic evidence, and 
its subsequent admissibility in criminal proceedings. Access to information is unprecedented 
and intelligence is shared in ways that neither the state nor the public predicted. Disturbingly, 
in ways that have been found to be unlawful and unconstitutional. Despite being brought to 
light by commissions, committees, the courts and civil rights organisations, both international 
and local, including significant findings of ‘unlawful and unconstitutional’ 3  surveillance 
practices, reports of such unlawful activities continue to emerge in post-democratic South 
Africa.4 Informed discussion continues to be hampered by indications that the intelligence 
agencies appear to remain hopelessly politicised,5 with weak accountability, excessive secrecy, 
with the added failure of the state to implement changes in law despite concerns of illegalities 
brought to its attention. 
The benefits, and harm, of controversial and intrusive capabilities now available to law 
enforcement and security and intelligence agencies triggers a range of issues and challenges 
for individual rights, including how those capabilities are used in investigative activities, the 
scale of their use, the extent to which such capabilities intrude on privacy rights, legislative 
authority for their use and safeguards that constrain and regulate such new technological 
capabilities. The silence of the majority of the state is no longer defensible, nor can the 
necessity of further law reform continue to be ignored. Several aspects of Regulation of 
Interception of Communications and Provision of Communication-Related Information Act 70 
of 20026 have now been found by the High Court of South Africa to be ‘deficient in meeting 
the threshold required by s 36 of the Constitution to justify the subtraction of the rights in ss 
14 [privacy], 16(1) [rights to freedom of expression and of the media], and 34 [rights of access 
 
2 Ibid at 245 quoting J Bartlett Orwell vs Terrorists: Crypto-wars and the future of surveillance (2015).  
3 See ‘Ministerial Review Commission Intelligence in a Constitutional Democracy 10 September 2008 Final 
Report to the Minster for Intelligence Services, the Honourable Mr Ronnie Kasrils MP (hereafter ‘The 
Matthews Commission’) at 180 available at http://www.lse.ac.uk/international-development/Assets/Documents/ 
PDFs/csrc-background-papers /Intelligence-In-a-Constitutional-Democracy.pdf, accessed 05 January 2016. 
4 See earlier chapter 1 at 32 for incidents cited by amaBhungane Centre for Investigative Journalism in its legal 
challenge to the constitutionality of RICA 2002. 
5 See also chapter 2 at 91 where the Supreme Court of Appeal in Zuma v Democratic Alliance and Others 2018 
(1) SA 200 (SCA) noted with ‘unsettling’ concern ‘that different law enforcement agencies of government 
appear to be spying upon each other.’ 
6 Hereafter ‘RICA 2002’. 
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to a court] and 35(5) [rights to a fair trial] of the Constitution.’7 Bulk surveillance activities 
was declared unlawful and invalid ‘for want of a law authorising it to take place.’8 Those 
aspects of RICA declared inconsistent with the Constitution included: ss 16(7), 17(6), 18(3)(a), 
19(6), 20(6), 21(6) and 22(7) in that it failed to prescribe procedures for user notification;9 the 
definition of ‘designated judge’ in that it failed to prescribe an appointment mechanism and 
terms which ensure independence of the designated judge;10 s 16(7) for its failure to adequately 
provide a system of appropriate safeguards to deal with orders that are granted ex parte;11 ss 
35 and 37 for their failure to prescribe proper procedures for handling, destruction and retention 
arrangements for data obtained through interceptions;12 and ss 16(5), 17(4), 19(4), 21(4)(a), 
and 22(4)(b) for their failure to prescribe procedures for the protection of sensitive information, 
including legal privilege and journalistic information in relation to sources.13 Therefore, at the 
very least, legislative amendments to RICA 2002 or new legislation will have to remedy the 
above defects in law. 
The rest of the chapter contains a summary of my proposals for change that have been 
detailed in the preceding chapters. Below I reiterate my proposals for a legislative solution with 
a focus on the overall importance of clear and accessible laws that avoids different sets of rules 
in different legislation covering essentially the same intrusive power. It is proposed that such 
powers should only be exercised when it is strictly necessary in fulfilment of a legally 
prescribed mandate. Clearly drafted legislative provisions should provide a unified approach 
to bulk surveillance measures: in doing so  special care must be taken to minimise the impact 
on the constitutional rights of individuals, especially those whom are in no way implicated in 
an operation. There should be enhanced safeguards and procedures when sensitive rights are 
in issue such as the rights of journalists not to disclose their sources and the rights of 
lawyers/clients in privileged legal communications. It is essential that there is a clear and 
comprehensive system for the independent authorisation, transparency and oversight of the use 
of any measure that restricts constitutional rights. Individuals whose constitutional rights have 
been infringed must be able to seek an effective remedy. I have expressed the view that 
 
7 amaBhungane Centre for Investigative Journalism NPC and SP Sole v Minister of Justice and Correctional 
Services and Others Case No: 25978/2017 (16 September 2019) para 167, subject to confirmation by the 
Constitutional Court. The declaration of invalidity is suspended for two years to allow Parliament to cure the 
defects in law, and in some instances, interim relief was proposed by the court.  
8 See chapters 1, 2, and 3. Supra note 7 paras 143-166.  
9 Supra note 7 paras 41-54.  
10 Supra note 7 paras 55-71.  
11 Supra note 7 paras 72-83.  
12 Supra note 7 paras 84-108.  
13 Supra note 7 paras 109-142.  
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notification to a suspect/target of an interception direction should be by default, which would 
allow such individuals to pursue a challenge of legality retrospectively even in circumstances 
where exercise of such investigative power was deemed within rights limitations. Although my 
proposals below in Part II are done in the context of acquisition and retention of 
communications data, the key principles identified would equally apply across the other types 
of investigative powers identified. 
 
II A FORWARD-LOOKING AND TRANSPARENT LEGAL FRAMEWORK IN 
SOUTH AFRICAN LAW 
 
(a) Principles for a new legal framework 
Policy debates in the context of the challenges of continued technological advancements and 
the complexity of electronic evidence frequently lack clarity. Underlying most of the criticisms 
of existing investigative powers is a fundamental concern regarding their  scope and breadth in 
an environment dominated in the information age by connectivity, data and devices. The 
volume of information and data now being generated has the potential to give law enforcement 
and the security and intelligence agencies unprecedented access to personal information from 
a wide range of individuals, most of whom are unlikely to be of interest in any criminal matter, 
unless privacy protections and safeguards are robust in the modern technology environment. 
Successive governments in South Africa from 1994 onwards have supported the 
compulsory retention of communications data by telecommunication service providers. A key 
lesson for South African law from European jurisprudence is that ‘discretion afforded’ to the 
state in operating an electronic surveillance regime ‘must necessarily be narrower.’ There can 
no longer be untargeted and indiscriminate mandatory retention of communications data, 
without suspicion and for everyone. Specifically on retention of communications data, I 
propose that there should be the introduction of targeted retention orders in a new legal 
framework. In other words, any direction for data retention must be linked to a legitimate aim 
and not have blanket application. A legitimate purpose may include, the interests of disruption, 
detection and investigation of criminal activity, specifically of serious offences or in the 
interests of national security or compelling national economic interests. In the joined cases of 
Digital Rights Ireland Ltd (C-293/12) and Kärntner Landesregierung and 
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Others (C-594/12),14 the court was explicit in its view that that the retention of data by the 
adopted European Union Directive ‘constituted a particularly serious interference with those 
rights’ of privacy and data protection.15 The court provided a number of reasons. First, while 
the court noted that the obligation in terms of the Directive ‘does not permit the retention of 
the content of the communication or of information consulted using an electronic 
communications network’ it regarded that ‘[t]hose data, taken as a whole, may allow very 
precise conclusions to be drawn concerning the private lives of the persons whose data has 
been retained, such as the habits of everyday life, permanent or temporary places of residence, 
daily or other movements, the activities carried out, the social relationships of those persons 
and the social environments frequented by them.’16  
Second, the court found that the ‘the directive requires the retention of all traffic data 
concerning fixed telephony, mobile telephony, Internet access, Internet e-mail and Internet 
telephony. It therefore applies to all means of electronic communication, the use of which is 
very widespread and of growing importance in people’s everyday lives.’17 Furthermore, as the 
directive ‘covers all subscribers and registered users’ it effectively ‘entails an interference with 
the fundamental rights of practically the entire European population.’18 Third, while seeking 
‘to contribute to the fight against serious crime’ the directive ‘does not require any relationship 
between the data whose retention is provided for and a threat to public security.’ and, in 
particular, it is not restricted to a retention in relation ‘and/or to a circle of particular persons 
likely to be involved, in one way or another, in a serious crime’ or ‘to persons who could, for 
other reasons, contribute, by the retention of their data, to the prevention, detection or 
prosecution of serious offences.’19 Fourth, the court spoke of the need for ‘clear and precise 
rules governing the scope and application of the measure in question and imposing minimum 
safeguards so that the persons whose data have been retained have sufficient guarantees to 
effectively protect their personal data against the risk of abuse and against any unlawful access 
and use of that data.’20 The court found that the need for such safeguards was ‘all the greater’, 
as in the adopted directive, where ‘personal data are subjected to automatic processing and 
where there is a significant risk of unlawful access to those data.’21 Finally, ‘as far as concerns 
 
14 CJEU (08 April 2014) para 26-27 (emphasis added). See chapter 3 at 111-13 
15 Supra note 14 para 39.  
16 Supra note 14 para 27.  
17 Supra note 14 para 56.  
18 Supra note 14 para 56.  
19 Supra note 14 para 57.  
20 Supra note 14 para 54.  
21 Supra note 14 para 55.  
 224 
the rules relating to the security and protection of data retained by providers of publicly 
available electronic communications services or of public communications networks’ the court 
was concerned that the directive did not ‘lay down rules which are specific and adapted to (i) 
the vast quantity of data whose retention is required by that directive, (ii) the sensitive nature 
of that data and (iii) the risk of unlawful access to that data, rules which would serve, in 
particular, to govern the protection and security of the data in question in a clear and strict 
manner in order to ensure their full integrity and confidentiality.’22  
In considering a new legal framework for the compulsory retention of communications 
data by telecommunication service providers, the South African state could address the above 
list of shortcomings by the European Court of Justice and ensure that any new law in this regard 
provides various safeguards against unauthorised access to and use of communications data. 
This will include safeguards on storing, accessing, examining, using and destroying 
communications data, such that it provides adequate safeguards against abuse of treatment of 
personal data and thus serve to protect individuals’ personal integrity. These safeguards would 
equally apply to intercepted data, targeted and in bulk. This could similarly be the state’s 
response to the outcomes of the amaBhungane case referred earlier. The state ‘could take a 
superficial view’23 of both decisions, and regard it as cases in which the European Court of 
Justice and High Court of South Africa found provisions in Directive 2006/24 and RICA 2002 
respectively to be incompatible with various rights because it did not provide sufficient 
safeguards against unlawful access to that data or impose adequate limitations on data 
retention. Effectively, it would be ‘a superficial response to a superficial reading’24 to both case 
judgments.  As Roberts argues, the judgment of the European Court of Justice ‘has wider 
significance.’25 I agree, and so too does the decision of the High Court of South Africa. Both 
judgments address the ‘fundamental questions regarding the acceptable limits of mass 
surveillance and the function of the right to privacy, and we need to consider how it might be 
understood in this broader context and its implications for the relationship between the state 
and citizens (rights-holders).’26 A key balancing principle is that investigative powers need to 
be limited in the interests of privacy rights. 
 
22 Supra note 14 para 66.  
23 A Roberts ‘Privacy, data retention and domination: Digital Rights Ireland Ltd v Minister for Communications 
(2015) 78.3 The Modern Law Review 535 at 539-40. 
24 Ibid at 544.  
25 Ibid at 540.  
26 Ibid.  
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I therefore propose that the outcomes of both decisions reflect a fundamental concern 
regarding the scope and breadth of these investigatory powers in a modern fast-paced 
environment of technological advancements, and need for safeguards against ‘arbitrary 
interference.’27 Lord Sumption in United Kingdom case of R (P) v Secretary of State for Justice 
concluded that the need for safeguards against ‘arbitrary’ interference with individual rights, is 
a reference ‘to safeguards essential to the rule of law because they protect against the abuse of 
imprecise rules or unfettered discretionary powers.’28 Earlier in the judgment he noted: 
‘... An excessively broad discretion in the application of a measure infringing the right of 
privacy is likely to amount to an exercise of power unconstrained by law. It cannot therefore 
be in accordance with law unless there are sufficient safeguards, exercised on known legal 
principles, against the arbitrary exercise of that discretion, so as to make its application 
reasonably foreseeable.’29 
This is an opportunity for the South African state to not only address ‘declarations of 
invalidity’ of certain provisions in RICA 2002, but to do so within the context of  the ‘wider 
significance’ of the relationship between the state and its citizens in investigative powers 
legislation.30 It is not enough to say ‘trust us’.31 Concerns about the use of arbitrary power by 
law enforcement and security and intelligence agencies are well documented. Reports indicate 
that unlawful surveillance practices are only revealed by accident, or by information leaks, 
public interest litigation or whistleblowing. As such, the need for transparency and clear legal 
powers are fundamental as a new legal framework is being considered by the state, or at the 
very least legislative amendments to RICA 2002. Some of the intrusive investigative powers 
by law enforcement and security and intelligence agencies, specifically bulk surveillance, do 
not find clear and explicit basis for their use in RICA 2002 or any other legislation. This will 
need to be rectified. Different safeguards and authorising mechanisms based on types of data 
deemed less intrusive than others, and therefore more easily accessible by law enforcement and 
security and intelligence agencies, as set out in RICA 2002, will also need to be reconsidered. 
A legal framework designed in 2002 may have survived almost two decades through a 
technology neutral approach that ensured flexibility and agility in meeting the investigatory 
 
27 Roman Zakharov v Russia EctHR 47143/06 (4 December 2015) para 230. See also The Queen (on Application 
of National Council for Civil Liberties (Liberty) v Secretary of State for the Home Department and Secretary of 
State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs [2019] EWHC 2057 (Admin)  para 224, and Big Brother Watch & 
Ors v United Kingdom 58170/13 (13 September 2018) para 306. 
28 [2019] UKSC 3; [2019] 2 WLR 509 para 41. See also Liberty’s case supra note 27 paras 83-86.   
29 Supra note 28 para 31. 
30 Roberts op cit note 23 at 548.  
31 Anderson op cit note 1 at 214.  
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capability requirements of the information age. However, technology in the information age 
has now allowed law enforcement and security and intelligence agencies to have access to more 
sophisticated and new capabilities than appear justifiable in the existing legal framework of 
RICA 2002 and as demonstrated in the thesis, it carries with it safeguards that have minimal 
impact.32 Where the interference with the right to privacy by the state ‘is systematic rather than 
suspicion-based “[t]he sheer scale of the interference with privacy rights calls for a competing 
public policy justification of analogical magnitude”, including – as a minimum – “a meaningful 
public account of the tangible benefits that accrue from its use.”’33 
 
III SUMMARY OF PROPOSALS 
Shape of the new law in South Africa34 
• A comprehensive new law should be drafted, providing clear limits and 
safeguards on the use of any intrusive powers that are necessary for law 
enforcement and security and intelligence agencies. The safeguards contained 
within the new law must be capable of preventing abuse of power. 
• The new law clearly should provide for, inter alia: (i) types of powers allowed 
for obtaining data; (ii) the law enforcement and intelligence agencies permitted 
to obtain such data; (iii) authorisation and independent oversight mechanisms; 
(iv) handling criteria that apply to the use, retention, disclosure and deletion of 
such data, including parameters for sharing and safeguards in doing so. 
Investigative capabilities35 
• The existence of ‘bulk’ powers must be regulated subject to strict additional 
safeguards. 
• The definitions of ‘content’ and ‘communications data’ must be reviewed and 
updated. 
• The new law should close the loophole in s 205 of the Criminal Procedure Act  
51 of 1977 that provides different sets of rules for essentially the same 
 
32 Ibid.  
33 Ibid at 256, quoting B Emmerson QC (UN Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human 
rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism) Report to the General Assembly of 23 September 
2014 para 13. 
34 Chapters 2, 3 and 4.  
35 Chapter 2 and 3.  
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investigative measures, which in practise is less strictly regulated under 
different standards of conduct to RICA 2002. 
Warrants for interception36 
• All warrants for interception should be judicially authorised.  
• Where a warrant, targeted or bulk, is regarded as necessary at least in the 
interests of national security or for the purpose of preventing or detecting 
serious crime or in the interests of the economic well-being of the Republic 
insofar as those interests are also relevant to national security, it should  involve 
the approval functions of a designated Minister, who is accountable to 
Parliament (and also in principle to the relevant courts in the fulfilment of the 
statutory duties imposed by the new law), by applying the principles of 
necessity and proportionality, and subject to judicial approval/review. In the 
process of ministerial/judicial approval, it must be satisfactorily established  that 
the conduct of the investigative power authorised by the warrant is necessary to 
what is sought to be achieved. 
• There should be a requirement that a bulk warrant application must contain in a 
sufficient level of detail, the description of the communications to be 
intercepted, and relevant to the operational purposes specified in the warrant. 
The requirement of operational purposes for bulk interception, similar to law in 
the United Kingdom, must be from a list maintained by a designated Minister 
and reviewed at quarterly intervals, including being presented to the 
parliamentary Joint Standing Committee on Intelligence after each review, and 
also to the President who must review the list of operational purposes at least 
once a year. 
Independent oversight authority37 
• The new law should create an independent oversight authority, to be supported 
by a team of experienced inspectors/technology experts. This oversight 
authority should include a body of judicial officers, whom are persons who hold 
or have held high judicial office, and are responsible for the judicial 
authorisation of all warrants. 
 
36 Ibid.  
37 Ibid.  
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• The independent oversight authority must be satisfied that there are safeguards 
and protections in place relating to the manner in which data is retained, copied, 
disclosed and destroyed. 
• The independent oversight authority should also have the powers to notify the 
subject/target of interception surveillance after an investigation or operation has 
terminated, unless there is an objectively justifiable reason for maintaining 
secrecy. 
• Other important functions, including oversight by way of audit, inspection and 
investigations should be central in the independent oversight authority. 
Procedures for storing, accessing, examining, using and destroying the interception data38 
• Intercepted data must be protected by appropriate technical and procedural 
measures against accidental or unlawful destruction, accidental loss or 
alteration, or unauthorised or unlawful retention, processing, access or 
disclosure. This should also include measures for destroying the data if the 
retention of the data is no longer necessary, or ceases or is not otherwise 
authorised by law, and for the special handling of data in relation to legal 
privilege and journalists’ confidential sources. There should be constraints on 
search criteria for examination of intercepted data. 
Encryption39 
• The modern realities of the information age will require a rethinking of the 
doctrinal principles of the right against self-incrimination. 
• Although the provisions of RICA 2002 in relation to compelled decryption are 
not necessarily unconstitutional, the solution perhaps to the issue of compelled 
decryption and the impact of new technologies is to be found in new legislation 
that meets the requirements of the limitations clause of the Constitution which 
allows for the justifiable limitation of rights, which effectively means that the 
South African courts can afford a more generous approach to the contents of a 
right.  
• There should be restrictions on the ability of the state to access our electronic 
information. These robust protections should come into play in the context of 
 
38 Ibid.  
39 Chapter 4.  
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search warrants that restrict searches of encrypted devices seized, with a key 
goal of ‘a principle against government fishing expeditions in which agents 
conduct vast, exploratory searches for unsuspected, new crimes against suspects 
or even non-suspects.’40 
Admissibility and evidential weight41 
• A proper construction of s 15 of the Electronic Communications and 
Transactions Act 25 of 2002 should not preclude a rule of admissibility for all 
electronic evidence, irrespective of hearsay representations contained therein.  
• A rethinking of s 15(4) business records presumption is proposed. I argued this 
should be linked to evidential foundations. For such a presumption to be 
recognised, it should be necessary for the proponent seeking to benefit from the 
presumption to adduce sufficient evidence, at least proof of basic facts, to 
warrant the introduction of such a presumption. 
• On matters of evidential weight, there is no ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach that will 
work; while a robust consideration of authentication is required in the court’s 
assessment of evidential weight of electronic evidence, it should not be subject 
to stringent tests that makes it difficult for authentic electronic evidence to be 
admitted into evidence. 
 
IV CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The rhetoric of the debate as extremes ‘lurching between these nightmarish poles’42 of one or 
the other may not be particularly helpful, but it reflects the fears that underlie the debates on 
both the benefits and harms of controversial investigative powers. If one thing is certain, it is 
that a new legislative framework in South African law must reflect a better balance between 
the extremes of the two sides. It is worth nothing that in the year 2020, the day of 4 February 
marked the twenty-fourth anniversary of the Constitution coming into operation. As we take 
stock of the key achievements in South Africa since 1996, the start of the new decade in 2020 
provides an apt opportunity for the legislature and the courts to ensure that the protections 
enshrined in the Constitution are treated as a priority. The setup of a new legal framework for 
 
40 L Sacharoff ‘Unlocking the Fifth Amendment: Passwords and Encrypted Devices’ (2018) 87 Fordham LR 
203 at 251. 
41 Chapter 5.  
42 Ibid. 
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investigatory powers, including reforms in relation to matters of evidence, should be one that 
responds effectively to the challenges of new technology, with minimal and justified 
interference of rights supported by robust oversight and accountability mechanisms. I hope the 
opportunity will be taken to ‘build together an intricate set of modes of accountability, which 





43 The Queen (on Application of National Council for Civil Liberties (Liberty) v Secretary of State for the Home 




Chapter Two: Interception of Communications 
I REGULATION OF INTERCEPTION OF COMMUNICATIONS AND PROVISION 
OF COMMUNICATION-RELATED INFORMATION ACT 70 OF 2002 
(a) The meaning of interception 
Section 1 of RICA 2002 sets out the following definitions and interpretation of relevant key 
terms: 
‘‘‘intercept” means the aural or other acquisition of the contents of any communication 
through the use of any means, including an interception device, so as to make some or all of 
the contents of a communication available to a person other than the sender or recipient or 
intended recipient of that communication, and includes the- 
(a) monitoring of any such communication by means of a monitoring device; 
(b) viewing, examination or inspection of the contents of any indirect communication; and 
(c) diversion of any indirect communication from its intended destination to any other 
destination, 
and “interception” has a corresponding meaning; 
“interception direction” means a direction issued under section 16(4) or 18(3)(a) and which 
authorises the interception, at any place in the Republic, of any communication in the course 
of its occurrence or transmission, and includes an oral interception direction issued under 
section 23(7); 
“interception device” means any electronic, mechanical or other instrument, device, 
equipment or apparatus which is used or can be used, whether by itself or in combination with 
any other instrument, device, equipment or apparatus, to intercept any communication.’ 
 
(b) Other key definitions in section 1 
The definition of ‘direct communication’ is stated as follows: 
 ‘“direct communication” means an- 
(a) oral communication, other than an indirect communication, between two or more persons 
which occurs in the immediate presence of all the person participating in that 
communication; or 
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(b) utterance by a person who is participating in an indirect communication, if the utterance is 
audible to another person who, at the time that the indirect communication occurs, is in the 
immediate presence of the person participating in the indirect communication;  
… 
“indirect communication” means the transfer of information, including a message or any part 
of a message, whether- 
(a) in the form of- 
(i) speech, music or other sounds; 
(ii) data; 
(iii) text; 
(iv) visual images, whether animated or not; 
(v) signals; or 
(vi) radio frequency spectrum; or 
(b) in any other form or in any combination of forms, 
that is transmitted in whole or in part by means of a postal service or a telecommunication 
system; 
… 
“monitor” means to listen to or record communications by means of a monitoring 
device, and ‘monitoring’ has a corresponding meaning’.  
“monitoring device” means any electrical, mechanical or other instrument, device, 
equipment or apparatus which is used or can be used, whether by itself or in 
combination with any other instrument, device, equipment or apparatus, to listen to or 
record any communication.’ 
  
(c) Unlawful interception  
Section 2 of RICA 2002 constitutes the key provision in this regard and prescribes the 
prohibition of interception of communications as follows: 
‘Subject to this Act, no person may intentionally intercept or attempt to intercept, or authorise 
or procure any other person to intercept or attempt to intercept, at any place in the Republic, 
any communication in the course of its occurrence or transmission.’ 
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 The prohibition in s 2 refers to the interception of communications ‘in the course of its 
occurrence or transmission’. This must be read in conjunction with section 1(2)(a) and (b) of 
the Act which states that: 
 ‘(2) For the purposes of this Act- 
(a) the interception of a communication takes places in the Republic if, and only 
if, the interception is effected by conduct within the Republic and the 
communication is either intercepted, in the case of- 
(i) a direct communication, in the course if its occurrence; or  
(ii) an indirect communication, in the course of its transmission by means 
of a postal service or telecommunication system, as the case may be; 
and 
(b) the time during which an indirect communication is being transmitted by 
means of a telecommunication system includes any time when the 
telecommunication system by means of which such indirect communication is 
being, or has been, transmitted is used for storing it in a manner than enables 
the intended recipient to collect it or otherwise have access to it.’ 
Section 12 of RICA 2002 further provides as follows in relation to the prohibition of 
provision of real-time or archived communication-related information: 
‘Subject to this Act, no telecommunication service provider or employee of a 
telecommunication service provider may intentionally provide or attempt to provide any real-
time or archived communication-related information to any person other than the customer of 
the telecommunication service provider concerned to whom such real-time or archived 
communication-related information relates.’ 
 Section 42 of RICA 2002 provides in relation to prohibition on disclosure of 
information: 
‘(1) No person may disclose any information which he or she obtained in the exercising of 
his or her powers or the performance of his or her duties in terms of this Act, except- 
(a) to any other person who of necessity supplies it in the performance of his or her 
functions in terms of this Act; 
(b) if he or she is a person who of necessity supplies it in the performance of his or her 
functions in terms of this Act; 
(c) information which is required in terms of any law or as evidence in any court of 
law; or 
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(d) to any competent authority which requires it for the institution, or an investigation 
with a view to the institution, of any criminal proceedings or civil proceedings as 
contemplated in Chapter 5 or 6 of the Prevention of Organised Crime Act. 
(2) No- 
(a) postal service provider, telecommunication service provider or decryption key 
holder may disclose any information which he or she obtained in the exercising of 
his or her powers or the performance of his or her duties in terms of this Act; or 
(b) employee of a postal service provider, telecommunication service provider or 
decryption key holder may disclose any information which he or she obtained in 
the course of his or her employment and which is connected with the exercising of 
any power or the performance of any duty in terms of this Act, whether that 
employee is involved in the exercising of that power or the performance of that 
duty or not, 
except for the purposes mentioned in subsection (1). 
(3) The information contemplated in subsections (1) and (2) includes information relating 
to the fact that- 
(a) a direction has been issued under this Act; 
(b) a communication is being or has been or will probably be intercepted; 
(c) real-time or archived communication-related information is being or has been or 
will probably be provided; 
(d) a decryption key is being or has been or will probably be disclosed or that 
decryption assistance is being or has been or will probably be provided; and 
(e) an interception device is being or has been or will probably be installed.’ 
Section 45 of RICA 2002 in relation to the prohibition on manufacture, possession and 
advertising of listed equipment provides ‘no person may manufacture, assemble, possess, sell, 
purchase or advertise any listed equipment’. Section 44(1)(a) defines listed equipment as ‘any 
electronic, electro-magnetic, acoustic, mechanical or other instrument, device or equipment, 
the design of which renders it primarily useful for purposes of the interception of 
communications.’ 
 
(d) Lawful interception 
S 25 (5) of RICA 2002, provides as follows: 
‘If a direction issued under section 23(3) or oral direction is cancelled in terms of subsection 
2(2)- 
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(a) the contents of any communication intercepted under that direction or oral 
direction will be inadmissible as evidence in criminal proceedings or civil 
proceedings as contemplated in Chapter 5 or 6 of the Prevention of Organised 
Crime Act, unless the court is of the opinion that the admission of such evidence 
would not render the trial unfair or otherwise be detrimental to the administration 
of justice;’ 
 
(e) Application to a designated judge for the issuing of an interception direction  
In terms of s 16(5): 
‘An interception direction may only be issued if the designated judge concerned is satisfied, on 
the facts alleged in the application concerned, that- 
(a) there are reasonable grounds to believe that- 
(i) a serious offence has been or is being or will probably be committed; 
(ii) the gathering of information concerning an actual threat to the public health or safety, 
national security or compelling national economic interests of the Republic is 
necessary; 
(iii) the gathering of information concerning a potential threat to the public health or safety 
or national security of the Republic is necessary; 
(iv) the making of a request for the provision, or the provision to the competent authorities 
of a country or territory outside the Republic, of any assistance in connection with, or 
in the form of, the interception of communications relating to organised crime or any 
offence relation to terrorism or the gathering of information relating to organised crime 
or terrorism, is in- 
(aa)  accordance with an international mutual assistance agreement; or 
(bb) the interests of the Republic’s international relations or obligations; or 
(v) the gathering of information concerning property which is or could probably be an 
instrumentality of a serious offence or is or could probably be there proceeds of 
unlawful activities is necessary; 
(b) there are reasonable grounds to believe that- 
(i) the interception of particular communications concerning the relevant ground referred 
to in paragraph (a) will be obtained by means of such an interception direction; and  
(ii) subject to subsection (8), the facilities from which, or the place at which, the 
communications are to be intercepted are being used, or are about to be used, in 
connection with the relevant ground referred to in paragraph (a) are commonly used by 
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the person or customer in respect of whom the application for the issuing of an 
interception direction is made; and  
(c) in respect of the grounds referred to in paragraph (a)(i), (iii), (iv) or (v), other investigative 
procedures have been applied and have failed to produce the required evidence or 
reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed if applied or are likely to be too dangerous to 
apply in order to obtain the required evidence and that the offence therefore cannot 
adequately be investigated, or the information therefore cannot adequately be obtained, in 
another appropriate manner: Provided that this paragraph does not apply to an application 
for the issuing of a direction in respect of the ground referred to in paragraph (a)(i) or (v) 
if the- 
(i) serious offence has been or is being or will probably be committed for the benefit of, 
or in association with, a person, group of persons of syndicate involved in organised 
crime; or 
(ii) property is or could probably be an instrumentality of a serious offence or is or could 
probably be the proceeds of unlawful activities.’ 
 
II THE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE ACT 51 OF 1977 
The relevant provisions of s 205 read as follows: 
‘(1) A judge of a High Court, a regional court magistrate or a magistrate may, subject to 
the provisions of subsection (4) and section 15 of the Regulation of Interception of 
Communications and Provision of Communication-related Information Act, 2002, upon 
the request of a Director of Public Prosecutions or a public prosecutor authorized thereto 
in writing by the Director of Public Prosecutions, require the attendance before him or her 
or any other judge, regional court magistrate or magistrate, for examination by the Director 
of Public Prosecutions or the public prosecutor authorized thereto in writing by the Director 
of Public Prosecutions, of any person who is likely to give material or relevant information 
as to any alleged offence, whether or not it is known by whom the offence was committed: 
Provided that if such person furnishes that information to the satisfaction of the Director of 
Public Prosecutions or public prosecutor concerned prior to the date on which he or she is 
required to appear before a judge, regional court magistrate or magistrate, he or she shall 
be under no further obligation to appear before a judge, regional court magistrate or 
magistrate.  
(2) The provisions of sections 162 to 165 inclusive, 179 to 181 inclusive, 187 to 189 
inclusive, 191 and 204 shall mutatis mutandis apply with reference to the proceedings under 
subsection (1).  
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(3) The examination of any person under subsection (1) may be conducted in private at any 
place designated by the judge, regional court magistrate or magistrate.  
(4) A person required in terms of subsection (1) to appear before a judge, a regional court 
magistrate or a magistrate for examination, and who refuses or fails to give the information 
contemplated in subsection (1), shall not be sentenced to imprisonment as contemplated in 
section 189 unless the judge, regional court magistrate or magistrate concerned, as the case 
may be, is also of the opinion that the furnishing of such information is necessary for the 
administration of justice or the maintenance of law and order.’   
The above section contains a cross-reference to s 15 of RICA 2002. The latter section 
reads as follows: 
‘(1) Subject to subsection (2), the availability of the procedures in respect of the provision 
of real-time or archived communication-related information provided for in section 17 and 
19 does not preclude obtaining such information in respect of any person in accordance 
with a procedure prescribed in any other Act. 
(2) Any real-time or archived communication-related information which is obtained in 
terms of such other Act may not be obtained on an ongoing basis.’ 
 
III THE NATIONAL PROSECUTING AUTHORITY ACT 32 OF 1998 
Section 28 of the National Prosecuting Authority Act 32 of 19981, as amended by National 
Prosecuting Authority Amendment Act 61 of 20002, under chapter 5 in relation to ‘powers, 
duties and functions relating to investigating directorates’ provides powers to obtain ‘any book, 
document or other object’ as follows: 
‘(6) For the purposes of an investigation -  
(a) the Investigating Director may summon any person who is believed to be able to furnish 
any information on the subject of the investigation or to have in his or her possession or 
under his or her control any book, document or other object relating to that subject, to 
appear before the Investigating Director at a time and place specified in the summons, to 
be questioned or to produce that book, document or other object; 
(b) the Investigating Director or a person designated by him or her may question that person, 
under oath or affirmation administered by the Investigating Director , and examine or retain 
for further examination or for safe custody such a book, document or other object: Provided 
that any person from whom a book or document has been taken under this section may, as 
 
1 Hereafter ‘NPAA 32 of 1998’. 
2 Hereafter ‘NPAAA 61 of 2000’. 
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long as it is in the possession of the Investigating Director , at his or her request be allowed, 
at his or her own expense and under the supervision of the Investigating Director , to make 
copies thereof or to take extracts therefrom at any reasonable time.’ 
 
Chapter Three: Obtaining evidence from third part telecommunication service 
providers: Regulating surveillance of communication-related information (real-time or 
archived) 
I REGULATION OF INTERCEPTION OF COMMUNICATIONS AND PROVISION 
OF COMMUNICATION-RELATED INFORMATION ACT 70 OF 2002 
 
(a) Definitions 
‘“archived communication-related information” means any communication-related 
information in the possession of a telecommunication service provider and which is being 
stored by that telecommunication service provider in terms of section 30(1)(b) for the period 
determined in a directive referred to in section 30(2)(a), beginning on the first day immediately 
following the expiration of a period of 90 days after the date of the transmission of the indirect 
communication to which that communication-related information relates; 
“archived communication-related direction” means a direction issued under section 18(3)(a) 
or 19(3) in terms of which a telecommunication service provider is directed to provide archived 
communication-related information in respect of a customer”;  
“real-time communication-related information” means communication-related information 
which is immediately available to a telecommunication service provider- 
(a) before, during or for a period of 90 days after, the transmission of an indirect 
communication; and 
(b) in a manner that allows the communication-related information to be associated 
with the indirect communication to which it relates. 
 “real-time communication-related direction” means a direction issued under section 17 (3) 
or 18 (3) in terms of which a telecommunication service provider is directed to provide real-
time communication-related information in respect of a customer, on an ongoing basis, as it 
becomes available, and includes an oral real-time communication-related direction issued under 
section 23 (7).’3  
 
3 Section 1.  
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(b) Part 2: Prohibition of provision of real-time or archived communication-related 
information and exceptions (ss 12-15) 
The prohibition and provision of real-time or archived communication-related information is 
set out in ss 12-15: 
‘12 Prohibition of provision of real-time or archived communication- related information  
Subject to this Act, no telecommunication service provider or employee of a telecommunication 
service provider may intentionally provide or attempt to provide any real-time or archived 
communication-related information to any person other than the customer of the 
telecommunication service provider concerned to whom such real-time or archived 
communication-related information relates.’  
In terms of s 13 of RICA 2002 in relation to the ‘provision of real-time or archived 
communication-related information under real-time communication-related direction or 
archived communication-related direction’ it is stated: 
‘Subject to this Act, any telecommunication service provider to whom a real-time 
communication-related direction or an archived communication-related direction is addressed, 
may provide any real-time or archived communication-related information to which that real-
time communication-related direction or archived communication-related direction relates.’  
Sections 14 and 15 completes Part 2, Chapter 2 of RICA 2002 on the ‘[p]rohibition of 
provision of real-time or archived communication-related information and exceptions’ as 
follows: 
‘14 Provision of real-time or archived communication-related information upon authorisation 
by customer  
Any telecommunication service provider may, upon the written authorisation given by his or 
her customer on each occasion, and subject to the conditions determined by the customer 
concerned, provide to any person specified by that customer, real-time or archived 
communication-related information which relates to the customer concerned.  
15 Availability of other procedures for obtaining real-time or archived communication-related 
information  
(1) Subject to subsection (2), the availability of the procedures in respect of the provision of 
real-time or archived communication-related information provided for in sections 17 and 19 
does not preclude obtaining such information in respect of any person in accordance with a 
procedure prescribed in any other Act.  
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(2) Any real-time or archived communication-related information which is obtained in terms 
of such other Act may not be obtained on an ongoing basis.’  
 
(c) Applications and issuing of a real-time or archived communication-related direction 
In terms of s 17(1) ‘an applicant may apply to a designated judge for the issuing of a real-time 
communication-related information direction.’4 Further in terms of s 17(4): 
(4) A real-time communication-related direction may only be issued if it appears to the 
designated judge concerned, on the facts alleged in the application concerned, that there are 
reasonable grounds to believe that-  
(a) a serious offence has been or is being or will probably be committed; 
(b) the gathering of information concerning an actual threat to the public health or safety, 
national security or compelling national economic interests of the Republic is necessary;  
(c) the gathering of information concerning a potential threat to the public health or safety or 
national security of the Republic is necessary;  
(d) the making of a request for the provision, or the provision to the competent authorities of a 
country or territory outside the Republic, of any assistance in connection with, or in the form 
of, the interception of communications relating to organised crime or any offence relating to 
terrorism or the gathering of information relating to organised crime or terrorism, is in-  
 (i) accordance with an international mutual assistance agreement; or  
(ii) the interests of the Republic's international relations or obligations; or  
(e) the gathering of information concerning property which is or could probably be an 
instrumentality of a serious offence or is or could probably be the proceeds of unlawful 
activities is necessary,  
and that the provision of real-time communication-related information is necessary for purposes 
of investigating such offence or gathering such information.  
For an archived communication-related direction, s 19(1) provides that ‘[i]f only 
archived communication-related information is required, an applicant may apply to a judge of 
a High Court, a regional court magistrate or a magistrate for the issuing of an archived 
 
4 Emphasis added. RICA 2002 provides for combined application and issuing of an interception direction, real-
time communication-related direction and archive-related direction or interception direction supplemented by a 
real-time communication-related direction in terms of s 18(3)(a). 
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communication-related direction.’5 Similar to the grounds for a real-time communication-
related information direction, an archived communication-related direction may only be issued 
if the ‘reasonable grounds’ threshold has been met.6  
 
(d) Interception capability and mandatory retention of communication-related information 
Continued compliance from telecommunication service providers requires technology capable 
of facilitating interception. Section 30 of RICA 2002 imposes duties on telecommunication 
service providers as follows: 
            ‘(1) Notwithstanding any other law, a telecommunication service provider must- 
(a) provide a telecommunication service which has the capability to be intercepted; and 
(b) store communication-related information.’ 
In terms of s 30(2), provides specifically: 
‘(2) The Cabinet member responsible for communications, in consultation with the Minister 
and the other relevant Ministers and after consultation with the Authority and the 
telecommunication service provider or category of telecommunication service providers 
concerned, must, on the date of the issuing of a telecommunication service licence under the 
Electronic Communications Act, to such a telecommunication service provider or category of 
telecommunication service providers-  
(a) issue a directive in respect of that telecommunication service provider or category of 
telecommunication service providers, determining the-  
… 
(iii) type of communication-related information which must be stored in terms of subsection 
(1) (b) and the period for which such information must be stored, which period may, subject to 
subsection (8), not be less than three years and not more than five years from the date of the 
transmission of the indirect communication to which that communication-related information 
relates;’  
Interception centres, including the establishment of Office for Interception Centres7, is also 
provided for in RICA 2002 for ‘the interception of communications.’8 
 
5 Emphasis added.  
6 Section 19(4).  
7 Hereafter ‘OIC’.   
8 Sections 32-38. 
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Chapter Four: Obtaining evidence from a suspect/target of an investigation: Compelled 
decryption and the constitutional rights against self-incrimination  
I REGULATION OF INTERCEPTION OF COMMUNICATIONS AND PROVISION 
OF COMMUNICATION-RELATED INFORMATION ACT 70 OF 2002 
(a) Applications and issuing of a decryption direction and entry warrant 
Section 21 of RICA 2002 in relation to the application and issuing of decryption direction 
provides as follows: 
‘(1) An applicant who- 
(a) makes an application referred to in section 16(1) may in his or her application also 
apply for the issuing of a decryption direction; or 
(b) made an application referred to in section 16(1) or, if he or she is not available, any 
other applicant who would have been entitled to make that application, may, at any 
stage after the issuing of the interception direction in respect of which such an 
application was made, but before the expiry of the period or extended period for 
which it has been issued, apply to a designated judge for the issuing of a decryption 
direction. 
(2) Subject to section 23(1), an application referred to in subsection (1) must be in writing 
and must- 
(a) indicate the identity of the- 
(i) applicant; 
(ii) customer, if known, in respect of whom the decryption of encrypted 
information is required; and 
(iii) decryption key holder to whom the decryption direction must be 
addressed; 
(b) describe the encrypted information which is required to be decrypted; 
(c) specify the- 
(i) decryption key, if known, which must be disclosed; or 
(ii) decryption assistance which must be provided, and the form and manner 
in which it must be provided; 
(d) indicate the period for which the decryption direction is required to be issued; 
(e) indicate whether any previous application has been made for the issuing of a 
decryption direction in respect of the same customer or encrypted information 
specified in the application and, if such previous application exists, must indicate 
the current status of that application; 
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(f) if the application is made in terms of subsection (1)(b), also contain- 
(i) proof that an interception direction has been issued; and 
(ii) an affidavit setting forth the results obtained from the interception 
direction concerned from the date of its issuance up to the date on which 
that application is made, or a reasonable explanation of the failure to obtain 
such results; and 
(g) comply with any supplementary directives relating to applications for decryption 
directions issued under section 58. 
(3) A designated judge may, upon an application made to him or her in terms of subsection 
(1), issue a decryption direction. 
(4) A decryption direction may only be issued- 
(a) if the designated judge concerned is satisfied, on the facts alleged in the application 
concerned, that there are reasonable grounds to believe that- 
(i) any indirect communication to which the interception direction concerned 
applies, or any part of such an indirect communication, consists of 
encrypted information; 
(ii) the decryption key holder specified in the application is in possession of 
the encrypted information and the decryption key thereto; 
(iii) the purpose for which the interception direction concerned was issued 
would be defeated, in whole or in part, if the decryption direction was not 
issued; and 
(iv) it is not reasonably practicable for the authorised person who executes the 
interception direction concerned or assists with the execution thereof, to 
obtain possession of the encrypted information in an intelligible form 
without the issuing of a decryption direction; and 
(b) after the designated judge concerned has considered- 
(i) the extent and nature of any other encrypted information, in addition to the 
encrypted information in respect of which the decryption direction is to be 
issued, to which the decryption key concerned is also a decryption key; 
and 
(ii) any adverse effect that the issuing of the decryption direction might have 
on the business carried on by the decryption key holder to whom the 
decryption direction is addressed.” 
(5) A decryption direction- 
(a) must be in writing; 
(b) must contain the information referred to in subsection 2(a)(ii) and (iii), (b) and (c); 
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(c) must state the period within which the decryption key must be disclosed or the 
decryption assistance must be provided, whichever is applicable; 
(d) may specify conditions or restrictions relating to decryption authorised therein; and 
(e) may be issued for a period not exceeding three months at a time, and the period for 
which it has been issued may be specified therein: Provided that a decryption 
direction expires when the period or extended period for which the interception 
direction concerned has been issued, lapses. 
(6) Section 16(7) applies, with the necessary changes, in respect of the issuing of a 
decryption direction.’ 
Section 22 of RICA 2002 in relation to the application and issuing of an entry warrant 
provides: 
‘(1) An applicant, who- 
(a) makes an application referred to in section 16(1) may in his or her application also 
apply for the issuing of an entry warrant, or 
(b) made an application referred to in section 16(1) or, if he or she is not available, any 
other applicant who would have been entitled to make that application, may, at any 
stage after the issuing of the interception direction in respect of which such an 
application was made, but before the expiry of the period or extended period for 
which it has been issued, apply to a designated judge for the issuing of an entry 
warrant. 
(2) Subject to section 23(1), an application referred to in subsection (1) must be in writing 
and must- 
(a) indicate the- 
(i) identity of the applicant; 
(ii) premises in respect of which the entry warrant is required to be issued; and 
(iii) specific purpose, referred to in the definition of ‘entry warrant’, for which 
the application is made; 
(b) if the application is made in terms of subsection (1)(b), also contain- 
(i) proof that an interception direction has been issued; and 
(ii) an affidavit setting forth the results obtained from the interception 
direction concerned from the dates of its issuance up to the date on which 
that application is made, or a reasonable explanation of the failure to obtain 
such results; 
(iii) comply with any supplementary directives relating to applications for 
entry warrants issued under section 58. 
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(3) A designated judge may, upon an application made to him or her in terms of subsection 
(1), issue an entry warrant. 
(4) An entry warrant may only be issued if the designated judge concerned is satisfied, on 
the fact alleged in the application concerned, that- 
(a) the entry of the premises concerned is necessary for a purpose referred to in the 
definition of ‘entry warrant’; or 
(b) there are reasonable grounds to believe that it would be impracticable to intercept 
a communication under the interception direction concerned otherwise than by the 
use of an interception device installed on the premises. 
(5) An entry warrant- 
(a) must be in writing;  
(b) must contain the information referred to in subsection (2)(a)(ii) and (iii); and 
(c) may contain conditions or restrictions relating to the entry upon the premises 
concerned as the designated judge deems necessary. 
(6) An entry warrant expires when- 
(a) the period of extended period for which the interception direction concerned has 
been issued, lapses; or 
(b) it is cancelled in terms of section 23(11) or 25(1) or (2) by the designated judge 
who issued it or, if he or she is not available, by any other designated judge, 
whichever occurs first. 
(7) Section 16(7) applies, with the necessary changes, in respect of the issuing of an entry 
warrant.  
(8) If an entry warrant has expired as contemplated in subsection (6)(a), the applicant who 
made the application in respect of the entry warrant concerned or, if he or she is not 
available, any other applicant who would have been entitled to make that application, 
must, as soon as practicable after the date of expiry of the entry warrant concerned, and 
without applying to a judge for the issuing of a further entry warrant, remove, or cause 
to be removed, any interception device which has been installed thereunder and which, 
at the date of expiry of that entry warrant, has not yet been removed from the premises 
concerned.’ 
  
(b) Assistance by the decryption holder 
In terms of assistance by the decryption holder, s 29 of RICA 2002 provides: 
‘(1) If a decryption direction or a copy thereof is handed to the decryption key holder to 
whom the decryption direction is addressed by the authorised person who executes that 
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decryption direction or assists with the execution thereof, the decryption key holder 
concerned must within the period stated in the decryption direction- 
(a) disclose the decryption key; or 
(b) provide the decryption assistance, 
specified in the decryption direction concerned, to the authorised person concerned. 
(2) In complying with a decryption direction, a decryption key holder- 
(a) must only disclose such decryption key or provide such decryption assistance 
which is necessary to obtain access to the encrypted information specified in that 
decryption direction or to put that encrypted information in an intelligible form; 
(b) may only disclose the decryption key or provide the decryption assistance to the 
authorised person who executes that decryption direction or assists with the 
execution thereof; and 
(c) may not disclose any other information, which is not specified in that decryption 
direction, relating to the customer in respect of whose encrypted information the 
decryption key has been disclosed or the decryption assistance has been provided. 
(3) A decryption key holder to whom a decryption direction is addressed and who is in 
possession of both the encrypted information and the decryption key thereto- 
(a) may use any decryption key in his or her possession to provide decryption 
assistance; and  
(b) must, in providing such decryption assistance, make a disclosure of the encrypted 
information in an intelligible form. 
(4) A decryption key holder who, in terms of a decryption direction, is required to provide 
decryption assistance in respect of any encrypted information, will be regarded as 
having complied with that requirement if he or she- 
(a) instead of providing such decryption assistance, discloses any decryption key to 
the encrypted information that is in his or her possession; and 
(b) makes such a disclosure, in accordance with the decryption direction concerned, to 
the authorised person to whom, and by the time by which, he or she was required 
to provide the decryption assistance. 
(5) If a decryption key holder to whom a decryption direction is addressed, is- 
(a) not in possession of the encrypted information; or 
(b) incapable, without the use of a decryption key that is not in his or her possession, 
to comply fully with that decryption direction, 
the decryption key holder concerned must endeavour to comply, to the best of his or her ability, 
with that decryption direction. 
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(6) If a decryption key holder to whom a decryption direction is addressed, is in possession 
of different decryption keys, or combinations of decryption keys, to the encrypted 
information- 
(a) it will not be necessary, for purposes of complying with the decryption direction 
concerned, for the decryption key holder to disclose any decryption keys in 
addition to those the disclosure of which, alone, is sufficient to enable the 
authorised person to whom they are disclosed to obtain access to the encrypted 
information and to put it into an intelligible form; or 
(b) the decryption key holder may select which of the decryption keys, or combination 
of decryption keys, to disclose for purposes of complying with the decryption 
direction concerned. 
(7) If a decryption direction is addressed to a decryption key holder who- 
(a) has been in possession of the decryption key to the encrypted information, but is 
no longer in possession thereof; 
(b) if he or she has continued to have the decryption key in his or her possession, he 
or she would have been required by virtue of the decryption direction to disclose 
it; and 
(c) is in possession of any information that would facilitate the obtaining or discovery 
of the decryption key or the provision of decryption assistance, 
he or she must disclose all such information as is in his or her possession to the authorised 
person who executes the decryption direction or assists with the execution thereof. 
(8) An authorised person to whom a decryption key has been disclosed under this section- 
(a) may use the decryption key only in respect of the encrypted information, an in the 
manner and for the purposes, specified in the decryption direction concerned; and 
(b) must, on or before the expiry of the period or extended period for which the 
decryption direction concerned has been issued, with the written approval of the 
applicant who made the application for the issuing of a decryption direction, 
destroy all records of the disclosed decryption key, if in the opinion of the applicant 
concerned- 
(i) no criminal proceedings or civil proceedings as contemplated in Chapter 5 
or 6 of the Prevention of Organised Crime Act, will be instituted in 
connection with such records; or 
(ii) such records will not be required at any such criminal or civil proceedings 
for purposes of evidence or for purposes of an order of court.’ 
 
(c) Offences and penalties 
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In terms of offences and penalties stated in s 51(4) provides as follows: 
‘(a) Any decryption key holder or any employee of a decryption key holder who- 
(i) contravenes or fails to comply with section 29(1); 
(ii) contravenes or fails to comply with section 29(2), (3)(b), (5) or (7) or 42(2); or 
(iii) performs an act contemplated in subsection (1) (a)(iii), (v) or (vii), 
is guilty of an offence. 
(b) Any decryption key holder or employee of a decryption key holder who is convicted of an 
offence referred to in paragraph (a) is liable, in the case of- 
(i) a decryption holder who is a- 
(aa) natural person, to a fine not exceeding R2 000 000 or to imprisonment for a 
period not exceeding 10 years; or 
(bb) juristic person, to a fine not exceeding R5 000 000; or  
(ii) an employee, to a fine not exceeding R2 000 000 or to imprisonment for a period 
not exceeding 10 years.’ 
 
Chapter Five: Admissibility of electronic evidence 
I REGULATION OF INTERCEPTION OF COMMUNICATIONS AND PROVISION 
OF COMMUNICATION-RELATED INFORMATION ACT 70 OF 2002  
In terms of use of information in criminal proceedings, s 47 of RICA 2002 sets out the 
following: 
‘(1) Information regarding the commission of any criminal offence, obtained by means of 
any interception, or the provision of any real-time or archived communication-related 
information, under this Act, or any similar Act in another country, may be admissible as 
evidence in criminal proceedings or civil proceedings as contemplated in Chapter 5 or 6 of 
the Prevention of Organised Crime Act. 
(2) Any information obtained by the application of this Act, or any similar Act on another 
country, may only be used as evidence in any criminal proceedings or civil proceedings as 
contemplated in Chapter 5 or 6 of the Prevention of Organised Crime Act, with the written 
authority of the National Director, or any member of the prosecuting authority authorised 
thereto in writing by the National Director.’ 
 
II ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS AND TRANSACTIONS ACT 25 OF 2002 
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In terms of the legal requirements for data messages, Part 1 of the ECT Act 2002 sets out the 
following relevant sections: 
‘11. Legal recognition of data messages 
(1) Information is not without legal force and effect merely on the grounds that it is wholly 
or partly in the form of a data message. 
(2) Information is not without legal force and effect merely on the grounds that it is not 
contained in the data message purporting to give rise to such legal force and effect, but 
is merely referred to in such data message. 
(3) Information incorporated into an agreement and that is not in the public domain is 
regarded as having been incorporated into a data message if such information is- 
(a) referred to in a way in which a reasonable person would have noticed the reference 
thereto and incorporation thereof; and 
(b) accessible in a form in which it may be read, stored and retrieved by the other party, 
whether electronically or as a computer printout as long as such information is 
reasonably capable of being reduced to electronic form by the party incorporating it. 
 
Original 
14. (1) Where a law requires information to be presented or retained in its original form, 
that requirement is met by a data message if- 
(a) the integrity of the information from the time when it was first generated in its final 
form as a data message or otherwise has passed assessment in terms of subsection (2); 
and 
(b) that information is capable of being displayed or produced to the person to whom it is 
to be presented. 
(2) For the purposes of subsection 1(a), the integrity must be assessed- 
(a) by considering whether the information has remained complete and unaltered, except 
for the addition of any endorsement and any change which arises in the normal course 
of communication, storage and display; 
(b) in the light of the purpose for which the information was generated; and 
(c) having regard to all other relevant circumstances. 
 
Admissibility and evidential weight of data messages 
15 (1) In any legal proceedings, the rules of evidence must not be applied so as to deny the 
admissibility of a data message, in evidence- 
(a) on the mere grounds that it is constituted by a data message; or 
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(b) if it is the best evidence that the person adducing it could reasonably be expected to 
obtain, on the grounds that it is not in its original form. 
(2) Information in the form of a data message must be given due evidential weight. 
(3) In assessing the evidential weight of a data message, regard must be had to- 
(a) the reliability of the manner in which the data message was generated, stored or 
communicated; 
(b) the reliability of the manner in which the integrity of the data message was maintained; 
(c) the manner in which its originator was identified; and 
(d) any other relevant factor. 
(4) A data message made by a person in the ordinary course of business, or a copy or 
printout of or an extract from such data message certified to be correct by an officer in the 
service of such person, is on its mere production in any civil, criminal, administrative or 
disciplinary proceedings under any law, the rules of a self regulatory organisation or any 
other law or the common law, admissible in evidence against any person and rebuttable 
proof of facts contained in such record, copy, printout or extract.’ 
